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Evaluation of International Assistance Programming in Haiti
2016-17 to 2020-21

Evaluation Report

Prepared by the Evaluation Division (PRA)
¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ
June 2023

Acronyms and Abbreviations

BINUH

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

CARICOM

Caribbean Community and Common Market

CDB

Caribbean Development Bank

CERF

Central Emergency Response Fund

CIDA

Canadian International Development Agency

CSO

Civil society organization

DAC

Development Assistance Committee (OECD)

DPI

International Assistance Programming Process and Coordination Division

ECOSOC-AHAG

Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti

FIAP

Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy

FIPCA-PNH

Initial Training and Professional Development for the Haitian National Police's Managerial Staff

GAC

¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ

GBA Plus

Gender-based Analysis Plus

GE

Gender equality

IBRD

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IDB

Inter-American Development Bank

IFM

International Security and Political Affairs Branch

IOM

International Organisation for Migration

IMF

International Monetary Fund

KFM

Partnerships for Development Innovation Branch

MCFDF

Ministry on the Status and Rights of Women in Haiti

MENFP

Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training

MFM

Global Issues and Development Branch

MHD

International Humanitarian Assistance

MINUJUSTH

United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

MINUSTAH

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MNCH

Maternal, Newborn and Child Health

NDH

Haiti Division

NAPWPS

Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security

NGM

Americas Branch

NGO

Non-governmental organization

NPA

National Police Academy

NPO

Non- profit organization

OAS

Organization of American States

ODA

Official development assistance

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OIF

International Organisation of La Francophonie

PAHO

Pan American Health Organization

PAMREF

Revenue Generation Support Project in Haiti

PARGEP

Public Sector Management Support Project

PATH

Field Support Services in Haiti Project

PIRFH

Computerization of the Land Registry in Haiti

PNH

Haitian National Police

PRA

Evaluation Division

PRISMA II

Integrated Management of Maternal and Child Health in Artibonite

PSAT

Field Support Services’ Project

PSDH

Haiti's Strategic Development Plan

PSOP

Peace and Stabilization Operations Program

SGF

Financial Management Grants and Contributions

RBM

Results-based management

SYFAAH

Agriculture Finance and Insurance System in Haiti Project

UN

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA

United Nations Population Fund

UNICEF

United Nations Children's Fund

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

WFP

World Food Programme

WHO

World Health Organization

Executive Summary

¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ's Evaluation Division (PRA) conducted an evaluation of Canada's international assistance program in Haiti from 2016-17 to 2020-21 to assess the extent to which international assistance has been aligned with priorities and optimized for development objectives in a context of persistent fragility. The evaluation serves to support decision-making on the future direction for program improvement. Questions focused on relevance to country needs and to the FIAP priorities, efficiency in delivery, coherence across international assistance channels and among donors, and achievement of results.

The profile of Canadian international assistance showed a de facto alignment with the social and institutional priorities of Haiti’s Development Plan (Vision 2030), notably through significant funding to multilateral partners, in line with national priorities. However, challenged by the deteriorating political and security situation, the program was mostly reactive to Canadian departmental priorities and only developed a strategic plan at the end of the period. There was no comprehensive analysis to anchor cross-sectoral collaboration and systematically address multiple vulnerabilities, risks of conflict and disaster, and conditions that weaken governance structures. A strategic analysis of environmental issues in Canada’s development effort, given the country’s vulnerabilities, lacked as a framework for projects, and some important projects gave little consideration to these issues despite valuable initiatives that included elements of risk mitigation and prevention. The modalities for advancing gender equality (GE) could have considered better the links of humanitarian, security and development sectors in a cross-cutting manner (the triple nexus perspective). The program and project-based management approach, supporting relevant but short-lived initiatives, resulted in a uniform weakness in achieving or demonstrating results beyond outputs.

Since 2017, the program has invested heavily in advancing GE across all streams, in alignment with the FIAP. GAC has exercised significant leadership on the GE agenda in overall programming, including at sectoral tables and in multi-donor collaborations. This has amplified GAC's impact beyond Canadian projects but still had a moderate influence on GE agendas and modalities in multilateral partnerships. Results on GE are mixed, difficult to measure, and more practical (service provision, training, etc.) than transformative from a feminist perspective. However, GE is now a top priority on the global development agenda in Haiti and included in Haitian government policies in part because of these efforts.

Using a triple nexus approach in a country such as Haiti could maximize the coherence and impact of international assistance. Yet the various sectors had few incentives and mechanisms to work collaboratively and generally operated in silos, with no interlinked objectives. Tangible progress made through governance, sustainable agriculture, and health initiatives was tempered by short duration of projects (4,3 years on average) and lack end-of-project plans to consolidate gains in the context of growing instability and insecurity. The often ambitious objectives faced operational hurdles and monitoring deficiencies that have limited the achievement of results and cast doubt on sustainability. However, Canada’s program in the highly challenging context succeeded in attaining positive short-term results and outputs that could be leveraged through sustained support and a more focused, longer-term vision, including more systematic engagement with selected Haitian partners, as the situation permits.

Program Background

Haiti Country Context

Figure 1:

A country with limited economic resources, plagued by frequent natural disasters

Haiti, the poorest country in the Americas and one of the poorest in the world, has seen its fragile economy deteriorate in recent years, with a declining gross domestic product (GDP) since 2019 and a severely devalued currency (the Haitian gourde). Gross national income in 2021 was US$1,420 compared to a regional average of US$15,092. In 2021, an estimated 87% of the population was living in poverty. Remittances from the Haitian diaspora and the remuneration of international workers in Haiti represented 23.8% of GDP in 2020, illustrating the difficulty of generating resources through domestic economic activity.

Haiti is the 3rd country in the world most affected by extreme weather events between 2000 and 2019. Between 2016 and 2021, the country experienced 22 natural disasters or climatic events, the deadliest being Hurricane Matthew in October 2016 and the earthquake of August 14, 2021. Over 96% of the population is extremely vulnerable. The difficult economic situation coupled with these disasters have contributed to the steady decline since 2017 in the Human Development Index (HDI), where Haiti ranks 163rd out of 191 countries.

A deteriorating political and security situation

Politically, the last decade has seen postponements and cancellations of elections (postponement of senatorial elections from 2012 to 2014, cancellation of the 2015 elections, postponement of the 2019 general elections). The presidency of Jovenel Moïse, inaugurated in February 2017, was marked by the PetroCaribe scandal of misappropriation of oil revenues, subsequent protests paralyzing the country (Peyilock), the rise of control by armed gangs and the increase in criminal and political violence (La Saline massacre in 2018, 71 dead). Since the assassination of President Moïse on July 7, 2021, the multidimensional political, economic, humanitarian, and security crisis has continued to worsen: unlikely return to constitutional order, lack of elected governance at all levels of the state, deterioration of people’s security and living conditions, mass exodus abroad, resurgence of food insecurity and cholera, and growing control of strategic areas by criminal gangs.

A society disrupted by economic and gender inequality

A wealthy and highly influential urban Haitian elite represents 20% of the country's population but controlled over 64% of the total wealth in 2014. Haiti is the country with the highest gender inequalities in the Americas.^{Footnote 1} Although the principles of equality between men and women are enshrined in a policy and in the State's strategic plan, women are victims of exclusion from production and governance systems, suffer from violations of their rights and live in conditions of physical and economic vulnerability that permanently affect their lives. Maternal mortality rates increased from 2000 to 2017, and it is estimated that 26% of Haitian women experience domestic violence in their lifetime^{Footnote 2}. Women are more likely than men to be in insecure employment (81.3% vs. 65.6%) even though the gender gap in employment rates has narrowed over the past 20 years. While 35% of the Haitian population had internet access in 2020, only 7% of women and girls did, limiting their access to information and resources.^{Footnote 3}

Context

Key Events and Milestones in Haiti

Donor Relations

Figure 2:

Source: Net ODA disbursements to countries and regions, OECD.Stat, in millions US, from 2016 to 2021.

Bilateral Relations

Canada has long-standing ties with Haiti, founded on a solidarity established by Quebec clergy and intellectuals in the early 20th century, which evolved into a formal diplomatic arrangement through the exchange of ambassadors in 1954. Cultural, academic and institutional collaborations have built the foundation for ongoing development support to Haiti. Initially shaped by the strong common influence of the Church and Francophone heritage, organic links have been facilitated by geographic proximity, the establishment of a large Haitian diaspora in Canada, especially following the Duvalier dictatorship, and the growing number of Canadian development and humanitarian organizations (NGOs) working in Haiti since the 1970s to support development efforts. At Haiti's request, Canada chairs the Group of Friends of Haiti at the Organization of American States (OAS).

Within the Americas region, Canada has invested the largest proportion of its international assistance funds in Haiti, with $88.4M disbursed in 2020 to 2021. International assistance is delivered through development projects led by implementing partners (multilateral, governmental, non-profit, institutional and private sector). Direct budget support to Haiti is non-existent.

Trade has remained modest since a first economic agreement in 2003. Canadian direct investment in Haiti is limited to the agri-food and textile sectors for import into Canada. The growth of trade links is hampered by the unstable situation, corruption and poor infrastructure.

Multilateral Relations

Canada and Haiti are both members of the OAS, the United Nations (UN), the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), and the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF). Canada has positioned itself to support Haiti's needs within CARICOM, where Haiti is the only French-speaking country and the one with the largest population.

Since 1993, Canada has supported the various UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti, such as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), and since 2019, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). Canada also chairs the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti (ECOSOC-AHAG).

Canada actively participates in several donor coordination platforms in Haiti. It is a member of the CORE Group (including the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, the Special Representative of the OAS and 7 ambassadors), created in 2004. Canada chaired the tax revenue mobilization table and co-chaired the Gender Equality Working Group with UN Women to better coordinate the work of international partners invested on gender equality (GE) in Haiti.

In 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada collaborated with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) to provide access to vaccines and deliver 180,000 doses through the COVAX mechanism.

Programming Profile

Figure 3:

Disbursements (%) by FIAP action areas, from FY 2016-17 to 2020-21

Source: CFO-Stats (2022-02-18), GAC.

Figure 4:

Disbursements (%) by type of implementing partner, from 2016-2017 to 2020-2021

Source: CFO-Stats (2022-02-18), GAC.

Program Disbursements

During the evaluation period, Haiti was the largest recipient of Canadian international assistance in the Americas, ranging from 4th to 13th in volume of Canadian ODA (9th in cumulative average disbursements), with a total disbursement of $436M. Four branches were involved: the Americas Branch (NGM) (66% of total disbursements), Partnerships for Development Innovation Branch (KFM) (17%), Global Issues and Development Branch (MFM) (9%), and the International Security and Political Affairs Branch (IFM) (8%). From FY 2016-17 to 2020-21, Canadian international assistance primarily funded health ($111.8M), state and civil society strengthening ($110.8M), education ($58.9M), humanitarian assistance ($46.2M) and agriculture ($26.6M).

Figure 5:

Americas Branch (NGM)

With average annual disbursements of $58M, NGM was invested primarily in state and civil society strengthening ($76.1M), health ($68.7M), and education ($51.9M). The most significant programmatic commitments of the bilateral program over the evaluation period were the World Food Programme's (WFP) School Feeding and Local Purchases in Haiti project for $24.7M, the United Nations Population Fund's (UNFPA) Improving Integrated Health Services for Women, Teenage Girls and Children in Haiti project for $19.6M, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's (IBRD) contribution to trust funds for the Improving Girls' Access to Secondary Education in Haiti.

Partnerships for Development Innovation Branch (KFM)

KFM invested primarily in health (57% of its disbursements) and agriculture (16%). The 45 projects were supported in response to multi-country calls for proposals and delivered by Canadian organizations (NGOs). KFM’s main partners in terms of financial volume were the Université de Montréal ($12M), Doctors of the World Canada ($8.8M) and Plan International Canada ($7.2M).

Global Issues and Development Branch (MFM)

This Branch primarily invested in humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters and the resurgence of cholera, which accounted for 98% of disbursements by the sector. International assistance was deployed through support to the WFP ($18.9M), UNICEF, and Doctors of the World Canada ($5.1M each).

International Security and Political Affairs Branch (IFM)

93% of IFM disbursements were dedicated to state and civil society strengthening, primarily through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) projects (3 projects - $8.1M), International Organization for Migration (IOM) (1 project - $6.2M), and Mercy Corps (1 project - $5.8M).

Evaluation Scope and Methodology

Evaluation Scope and Objectives

Evaluation scope 

The evaluation covers Canadian international assistance programming in Haiti for the period 2016-17 to 2020-21, focusing on the latter years which were marked by significant budgetary fluctuations and structural changes. The COVID-19 pandemic at the end of the covered period, led to sudden necessary adjustments in management and programming modalities, which served to observe the program's adaptability following the evaluation. The last corporate evaluation of the Canadian program in Haiti (January 2015) covered the period from 2006 to 2013 and made 9 recommendations on programmatic direction and consolidation, sustainability, environmental sensitivity, support to state structures, and capacity to demonstrate results.

A sample of 42 projects implemented by 36 partners representative of the four program areas and diversity in partner typology served as the basis for the literature review. The evaluation did not cover humanitarian programming in depth, which has largely been implemented through multilateral agencies; nor the PSOP program in Haiti, which has been the subject of a recent in-depth case study.^{Footnote 4}

The evaluation covers official development assistance (ODA) disbursed mostly through four branches of ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ (GAC) over the period: the Americas Branch (NGM), Partnerships for Development Innovation Branch (KFM), Global Issues and Development Branch (MFM) and International Security and Political Affairs Branch (IFM).

Objectives

The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the extent to which Canada's international assistance to Haiti has been adapted to the country's priorities and has used optimal intervention strategies and modalities to advance its objectives, given the context of persistent fragility during the period. 

It serves a substantial formative evaluation, with findings and recommendations that could lead to better targeting of Canada's role in international cooperation in Haiti and to improved programming, management and coordination within and across GAC programming streams in the country.

Evaluation approach

The evaluation was conducted by the Evaluation Division (PRA), with the support of an external consultant to conduct two case studies. Initially scheduled for approval in 2020 as per the Five-Year Departmental Evaluation Plan from 2020-21 to 2024-25, the evaluation of Canada's international assistance program in Haiti was postponed for one year and then launched in February 2022. It was preceded by an evaluability analysis conducted from November 2021 to January 2022.

The evaluation focused on five of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for evaluating development assistance: relevance, efficiency, internal and external coherence, and aspects of the impact of Canada's international assistance program in Haiti. It examines programmatic results with a view to support the implementation of Canada's new Haiti program strategy (FY 2021-22 to 2027-28).

Evaluation Questions

Methodology

The evaluation used a mixed-methods approach and data collected from diverse sources were triangulated using five methods: 

Document Review:

Analysis of ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ internal documents:

• strategic, policy and operational planning documents;
• statistical data (CFO stats, partner portal, etc.);
• briefing notes and memos;
• evaluation report;
• annual reports;
• project documents.

Literature Review

Analysis of external documents:

• scholarly articles;
• research reports and technical notes; and
• other, such as media publications, websites and fact sheets.

Case studies:

1. Governance: analysis of Canada's interventions in governance in Haiti (at various state, municipal and CSO levels) with a view to assess the success factors, impact, and challenges encountered.
2. Meta-analysis of decentralized evaluations conducted during the period that covered a variety of sectoral initiatives, to highlight the cross-cutting findings and lessons learned informing programmatic results.

Focus Groups

Two focus groups were conducted with implementing partners selected on the basis of their initiatives in Haiti on governance and agriculture and rural development (N=11 partners in total).

Semi-structured Key Informant Interviews

Semi-structured individual interviews (N=57) with various internal ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ stakeholders and external stakeholders:

• NDH and NGM staff (N=10);
• ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ staff from other branches (IFM, KFM, MFM, DPD, SCM, BSD) (N=9);
• staff present and previously based at the mission (NCCP) (N=12);
• representatives of partner organizations (N=12);
• staff affiliated with the Government of Haiti (N=8);
• Canadian programming consultants and experts in Haiti (N=6).

Evaluation Limitations and Mitigation Measures

Findings: Relevance

Responding to Haiti's needs and priorities

Figure 6:

Net ODA (grant) disbursements by sector of intervention in Haiti, in millions US dollars, from 2016 to 2020

Source: Aid Atlas, Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), 2019.

The broad range of priorities in Haiti's Strategic Development Plan (PSDH) has allowed for a default alignment of Canadian international assistance.

In 2012, the Haitian government adopted the PSDH, which sets out a long-term vision for the development of the country, in the context of recovery from the 2010 earthquake, in four major areas (territorial, economic, social and institutional) and their 32 programs. The plan aims to achieve a more just and egalitarian society, where the needs of the population are met through economic development, the restructuring of state institutions and the leadership of a strong and responsible state. From 2016 to 2021, Canadian international assistance planning in Haiti has not been subject to a deliberate and systematic exercise of alignment with the PSDH. In a ministerial statement in 2018, the principles that would guide Canada's engagement in Haiti were set out: "Canada is accompanying Haiti on its path to economic emergence. Under Haitian leadership and with the increased participation of women, Canada is helping to strengthen governance and the rule of law and improve the quality of life of the poorest in ways that increase the confidence of the people, partners and investors." The profile of Canadian international assistance has demonstrated a de facto alignment with mostly social and institutional priorities due to the broad range of priorities of the PSDH rather than through strategic consultation with the Haitian state. The high level of Canadian funding to multilateral agencies and multi-donor initiatives has reinforced alignment in that these initiatives fit within the priorities identified with the Haitian state.

Canadian international assistance has been guided by departmental commitments and by Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) rather than by a country programming strategy.

A country strategy for the Haiti program was only developed at the end of the period, in 2021. During the five years covered by the evaluation, Canadian programming did not have an articulated long-term programmatic framework^{Footnote 5} and rather focused on responding to departmental commitments (Maternal and Child Health program from 2016 to 2021; "Her Voice Her Choice" from 2017 to 2020; "Women's Voice and Leadership" from 2017 to 2021). Programming remained largely in line with the historical continuity of Canadian international assistance, but with an even stronger focus on the health of women and children in particular. Within the FIAP's action areas, investments in the area of human dignity were characterized by a significant component of direct service delivery in health and education. The relevance of these investments was apparent, as only 4.7% of the Government of Haiti's budget was allocated to health between 2016 and 2020,^{Footnote 6} with Haiti listed last out of 34 countries for health investments in 2017.^{Footnote 7}Increased investment in health initiatives resulted in a shift in funding, with decreasing funds allocated to environmental protection and climate change adaptation programming by 33% (compared to the 2011 to 2015 period). This shift signaled the dilemma of investing in long-term systemic change objectives in favor of shorter-term projects targeting vital service programming.  This is a particularly persistent challenge in fragile states, where these difficult choices have to be made. The inclusive governance sector saw a modest increase of 4% over the previous period. The chaotic governance context and the instability during the period were reflected in the programmatic choices, with a tendency toward meeting basic needs.

Consideration of the causes of vulnerability

The results-based program framework allowed for flexibility in project implementation, but actions were decided in response to events rather than as part of a risk management strategy.

A thorough analysis of vulnerability issues and the causes of gender inequality was not done at the program level in support of the objectives of Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (NAPWPS).  Analysis could have better targeted the integration and planning of gender equality (GE) work across all of GAC's spheres of action, including sectoral analyses, as the basis for a programmatic strategy on GE.

While GAC has indeed shown flexibility when conditions and events posed significant challenges to project implementation, the program as a whole has shown little evidence of a strategic approach to risk management and mitigation. This was evident in the case of environmental risks associated with the natural disasters that the country suffered recurrently over the past decades. While the environmental impact criterion was included in the project proposal modalities, the considerations were limited to the plausible impact and mitigation of the initiative itself: the Canadian program did not develop a strategic analysis on broader environmental issues impacting development efforts in Haiti, which could have identified trends, means and opportunities for Canada to address these challenges in a programmatic approach.

The absence of a strategic planning exercise at the country program level until late in the period and the low level of introspection of the lessons learned by GAC from events and projects were some of the factors inhibiting the consideration of the causes and risks of vulnerabilities from a broader perspective than on the basis of singular projects.

Nevertheless, at the activity level, several partner initiatives were designed with a strong climate change resilience objective. These projects included risk mitigation and prevention components (agricultural sector and adapted transformative technologies; agricultural insurance; production methods and inputs with high resistance to natural disasters, etc.), but the level of risk of natural disasters and their impacts would have justified both a programmatic vision and a longer-term commitment on the part of the Government of Canada to better ensure the preservation and longevity of development gains.

Findings: Efficiency

Partner Selection: Mechanisms and adaptation

Figure 7:

Top partners of Canadian international assistance to Haiti, in millions of dollars, from FY 2016-17 to 2020-21

Source: CFO-Stats (2022-02-18), GAC.

The efficiency of partner selection was adapted to the context.

Canada delivered the program through 38 Canadian and 29 international non-profit organizations (NPOs), including 17 multilateral executing agencies. The latter received 50% of total disbursements and 59% of NGM disbursements. The 38 Canadian NPOs received 33% of the funding, including 29% of bilateral funds and 99% of KFM funds. The Canadian NPOs, the majority of which were long-established in Haiti, had a history of programming with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and GAC. Project report reviews and decentralized evaluations showed that these partners brought a solid knowledge of the country's issues and of their geographic areas of intervention, as well as an extensive network of local contacts through their direct work with Haitian communities and civil society organizations. According to several respondents, this enabled activities to be started up and resumed following interruptions efficiently, despite delays in approvals (at the level of GAC and/or the supervising state structures). Multilateral agencies, for their part, had a broader coverage both geographically and thematically, and a strong capacity for resilience in the context of multiple vulnerabilities, but less solid roots at community level, particularly for post-project ownership and continuity.

The department-initiated mechanism for project selection by the Haiti Division (NDH) has been largely adapted to the partnership with multilateral agencies, but the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) agenda was therein diffused.

The high number of projects carried out by multilateral agencies (comparable to disbursements in highly vulnerable countries) explains the predominance of the department-initiated selection mechanism (52% of projects and 13 department-initiated initiatives). From 2014 to 2021, there were 3 calls for proposals by NDH that generated few projects:  Women as agents of change in the Americas in 2019 (3 proposals, no approvals), Improving Citizen Participation in Haiti’s Health Sector in 2018 (14 proposals, 2 approvals), and Strengthening Agri-food Value Chains and Adaptation to Climate Change in 2017 (24 proposals, 4 approvals). In this context, the department-initiated mechanism targeted more effectively and efficiently recognized development priorities in Haiti, but limited the level of prioritization and intensity of work on GE as multilateral partners framed their commitments around broad national priorities. While GAC benefited from multilateral project administration (rapid project start-up and efficiency in management), these partners and projects were not designed to provide GAC-specific results reporting aligned to the FIAP, making it difficult to measure the extent of those projects’ contribution to priorities of the Government of Canada.

Calls for proposals made by the Partnerships for Development Innovation Branch (KFM) generated projects that met departmental priorities but were sometimes slow in moving to implementation. 

Eight calls for proposals were issued between 2014 and 2021 by KFM for multi-country programming, stemming from thematic ministerial commitments, especially in health. Twelve of the 18 projects selected from these calls started during the period: while the calls for proposals were effective in selecting the partners and projects best aligned with the themes, the processes were unpredictable in their duration and associated administrative complexity.

Partner Selection: Focus of the FIAP

Figure 8:

Level of substantive GE integration (by number of projects), from FY 2016-2017 to 2020-2021

Source: CFO-Stats (2022-02-18), GAC.

Figure 9:

NDH GE integration (FY 2016-17 – 2020-21)

Source: CFO-Stats (2022-02-18), GAC.

Figure 10:

Total GE integration (FY 2016-17 – 2020-21)

Source: CFO-Stats (2022-02-18), GAC.

Delays in closing the selection and contracting processes adversely affected project plans, management, and partnerships.

Rigorous selection processes ensured the selection of projects and implementing partners with good technical and fiduciary capabilities. However, the time lag between proposal submission and project start-up (1-4 years for 5 calls for proposals) created challenges for many partners in terms of planning, human resource retention, budgeting, and linkages with local communities and partners that hindered timely responsiveness to needs. The same is true for the extension of projects: long delays before confirmation affected the maintenance of management structures, ongoing links with beneficiaries and the stability or even feasibility of the project (e.g. PCM, Vivre ensemble, PRISMA). Decision-making delays hampered opportunities for additional funding or expansion (e.g. PCM, suite de PIRFH, PRISMA).

The adoption of the FIAP and its implementation in the Haitian context and program raised several types of challenges despite some observable gains.

The lack of a long-term perspective on GE work in Haiti, which would have focused on an analysis of GE issues specific to the context of prolonged crises, limited the strategic perspective in support of the FIAP. The Policy and its aims were inserted into the program in a reactive manner, resulting in little coherence and limited vision on priority and strategic issues that could help maximize results. The approach to GE was considered on the basis of singular projects.

The selection of projects from 2017 onwards was indeed made with specific attention to the integration of GE. Thus, the proportion of projects substantially integrating the GE increased from 29.5% before the adoption of the FIAP to 55.9% for projects after June 2017. Several partners aligned their projects more strongly with strengthening GE – which was an opportunity for some, and a more demanding adaptation for others. There was a very mixed reception of FIAP from several state partners as well as at community level where traditional roles and power dynamics manifested in resistance to prioritizing efforts toward GE. It should be noted that the rating system and coding by priority action area did not provide an accurate profile of GE work. Policy implementation was slow to translate into projects on the ground, interpreting a rating on existing projects was complicated, and projects with a significant GE dimension were categorized in different action areas.

Partners faced both existential and operational challenges, citing, for example, the difficulty of planning transformative systemic projects (rated EG-3) that were rightly or wrongly perceived as prioritized by GAC, in a social and institutional context with unfavorable traditions. Respondents complained about the late availability of resources to support the implementation of the FIAP, the varying interpretations of expectations provided by GAC and the coding system. 

However, notable gains were identified. For instance, projects that did not specifically target gender mainstreaming still developed tools to measure their gender outcomes as a result of gender-based analysis (GBA Plus) (e.g. UNICEF; Equitas). The “positive masculinity” approach shared by 5 MNCH projects aimed at engaging men resulted in, among other things, increased support from men to women in their decision to use MNCH services, and increased recognition of women's rights in the project areas.

Structure and Human Resources

Figure 11:

Vacancy rate (%), quarterly change, from FY 2016-17 to 2020-21

Source: HR Data from Power BI, GAC, February 2023.

The constant challenges of crisis management in a context of limited human resources prevented strategic planning until the last year of the period covered.

The first recommendation of the Evaluation of Canada-Haiti Cooperation 2006-2013 was the development of a country framework that takes into account the Haitian government's priorities and update the sectoral strategies. The Strategy for Canada in Haiti was developed and adopted in January 2021. In the absence of a medium- and long-term strategic vision, the program and its staff had to deal with crisis after crisis in reactive mode, a situation that affected the attractiveness of potential staff to the program. The consequences of crisis management on human resources were evident in the loss of institutional memory at the staff and bureau levels. All of these conditions were therefore not optimal for strategic management based on built knowledge and planning.

Significant human resource challenges (recruitment, retention, and expertise) disrupted the management of the Haiti program (NDH) at HQ and at mission.

The Haiti Geographic Bureau had, almost consistently over the period, problems with recruitment and retention of staff. This affected management and programming capacity due to the volume of work to be distributed over a limited staff contingent, especially taking into account program needs and disruptions. Frequent changes in senior decision-making positions, according to a majority of respondents, affected the stability of the management approach and the ability to develop strategic programming with a clear vision supported by all program stakeholders.

The quarterly vacancy rate within NDH from June 2016 to March 2021 showed significant fluctuations (between 13% and 51% with an average of 30%) and was the highest in the Branch (NGM average of 20%). Due to changes in budget allocations, the number of positions also dropped from 40 in 2016 to 25 in March 2021. This resulted in a loss of stability, gaps in expertise and experience level, and a disruptive situation of managing in crisis mode, while the number of projects to be managed over these years remained stable.

At the mission level, the number of positions were fairly stable for both Canadian and local positions. However, even at the mission, there were vacancy percentages ranging from 10% (2016) to 43% (2021). Security challenges and the difficulty of attracting qualified rotational staff have increased since 2015. Important decision-making positions were not always filled with staff with the appropriate expertise for the context and needs. Stable local staff played an important role in monitoring mission activities both during periods when several Canadian positions remained vacant and during crisis situations when evacuations were required.

The demand on management was thus exacerbated by the cumulative effects of three disruptive factors: the level of unfilled positions, the frequent staff turnover limiting the contribution of experience to a complex program, and the level of instability in Haiti increasing crisis management pressures, both at HQ and at the mission.

Operation and Program Monitoring

Opportunities to strengthen linkages between Canadian initiatives and to network with donors were missed.

From the point of view of several respondents, the mission, while providing ad hoc support, did not actively play a catalytic role between Canadian project partners and between partners and other donors. This could have leveraged Canadian programming, increased funding and extended strategic projects. Projects that had built strong networks between various sectors, such as the PIRFH project with its network of Canadian partners (Union of Quebec Municipalities, chambers of commerce, City of Montréal, etc.) and its extensive networking with donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), USAID, and the UN in the field, could have been accentuated and expanded by a commitment from the mission in support of these potential leverage effects.

Several respondents also pointed out that the roles and responsibilities between HQ and mission were not always applied in a way that maximized benefits to the program and the various partners. Decisions made at HQ sometimes clashed with the reality on the ground, lacked systematic and timely context analysis, and did not reflect a proactive role by GAC in creating spaces for regular collaboration among partners.

Modalities for monitoring and evaluating programming were uneven and insufficient to adequately extract lessons for program improvement.

Program monitors assigned to monitor certain projects, and the field monitoring by experts attached to the Field Support Services’ Project (PSAT), generated useful reports for the program. However, other factors hampered monitoring capacity, including the insecure context limiting visits to the regions, vacancies affecting staff capacity, and the high level of solicitation for external support that PSAT received. In contrast to the former Project Support Unit, PSAT offered experts who were often called upon by other donors or mobilized to provide information to headquarters, and therefore had limited availability. PSOP assigned a project officer at headquarters and a political attaché at the mission as a focal point officer, but the local officer had neither the mandate nor the expertise for PSOP technical monitoring and inter-donor coordination on peace and security in Haiti. The PSAT did not have a formal role in supporting PSOP, which limited Canada's engagement and visibility in the field. 

In addition, the management summary reports (MSRs) prepared by project officers based on partner reports were poorly aligned with the department's key performance indicators, and were of little use in extracting meaningful lessons from experiences to improve programming. The limited availability of project officers to distill lessons learned and disseminate project learning meant that knowledge useful for future programmatic directions and decisions did not circulate as much as it could have and did not feed much into collective thinking on strategic directions.    

Ability to adapt programming

Figure 12:

Figure 13:

Selection and contracting processes did not facilitate the need for rapid adaptation to the Haitian context, particularly given the differing standards between the mechanisms favored by various branches.

The selection process for development projects was lengthy and its bureaucratic complexity posed significant challenges for many partners in this stream. This was not the case for humanitarian projects, according to the testimonies of partners who received funding from both sources. Both the humanitarian sector and PSOP have had faster and more efficient selection and contracting processes. The ability to easily interweave a development project following, for example, the end of a humanitarian response, was limited by these separate standards. In the case of extended waiting periods reported by a number of partners, plans were eventually adapted, although the elapsed time sometimes resulted in several iterations of proposals and back-and-forth negotiations with program management at GAC, limiting efficiency and creating unduly idle periods between initiatives that should have smoothly followed one another.

GAC programming was able to draw on the experience of local partners and staff at mission to ensure continuity and adaptation during disruptions.

Partners with experience in Haiti and extensive experience working at the local and regional level had contingency planning practices in response to situations of fragility. These partnerships, along with the stability of local staff at mission, were factors that facilitated resilience and adaptation to crisis situations.

The results-based program framework was a factor in facilitating adjustments to projects when necessary.

The results-based programming framework allowed for adjustments to activities and timelines in ongoing projects, which was useful during natural disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic, and in the context of increasing insecurity. Several partners spoke of the impact of frequent contextual changes in Haiti on their ability to carry out their activities as planned, noting that, in addition to their knowledge of the terrain, GAC's flexibility in adapting projects helped them operate through constraints and achieve some results.

Measures taken by GAC at the time of the pandemic, both to adjust project activities and monitoring (reporting, delegated decision making, reallocation of funds, support for telework, etc.), were effective and appreciated, demonstrating that the flexibility then applied can simplify program operationalization. On the other hand, physical adaptations that would have facilitated the teleworking of local partners could not be implemented due to lack of budget and essential logistical conditions, with the result that program elements had to be interrupted or cancelled.

Findings: Internal Coherence

Triple nexus

Despite an observable convergence of interventions between the development program and PSOP, the program channels paid little attention to collaboration and complementarity that could have supported their efficiency.

As mentioned in the March 2020 PSOP monitoring report,^{Footnote 10} 13 development program projects ($62M in disbursements) focused on themes common to PSOP (human rights, women's rights, justice, police, elections, transparency and local governance). There was also a convergence of partners or beneficiaries between the development program and PSOP: the projects Supporting and Reinforcing the Establishment of the Haitian National Border Police (PSOP), Assisting Vulnerable Children and Women in Haiti's Border Areas (NDH), and Relocation and Support Program for Displaced People in Haiti (NDH) all had IOM as an implementing partner, while the projects Improving the Integration of Women in the Haitian National Police (PSOP), and Initial Training and Professional Development for the Haitian National Police's Managerial Staff (NDH) both targeted the strengthening of the Haitian National Police (PNH). Despite these intersections, the development program appeared to be unfamiliar with PSOP activities and the Integrated Peace and Security Plan for Haiti (IPSP), to which NDH nevertheless contributed through consultations. The plan was seen singularly as the PSOP plan, despite the alignment of its objectives with the goals of GE programming.  

The humanitarian-development nexus was often an operational challenge in coordinating emergency response and the resumption of development initiatives, but the alignment of partners helped coordination and transition.

Coordination between the humanitarian and bilateral programs was achieved primarily through the funding of complementary initiatives implemented by the same partner. The WFP received 49.7% of the humanitarian funding from Canada that implemented the School Feeding and Local Purchases in Haiti project on behalf of the development program. During Hurricane Matthew, discussions between the humanitarian program and the development program made it possible to make food stocks available in school canteens to meet the urgent needs of disaster victims. The humanitarian program's grant then replenished the school feeding project's stocks. The two programs also provided complementary funding to UNICEF: the fight against cholera and the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) in the Artibonite and Centre Departments of Haiti. Doctors of the World Canada partnered with both a development project funded by KFM and a humanitarian response to Hurricane Matthew. However, despite the ability of some partners to carry out programming in multiple streams, continuity over time between the end of humanitarian interventions and the resumption of development projects was not assured. Some factors were longer approval times for bilateral projects than for humanitarian projects, for example, and the fact that the required interventions were not planned with a broader perspective than what each sector covered in its own modalities. This was also problematic following the recovery from Hurricane Matthew. Leveraging from one program to another was therefore not always maximized.

Findings: External Coherence

Canada’s role among donors

Figure 14:

Photo credit: CARICOM, May 2018

Donor coordination was more effective at the political level than at the operational level.

Canada played an active role in the group of major bilateral and multilateral donors in Haiti (the "CORE group") and worked continuously to build consensus among donors. In the context of the multi-dimensional crisis, donor coordination and consensus remained essential to streamline actions. Donor coordination at this level was aimed at collectively seeking solutions to restore a functioning democracy in Haiti. Canada has been increasingly active on the Group of Friends of Haiti at the OAS. Canada's voice at the diplomatic level became more important over the period.

At the operational level, a few mechanisms fostered some coordination between development interventions, notably thematic tables, but they were unevenly active and were used more for information sharing (Canada co-chaired the Gender Equality table and chaired the Tax Revenue table under the Public Finance group). There were examples of complementarity between Canadian and other donor interventions, such as the US funding of the Haitian National Police School and Canada's funding of the National Police Academy (NPA), both of which ensure a continuum of police training in Haiti. Joint funding also supported the strengthening of the border police, in collaboration with the IOM. Inter-donor coordination was also quite functional in humanitarian responses under the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs following natural disasters during the period. The broad interventions of co-funded multilateral partners were an asset for external coherence and were part of a negotiated strategy in the humanitarian and security context mainly.  

However, the lack of dedicated mission resources to enhance Canada's engagement on the ground in various policy forums, as well as the reluctance of individual donors to share information on their interventions, limited the potential for inter-donor collaboration, particularly in the development stream. There were distinctions in the geographic areas of donor intervention, but even that complementarity remained unclear and informal.

Canada continued to play a leadership role as an international assistance partner in Haiti, in regional institutions and at the United Nations.

Canada supported several initiatives for Haiti within CARICOM, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and advocated for stronger support for Haiti from these institutions. This translated into projects for access to basic education, including earthquake resistant infrastructure and access by Haiti to CCRIF SPC insurance payments (a CARICOM and IDB mechanism) through Canada's contribution to the multi-donor fund following Hurricane Matthew. Canada played an important role in the design and implementation of multi-donor funds, including the UN Common Security Fund and the Southern Reconstruction Fund, which allowed Canadian international assistance to have a broader impact than individual projects, thanks to the collective approach coordinated by the UN (OCHA and UNDP). Haiti relied on and recognized Canada's support at these regional tables.

Results: Gender Equality

Figure 15:

Photo credit: Lucie Goulet, Les Palmes, Haiti, 2016.

Canada distinguished itself as a leader on gender equality (GE) among donors.

GAC staff raised the level of consideration of GE at sectoral working tables and influenced its inclusion in multilateral or co-financed interventions. The FIAP was adopted in 2017 and, as a result of implementation deadlines, most of the projects approved under the FIAP were approved towards the end of the period between 2019 to 2021. It was therefore premature to conclude on results over such a short period. However, GE was already a cross-cutting theme of CIDA's Gender Equality Policy (2013) and a priority in the period prior to the FIAP. From 2016-17 to 2020-21, GAC worked to strengthen the GE policy framework at the national level by supporting, through the PARGEP and PATH projects, the design of MCFDF's Gender Equality Policy (2015) and its Action Plan, and by co-chairing with UN-Women the Gender Equality Partners Working Group (2017).

The integration of GE was subject to various interpretations and uneven consideration in projects, but more importantly, was not strategically planned at the program level.

Some partners developed a GE strategy and conducted Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus), used to refine initiatives. For example, the FIPCA-PNH project focused on reducing biases that limit women's access to policing; human rights education projects also began with a gender-based analysis. However, most projects addressed gender equality issues on the surface in Haiti. Few solid preliminary analyses using GBA Plus were done, with partners planning at the outset strengthening and awareness-raising activities or service delivery to meet the practical needs of women and girls. As illustrated in reports, indicators were largely based on counts of activities and participants. The predominant approach to GE focused on increasing the number of women beneficiaries was scarcely strategic in view of transforming gender-based power relations. This finding illustrates the complexity of GE work in a context where cultural, social, and political barriers to empowerment were considerable, and stresses the limitation of a project approach to foster systemic change. The finding on GE outcomes compares to that of the previous evaluation of the Haiti program (2006-2013), where the "lack of an effective performance measurement system" makes it impossible to identify outcomes beyond outputs for almost all projects.

In targeted programming for Women's Voices and Leadership in Haiti, the "Pou Fanm Pi Djanm" project supported 30 women's rights organizations with rapid funds for training on women's rights. The Reducing Violence Against Women Politicians in Haiti project was able to train 272 potential women candidates for political leadership. However, at this stage, there is also a lack of data demonstrating results beyond outputs.

Overall, monitoring of results after a project began was weak. Three observations about the integration of GE emerged from the meta-analysis of decentralized project evaluations: some projects developed strategies on GE but did not implement them (PAMREF) or allocate funds to them (Support to the Electoral Process in Haiti), others collected baseline data on GE but did not use them (Support to Local Governance and Territorial Development and Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene), while others achieved some GE outcomes without planning a strategy to do so (empowerment of women farmers through the SYFAAH project).

Results: Health – Education

Figure 16 :

Photo credit: Doctors of the World Canada.

Significant programming in maternal and child health reported positive output results but were structurally weak and of questionable sustainability.

Health programming in Haiti was dominated by five projects from KFM's call for proposals for the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health (PMNCH) for a total of $31.6M versus $24.7M invested by NGM. The interventions targeted at the Haitian government’s administrative department level carried out most of their activities and obtained positive outputs, but the results were difficult to measure due to the lack of baseline data and the weakness of maternal and child health indicators at the departmental level. According to the evaluation, positive results in strengthening the technical and material capacities of the supported health structures were observed to some extent, but the sustainability of these gains is questionable without continued support. The mixed performance was attributable to the uneven expertise of the partners in health governance and the moderate commitment of certain Directions of health departments. In addition, minimal engagement with authorities of the Ministry of Health (MSPP) at the central level further reduced potential of continuity and follow-up.

NDH managed significant health programming, but the potential for sustainability of interventions were equally limited.

GAC made a significant commitment with the Call to Action for Robust Canadian Cooperation for Haiti's Health System (2018), including its major partners working in health. This included two 5-year projects (SSIAF, Midwifery Support) among others. The PRISMA 2 project ($19.5M), was working with the Artibonite Departmental Health Directorate since 2017 to reduce the high maternal mortality rate and reported an increase in attendance at health facilities for deliveries, use of sexual and reproductive health services, and improved nutritional monitoring of children. The Directorate performed among the best in managing COVID-19, and integrated gender issues into its plans and reports.

NDH health programming targeted other health sub-sectors, including water, sanitation and hygiene. Results in this area were limited: the number of households and schools with safe water and sanitation facilities increased, but most ceased to be functional. There was no mechanism for ongoing maintenance of these water points, and the weak monitoring system did not allow for the raising of awareness and the mobilization necessary to organize for beneficiary takeover of the infrastructure.

Education initiatives effectively supported school feeding and facilitated girls' access to secondary education: reports showed positive results, but initiatives remained donor dependent.

There were 26 education projects totaling $58.9M (NDH: $51.9M; KFM: $4.9M). WFP's School Canteens and Local Procurement ($23.2M) and Support to School Canteens in Haiti ($4.5M) projects aimed to keep children in school and improve their nutrition, and to develop a National School Feeding Policy and Strategy with MENFP. Results remained largely dependent on continuity of funding. There was no possible assessment of results of the Improving Access to Secondary Education for Girls (IBRD) project, which was active at the end of the evaluation period.

Results: Governance

Figure 17:

Disbursements by governance sub-sectors, in millions of dollars, from FY 2016-2017 to 2020-2021

Source: CFO-Stats (2022-02-18), GAC.

Canadian investments in decentralized governance strengthened local management and governance structures and community participation.

The second phase of the Haiti-Canada Municipal Cooperation Program (2014-2020) strengthened the achievements of the first phase, notably the management bodies of Les Palmes region in the inter-municipal sharing of resources, the development of development plans and the implementation of local economic development projects. The project successfully supported citizen participation in the management of municipal affairs and tax duty, resulting in a 38% increase in voluntary payment of municipal taxes from 2017 to 2018. The projects in support of decentralized governance demonstrated the potential of grassroots (communal) power building in developing some level of local resilience in an environment where central government capacity was compromised.

Programming across several governance sectors produced appreciable results at some levels of the Haitian state apparatus, but results were mixed and at risk overall.

A UNDP program to which Canada contributed showed preliminary results in providing justice services, including mobilizing state institutions to provide legal international assistance to vulnerable populations, particularly women and children. A project by Lawyers Without Borders Canada (LWBC) also reported positive results in supporting the creation of a collective of lawyers specializing in human rights litigation and support for CSOs providing legal international assistance services.

In the area of economic governance, the Computerization of the Land Registry in Haiti (PIRFH) project was notable for its support to Haiti’s tax authority (Direction générale des Impôts, DGI) and exceeded its objectives in digitalizing the registry and incorporating gender-specific data on land ownership for the first time. The project ensured the operationalization of the registry in 3 important jurisdictions of the country. For the PAMREF project, while some output results were real (improvement of the management system, revision of the customs code, equipment, training, 17.4% increase in customs revenue during the project), results were mixed in terms of sustainability due to withdrawal of a targeted Haitian institution; the end of a contract before completion of the technical installations; and little progress or even a decline in tax pressure^{Footnote 11}.

Several of these structural projects were too short-lived to anchor results, and some had potential for amplification through possible collaborations with other donors, but opportunities were not seized on time by GAC. Despite the inadequate relationship between project duration and expected results, important and relevant results were produced by the PARGEP project, including the creation of the National School of Public Administration (ENAP) in Haiti and the institutional strengthening of certain central government functions. The PATH project, on the other hand, did not achieve its initial objectives of strengthening government structures.

The promising results of some governance projects were seriously questioned as to their sustainability given both the insecurity situation that has strangled the functioning of the country and the erosion of governance at all levels that has blocked the capacity for state accountability.

Results: Agriculture and Environment

Figure 18:

Canada's interventions to improve agriculture spanned several sectors and components with significant results reported.

GAC invested $26.6M in the agricultural sector in response to growing food security needs and the impact of recurring crises on agricultural production. Along with health, this area has long been a cornerstone of Canadian development assistance. Important projects, particularly in Grand-Anse region, varied in nature and type. They included agricultural productivity, support for resilient agriculture and adaptation to climate change, support for market expansion and local access to commodities, training and professional insertion. Mitigating the impacts of climate change and adapting to withstand natural disasters is vital for the country as a whole, where forest cover is rapidly degrading (estimated in 2021 to be between 4.5% to 20%), and where soil erosion threatens food production. According to reports and evaluations, the 23 projects during that period, most of which were implemented by NGOs, helped improve producers' incomes, adapt crops to the risks of disasters, diversify the food supply and increase the economic power of small producers. Training and support for entrepreneurship contributed to better consolidated skills, especially for women farmers. Partners reported that agreements with financial institutions facilitated access to credit and agricultural insurance. For example, the Increasing Food Security and Promoting Public Health project reduced the proportion of households with high food insecurity in its area of intervention from 7% to 4.2% and the proportion of children in acute malnutrition from 3.7% to 1%. The Adaptive and Innovative Solutions to Agri-Food Market Opportunities project produced 565.11 tons of corn from July 2020 to February 2021.

The integration of environmental considerations into overall programming were marginal and limited to the project level.

Projects with significant impact potential were implemented, for example, to develop cleaner energy tools for cookstoves, which have a significant impact on deforestation, and for waste recovery. Projects in the agricultural sector were well aligned with FIAP action areas and targets. However, integration of the environment into GAC's programming was limited to a group of projects, particularly in relation with the development of sustainable agricultural techniques and adaptations.

No structured approach for taking the environment into account on a programmatic scale could be identified. The scope and duration of projects limited the capacity to sustain improvements. Opportunities to consider climate change impact mitigation and disaster adaptation at a more strategic level were missed. Research consistently demonstrates the importance of taking a holistic approach to environmental and climate impact interventions. Considering the interdependence of various factors provides insights into the risks and opportunities that can otherwise be overlooked. Such an approach provides a solid foundation from which to make informed decisions and optimize projects. Several project evaluations pointed to a significant weakness in this area, even in areas of intervention where a better strategy on environmental issues would have been appropriate (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and Agriculture Finance and Insurance System in Haiti Project (SYFAAH)).

Results: Humanitarian assistance and post-disaster recovery

Figure 19:

Top donors of humanitarian assistance to Haiti, in millions US, from 2016 to 2021

Source: Aid disbursements (ODA) to countries and regions, OECD.Stat, from 2016 to 2021.

Canada provided a rapid and coherent humanitarian response to the natural disasters that affected Haiti.

Humanitarian assistance accounted for 10.6% of Canada's international assistance to Haiti ($46.23M). The El Niño drought, Hurricane Matthew, the cholera crisis, and the 2018 and 2021 earthquakes all resulted in a Canadian humanitarian response, delivered primarily by multilateral agencies (71.2% of MHD disbursements).

Several factors contributed to the rapid response to humanitarian emergencies. The flexibility of the grant agreements between GAC and multilateral agencies enabled funds already available to be allocated to emergency responses, pending approval of the humanitarian envelope. Long-standing partnerships with humanitarian implementing agencies, such as the joint use of multilateral agencies and experienced CSOs (Canadian Red Cross, Doctors of the World Canada, etc.), allowed for targeted interventions with communities.

Geographic proximity to Haiti also facilitated rapid response. For example, it was possible to use Canadian Red Cross contingency stocks for rapid deployment on the ground. Due to the small number of donors involved in the humanitarian response, the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan (OCHA) emphasized the complementarity of interventions. Canadian funds supported food aid, water and sanitation, while the United States invested primarily in food security.

Valuable results were achieved in post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation, but there was little sustainability overall.

The transition from humanitarian to development was complex, both because of the differing modalities, delays involved in funding approvals and the limiting nature of these transitional investments. For example, NDH funded the UNDP Strengthening National Systems to Improved Disaster Management and Response project for $12M of the $30M. Launched in 2018 following Hurricane Matthew, it aimed to improve the sustainability of post-disaster efforts, strengthen the economic empowerment of affected people, particularly women, promote sustainable livelihoods, and protect the environment. While the project was successful in supporting microenterprises and cooperatives in their economic recovery, there were many challenges to implementation and several outcomes were compromised. These challenges included 3 separate UNDP implementing units that were not always coordinated; 9 donors whose approval times were not aligned; long delays in securing funding, disbursements complicated by the absence of a financial institution in the project area; and delays in key activities such as the development of contingency plans and communal development plans. Finally, the short duration of the project (2 years) did not allow for the finalization of the infrastructure to be rebuilt, except for the roads, or to ensure ownership by the communal authorities, nor to support to the same authorities in the finalization of these plans. According to the evaluation, the duration of the project was unrealistic for the number of targeted results and the constraints of the environment.

Results: Peace and Security

Stable and sustained support to the Haitian National Police (PNH) by NDH and its border police by PSOP improved the structures, knowledge, and practices of the police force and had a positive impact on the public image of the police in Haiti. 

The Initial Training and Professional Development for the Haitian National Police's Managerial Staff (FIPCA-PNH) project was one of the longest (2010-2021) and largest ($22.5M) commitments of the bilateral office. It allowed for the creation of the National Police Academy (NPA), curriculum development, training including modules on respect for human rights and the fight against gender-based violence. The project also allowed for the collaboration and integration of Canadian police officers among the United Nations Police (UNPOL) officers to better support community policing. The FIPCA-PNH evaluation reported that trained police officers were better equipped for their duties as a result of the program and that changes in the professional behavior of NPA graduates had enhanced public confidence in the police, although management did not systematically support changes. On the other hand, PSOP support to the border police, in collaboration with the United States and UN-Migration, helped to rehabilitate infrastructure and improve police knowledge of migrants' rights and protection mechanisms.

Targets were met and progress was made, but Canada's support for peace and security has been hampered by the escalating governance and security crisis since 2019.

In alignment with the FIAP, the Integrated Conflict and Instability Analysis Process (CICAP) was adopted and an Integrated Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) was developed for Haiti as a PSOP priority country. The analysis articulated a solid peace and security programming framework and interventions since 2019 have been in line with the defined targets. In addition, Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (NAPWPS) defined by PSOP was on track to meet all targets related to the NAPWPS priorities except for one in the 2nd priority,^{Footnote 12} for which it was too early to tell.

The target for mainstreaming GE (4th priority) was exceeded, with 100% of PSOP projects having incorporated a GE component by 2020-21.

The FIPCA-PNH project also developed and implemented a GE strategy that included gender mainstreaming in training and awareness raising to reduce negative social perceptions of women in policing. This prioritization caused internal resistance, as state partners felt that the deteriorating security situation in the country called for other tactical and material priorities. This reflected a low level of support from Haitian authorities and institutions for GE as a priority, as also observed in other projects. A reluctant posture from the top to the application of new policing approaches by NPA graduates also cast doubt on subsequently adopting new practices. The mid-term evaluation of the Inclusive Local Governance Support in Haiti project (2017-2021) raised the fragility of the achievements and doubts about the capacity of Haitian institutions to sustain immediate results over the long term.

While the gains of the capacity-building projects were perceptible, their consolidation and sustainability were problematic: the Haitian state budget was minimal for maintaining gains beyond the duration of the projects, and the growth of gang violence since 2019, targeting the police in particular,^{Footnote 13} in a context where police forces were often even deprived of salaries, suggests a less than optimistic scenario without ongoing and broadening strengthening support.

Some initiatives enabled micro-projects to be carried out by community organizations, promoting local empowerment and leadership.

The PSOP‘s Improving Security in Haiti through Relationship Building in the Community and Community and Public Security in Haiti projects enabled community organizations to carry out micro-projects focused on reducing violence in communities, building peace, social cohesion, empowering women and engaging citizens in decisions about security and police work. These projects, by contributing to the five elements of the Building Blocks of Peace approach, had significant results, including in improving the capacities of local partners. These areas of intervention are of interest to the development program and have transformative potential, if their model could be tested and eventually scaled up.

Results: Factors for Success and Challenges

Conclusions

International assistance from 2016-17 to 2020-21 responded to ministerial commitments in line with the FIAP, and de facto aligned with priorities of Haiti's Strategic Development Plan (Vision 2030) but was not guided by a country strategy that could have limited fragmentation and deepened certain priorities.

The ministerial commitments that were made during the period were numerous, shaping almost all of the development programming. The program was relevant and stood out in its GE prioritization niche. However, a selective prioritization perspective for substantive work on certain niches could have supported both results measurement and sustainability, and more balanced management capacity. This finding is also the subject of two of the recommendations from the previous Haiti program evaluation.

The GAC program worked diligently to integrate GE into programming. However, the connection between initiatives, potential leverage, and linkages between Canadian international assistance streams (policy and triple nexus) were not optimized to increase the relevance and impact of aid.

Given the context of fragility in Haiti, relevance can be justified in all areas, but it sometimes becomes questionable in terms of the choices and approaches favoured in projects and measures aimed at sustainability. Many observations flagged the limiting impact of sectors working in silos. Opportunities were missed to connect initiatives and scale up projects in one sector by extending or scaling up in another sector.

In response to the largely climate change-related disasters that regularly strike Haiti, GAC acted quickly in humanitarian responses, but the program demonstrated a weak capacity to strategically consider risk reduction measures and a programmatic approach tailored to the context of vulnerability.

The Haiti program limited itself to looking at environmental impacts at the project proposal level but did not do a strategic analysis to consider the environmental issue more broadly in Canada's development effort in Haiti. Humanitarian interventions were based on crisis response needs (health related, natural disasters) but with little continuity towards rehabilitation and return to development. Valid partner initiatives included elements of risk mitigation and prevention, but the high level of risk of natural disasters would have justified a systematic approach at the program level to preserve development gains. This was previously raised by 2 of the 9 recommendations of the Haiti program evaluation.    

The lack of strategic analysis underlying programmatic choices and lack of a long-term vision and direction weakened the influence and impact that many of the Canadian investments could have had.

Despite multi-year commitments in support of governance, much of the programming was carried out over relatively short timeframes for a context as fragile as Haiti. Requests, changes in priorities and budget cuts resulted in resources being spread over several areas, but only in the short term, limiting the consolidation of the achievements of promising projects and compromising the potential for sustainability of results. Support of a more systemic nature could have been a better vector for change if it was designed at the outset for the longer term.

The centralized program was adequate for shared decision-making and complementarity between HQ and mission, facilitating the de-politicization of programmatic issues in the field, but the program was affected by a lack of stability, a persistent difficulty in recruiting staff and filling positions with staff who have appropriate expertise, particularly at mission.

Local staff were essential and often indispensable in filling gaps, particularly during frequent repatriations of Canadian staff during times of crisis (COVID; periods of insecurity). GAC has not questioned the diversity of its commitments and its programmatic dispersion in Haiti despite the decrease of NDH budget and the number of positions within the division. This, combined with the level of work resulting from repeated crises in Haiti, has placed and continues to place significant pressure on program staff.

The interconnection between humanitarian, development and peace and security sectors (triple nexus) was not demonstrated in a context where coordination and continuity between the initiatives of these sectors were essential to the effectiveness and sustainability of aid.

Haiti, as the most vulnerable country in the Americas, calls for a triple nexus approach to maximize the coherence and impact of international assistance. However, the various sectors had few incentives and mechanisms to work collaboratively and generally operated in silos, with no interlocking vision or objectives. This illustrated the weak capacity at GAC to put in place mechanisms to maximize effectiveness through an intentional triple nexus approach.

Within the donor group, Canada played an active role on some streams and had a more modest participation in policy discussions.

GAC exercised significant leadership in global development programming on the GE agenda, including at sector tables, and in multi-donor collaborations, amplifying its impact beyond the capacity of stand-alone projects, but with less influence on the modalities and decisions related to several multilateral partnership initiatives. Canada was an important voice for support to Haiti in regional institutions (CARICOM) and at the United Nations, resulting in the approval of concrete projects. Its participation in policy dialogue as the 2^nd largest bilateral donor in Haiti was uneven but appeared to improve towards the end of the period.

Canada's programming in Haiti produced positive results, but mainly at the outputs and immediate results levels and therefore partial and fragile, in the development, governance and security sectors. Performance measurement frameworks, monitoring practices, and aggregation of results were not adequate to account for higher-level results or sustainable changes.

GAC systematically invested in advancing GE, but results in this regard remain mixed, difficult to measure, and more superficial than transformative from a feminist perspective, despite the fact that the issue is now prominent on the global development agenda. Tangible progress made through governance initiatives were tempered by the early termination of funding, the short time frame for consolidating gains, and the growing context of instability and insecurity. Ambitious project objectives faced operational challenges (data collection systems, unclear targets, and poor monitoring) that limit the achievement of or ability to demonstrate results. For some projects with significant results, the challenge is longer-term sustainability and ownership by Haitian structures, whether state or community-based. The lack of end-of-project strategies and exit plans, as raised by the last program evaluation (2013-2016), is not conducive to the attainment or measurement of long-term impacts and supporting the Haitian state and partners toward empowerment.

Recommendations and Considerations

Recommendations

1. NDH should focus the program in Haiti, targeting a limited number of intervention pillars and a longer-term programmatic approach likely to optimize the impact of Canadian international assistance in terms of structural strengthening, stability and governance, and sustainability. To this end, the planning and management of the program within the framework of the Strategy for Canada in Haiti adopted in 2021 should:
   • assess, on the basis of the deteriorating conditions of the state and stability in Haiti, a sequential program that relies on multilateral collaboration to restore the essential conditions for development work, and a program that prioritizes strategic interventions that take into account Canadian expertise (e.g., work on governance in the health and security sectors);
   • analyze and address vulnerabilities related to environmental risks and susceptibility to natural disasters from a programmatic perspective that would guide the approach used in projects;
   • assess the steps needed to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation framework and methods to support the identification and reporting of results;
   • ensure that projects systematically develop realistic exit and transition plans for local ownership.
2. NDH should ensure continued and strengthened collaboration with Haitian stakeholders (credible and legitimate actors from the Haitian state, Haitian civil society, and local communities) in international assistance planning to foster project ownership, the use of endogenous solutions, and the sustainability of results from a localization of aid perspective.
   • Where the context allows, GAC should collaborate more deliberately and systematically with legitimate authorities and central and decentralized state structures (Departments, Communes, etc.) as well as Haitian CSOs, beyond consultation, to pave the way for greater local ownership of development.
3. NDH should mobilize branches active in Haiti (IFM, KFM, MFM) to develop a collective analysis of the context of fragility and vulnerabilities aimed at improving programming effectiveness through connectivity between program streams in a triple nexus approach. This could include:
   • joint planning that articulates the respective contributions of separate branches under common goals;
   • identifying solutions and practices to improve ongoing communication between branches and connections between their interventions.
4. NGM should consider a human resources strategy to equip the Haiti program at HQ and at mission with the required capacities and skills, which could include, for example:
   • identifying surge capacity to meet higher workloads (depending on time periods and events) to compensate for vacant positions;
   • prioritizing recruitment and providing incentives to recruit staff at mission with established capacity to manage development programs related to the triple nexus.

Considerations

In a country with a high level of fragility and vulnerability, an international assistance program must have mechanisms to ensure flexibility, timeliness of response to changes and needs, and rely on increased capacity of local partners with the means to operate to sustain gains in precarious situations.

GAC should support NDH to work with SGF, DPI and KFM to identify solutions to reduce delays associated with the Authorized Programming Process (APP), increase funding flexibility and cross-streams efforts in response to the unstable programming environment in Haiti, for example by:

• adjusting the level of risk tolerance in proposals and ensuring contingency plans;
• considering a more predictable and flexible approach to funding, such as a fast-track flexible funds envelope that facilitates linking interventions across program streams or supports local partners to increase resilience in crises;
• putting in place operational mechanisms to encourage cross-channel work so that the program in Haiti becomes an example of coordination and harmonized planning in a triple nexus approach.

Annexes

Annex I: Summary of the meta-analysis of decentralized evaluations in Haiti

Context

Several projects or programs funded by GAC during the period under review have been the subject of evaluations. The Evaluation Division (PRA) commissioned a synthesis of the results and cross-cutting findings of these evaluations and the factors that influenced the achievement of results in these Canadian international assistance initiatives in Haiti from FY 2016-17 to 2020-21.

Cross-Cutting Findings

Gender equality (GE) and environment capabilities: GE and the environment were integrated into programming unevenly. Few projects conducted gender analysis, reported results were anecdotal, limited to outputs, and did not reflect a GE strategy that would allow for the evolution of trends or outcomes at a higher level than activities, as would have been required by a concerted and systematic approach to FIAP. Projects with an environmental component were limited to activity outcomes, but little consideration was given to the environment, and little specific indicator and outcome tracking was done in projects where this should have been a central issue.

Factors for success: The Canadian international assistance was successful and resulted in some progress. Specific factors seem to have favoured the achievement of results and influenced their sustainability, including: approaches, conceptual and operational frameworks ("Building Blocks for Peace") anchored in local structures and favouring real participation by the authorities and the population, and the use of a competency-based approach in vocational training projects.

Challenges and obstacles to achieving results: Many of the program's initiatives in Haiti faced significant constraints due to contextual, organizational, and programmatic factors, including the difficulty of carrying out projects as planned in a chaotic context of governance, security, and the impact of natural and health disasters; weak engagement with and from state structures in projects even when planned with them; projects designed with too much ambition and too little time given the complexity of the context; and overall weaknesses in planning, monitoring modes, methods, and practices that do not allow for reliable indicators or the collection of evidence identifying desired changes.

Overall Observations

Programming in Haiti produced some results and benefits, however, these verifiable results have been limited to outputs and sometimes immediate outcomes. Evaluations raised the issue of questionable sustainability of gains and extension of results to some scale beyond the project. The enduring local context of multiple vulnerabilities was a major impediment to local ownership and empowerment, and the ambitious changes targeted by the projects would have required a longer duration of support and more stability in local structures. Some gains could be reinvigorated when the environment is more conducive.

Annex II: Summary of results in governance programming in Haiti

Context

The Evaluation Division (PRA) commissioned a case study on Canada's governance initiatives in Haiti through a sample of projects carried out between 2016-17 and 2020-21 and affecting several spheres of governance: central and decentralized state, rule of law, sectoral, civil society, human rights, economic governance and support to democratic processes. This study aimed to highlight the success factors, results, and challenges encountered, and allowed us to compile findings and observations inherent to this type of intervention in the Haitian context.

Findings

Relevance and progress: The governance projects were essential in the Haitian context and consistent with the Haitian government's priorities. Projects aimed at strengthening the rule of law had interesting results in terms of access to legal services, community building, and positive changes in police practices (FIPCA-PNH project, from 2008 to 2017). Human rights projects advanced knowledge of rights, tools for recognizing rights, and policies such as the GE ones in Haiti. Economic governance has had some results, particularly for the land tenure system, but success remained uneven and uncertain in sustainability, which is dependent on leadership and consolidation that was often weak or too short.

Fragmentation: The fragmentation of programming into sub-sectors and lack of connections between projects that had potential for synergy made it difficult to estimate the results of the governance investment, particularly given the lack of a programming framework that brought together program components and expected results under a defined strategy beyond individual projects.

GE capacity: Projects integrated GE in an uneven manner; several individually showed some results but few adopted and implemented a systematic approach to GE. In addition, many partners had limited capacity in GE, which reduced updating once the project began and the likelihood of reporting results beyond the activities.

Duration: In several cases, the relationship between project duration and the magnitude of expected change appeared inadequate, affecting the efficiency of program implementation and effectiveness. Shorter-term projects were unlikely to generate sustainable transformative results in governance, even though significant progress in building systems and practices was made.

Sustainability: The contributions of several projects did not leave lasting impressions on the institutions involved due to a combination of factors such as project timelines and durations that were too short to achieve verifiable and stable results, limited resources, and cumbersome and confusing technical support delivery modalities among Haitian partners.