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Evaluation of Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises — 2017-18 to 2022-23

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Final report

Prepared by the Evaluation Division (PRA)
¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ
April 2024

Table of contents

Acronyms and abbreviations

ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRAC
Building Resources Across Communities
CFO
Chief Financial Officer
CFLI
Canada Fund for Local Initiatives
FPDS
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Services
FTE
Full-time Equivalent
GAC
¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ
HQ
Headquarters
ICJ
International Court of Justice
IDPs
Internally Displaced Persons
IIMM
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar
ILO
International Labour Organization
IRG
PSOPs Programs Division
JPF
Joint Peace Fund
MHI
International Humanitarian Assistance Division
MSF
Doctors Without Borders
NGO
Non-Governmental Organization
OAK
India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal Division
OSC
Southeast Asia Division 2
PSOPs
Peace and Stabilization Operations Programming
SGBV
Sexual and gender-based violence
UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNOPS
United Nations Office for Project Services
WFP
World Food Programme

Executive summary

This evaluation examined Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises from 2017-18 to 2022-23. The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the effectiveness of the Strategy at achieving its intended results as well as how Canada’s engagement was able to respond to the complex and evolving needs of the crises. The report provides independent evaluation findings, recommendations and considerations to inform Canada’s ongoing and future engagement in these two evolving crises.

The evaluation found that the Strategy mostly achieved its stated objectives in responding to the two crises, but progress towards lasting outcomes for humanitarian, development, and peace and security programming was hinderedby limitations arising from the protracted crisis context.It also highlights Canada's considerable influence in international coordination and advocacy, and its contributions to the global response to the crises.

In Bangladesh, Canada helped save lives and alleviate human suffering through humanitarian assistance and provide medium-term support to vulnerable and crisis-affected populations through development programming focused on key sectors including education and livelihoods. However, contextual constraints hindered the achievement of lasting outcomes as conditions worsened and needs increased in the camps. Canada also adapted to emerging opportunities by playing a leading role in third-country resettlement. In Myanmar, Canada also provided life-saving humanitarian assistance and achieved the Strategy’s intended development assistance results, butincreased violence, instability and operational constraints hampered lasting outcomes.

Despite these contributions, the protracted Rohingya and Myanmar crises have resulted in Rohingya refugees’ continued dependence on international humanitarian assistance. Moreover, despite Canada’s push for accountability on human rights violations and increased pressure on malign actors in Myanmar, the military regime’s continued use of violence hindered progress towards creating the conditions for the return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar. The coup and subsequent military rule also resulted in major operational and access limitations for implementing partners and Canadian staff operations. Nevertheless, the evaluation noted that Canada’s administrative flexibility and strong partner engagement enabled implementing partners to better adapt to Myanmar’s post-coup political and operational context.

The evaluation underscored the importance of fostering the self-reliance of Rohingya refugees and exploring complementary solutions to repatriation in Bangladesh, while also addressing humanitarian needs to maximize the value-added of Canadian engagement in response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. It also showed that supporting sustainable solutions to the crises requires identifying ways for Canada to target the underlying causes of the conflict and political instability in Myanmar.

Summary of recommendations

  1. In Canada’s response to the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, focus on efforts to improve Rohingya refugees’ self-reliance while still pursuing complementary solutions to repatriation, as well as addressing humanitarian needs.
  2. Identify ways for Canada to target the underlying causes of the conflict and political instability in Myanmar and support lasting solutions to the Myanmar and Rohingya crises.

Background

Dual crises

What is the Rohingya crisis?

The Rohingya crisis is a human rights and humanitarian emergency stemming from long-standing systemic discrimination and violence faced by the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State, Myanmar. The crisis escalated in 2017 when Myanmar’s military responded with disproportionate and widespread violence to attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, a militant insurgency primarily composed of Rohingya Muslims. The Myanmar military's clearance operations and forced displacement precipitated a mass exodus of Rohingya from Rakhine State, with over 978,000 centering in what is now the world’s largest refugee camp in the Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh.

What is the Myanmar political crisis?

Following the 2021 military coup d’état in Myanmar against the democratically elected government, increased political violence by the regime and armed conflict, as well as a humanitarian crisis and displacement, greatly diminished peace and security in the country. This context led to significant democratic, political, human rights and economic erosion, with implications for the broader region. Myanmar went from being the 22nd most fragile state globally in 2018 to the 12th most fragile in 2023 (out of 179 countries). This context jeopardizesthe Rohingya refugees’ safe,voluntary and sustainable returnto Myanmar.

Note: Annex I provides a timeline of events related to the crises.

The United Nations has described the Rohingya population as the most persecuted minority in the world.

Figure 1:

Figure 1
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Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh

YearTotal Rohingya Refugees
201643,000,000
2017655,000,000
2018773,000,000
2019860,000,000
2020860,000,000
2021895,000,000
2022927,000,000
2023961,000,000

In Rakhine State, “approximately 600,000 Rohingya remain under an apartheid regime, with 140,000 confined to de facto internment camps”.

Across Myanmar, “approximately 1.7 million people have been displaced… bringing the total number of internally displaced persons to nearly 2 million".

- UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar

Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises

The Rohingya and Myanmar crises garnered international responses across the globe. Canada was consistently among the top 10 donor countries to the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plans in Bangladesh and Humanitarian Response Plans in Myanmar*, from 2018 to 2023. Following a report by the Honourable Bob Rae as Special Envoy to Myanmar, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced the first phase of Canada’s Rohingya Strategy, which was later followed by a second phase.

*Canada's programming goes beyond humanitarian plans, and total ODA funding is noted in Annex V.

Figure 2: Budget breakdown**

Figure 2
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Phase 1:

Myanmar Development Program: $73M
Bangladesh Development Program: $82M
Peace and Stabilization Operations: $21M
Humanitarian Assistance: $124M

Phase 2:

Operations and Maintenance (O&M): $36M
Myanmar Development Program: $83M
Bangladesh Development Program: $145M
Peace and Stabilization Operations: $24M

**Annex II provides a breakdown of disbursements by phase and by program. All monetary values in this report are in CAD unless indicated otherwise.

Phase 1 (2018-2021): $300 million

Objectives:

Following Canada’s efforts to address the crisis from 2018 to 2021, significant challenges persisted, including impacts of the coup in Myanmar in 2021. In response to the continuing escalation and evolution of the two linked crises, Canada extended its Strategy to a second phase.

Phase 2 (2021-2024): $288.3 million

Objectives:

Key programming changes between the 2 phases:

Strategy implementation structure

Task force to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises

An informal task force was created to help implement the Strategy via a nexus approach across the foreign policy and diplomacy services (FPDS), peace and stabilization operations programming (PSOPs), and development and humanitarian assistance streams:

Budgeted Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy positions

Key Departmental Stakeholders

Branch & DivisionFocus
Indo-Pacific Branch (OGM) Southeast Asia Division 2 (OSC)Development programming and FPDS engagement in Myanmar and Thailand.
India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal Division (OAK) Development programming and FPDS engagement in Bangladesh
International Security and Political Affairs Branch (IFM)PSOPs Program Division (IRG)Peace and stabilization operations programming in Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Global Issues and Development Branch (MFM) International Humanitarian Assistance Division (MHI)Humanitarian assistance in Myanmar and Bangladesh
Mission AbroadEmbassy of Canada to Myanmar (YNGON)Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations (PRMNY)
High Commission of Canada to Bangladesh (DHAKA)Permanent Mission of Canada in Geneva (GENEV)

Evaluation scope and methodology

Evaluation scope and objectives

The scope and objectives of the evaluation were informed by consultations with ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ staff (n=23) engaged across all streams of Canada’s Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy, a preliminary review of relevant external literature, and internal planning and financial documentation.

Evaluation scope

The evaluation covers FY 2017-18 to 2022-23 and includes all operations and programming delivered through both phases of Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises at ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ headquarters in Ottawa and missions abroad.

Evaluation objectives

Offices of primary and secondary interest

For this evaluation, OSC and OAK serve as the offices of primary interest, and IRG and MHI as offices of secondary interest.

Evaluation Questions*

Evaluation IssuesQuestions
Results, Delivery, Effectiveness Q1. What have been the key results of Canada’s Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy?
1.1. To what extent did the Strategy achieve its intended results?
1.2. What have been the key enabling or limiting factors for the effective implementation of the Strategy?
Relevance Q2. To what extent has Canada’s engagement through the Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy responded to the complex and evolving needs related to the crises?
2.1. How has Canada’s engagement through the Strategy leveraged foreign policy and diplomacy services, development, humanitarian assistance, and peace and security efforts to respond to the complex and evolving needs related to the crises?
2.2. What international practices and key lessons can inform Canada’s response to the crises?

*Note: See Annex VI for the evaluation findings corresponding to each evaluation question.

Methodology

The evaluation used a mixed-methods approach, collecting data from a variety of sources to ensure multiple lines of evidence when analyzing data and formulating findings. Each finding was triangulated with evidence from a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. Eight main methods were used for the evaluation:

Document review

Review of ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ internal documentation and-external publications related to Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises:

Literature review

A systematic literature review based on a library-supported synthesis of 200 relevant sources, including:

Project review

A systematic review of documentation related to 10 sampled projects covering both phases of the Strategy and all programming streams:

Scan of other donor practices

A targeted scan of the strategies, approaches and engagement of a sample of 7 other donor countries and entities (Australia, Germany, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States and EU) involved in the global response to the crises. This also included 13 interviews with other donors engaged in Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Financial analysis

Review of internal ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ financial documents, namely statistical data on total disbursements, targeted thematic areas, gender coding and variations overtime.

Interviews

73 semi-structured individual and small group interviews:

Site visits

Six visits to project sites in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh to validate and assess project results, constraints and needs. The evaluation adopted a do-no-harm approach for interactions with beneficiaries during site visits, in accordance with the Murad Code.

Case study

An internal case study focused on Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy services addressing the Rohingya and Myanmar crises, building on an internal advocacy, access and influence measurement framework previously developed by the evaluation division (PRA).

Evaluation limitations and mitigation measures

Limitations

Broadly worded and output-oriented Strategy objectives

Canada's Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy objectives (except for "ensuring accountability for crimes committed“ in Phase 1) were broadly worded and output-oriented. This limited the ability to assess the Strategy's results, effectiveness and relevance beyond its outputs. The way the objectives were formulated complicated the measurement of sustainable progress.

Complex and highly politicized nature of the dual crises

The Rohingya and Myanmar crises involve complex, politicized issues having implications across the FPDS, peace and security, development and humanitarian assistance streams. The diversity of stakeholders, along with varying political implications, resulted in divergent and sometimes conflicting perspectives on the effectiveness and relevance of Canada’s response. The respective stream priorities of internal stakeholders and the political objectives of external stakeholders highlighted the challenge and importance of ensuring neutrality and limiting the subjectivity of findings through data triangulation.

Limited access to stakeholders and projects sites in Myanmar

Myanmar’s complex and unstable political environment, as well as the military regime’s strict in-country regulations around travel and field access, posed risks and constraints, including:

Mitigation measures

Assess intended results and progress towards sustainable solutions

The evaluation team assessed the Strategy's results, effectiveness and relevance against its objectives and intended results, while also taking into account the sustainability of results and programming, and the progress towards the advancement of lasting solutions. This enabled a critical assessment of the Strategy’s results and progress, and Canada’s contributions to sustainable solutions.

Data triangulation and feminist principles

The evaluation team interviewed internal and external stakeholders involved in both phases of the Strategy and all program streams, and triangulated interview data with document, project and literature reviews to increase confidence in the evaluation’s findings. The team applied feminist evaluation principles of acknowledging biases and ensuring the active inclusion of diverse voices and perspectives. When collecting data in-country in Bangladesh and Myanmar, the evaluation team consulted with ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ mission staff for recommendations on navigating the complex environment.

In-person interviews with stakeholders in Thailand and Myanmar

The evaluation team conducted face-to-face interviews with stakeholders in Thailand and Myanmar to obtain perspectives on projects that the team was unable to visit in person due to the military regime’s restrictions on internal travel in Myanmar. The evaluation team adopted a do-no-harm approach to ensure that no stakeholders were re-victimized and that any security concerns arising from participants’ involvement in the evaluation were carefully addressed or mitigated to the extent possible, in accordance with the Murad Code.

Findings

Results and delivery

Enhancing international cooperation

Spotlight: Canada's influence in advocating for Rohingya refugee children's right to education

In response to the Government of Bangladesh’s early restrictions on education for Rohingya refugees, Canada led concerted diplomatic engagement in advocating for Rohingya refugees' right to education.

This included emphasizing the potential security implications of large groups of uneducated youth, enabling Bangladesh's access to a World Bank grant for refugees and host communities, and supporting Bangladesh's efforts to hold Myanmar accountable before the International Court of Justice.

Following this diplomatic engagement and advocacy, Bangladesh approved in 2020 the provision of formal education to Rohingya child refugees using a Myanmar school curriculum, which was a key success of Canada's FPDS. While gaps in access remain, over 332K children (incl. 162K girls) were enrolled by 2023.

Figure 3:

Figure 3
Text version

A class full of refugee pupils in Bangladesh listening to the teacher.

Image credit: Zakir Hossain, The New Humanitarian, 2020

Canada exerted considerable influence among the donor community in international coordination and advocacy for the Rohingya refugee response in Bangladesh.

As the first donor with a Special Envoy and a dedicated Strategy for the crises, Canada led collaboration, diplomatic engagement and advocacy efforts with the Government of Bangladesh, other donors and the UN to facilitate a whole-of-donor community approach and a collective response to humanitarian and development needs. This enabled Canada to advance its objective of enhancing international cooperation in the response to the crises. As Canada’s Special Envoy to Myanmar during Phase 1 of the Strategy, Bob Rae’s vocal engagement helped to raise international attention on the Rohingya crisis, mobilize the global community to respond to the crisis, and enhance Canada’s image abroad based on its strong support for human rights.

Canada’s influence in international coordination during Phase 1 included chairing an NGO and donor working group on the Rohingya response, leading an education strategy executive group, and co-creating and co-chairing a donor working group, and chairing the Joint Peace Fund, among other roles. Canada also led on coordination with like-minded countries in multilateral institutions, including by hosting a UN ministerial-level meeting in 2018 on the Rohingya crisis and launching an International Working Group (an informal grouping of 22 states) that served as a platform to facilitate cooperation among UN offices and partners. Canada continued to signal its high-level political commitment, maintain global visibility on the crises, and lead in various coordination groups, albeit the announced Special Envoy position remained vacant in Phase 2.

Canada’s advocacy and diplomatic efforts were pivotal in enabling the Government of Bangladesh successfully secure grant (as opposed to loan) funding from the World Bank to help meet the basic needs of the Rohingya refugee populations and host communities.  Canada’s advocacy efforts with the World Bank were critical in enabling the Government of Bangladesh to benefit from the International Development Association’s refugee sub-window in 2018.Canada’s influence resulted in the World Bank exceptionally waving its funding criteria to allow Canada to fund the “buy down” usually required of the host country. Through this innovative funding mechanism, every $1 contributed by Canada was matched by an additional $5 in grant funding from the World Bank, and over US $500 million in additional grant funding was unlocked. This was a significant advocacy result that demonstrated Canada's influential role in allowing for support to be channelled responsively and effectively to Rohingya refugee populations as well as impacted host communities.

By combining a strong political commitment to address the crises with important financial and human resources for the implementation of a multi-year response, Canada’s Strategy served to strengthen Canada’s credibility with the Government of Bangladesh and other donors and partners around the world. This positioned Canada to exert considerable influence in responding to the crises, notably by leading international coordination in Bangladesh, as well as advocacy and diplomatic efforts.

Alleviating humanitarian needs

Figure 4: Top 5 Humanitarian Partners in Bangladesh (both phases) *

Figure 4
Text version

WFP: $26.5 M
UNHCR: $16.8 M
MSF: $15.8 M
IOM: $10.5 M
IRC: $8.4M

*Disbursement to all humanitarian partners in Bangladesh totalled $120.2M over both phases of the Strategy.

Figure 5: Top 5 Humanitarian Partners in Myanmar (both phases) *

Figure 5
Text version

ICRC: $16.9 M
OCHA: $13.5 M
WFP: $8.0 M
CLWR: $5.4 M
UNHCR: $4.4 M

*Disbursements to all humanitarian partners in Myanmar totalled $54.2M over both phases of the Strategy.

Canada helped save lives and alleviate human suffering in Myanmar and Bangladesh, althoughits humanitarian funding decreased in Phase 2 in a context where needs increased.

Canada’s humanitarian contributions across both Phases of the strategy helped save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain the dignity of those affected by conflict and natural disasters in Myanmar and Bangladesh. In terms of the donor landscape, Canada was the 6th largest bilateral humanitarian donor in Bangladesh for the Joint Response Plans (JRP) for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis from 2018-23, with total funding of US $102.7M. Canada was the 10th largest bilateral humanitarian donor in Myanmar to the Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plans (or similar plans) from 2018-23, with total funding of US $29.8M*. Canada’s humanitarian contributions included life-saving food assistance, healthcare and nutrition, and other essential services.

In Bangladesh, Canada’s support to the World Food Program (WFP), helped provide life-saving food assistance to nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees through food outlets across the camps in Cox’s Bazar, using an innovative blockchain platform. It also contributed to financial inclusion and poverty alleviation through food procurement from host communities’ ultra-poor farmers. As one of only three countries providing funding to Doctors without Borders (MSF), Canada’s humanitarian contributions helped address the enormous health needs of a growing number of Rohingya refugees and host community patients through the provision of general healthcare, treatment for chronic diseases, psychosocial support and women’s healthcare.

In Myanmar, Canada’s support to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) helped meet urgent needs and to improve access to water and other essential services for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and others affected by situations of violence. Canada’s contributions also enabled the ICRC to deliver its core protection-focused activities in favour of violence-affected communities and detainees. Support to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) in Myanmar in 2022 enabled 32 partners to implement 49 urgent and life-saving projects that reached 586,000 people.

Despite these key contributions, Canada’s humanitarian funding in response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises also decreased considerably over the Strategy, from a total of $124M in Phase 1 to $50.5M in Phase 2. Canada shifted to providing humanitarian funding in Phase 2 through departmental reference levels rather than the Strategy, which enhanced its flexibility to direct funds to other global crises while continuing to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar humanitarian crises. However, it is worth noting that this decrease in funding occurred in a context where humanitarian needs have increased in both countries, amidst overall declining levels of international donor funding to respond to these crises.

Overall, Canada played a key role in addressing humanitarian needs of the Rohingya and Myanmar crises. However, the widening gap between the growing needs in Myanmar and Bangladesh, and Canada’s decreasing levels of humanitarian funding, has limited its ability to continue alleviating overall humanitarian needs.

*Note: These numbers may not fully reflect Canada’s or other donors’ humanitarian contributions due to differences in UN reporting systems. Canada’s disbursements under the Strategy are detailed in Annex II, and total donor humanitarian response vs ODA funding is in Annex V.

Medium-term support to vulnerable and crisis-affected populations

Spotlight: Environmental rehabilitation, Cox’s Bazar

The influx of Rohingya refugees in 2017 created massive pressure on the already dilapidated environment of Cox’s Bazar. Some 4,300 acres of hills and forests were cut down or cleared. Canada’s contributions to the UN SAFE Plus projects supported significant land stabilization and reforestation.

Before - Figure 6.1

Figure 6.1

After - Figure 6.2

Figure 6.2
Text version

Two pictures representing before (26 February 2018) and after (23 May 2022) the implementation of the environmental rehabilitation in Cox’s Bazar.

Image credit: IOM, 2023. Site Development Catalogue 2.1 April 2023.

While Canada achieved the Strategy’s intended development assistance results in key sectors in Bangladesh, contextual constraints hindered the achievement of lasting outcomes.

Triangulation of evidence revealed that the Strategy’s objective of medium-term support to meet the needs of vulnerable and crisis-affected populations in Bangladesh was achieved through key development assistance contributions and a mix of projects aligned with the needs of Rohingya refugees and impacted host communities. However, the Strategy’s development assistance objective was not designed to go beyond addressing medium-term needs and sustainable outcomes were constrained by contextual limitations. These included host government constraints on Rohingya refugees’ self-reliance and the protracted nature of the crisis illustrated by worsening conditions in the camps and increasing dependence on donor assistance.

Through the course of the Strategy, Canada provided $179M in development assistance for the Rohingya refugee response in Bangladesh, delivering 16 projects across top 5 sub-action areas of education (37%), health & SRHR (17%), growth that works for everyone (15%), social services & food security (13%) and environment & climate action (11%). Canada’s key role and results in education and livelihoods were particularly relevant given the need for greater refugee self-reliance, in a context of restrictive host government policies resulting in an increased dependence on declining global donor funding.

Key Canadian development results in Bangladesh:

The Strategy enabled Canada to be a key donor in the environmental and livelihoods sectors, namely for the joint UN Safe Access to Fuel and Energy Plus (SAFE Plus) project (2019-22) and its second iteration SAFE Plus 2 (2022-25), for which Canada provided respectively 35% ($20M) and 66% ($15M) of all donor funding. Results to-date included improved environmental and economic security for vulnerable Rohingya refugee and host community households in Cox’s Bazar through the revegetation of land (52 hectares), the reduced use of firewood, the increased use of cooking fuel, as well as the development of green skills among beneficiaries.

Canada served as the leading donor in the operationalization of skills and livelihoods programming for refugees and host communities in Bangladesh as the sole donor of the largest project in this sector, namely the “Leaving No One Behind” initiative ($44M) implemented by UNHCR, BRAC and ILO (2023-25). Similarly, Canada helped improve educational access, systems and infrastructure through the Education Cannot Wait Programme ($27.5M) (2022-24). Overall, Canada's engagement in these two projects enabled refugees in the camps to become more self-reliant and resilient through skills development and stipends earned through “volunteering” services, as well as improved their access to quality, safe and inclusive learning opportunities.

Despite Canada's key development assistance contributions in meeting the needs ofvulnerable and crisis-affected populations in Bangladesh in the short and medium-term, it did not lead to sustainable outcomes due to various contextual constraints (see slides 26 & 27 for more details on contextual constraints).

Spotlight: Tackling Gender Norms in Myanmar

Canada’s ongoing funding to Women’s Voice and Leadership (WVL) Myanmar supports Women’s Rights Organizations across the country to sustain and empower intersectional feminist movements.

One WVL implementing partner – the Women for Women Foundation – supported a new protest strategy against the Myanmar military coup, using women’s garments as protest signs to symbolically confront the traditional belief that women are “unclean” and inferior to men. This strategy was rapidly adopted across the country and garnered the support and participation of large numbers of boys and men. It also supported the shifting of broader gender norms and stereotypes in Myanmar and the acceptance of women’s participation and leadership.

Figure 7:

Figure 7
Text version

Woman with a yellow helmet holding women’s garment attached to a rope in the middle of an empty street in Myanmar.

Image credit: Vice News, 2021

Canada’s development assistance in Myanmar achieved the Strategy's intended results, but increased violence, instability and operational constraints hampered lasting outcomes.

Canada achieved its development assistance objective of providing medium-term support to meet the needs of vulnerable and crisis-affected populations in Myanmar through programming in the areas of poverty reduction, health and nutrition, as well ascivil society, all with a strong gender lens. However, the Strategy’s development assistance objective was not designed to go beyond addressing medium-term needs. Additionally, an increase in violence, instability and operational constraints in Myanmar also hampered Canada’s ability to ensure lasting progress and outcomes for Rohingya and other crisis-affected population.

Through the course of the Strategy, Canada provided $143M in development assistance in Myanmar, delivering 20 projects across top 5 sub-action areas of health & SRHR (30%), inclusive governance (25%), growth that works for everyone (21%), gender equality & the empowerment of women and girls (14%) and environment & climate action (4%). Canada’s engagement across these areas was relevant in a context of increased socio-economic fragility and gaps in governance and social services following the coup in Myanmar, which disproportionately affected the most vulnerable including women and girls.

Key Canadian development results in Myanmar:

Canada contributed to the prevention of gender-based violence and increased awareness of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) through $18M in funding to UNICEF’s Health, Empowerment and Rights for Vulnerable Populations in Myanmar (HER) project (2018-23). HER Myanmar made progress towards the increased realization of SRHR for women, boys and girls, including through increased promotion, scale and capacity strengthening for out-of-school Comprehensive Sexuality Education. However, the sustainability of results was uncertain, given the turbulent and unpredictable nature of the post-coup regime in Myanmar.

The Strategy enabled Canada to provide key support for poverty reduction, inclusive governance and gender equality in Myanmar, through support to the UNOPS Livelihoods and Food Security Fund (LIFT). Canada’s contributions in Phase 1 ($16M) helped increase women’s economic empowerment and gender equitable community governance, and improve Rohingya rights, as well as relationships between Rakhine and Rohingya communities. Canada’s support in Phase 2 ($15M) allowed LIFT to further its objectives, benefiting 12 million people in 88% of Myanmar’s townships. That being said, significant operating challenges in a post-coup environment impacted its capacity to measure its outcomes and report on progress during Phase 2.

Despite the medium-term support provided by Canadian development assistance to vulnerable and crisis-affected populations in Myanmar, a variety of contextual constraints hampered lasting outcomes.

Accountability and pressure on malign actors in Myanmar

Canada’s 9 rounds of sanctions since the coup have targeted 135 individuals and 88 entities (as of 2023).
2021February: Sanctions on Myanmar military officials in response to coup d’état
May: Additional sanctions on individuals and entities affiliated with Myanmar’s Armed Forces
December: Additional sanctions on entities affiliated with Myanmar’s military regime
2022January: Additional sanctions on individuals associated with Myanmar’s military regime
March: Further sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for procuring and supplying arms and military equipment to Myanmar
December: New sanctions on Russian, Iranian and Myanmar regimes
2023January: Regulations amending the Special Economic Measures (Burma) Regulations
October: Additional sanctions against individuals and entities supporting Myanmar’s military regime
December: Sanctions in response to long-standing human rights violations in Russia, Iran and Myanmar

Despite Canada's efforts to hold human rights violators accountable and increase pressure, the Myanmar military regime’s continued use of violence hindered success in these areas.

Canada made important progress in achieving the Strategy’s objectives of ensuring accountability for the crimes committed and increasing pressure on malign actors. The Strategy enabled Canada to support a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), impose sanctions including through FPDS advocacy and coordination among like-minded countries, and build an evidence base for accountability and the pursuit of justice. However, the regime’s de facto rule and violence have continued.

Canada has intervened in a case brought forth by The Gambia in 2019 against Myanmar at the ICJ, in which The Gambia alleges violations of the Genocide Convention. In November 2023, Canada filed a joint declaration of intervention with Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in the case against Myanmar. The declaration focused on the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. Canada had issued joint statements with the Netherlands in 2020 and 2022 announcing its intention to intervene in the case.

Canada also helped establish and fund the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar in 2018 to enable the collection, preservation and analysis of evidence of international crimes and gross human rights violations in Myanmar. The Mechanism has continued to actively monitor and investigate the deteriorating situation in Myanmar and share its reporting with relevant courts and tribunals, including the ICJ.

Canada also funded Legal Action Worldwide, which supported The Gambia’s legal team and provided witnesses and survivors an opportunity to engage with international accountability processes and receive ongoing survivor-centred support. The ICJ case is an ongoing and lengthy process.

In response to the 2021 Myanmar military coup, Canada condemned the military’s actions and has organized 9 rounds of sanctions against the regime. Often implemented through FPDS advocacy and coordination with like-minded countries, these sanctions and related public messaging aim to maximize concerted pressure on the regime to reverse course and limit its access to key resources and revenue to fuel its violence. Canada was also one of the first countries to target aviation fuel in response to the regime counter vailing international law through air strikes. These sanctions served to limit the capacity of Myanmar’s military regime to operate, but have not resulted in a significant change of course.

Canada’s considerable efforts to build an evidence base for accountability and increase pressure on malign actors in Myanmar were mitigated by ever-increasing levels of human rights violations, violence, oppression, lawlessness and poverty following the military coup of 2021. The military regime’s continued use of violence against the Rohingya (described by the UN as the most persecuted minority in the world) and Myanmar’s wider population highlights the fact that pursuing accountability remains a long-term process.

Engagement across streams

Development, Humanitarian and PSOPs Spending
Across both phases of the Strategy, a total of $526.3M* was disbursed across development (61%), humanitarian (33%) and peace and stabilization operations programming (PSOPs) (6%).
$322M Development Assistance$174.4M** Humanitarian Assistance
$29.9M PSOPs

Source: ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ, 2023. CFO Stats Financial Data.

* Includes disbursements for FY 2022-23 up to November 2023.

** Includes $50.5M funded outside the Strategy Phase 2.

The context limited the advancement toward establishing the conditions forthe safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar.

Among their contributions to the Strategy, Peace and Stabilization Operations (PSOPs) programming and Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Service (FPDS) engagement were key drivers for Canada’s efforts to supporting the creation of the conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees. PSOPs was allocated 6% ($29.9M) of the Strategy’s funding across both phases and provided strategic contributions to peace, security and democracy in post-coup Myanmar, which was critical to meeting the Strategy’s objectives relating to advancing inclusive and sustainable peace, advancing the restoration of democratic rule, and increasing pressure on malign actors and pursuing accountability. This included projects on armed-conflict prevention, support for peace and accountability in Myanmar, support to Rohingya survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Bangladesh, and investigations into SGBV crimes.

Canada’s largest PSOPs engagement in Myanmar ($15.3M across both phases) was its support to the multi-donor Joint Peace Fund (JPF), designed to support national efforts to achieve lasting settlement of ethnic armed conflict in Myanmar and to build broad-based participation and support for the implementation of the Nation wide Ceasefire Agreement. As a multi-donor fund focused on political and peace processes rather than on development assistance, the JPF was strategically relevant for addressing instability in Myanmar. Canada also used its positionon the JPF board to advocate for gender issues and bring together women leaders and decision-makersfrom diverse backgrounds to advance women’s roles in the peace process and integrate gender into policies and procedures in the overall process.

Canada’s FPDS stream, for its part, undertook efforts to sustain visibility on the crises and engage extensively in multilateral forums such as the UN Human Rights Council and other UN committees. Canada also led or coordinated with like-minded countries on demarches, sanctions, joint statements, interventions and resolutions, including the retention of key language such as the reference to arms flows. In addition, FPDS supported pro-democratic efforts, network building and cross-border work, and coordinated projects funded by the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) on inclusive governance, human rights and the rule of law, democracy, independent media and security. In FY 2022-23, Canada funded 9 CFLI projects in Myanmar, including a key project to increase people’s access to credible news and information on the post-coup crisis.

However, given broader geopolitical constraints, Canada’s Strategy was unable to significantly advance inclusive and sustainable peace, the restoration of democracy orthe creation of conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees. These constraints included Myanmar’s 2021 military coup and subsequent instability, ongoing discrimination against the Rohingya population and other groups, the protracted nature of the crises and the recurrence of natural disasters. Such persistent geopolitical constraints limited progress in advancing inclusive and sustainable peace, and the restoration of democratic rule, while underlining the remaining gaps and missing conditions to establish lasting solutions.

Effectiveness

Political and operating environment

Figure 8:

Figure 8
Text version

Main street in Myanmar with car on the left side and a golden temple in the horizon.

Image credit: International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2023

Myanmar military’s Organization Registration Law

In October 2022, the Organization Registration Law (or NGO Law) was passed by the Myanmar military regime's State Administration Council. It imposed regulations described by most international law observers and research centres as severely restricting the legitimate activities of civil society and humanitarian actors and violating basic human rights, such as freedom of association.

Various analyses highlighted certain areas in which the law fails to meet international human rights standards, including NGO registration commissions’ lack of independence and vulnerability to military interference, criminal penalties for operating an unregistered NGO and the prohibition of activities linked to political, religious or economic matters.

Operational and access constraints resulting from the coup and subsequent military rule in Myanmar were key limitations for implementing partners and Canadian staff.

The increased violence and instability following the military coup created significant security and access challenges for implementing partners in Myanmar, with some partners having to relocate outside the country, namely to Thailand. While field access was already limited before the coup, it was further restricted post-coup by additional regime requirements, such as increased administrative difficulty for domestic travel authorization. This process was bureaucratically burdensome and slow, making it difficult for partners to reach target beneficiaries, particularly in Rakhine State. The regime’s 2022 Organization Registration Law (or NGO Law) was a major constraint for partners due to its complexity, prohibitive reporting requirements, lack of protection for sensitive information, and risk of criminal penalties for non-compliance. The NGO Law, while restricting access to regions in need of humanitarian assistance, also imposed substantial restrictions on partner operations and responsiveness by making operations more administratively complex.

In addition, the narrowing of democratic space and the absence of legitimate government counterparts due to the coup have limited Canada’s ability to engage in Myanmar and have had an impact on previous gains, making it more difficult to advance Canada’s objectives of sustainable peace and democratic restoration.

Canada’s administrative flexibility and strong partner engagement enabled implementing partners to better adjust to Myanmar’s post-coup political and operating environment.

In response to the unstable and challenging operating context for implementing partners in post-coup Myanmar, Canada demonstrated flexibility by adjusting its standard operating and reporting requirements for partners. For example, Canada reduced the reporting burden for partners and allowed them to pivot their programming activities or objectives in response to emerging security and operational challenges. This flexibility enabled implementing partners to continue to operate effectively in an evolving context.

Canada also consistently engaged with implementing partners and created opportunities for feedback and information sharing through site visits, partner consultations and regular communications. This was key to strengthening partners’ understanding and alignment with Canadian priorities in a rapidly changing context and enabling partners to identify opportunities for complementarity. Canadian engagement with implementing partners included a series of five consultations in June 2023, regular meetings with partners based in Canada, and project visits from mission staff to partners in the field. This facilitated the exchange of information on project development and changes in context and gave partners the opportunity to obtain feedback as well as voice their concerns and ideas.

While operational and access constraints were important limitations for implementing partners and Canadian staff in Myanmar, Canada's administrative flexibility and strong partner engagement were enabling factors to the effective implementation of the Strategy.

Relevance

Alleviating humanitarian needs

Figure 9:

Figure 9
Text version

Graphic representing the financial aid distribution between Rohingya and Myanmar.

Humanitarian Needs 2023 - Rohingya and Myanmar Crises

Sources: (1) ISCG, 2023. 2023 Joint Response Plan: Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis. ; (2) UN OCHA, 2023. Humanitarian Needs Overview Myanmar 2023.

The Rohingya and Myanmar protracted crises resulted in a continued dependence of Rohingya refugees on international humanitarian assistance.

Following the military coup in Myanmar in 2021 and ensuing civil war, the prospects for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar have become more remote than ever. The UN noted that the Rohingya population continued to face systematic human rights violations in Myanmar and rapidly deteriorating conditions in refugee camps in Bangladesh.

In Bangladesh, an estimated 1.5 million people (538K host community and 978K Rohingya refugees)—with just over half of them women and girls—required humanitarian assistance in 2023 as part of the Rohingya humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, 95% of all Rohingya households in Cox’s Bazar in 2022 were moderately to highly vulnerable and entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance. Confined to the camps and prohibited from finding formal employment, Rohingya refugees are also almost completely dependent on food assistance, making them particularly vulnerable to food ration cuts due to declining donor funding.

In Myanmar in 2023, 600,000 Rohingya people in Rakhine State faced challenges in accessing livelihoods, urgent health care and basic services due to ongoing discriminatory restrictions on their citizenship, legal status and movement. This includes nearly 130,000 internally displaced Rohingya (IDPs), the vast majority of whom are confined to closed internally displaced people camps. This has prolonged their need for and reliance on humanitarian assistance, all in a broader context where an estimated 17.6 million people across the country were in humanitarian need due to increased conflict, instability and poverty following the coup.

Humanitarian needs were further exacerbated by natural disasters in Bangladesh and Myanmar. Myanmar is one of the world’s most disaster-prone countries, and the populations (particularly Rohingya communities in Rakhine State) affected by Cyclone Mocha in—Myanmar’s worst natural disaster in nearly a decade—remain in dire need of food, clean water, medicine, medical care and materials to build or repair shelters. In Bangladesh, a country also vulnerable to natural disasters, hundreds of thousands were affected by Cyclone Mocha, which caused considerable destruction to Rohingya and Bangladeshi homes and facilities in Cox’s Bazar.

The protracted humanitarian needs in Myanmar and Bangladesh owing to continued conflict and prolonged displacement, compounded by a vulnerability to natural disasters, mean that Rohingya refugees and IDPs will require continued international humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs and ensure their survival. For refugees in Bangladesh, humanitarian needs persist in the absence of the conditions are met for their safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable repatriation to Myanmar. This indicates that Canada’s humanitarian engagement and contributions through the Strategy, while important, cannot alone provide a sustainable solution to the growing humanitarian needs resulting from the protracted crises.

Medium-term support to vulnerable and crisis-affected populations

Figure 10: Livelihoods and Skills Development Sector Needs – Bangladesh (2023)

Figure 10
Text version

Source: ISCG, 2023. Livelihoods and Skills Development (Bangladesh).

Canada’s advocacy and support to livelihoods and skills development were key to meeting the needs of vulnerable and crisis-affected populations in Bangladesh.

The limited legal opportunities for Rohingya refugees to earn a livelihood in the camps in Bangladesh leave them almost entirely reliant on donor assistance, and declining donor funding levels and shifting priorities due to multiple global crises have further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. Canada’s advocacy and support to livelihoods and skills development were particularly relevant to achieving the Strategy’s objective of meeting the needs of vulnerable and crisis-affected populations. This contributed to advancing sustainable solutions to the humanitarian crisis while seeking to reduce the related cost to donors and the Government of Bangladesh.

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh face government restrictions on livelihoods and skills development and are officially prevented from accessing formal employment. These ongoing restrictions are related to Bangladesh Government’s concerns that providing economic opportunities to Rohingya refugees would create a “pull factor” that would lead to an influx of additional refugees and further distort local markets. They are part of a larger set of host government policies that include various degrees of restrictions on the provision of development or multi-year funding, formal education, and the use of permanent materials and structures in the camps.

Canada has maintained livelihoods as an advocacy and programming priority in Bangladesh, and donor engagement has led to incremental improvements in livelihoods and skills development opportunities for Rohingya refugees. This reflects an approach to livelihoods and skills as elements along the spectrum of education, building upon Canada’s advocacy and provision of basic education. In 2022, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) endorsed 2 related frameworks: (1) the GoB–UN Framework on Skills Development for Rohingya Refugees and Host Communities, related to refugee vocational skills development; and (2) Guidance on the Engagement of Volunteers for the Rohingya Refugee Camps, covering refugee volunteer services and incentives within the camps. A Livelihoods and Skills Development Sector was also established to build the skills and capacities of refugees, reaching over 69,000 Rohingya refugee and host community beneficiaries through 18 projects by 2023, including a Canada-funded joint UNHCR, BRAC and ILO project on vocational skills.

While incremental progress was made, limited opportunities for livelihoods and skills development and the resulting dependence on donors was of concern in a context of decreased donor funding. Indeed, the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan was 50% funded in 2023, compared to 69% in 2018. Decreased funding led to food rations being cut by a third in 2023 (below minimum humanitarian standards), further eroding the health and security of a population already suffering from severe trauma and deprivation, and increased of vulnerability of Rohingya households as more than half relied on donor-funded e-vouchers as their main income.

The continued need for livelihood opportunities and related advocacy, in the context of declining global funding and a constraining policy environment, has reinforced the relevance of Canada's focus on livelihoods and skills development for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to mitigate the worsening crisis and provide longer-term solutions in a context where Rohingya refugees depend on progressively decreasing donor funding.

Resettlement efforts and dialogue

Figure 11:

Figure 11
Text version

Migrants walking in the water to climb a boat docked on a beach.

Image credit: Al Jazeera, 2023.

Rohingya refugee movements at sea in the region

A growing number of Rohingya refugees are risking their lives to undertake perilous sea journeys in search of resettlement and safety in other countries. In 2022, more than 3,500 Rohingya attempted sea journeys to Malaysia and Indonesia, compared to 700 in 2021—an increase of more than 360%.

In 2022 and 2023, Canada engaged on an ongoing and regional basis in advocacy for rescues at sea and for the reception and humane treatment of refugees on arrival, including funding provided to the IOM to help shelter refugees arriving in Indonesia. For example, Canada engaged in December 2022 with regional governments (India, Malaysia, Indonesia) and Canadian missions to coordinate a response to an incident involving Rohingya boats lost at sea. This was made possible by the networks and resources available through the Strategy.

Canada’s role as a leading donor on third-country resettlement emerged as an unexpected result from its response to the crises.

Given the rapidly deteriorating conditions for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and the lack of prospects for their repatriation to Myanmar, third-country resettlement of Rohingya refugees has become increasingly relevant as an alternative to repatriation. The UN estimated that more than 100,000 Rohingya refugees will bein need of resettlement in 2023 from host countries in Asia, including Bangladesh, and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has called on the international community to accept Rohingya refugees, provide them with the support required under international standards, and expand opportunities for resettlement and other durable solutions.

While resettlement was not an expected result or a key Canadian objective of either phase of the Strategy, Canada played a leading role on third-country resettlement of Rohingya refugees in Phase 2. Canada actively engaged with the Government of Bangladesh and other donors on this issue, and in 2007, and again in 2022, it was the first country to welcome Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh when third-party resettlement was reopened in Bangladesh. This built on Canada’s long tradition of welcoming refugees (i.e. since 1959, Canada has welcomed more than 700,000 refugees from around the world).

Canada, along with the United States, remains one of the few donors to advocate for and engage in resettlement. In 2022, the United States announced the establishment of a resettlement program for vulnerable Rohingya refugees in collaboration with the Government of Bangladesh and the UNHCR. This followed a shift in the Government of Bangladesh’s approach to third-country resettlement after a 12-year suspension. In 2022, the UNHCR submitted 1,082 refugees for resettlement, with some cases submitted to 3 resettlement countries (United States, Canada and Sweden) as a pilot initiative.

¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ staff in Bangladesh and at headquarters were heavily involved in supporting third-country resettlement, notably through advocacy and diplomatic efforts. The planning and implementation of Canadian resettlement initiatives were also managed by Immigration Refugee Citizenship Canada, which oversees the screening, processing and operationalization of refugee resettlement applications, notably under the Resettlement Assistance Program.This highlighted the importance of adopting a whole-of-government of Canada approach when it comes to resettlement and ensuring clarity on how resettlement fits within Canada’s broader response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises.

Conclusions

Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises enabled it to play a key role and make important contributions to the global response, while largely achieving the objectives set out in the Strategy. However, the worsening situation in the region has rendered it increasingly challenging for Canada to help advance lasting solutions to the crises. In particular, with the prospects for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar more remote than ever, the refugees remain fully dependent on the Government of Bangladesh and the international donor community for their survival in the camps. The ongoing violent conflict in Myanmar, including after the 2021 coup, has led to increased humanitarian needs for internally displaced persons in Myanmar. Recurring natural disasters in both countries and a decline in donor funding globally have also further compounded the challenges.

As Canada considers its future engagement beyond the second phase of the Strategy, this evaluation provides an opportunity to reflect on Canada’s response to help prioritize areas where its impact and value can be maximized. The evaluation underscores the importance of programming in Bangladesh that focuses on fostering self-reliance among Rohingya refugees, exploring complementary repatriation solutions, as well as addressing humanitarian needs. Furthermore, the evaluation demonstrated that supporting sustainable solutions to the conflict and political instability in Myanmar requires identifying ways for Canada to target their under lying causes.

Recommendations and considerations

Recommendations

  1. In Canada’s response to the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, focus on efforts to improve Rohingya refugees’ self-reliance while still pursuing complementary solutions to repatriation, as well as addressing humanitarian needs.
  2. Identify ways for Canada to target the underlying causes of the conflict and political instability in Myanmar and support lasting solutions to the Myanmar and Rohingya crises.

Note: See Annex VII for the evaluation findings corresponding to each recommendation.

Considerations for ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ

Whole-of-government coordination: Canada's coordinated advocacy has been an enabling factor in the effective implementation of its response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises across a wide range of issues. This has reinforced the importance of coordination across business lines within ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ, as well as across the Government of Canada, including on initiatives such as third-country resettlement which requires a high level of coordination and collaboration with other departments such as Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. In light of this, the Department should consider exploring how best to integrate a whole-of-government approach to advance Canada’s objectives and mitigate risks off ragmentation through greater collaboration and coordination.

Building on Canada’s considerable influence in the global response to the crises: Through the Strategy,Canada exerted considerable influence among donors and partners, in terms of international coordination and advocacy in the global response to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Notably, as Canada’s Special Envoy to Myanmar, Bob Rae played a pivotal role in increasing international attention and urging coordinated action to address the crisis. Combined with broader diplomatic and advocacy efforts, this active engagement provided Canada with increased and enduring diplomatic influence both within Bangladesh andthe broader international community. The Department should therefore consider identifying options to further capitalize on Canada’s considerable influence to mobilize international support in advancing sustainable solutions to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises. Furthermore, it could consider how similar approaches may be leveraged in other crisis situations.

Support to regionally-driven political solutions to the crises: While Canada supported a regional response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises by engaging with regional governments and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including on the advancement of its Five-Point Consensus to address the Myanmar political crisis, this was nota direct objective of the Strategy and progress towards a lasting regional solution remained limited. Considering the importance of regionally-driven political solutions to resolving the crises and achieving the Strategy’s objectives, the Department should consider how best to engage bilaterally in the region and with ASEAN to support peace building and sustainable solutions while also advancing Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Annexes

Annex I: Timeline of the Rohingya and Myanmar crises

YearCanada’s response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crisesCornerstones
2017
  • Appointment of Special Envoy Bob Rae
  • Announcement of the Myanmar Crisis Relief Fund
Key events related to the Rohingya and Myanmar crisesInternational responses
August 2017: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army launches coordinated attacks on security forces in Rakhine State. This marks the start of a mass exodus of Rohingya to BangladeshAugust–December 2017: Myanmar military begins carrying out a brutal campaign of violence against the Rohingya population, involving widespread killings, rape, arson and other human rights abuses
2018
  • Report published by Bob Rae
  • Phase 1 ofCanada’s Strategy released
International responses
August 2018: United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar releases a report accusing the Myanmar military of genocide, calling for the prosecution of top military officials
2019International responses
November 2019: The Gambia files a legal case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice, accusing the country of genocide against the Rohingya population
2020Key events related to the Rohingya and Myanmar crisesInternational responses
January 2020: ICJ orders provisional measures to protect the Rohingya population, including the prevention of genocidal acts and the preservation of evidenceNovember 2020: Myanmar holds general elections, and the National League for Democracy wins a majority
2021
  • Budget 2021 announced Phase 2 of the Strategy ($288.3M)
  • Canada issues advisory on doing business with Myanmar-related entities
Key events related to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises
February 2021: The Myanmar military stages a coup, overthrowing the civilian government and arresting political leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi
2022- PresentKey events related to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises
Ongoing: As of December 2023, Canada has imposed 9 rounds of sanctions against Myanmar post-coup.
Ongoing: The Rohingya and Myanmar crises continue, with ever greater levels of human rights violations, internally displaced persons, violence, oppression, lawlessness and poverty in Myanmar

Note: This timeline provides a general overview of the Rohingya and Myanmar Crises and Canada’s response and is not exhaustive. The situation is complex and continues to evolve.

Annex II: Canada’s Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy budget vs. actuals by stream and phase

Below is a comparison of budgeted amounts and actual expenditures for the 3 main ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ streams funded through Canada’s Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy Envelope for Phase 1 (2018-21) and Phase 2 (2021-23).

Note: Amounts are in Canadian dollars.

Figure 12: Phase 1 (2018-21), Budgeted Amounts Vs. Actuals by Streams

Figure 12
Text version

Development:

Budget (M$) – $155 M
Actual (M$) – $155 M

Humanitarian:

Budget (M$) – $124 M
Actual (M$) – $124 M

Peace and Security:

Budget (M$) – $21 M
Actual (M$) – $19 M

Figure 13: Phase 2 (2021-23), Budgeted Amounts Vs. Actuals by Streams*

Figure 13
Text version

Development:

Budget (M$) – $228 M
Actual (M$) – $167 M

Peace and Security:

Budget (M$) – $24 M
Actual (M$) – $13 M

*Note: Actual expenditures reflect funds disbursed to date (up to November 2023), given that Phase 2 continues until March 2024 and is therefore only 2/3 complete.

Figure 14: Complementary Humanitarian Assistance During Phase 2*

Figure 14
Text version

Humanitarian:

Actual (M$) - $50 M

*Note: While Phase 2 did not provide dedicated funding for humanitarian assistance, it was complemented by $50.49M disbursed up to November 2023 by ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s International Humanitarian Assistance Division in Myanmar and Bangladesh, in accordance with needs.

Annex III: Donor scan: Humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh

A scan of a sample of like-minded donors to the Rohingya Crisis Joint Response Plans (JRPs)* in Bangladesh revealed an overall complementarity of donor approaches but also a trend of declining humanitarian funding over the evaluation period. Canada remained a top bilateral humanitarian donor, and one of the few countries with a dedicated Strategy. This is in addition to significant contributions from the Government of Bangladesh, including US$50.6M in funding for the 2018-23 JRPs from and its efforts in hosting refugees.

Note: These numbers retrieved in November 2023 represent contributions to the JRPs and may not fully reflect Canada’s humanitarian contributions (detailed more fully in Annex II) due to differences in UN reporting systems.

CountryStrategy or ApproachDonor funding to JRP 2018-23Funding trends 2018Funding trends 2023

United States

The United States led among donors on humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees and host communities in Bangladesh, including water, health, education and shelter, and advocating for a lasting solution for a safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees.

Rank: 1st

US$ 1,562M total funding

47% decrease in overall funding

$239M

$127M

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom focused on providing vital humanitarian services to Rohingya refugees and host communities in Bangladesh in the areas of protection, health, GBV and SRHR, and clean energy provision, while advocating for a safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation when conditions allow.

Rank: 2nd

US $389M total funding

65% decrease in overall funding

$94M

$33M

European union

Through the UN and international NGOs, the EU focused on needs-based humanitarian aid to Rohingya refugees and host communities in Bangladesh in the areas of water, sanitation, food health, protection and education, while supporting development activities.

Rank: 3rd

US $248M total funding

13% decrease in overall funding

$47M

$41M

Australia

Australia focused on providing humanitarian assistance to both Rohingya refugees and host communities through multilateral organizations and NGOs, including in the areas of food, health and resilience, as well as advocacy to encourage a safe return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar.

Rank: 4th

US $216M total funding

42% increase in overall funding

$24M

$34M

Japan

Japan focused on humanitarian support to Rohingya refugees and host communities in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char in the areas of life-saving assistance and relief, health, protection, environment and improvement of living conditions through multilateral agencies and Japanese NGOs.

Rank: 5th

US $182M total funding

33% decrease in overall funding

$43M

$29M

Canada

Through its multi-phase strategy and the FIAP, Canada provided life-saving humanitarian aid and development programming to Rohingya refugees and host communities in Bangladesh in the areas of health, education, livelihoods, and GEWE, while advocating for more livelihood opportunities.

Rank: 6th

US $103M total funding

19% decrease in overall funding

$21M

$17M

Germany

Germany focused on multi-year humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees and host communities in Cox’s Bazar in the areas of life-saving assistance, food, nutrition and livelihood support, mainly through multilateral organizations and by supporting the GoB. Germany underlined the need for safe voluntary and dignified repatriation and central role of the UNHCR in the process.

Rank: 7th

US $98M total funds to JRP

50% decrease in overall funding

$14M

$7M

Republic of Korea

In Bangladesh, the Republic of Korea, through the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), focused on providing humanitarian assistance to Rohingyas refugees in camps and host communities in the areas of food and non-food assistance and protection.

Rank: 15th

US $18M total funds to JRP

25% decrease in overall funding

$4M

$3M

Annex IV: Donor scan: Humanitarian assistance to Myanmar and political crisis

A scan of a sample of like-minded donors to the Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plans (MHRPs)* and similar plans revealed an overall complementarity of donor approaches, often including condemnation of the military regime following the 2021 coup, and a trend of increased humanitarian funding over the evaluation period. Canada remained a major bilateral humanitarian donor and one of the few countries with a dedicated strategy.

*Note: These numbers retrieved in November 2023 represent contributions to the MHRPs and may not fully reflect Canada’s humanitarian contributions (detailed more fully in Annex II) due to differences in UN reporting systems.

CountryStrategy or ApproachDonor funding to MHRP 2018-23Funding trends 2018Funding trends 2023

United States

Through the BURMA Act, the United States focused on humanitarian assistance to Rohingyas in Myanmar, support for justice and accountability for crimes committed and a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The United States imposed sanctions and condemned the military junta.

Rank: 1st

US $427M total funding

79% increase in overall funding

$34M

$61M

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) focused on providing humanitarian aid to Rohingyas in Myanmar, accountability and sanctions against the military regime and brokering a peaceful and political solution for there turn of Rohingya refugees.The UK imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar.

Rank: 2nd

US $120M total funding

425% increase in overall funding

$4M

$21M

Japan

Japan focused on providing humanitarian aid to Rohingyas in Myanmar through multilateral organizations and has not imposed sanctions on Myanmar. The NUG and other actors have recently urged Japan to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on Myanmar’s military.

Rank: 3rd

US $114M total funding

250% increase in overall funding

$10M

$35M

European union

The EU focused on humanitarian aid to Rohingyas in Myanmar, support for justice and accountability for the crimes committed in Myanmar and a political solution to the crisis, while imposing targeted sanctions and condemning the violent rule of Myanmar’s military junta.

Rank: 4th

US $109M total funding

59% increase in overall funding

$11M

$18M

Germany

Germany focused on multi-year humanitarian and development aid to Rohingyas in Myanmar, particularly through multilateral organizations, while supporting international justice and accountability efforts and a peaceful political solution to the crisis.

Rank: 5th

US $102M total funding

32% increase in overall funding

$13M

$17M

Australia

Australia focused on humanitarian aid to Rohingyas in Myanmar, sanctions against Myanmar, and advocacy along side like-minded countries and ASEAN for the protection of minorities, an end to violence and a return to democratic rule in Myanmar.

Rank: 6th

US $84M total funding

113% increase in overall funding

$9M

$20M

Canada

Canada focused on providing humanitarian and development aid, and encouraging positive political developments in Myanmar, in particular by supporting federalism, ensuring accountability for crimes, and enhancing international cooperation to address the Rohingya crisis.

Rank: 10th

US $30M total funding

166% increase in overall funding

$3M

$8M

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea focused on providing humanitarian aid to Rohingyas in Myanmar and condemned the military coup and violence, urged the return to democracy, and stopped bilateral development projects. The Republic of Korea also suspended defence exchanges and banned arms exports to Myanmar, but did not impose economic sanctions beyond these measures.

Rank: 16th

US $8M total funding

280% increase in overall funding

$0.5M

$2M

Annex V: Top 10 donors in Myanmar and Bangladesh - Total ODA vs Rohingya response

Donor funding to the Rohingya Crisis Joint Response Plans (JRPs)* in Bangladesh and Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plans (MHRPs) and similar plans in Myanmar provide an important measure of international engagement in response to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises. However, contributions to these humanitarian response plans may not fully reflect the funding provided to the crises due to limitations in UN reporting systems, and their omission of (or potential overlap with) development programming. Total net official development assistance (ODA) funding provides an alternative measure of the level donor engagement, and the tables below list the top 10 donors in each country by total humanitarian response plan funding compared to total ODA funding (although this includes bilateral assistance that may not be specific to the Rohingya crisis).

Top 10 donors in Bangladesh

Total JRP funding (2018-23)

Total ODA funding (2018-22) *

1

United States: US$1,562M

Japan: US$8,958M

2

United Kingdom: US$389M

United States: US$1,897M

3

European Union: US$248M

United Kingdom: US$1,131M

4

Australia: US$216M

European Union: US$1,050M

5

Japan: US$182M

Germany: US$789M

6

Canada: US$103M

France: US$604M

7

Germany: US$98M

South Korea:US$601M

8

Bangladesh: US$51M

Canada: US$449M

9

Sweden: US$50M

Australia: US$399M

10

Norway: US$49M

Sweden: US$269M

Top 10 donors in Myanmar
Total MHRP funding (2018-23)Total ODA funding (2018-22) *
1United States: US$427MJapan: US$3,140M
2United Kingdom: US$120MUnited States: US$804M
3Japan: US$114MUnited Kingdom: US$610M
4European Union: US$109MEuropean Union: US$565M
5Germany: US$102MAustralia: US$328M
6Australia: US$84MSouth Korea:US$326M
7Sweden: US$36MGermany: US$275M
8Switzerland: US$31MSwitzerland: US$238M
9Denmark: US$30.3MSweden: US$207M
10Canada: US$30MCanada: US$174M

*Note: While JRP and MHRP funding data was available up to 2023, ODA data was only available until 2022 (source: OECD, 2022. Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions – total net).

Annex VI: Evaluation findings corresponding to the evaluation questions

Evaluation IssuesQuestionsCorresponding evaluation findings (page numbers in the PDF version)
Results, Delivery, EffectivenessQ1.What have been the key results of Canada’s Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy?Pages 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26
1.1. To what extent did the Strategy achieve its intended results?Pages 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26
1.2. What have been the key enabling or limiting factors for the effective implementation of the Strategy?Pages 22, 23, 24, 25, 26
RelevanceQ2.To what extent has Canada’s engagement through the Rohingya and Myanmar Strategy responded to the complex and evolving needs related to the crises?Pages 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27
2.1. How has Canada’s engagement through the Strategy leveraged foreign policy and diplomacy services, development, humanitarian assistance, and peace and security efforts to respond to the complex and evolving needs related to the crises?Pages 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27
2.2. What international practices and key lessons can inform Canada’s response to the crises?Pages 18, 22, 25, 26, 27

Annex VII: Evaluation findings corresponding to the evaluation recommendations

RecommendationsCorresponding evaluation findings (page numbers in PDF version)
1. In Canada’s response to the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, focus on efforts to improve Rohingya refugees’ self-reliance while still pursuing complementary solutions to repatriation, as well as addressing humanitarian needs.Pages 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27
2. Identify ways for Canada to target the underlying causes of the conflict and political instability in Myanmar and support lasting solutions to the Myanmar and Rohingya crises.Pages 22, 23, 24
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