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Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE) – Briefing material

2020-03-12

Table of contents

Canada–Africa relations

Supplementary messages

Update

Prime Minister Trudeau led a delegation, including yourself, and Ministers Ng and Hussen to Ethiopia and Senegal in February 2020.  All told, over the past two months, the Prime Minister, you, Parliamentary Secretary Oliphant, the Minister of International Development, the Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade as well as the Minister of Families, Children and Social Development have visited 11 countries in Africa.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada’s Arctic sovereignty

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

No one disputes Canada’s sovereignty over the lands and islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The only exception is tiny Hans Island between Ellesmere Island and Greenland, which is claimed by Denmark.

The waters of the archipelago, including the waters of the “Northwest Passage,” are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title, and thus Canada has full sovereignty over them. For greater clarity, in 1986 Canada drew straight baselines around the archipelago. According to the Oceans Act, all waters landward of baselines are internal waters and form part of Canada.

Under International Law, no right of transit passage by foreign vessels exists through internal waters. The U.S., however, disputes Canada’s characterization of the Northwest Passage as internal waters and considers the passage to be a strait used for internal navigation, in which a right of transit passage exists. This dispute is well managed, including through the Arctic Cooperation Agreement, under which the U.S. has committed to seek, and expects Canada to grant, consent to voyages by U.S. icebreakers through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

Under international law, Canada has sovereign rights over resources of the seabed and subsoil of its continental shelf, including as it extends beyond 200 nautical miles. Filing a continental shelf submission is the first step in the process that will clarify the outer limits of where these rights can be exercised.

Canada is working to resolve the (limited) maritime boundary dispute in the Lincoln Sea and the dispute over Hans Island through the Canada-Denmark Joint Task Force on Boundary Issues, established in May 2017. The Beaufort Sea dispute with the U.S. continues to be well managed and will be resolved in due course, in accordance with international law.

Brexit

Supplementary messages

Update

The U.K. has ceased to be a Member State and no longer has representation in the EU’s institutions since February 1, 2020.  The U.K. has entered into a transition period lasting until December 31, 2020 (with a possibility of a one-off extension for one or two years, although PM Johnson has said there will be no extension) during which the U.K. will be bound by the entire body of EU law, including any new laws that enter into force during that period.  It will also continue to contribute to the EU budget and be bound by the EU’s four freedoms, i.e. freedom of movement for people, goods, capital, and services. In return, the U.K. retains unfettered access to the EU single market and customs union for the duration of the transition period.

It is hoped that during the transition period, the EU and the U.K. will be able to finalize the terms of their future relationship, including in areas such as trade, air transport, data sharing, and security cooperation. The U.K. and the EU have each published their negotiating objectives ahead of talks, scheduled to begin on March 2, 2020.

Supporting facts and figures

Canada–CARICOM relations

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

China

China consular cases

Mr. Huseyincan Celil

ATIP protected background

[REDACTED]

Canada’s approach to China, including Canada’s One China Policy

Supplementary messages

Update

GAC officials, in consultation with other departments, continue to examine Canada’s approach to relations with China.

Supporting facts and figures

Human rights and religious freedom in China

Supplementary messages

Update

Canada continues to raise human rights concerns as a priority in its engagement with China. Some key issues are the human rights situations in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Ethnic minorities, human rights defenders and religious groups face repression and persecution from Chinese authorities. In particular, ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet face increasing restrictions against their rights and freedoms (religion, language, culture, expression and movement) and are subject to forced patriotic education. There are credible reports that as many as one million or more Uyghurs and other Muslims are being detained, because of their ethnicity or religion. Large-scale protests erupted in Hong Kong in 2019 in response to changes proposed by the Hong Kong authorities to its extradition laws that would have allowed case-by-case extradition to all jurisdictions, including mainland China. Despite the announcement that the extradition bill was suspended on June 15, 2019 and fully withdrawn on October 23, protests have continued with broader demands and increasingly violent clashes between a minority of protesters and security forces.

Meng Wanzhou arrest and u.s. extradition request

Supplementary messages

Update

Ms. Meng’s double criminality hearing occurred from Jan 20 to 24, 2020.

For Canada to extradite an individual, the foreign charges must amount to a criminal offence in Canada (dual criminality).

The Attorney General of Canada argued that the U.S. extradition request emphasizes that Ms. Meng’s actions in the U.S. constitute fraud and therefore, double criminality exists as her actions would be considered illegal pursuant to the Criminal Code in Canada.

Ms. Meng’s defence argues that the focus of the extradition request is on sanctions violations, which do not apply in Canada, so double criminality is not present.

Justice Heather Holmes, the B.C. Supreme Court Judge presiding over the double criminality hearing, has reserved decision: the timing of her decision is at her discretion.

If the judge decides that the conditions for double criminality are fulfilled, then hearings will proceed. If the judge finds that there is no double criminality, Ms. Meng would be free to go. The Attorney General of Canada would have the option to appeal the court’s decision.

Ms. Meng’s extradition process will also include a hearing on a defence motion regarding abuse of process, and a committal hearing: both are expected to take place later this year. From the day of her arrest, Ms. Meng has had full access to Chinese consular assistance as well as her lawyers.

5G review

Supplementary messages

Update

The security of 5G wireless systems has been at the forefront of domestic and international media stories. Canada’s Five Eyes partners have all made public announcements on how they plan to protect 5G wireless telecommunications networks. The United States has been the most vocal on this issue, strongly encouraging countries to carefully weigh the security considerations of 5G technology. On 28 January 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) announced that high risk vendors would be excluded from the sensitive elements of their networks, and limited to a minority presence in the less sensitive elements of its networks.

Canada-China agriculture trade

Supplementary messages

Canola

Meat (including pork and beef)

COVID-19 and Impact on Agriculture Trade

RESPONSIVE – if asked about the impact of the U.S.-China Phase One deal on Canadian agriculture exports

Background

Canada-China Trade: China is Canada’s third-largest trading partner, after the U.S. and the EU (in 2019, 75.4% of Canada’s total exports went to the U.S., 8.1% to the EU, and 3.9% to China). In 2019, two-way merchandise trade between Canada and China fell slightly to $98.2 billion ($23.3 billion in Canadian exports and $75 billion in imports). Top exports were wood pulp, motor cars and vehicles for transporting persons, iron ores and concentrates, and copper ores and concentrates. Top imports from China included electronic machinery and equipment, data processing machinery, furniture, and toys. Canadian merchandise trade deficit with China increased by 8.1 percent from $47.9 billion in 2018 to $51.7 billion in 2019.

Canola:Canada’s canola seed exports to China have since fallen by 70% from January to December 2019, compared to the same period in 2018. WTO consultations took place on October 28, 2019. Face-to-face technical meetings to discuss China’s canola seed quarantine and inspection methodology took place in Beijing from December 18-20, 2019. Canada is assessing the information provided by China and considering next steps, including at the WTO. The next set of technical discussions set to take place in early 2020 are likely to be postponed due to the outbreak of COVID-19.

Pork and Beef: Despite the June 25 to November 5 pause in meat shipments to China, 2019 was an unprecedented year for Canadian pork exports to China with exports increasing 28.1%, becoming Canada’s 15th largest export to China.On November 5, 2019, China advised that it would once again accept export certificates to eligible establishments for compliant beef and pork products processed on or after November 5, resulting in the resumption of trade.

China-U.S. “Phase One” Trade Deal: The “Phase One” deal entered into force on February 14, 2020. The deal includes a chapter on agriculture and food trade, as well as chapters on intellectual property (IP), technology transfer, financial services, macroeconomic policy and exchange rates, expanding trade, and dispute resolution.

COVID-19 Economic Impacts: It is difficult to estimate the overall commercial impact of the outbreak on Canadian agriculture exports to China. Impacted agriculture sectors include live lobster; other seafood, including crabs; and meat, due to severe limitations of port operating capacity and consumer demand in China.

Regional maritime tensions

Supplementary messages

Update

In recent years, Beijing has pursued a more assertive policy to defend its claims in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) through persistent incursions by Chinese coast guard and militia fishing vessels in disputed waters, including off the coasts of Indonesia, Japan and Vietnam. Tensions between the U.S. and China have escalated concurrently, as the U.S. has increased the frequency of its “Freedom of Navigation Operations” (FONOPs) to challenge China’s claims. Canada does not have a FONOPs program and has never participated in a U.S. FONOP. However, Canadian navy ships regularly traverse the SCS and ECS when deployed in the Asia-Pacific and operate in areas where the freedom of navigation regime applies.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan have competing maritime and territorial claims in the SCS. Indonesia, while not a claimant, is affected by China’s claims which run through its territorial waters near the Natuna Islands. In the ECS, the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu by China), which are controlled by Japan but also claimed by China, have been a point of significant tension between the two regional powers.

China's claims in the SCS are often characterized by a "nine-dash line," which covers over 80 percent of the SCS, and are part of its efforts to secure its periphery. China has now constructed seven significant military bases on disputed features in the SCS, including the construction of airstrips capable of supporting fighter aircraft and strategic bombers.

Unilateral actions in the SCS, such as China’s large-scale land reclamation and the building of outposts, are eroding the rules-based international order. As a Pacific nation, it is in our national interest to maintain the open and accessible nature of this maritime artery as Canada continues to expand its commercial engagement across Southeast Asia. Vietnam will take over chairmanship of ASEAN in 2020 and will likely use this opportunity to highlight concerns regarding China’s actions in the SCS.

Consular cases

Supplementary messages

Clemency - Canadians facing the death penalty abroad

Atip protected background

[REDACTED]

Coronavirus

Supplementary messages

Update

A number of countries and territories have begun screening travellers arriving from China. Travellers returning to Canada from areas affected by the COVID-19 outbreak, particularly from Hubei Province, should be attentive to messages and instructions being provided at Canadian airports. They will be asked about their travel history and may be asked further questions about their health. The Public Health Agency of Canada is actively monitoring the situation and working with the WHO and other international partners to gather additional information.

There are several active travel health notices for COVID-19. Each country or area may have different levels of risk. These risk levels may change as the COVID-19 event evolves internationally.

In Iran, there are indicators that suggest widespread community transmission is occurring. Confirmed cases that are linked to Iran are being reported in other countries, including Canada, and more are expected. It is recommended that Canadians avoid all non-essential travel to Iran. Travellers who get ill while travelling in Iran may have limited access to timely and appropriate health care.

In South Korea, the risk to travellers is particularly high in the areas of Daegu and Cheongdo. These areas have reported widespread community transmission of the virus. It is recommended that Canadians avoid all non-essential travel to Daegu and Cheongdo.

It is also recommended that Canadians avoid all non-essential travel to northern Italy which includes the regions of Aosta Valley, Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige.

Supporting facts and figures

CUSMA / aluminum / softwood lumber

Supplementary messages

CUSMA timelines for ratification

Supply Management

Softwood Lumber

Aluminum Import Monitoring

Background

CUSMA Implementation Timelines

Implementing legislation (Bill C-4) was introduced in the House of Commons on January 29, 2020. The Bill was studied by the Standing Committee on International Trade and reported back to the House of Commons on February 27, 2020. The report stage is expect to begin the week of March 9, during which amendments may be brought forward, debated and a voted upon. This will be followed by Third Reading debate and a vote. Once approved, the Bill will then be sent to the Senate. In the United States, President Trump signed the implementing legislation into law on January 29, 2020. In Mexico, the Senate approved the original Agreement and amending protocol on June 21 and December 12, 2019, respectively. Given the requirements of the U.S. certification process, Mexico intends to submit a package of legislative changes to Congress for review and approval before the end of the session on April 30, 2020.

Supply Management

Under the CUSMA, the Government maintained the three pillars of Canada's supply management system for dairy, poultry and eggs - production control, pricing mechanisms, and import control - despite strong U.S. attempts to dismantle them.

As part of the negotiated outcome, Canada agreed, among other things, to provide additional market access to the United States for certain dairy, poultry, and egg products; to ensure the elimination of current milk price classes 6 and 7, with certain products being priced using a new pricing formula; to monitor exports of skim milk powder, milk protein concentrates and infant formula and impose charges to exports that exceed certain thresholds; and to publish, notify and consult on various aspects of milk class pricing.

The Government is committed to supporting farmers and processors in the supply management sectors as they adjust to the loss of market share. Following the signing of CUSMA in the fall of 2018, the Government created working groups comprised of representatives from supply-managed industries. There were three working groups, two with dairy farmers and processors and one with poultry and egg farmers and processors. The Dairy Mitigation Working Group and the Poultry and Egg Working Group have concluded their discussions and their recommendations have been shared with the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food. The Dairy Strategic Working Group has met twice and its work remains ongoing.

In Budget 2019, the Government of Canada made a commitment to support farmers in the supply-managed sectors following ratifications of new trade agreements. Budget 2019 proposed up to $3.9 billion to support eligible dairy, poultry and egg producers for CETA and CPTPP.

On August 16, 2019 further details of the Budget 2019 commitments were announced, a total of $2 billion in compensation for dairy producers, including $345 million this fiscal year through the Dairy Direct Payment Program was announced. This amount includes the previously announced $250 million for the Dairy Farm Investment Program.

On February 14, 2020, 抖淫视频 launched a second phase of public consultations on policy options related to the allocation and administration of TRQs for dairy, poultry and egg products.

The department currently administers 38 TRQs for supply-managed commodities under various trade agreements. Following the implementation of the Canada-United-States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), this would increase to 54 TRQs.

Given the significant increase in TRQs, the department undertook a broad-based, two-phased, 18-month engagement exercise to hear from stakeholders.

The objective of the consultations is to create long-term policies to ensure the continued efficiency and effectiveness of Canada’s TRQs for these supply-managed products.

Softwood Lumber

Canada has three ongoing challenges under the original NAFTA Chapter 19 binational panel dispute settlement system related to U.S. trade remedy investigations on softwood lumber.  Specifically, they are related to: 1) The U.S. Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) final countervailing duty determination on softwood lumber; 2) Commerce’s final anti-dumping duty determination on softwood lumber; and 3) The U.S. International Trade Commission’s (ITC) final determination of material injury on softwood lumber. Panels established under Chapter 19 review whether these determinations are consistent with U.S. trade law. On September 4, 2019, the Panel ruling on Canada’s injury challenge issued its decision, and found that several key issues that are central to the U.S. ITC’s determination of material injury were not based on substantial evidence, and were inconsistent with U.S. law. This decision, while not immediately putting an end to the punitive U.S. duties, was an important step in the right direction. On December 19, 2019, the ITC upheld its affirmative determination of material injury to the U.S. industry by providing new reasoning and analysis on some of the issues. Canada filed its submission challenging the redetermination before the same NAFTA Chapter 19 panel on February 6. The ITC and any participant filing in support of the determination on remand have until March 24 to respond. Canada and the U.S. continue to be engaged in discussions regarding panel composition for the countervailing and anti-dumping cases.

Aluminum Monitoring

Without an aluminum “smelted and poured” provision in CUSMA similar to steel, the Canadian aluminum industry is concerned that non-originating offshore aluminum will enter North America via Mexico and undermine the CUSMA 70% aluminum requirement for autos at the expense of U.S. and Canadian aluminum producers. While there has been no evidence of aluminum being transshipped into the U.S. through Mexico, industry is concerned that transshipment is a real threat and have called for Mexico to implement an aluminum import monitoring system. Canada will work with the United States and Mexico to monitor offshore aluminum imports into North America, with a focus on ensuring that such imports do not undermine measures such as the U.S. aluminum s. 232 tariff (Canada and Mexico are exempt from that tariff).

Export permits and LAVs

Supplementary messages

Update

The review of all arms exports to Saudi Arabia continues.  It includes an assessment of the sale of LAVs to Saudi Arabia.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Canada’s export controls regime is set out in the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA), which delegates to the Minister of Foreign Affairs wide discretionary powers to control the flow of goods and technology contained in specified lists (e.g. the Export Control List or ECL) created under the EIPA.

Canada’s export controls are not meant to hinder international trade, but to regulate and impose restrictions on exports in response to clear policy objectives. These objectives include ensuring that Canadian export controls are consistent with Canada’s foreign and defence policies, including respect for human rights and international peace and security.

The ECL includes military, dual-use and strategic goods and technology that are controlled for export from Canada to other countries. The ECL is comprised of eight groups of goods and technology that are based primarily on Canada’s participation in multilateral export control and non-proliferation regimes: the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group.

The Government committed to further strengthening the rigour and transparency of Canada’s export controls. To this end, Canada amended the EIPA to allow Canada to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). These amendments and associated regulations (on brokering and transparency) came into force on Sept. 1, 2019. Canada officially became a State Party to the ATT on Sept. 17, 2019.

Former Bill C-47 created a new legal requirement that the Minister of Foreign Affairs must deny export permits applications for sales of arms or munitions if he or she has determined that there is a substantial risk that the export would be used to undermine peace and security; to seriously violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law; to further international organized crime or terrorism; or to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

Feminist foreign policy

Supplementary messages

Update

Departmental preparations for civil society engagement are ongoing further to your commitment enunciated during your February 21st speech at the Montreal Council on Foreign Relations.   

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Canada has positioned its feminist foreign policy (FFP) as an effective approach to address its overarching international objectives of supporting lasting peace and security, fostering sustainable development and inclusive economic growth, achieving the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, and upholding progressive values. While gender equality and inclusion have long been an important aspect of Canadian foreign policy, a feminist foreign policy has gone further by applying a feminist lens across all of Canada’s international policy, advocacy and program efforts in trade, security, diplomacy, and international assistance. This means that policy and program efforts should focus on addressing fundamental structural and normative barriers preventing gender equality and inclusion, taking into account the needs of those most affected by multiple forms of discrimination. Some highlights of Canada’s achievements include: hosting the 2019 Women Deliver Conference; integrating gender equality in all areas of G7 work during our 2018 Presidency; appointing an Ambassador for WPS; including Trade and Gender chapters and gender-responsive provisions in our free trade agreements; and continuing to invest in our Feminist International Assistance Policy.

Incidents in Cuba affecting Canadian diplomats

Supplementary messages

Update

Supporting facts and figures

Canada-India bilateral relations

Supplementary messages

Update

The visit of Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar to Ottawa on December 19-20, 2019, was an opportunity to deepen the bilateral relationship across trade and investment, gender equality, environment and climate change, and peace and security.

Supporting facts and figures

International security, democracy and human rights

Canada’s contribution to UN peace operations

Supplementary messages

Update

The effectiveness of UN peace operations is being undermined by persistent resource shortfalls and gaps in mission-critical capabilities. UN missions are struggling to achieve coherent whole-of-system approaches that make best use of UN resources across missions, programs, funds and agencies. The UNSG is appealing to Member States to help address the most urgent needs.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

At the November 2017 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial (UNPKM) in Vancouver, Canada made several commitments to UN peacekeeping. Subsequently, at the 2019 UNPKM in New York, Canada confirmed its intent to honour its outstanding commitments. Further, Canada announced $45.37 million in new support for UN peace operations.

Military capabilities: Canada promoted the “smart pledge” approach at the 2017 UNPKDM, which encourages Member States to work together to make critical capabilities available to the UN on a more reliable, sustained and predictable basis through contingent rotations and burden-sharing.

From 15 August 2018 to 31 August 2019, Canada deployed an Aviation Task Force (ATF) in support to MINUSMA. Canada’s ATF was composed of two Chinook heavy lift helicopters, four Griffon armed escort helicopters and 250 military personnel. The ATF’s main tasks were to provide 24/7 aeromedical evacuation capability to MINUSMA in the region of Gao, as well as logistics and transport support. Romania assumed these ATF tasks in the fall of 2019.

Canada currently provides a military aircraft and crew on an episodic basis to the UN Regional Service Centre Entebbe (RSCE) in Uganda to transport troops, equipment and supplies to select UN missions in Africa (UNMISS and MONUSCO). Canada currently provides the UN with one week of flying time per month. The feasibility of transitioning to a full-time TAL is under review.

Canada committed to deploy a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) built around a mechanized infantry company and associated enablers. Officials are reviewing potential options for a QRF deployment that responds to UN needs.

Police Deployments: In July 2019, Canada announced its contribution of up to 20 police officers to Mali, in support of MINUSMA and the EU’s civilian capacity-building mission. As of February 2020, 17 Canadian police are serving in Mali: 15 officers (6 women, 9 men) with MINUSMA and 2 officers (2 men) with the EU mission. Three additional officers (3 men) serve in the UN mission in Haiti, BINUH.

Innovative Training: Canada is working with the UN and other partners to match available resources with needs, leveraging GAC programmatic resources, as well as civilian, police and military experts personnel.

The Vancouver Principles (VPs): The VPs are a set of political commitments by Member States, intended to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers in the context of UN peace operations. As of February 2020, 95 Member States have endorsed the VPs. Canada developed Implementation Guidance for the VPs (IGVP) to assist Member States in developing national policies, procedures and doctrine to operationalize the VPs. The IGVP was launched by the Minister of National Defence on 25 June 2019.

The Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations:

The Elsie Initiative is a five-year pilot project to increase the meaningful participation of uniformed women in UN peace operations, specifically in police and military roles. Significant progress has been made in designing and implementing the Initiative, including: establishing bilateral partnerships with the Ghana Armed Forces and Zambia Police Service; working with the UN to launch the UN’s Elsie Initiative Fund for Women in Peace Operations, which has received 30 letters of interest and contributions of over $20M USD since March 2019 (Canada has provided $15M CAD); supporting the development of a ground-breaking barrier assessment methodology for police and military organizations; and providing $4.5M to help the UN create more receptive environments for peacekeepers, and to implement its Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy.

Atip protected background

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Canada’s foreign policy on security, human rights and democracy

Supplementary messages

[Additional Responsive if needed:]

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Human rights are entwined with pressing global issues—among both their causes and effects.  Migration is often driven by violations of rights, such as the rights to life, to security of person, or to an adequate standard of living.  Emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, while providing new opportunities, can also lead to violations and abuses of rights, such as freedom of expression.  Counterterrorism measures are used by some regimes to justify or mask rights violations under the guise of “national security”. Climate change may threaten people’s economic, social and cultural rights, by creating shortages of food, water, and adequate housing. 

Canada leads on UN human rights resolutions related to Iran; child, early and forced marriage; and violence against women.  Canada has played a leadership role in protecting the rights of LGBTQ2 individuals, recently co-chairing the Equal Rights Coalition and hosting a conference on LGBTI Human Rights in Vancouver in 2018.  In July 2019, Canada co-hosted, with the UK, the first Global Conference for Media Freedom in London focused on the protection of freedom of expression and the freedom of the press.  Canada has committed to hosting a follow-up conference on media freedom in Quebec City in September 2020, and is planning a UN resolution on freedom of expression at the Human Rights Council.

Canada’s National Action Plan and Ambassador for women, peace and security (WPS)

Supplementary messages

Update

The first annual report for Canada’s National Action Plan on WPS was tabled in Parliament in September 2018. The next report will be tabled in Parliament in April 2020. It will outline in detail the progress made to advance WPS in the last fiscal year (2018-19). The tabling of the report was delayed due to the election.

Canada’s WPS Ambassador, Jacqueline O’Neill, began her role in August 2019 and has spent the first months of the three-year mandate establishing the office as a key resource of the Government of Canada for enhancing the effective implementation of Canada’s National Action Plan on WPS. Ambassador O’Neill has provided recommendations and advice to the Prime Minister, Ministers, and Members of Parliament and the Senate on advancing WPS in Canada and abroad. She has met with all nine federal Action Plan partner departments and agencies at the Deputy Minister, senior management, and expert levels on ways to increase implementation of the Action Plan. Regular consultations with Canadian civil society have been instituted, and visits to countries (7) and multilateral organizations have been undertaken.

Supporting facts and figures

Bill to Amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act

Supplementary messages

Update

Canada co-sponsored the proposal to add the chemicals used in the Salisbury attacks (known as “Novichoks”) to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These chemicals are highly toxic and extremely dangerous. They have been used as a chemical weapon and must be treated as such. Canada’s adoption of these amendments would be an expected response to international calls for these dangerous chemicals to be controlled under the CWC. As the chemicals to be added have no use except as chemical weapons, there will be no impact on Canadian industry.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) seeks to completely eliminate and prohibit an entire category of weapon of mass destruction in a verifiable manner. The CWC's Annex on Chemicals includes three lists of chemicals (the "Schedules") that are subject to declaration and verification by the OPCW - these are the lists of possible chemical weapons and their precursors. Chemicals in Schedule 1 have no use in industry and thus are effectively banned for any purpose other than limited research and training for defense against such chemical weapons. Chemicals listed in Schedules 2 and 3 are used in industry and other non-prohibited activities.

At the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC, in November 2019, two binding decisions were adopted to add new toxic chemicals to Schedule 1. Among these chemicals are the family of "Novichok" type agents used in the attempted assassination of former British spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal in the UK in March 2018.

Iran

Iran-U.S. tensions

Supplementary messages

Update

A January 17, 2020 Friday Prayers speech by the Supreme Leader indicates that he expects the Quds force to carry on exerting regional influence and has provided them with religious justification for their actions. In that same speech, the Supreme Leader called the Quds Force “combatants without borders” who sacrifice their lives to assist the oppressed in the region.

Iran – human rights

Supplementary messages

Update

The general trends suggest that grievances in Iran continue to multiply, along social economic, ethnic, and political lines. While occasional protests are a regular occurrence in Iran, it is likely that a higher frequency of protests will become the norm in the near term. At the outset, the Iranian regime is likely to opt for technical measures over excessive force to repress protests, though will escalate to excessive force if the protests threaten Iran’s domestic stability. The Iranian regime often demonizes marginalized groups in the face of domestic instability, including targeting ethnic and religious minorities, women and sexual minorities, and other minority groups. There have been no significant improvements in the situation of human rights in Iran during President Rouhani’s two terms. If the recent February 2020 elections are an indication, the trends will continue to worsen.

Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Israeli settlements

Supplementary messages

Update

On 20 February, Prime Minister Netanyahu announced the advancement of construction and expansion procedures in two settlements, Givat HaMatos and Har Homa. On 25 February, the Israeli PM further announced that he had authorized construction in the controversial E1 area, to the east of East Jerusalem. These developments – if fully implemented – would hamper significantly the prospect of a two-state solution. By nearly encircling Jerusalem, the new and enhanced settlements would virtually eliminate the potential for Palestinian territorial contiguity between East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank region, and could sever the link between northern and southern halves of the West Bank (via the E1 corridor). The areas all fall within the zone earmarked by the US Peace Plan for Israeli annexation. While construction in these areas is not imminent, several international actors (EU, UK, France, Germany, Italy, UN Special Coordinator Mladenov) have expressed their concern.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

All Israeli governments since 1967, including the current one, have continued to build settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. In line with the broad international consensus, Canada views Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and a serious obstacle to peace.

In Israel, discussion of annexation (which Israelis often characterize as “applying sovereignty”) of parts of the West Bank has become increasingly commonplace, with PM Netanyahu vowing in September to do so if re-elected. The US, with the release of their Peace Plan in December, effectively endorsed Israel’s future annexation of parts of the West Bank, including all settlements and the Jordan Valley.

Jerusalem

Supplementary messages

Update

The Palestinians have long sought their future capital to be in East Jerusalem, however the recently-released US peace plan proposes a future Palestinian capital in eastern Jerusalem, falling well short of Palestinian aspirations. During Israel’s recent election campaign, PM Netanyahu pledged to push forward with the expansion of several settlement projects in and around Jerusalem, which would further diminish the Palestinian presence in, and connection to, Jerusalem. Several states have issued public statements criticizing the Israeli plans.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

As the international consensus on Jerusalem begins to weaken, Israel is continuing the expansion of settlements and challenging the status quo at the Old City’s holy sites, raising tensions between the city’s Jewish and Arab residents. While the US peace plan did not propose any change to the status quo at the holy sites (including the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif complex), the plan’s proposal for overall Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem would, if implemented, further erode the Palestinians’ claims to East Jerusalem, risking increased tensions and further violence.

Violence in Gaza

Supplementary messages

Update

On February 23 2020 Israeli forces attacked a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) team that was placing a bomb along the border fence between Gaza and Israel, killing one. Video of the body of the deceased being moved by an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) bulldozer circulated on social media, causing considerable anger. Multiple exchanges of rocket fire by PIJ and airstrikes by Israel followed. Hamas did not engage in this round of violence. A fragile ceasefire between PIJ and Israel was struck on February 24 2020.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

The population of Gaza faces high levels of acute vulnerability. Recurrent violence, severe restrictions on the movement of people and goods, limited economic growth, poor governance, and poverty have eroded Gazans’ resilience. Approximately 82 percent of the population require some form of humanitarian assistance. Unemployment rates are among the highest in the world, the majority of the population is food insecure and 96 percent of the groundwater in Gaza is unfit for human consumption. Against this backdrop, protests began in March 2018 as part of the “Great March of Return”. The resulting clashes have led to more than 250 Palestinians being killed and over 23,600 injured.

While the protests have since diminished in intensity, violence between groups in Gaza and Israel continues. An escalation of violence occurred in November 2019 following an Israeli airstrike that killed a senior PIJ commander and his wife. In response, approximately 500 rockets were launched into Israel by PIJ. Israel’s counterstrikes on targets in Gaza resulted in 34 deaths in Gaza and in 111 injuries.

Canada exercises enhanced due diligence for all humanitarian and development assistance for Palestinians. Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, is a listed terrorist organization. The Government of Canada has no contact with Hamas.

U.S. Middle East peace plan

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The US peace plan was released in its entirety on January 28, 2020. The plan addresses the key final status issues (Jerusalem, refugees, borders, recognition), however the plan strongly favours Israel, and crosses several Palestinian red-lines, with the result that the Palestinian Authority rejected it the same day it was released.

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Background

In engagements with likemindeds and others since the plan’s release, Canadian officials have been clear that Canada remains committed to supporting peace between the parties, but ultimately it is up to Israelis and Palestinians to reach an agreement through direct negotiations. International reactions to the plan were at first cautiously supportive of US efforts, however more recently several states and groups such as the EU, Arab League, and others have reiterated their support to the longstanding international consensus of a two-state solution based on 1967 lines, rather than the vision laid out in the US plan. Many observers have also indicated that the US plan may have the effect of shifting the baseline negotiating positions on the conflict in Israel’s favour, which could affect future negotiations between the parties.

International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into the “Situation in Palestine”

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Background

On December 20, 2019, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court decided to formally advance the investigation on the “Situation in Palestine” after finding that in her view, war crimes had been or are being committed in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza. However, due the contested legal issues surrounding territorial definitions in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, the prosecutor requested from the Pre-Trial Chamber, a ruling confirming whether the ICC has the jurisdiction to investigate in those territories.

Canada has expressed its position to the treaty depositary in January 2015 that it does not recognize a “State of Palestine” and it does not consider “Palestine” to be a party to the Rome Statute or to have any treaty relationship to Canada as a State Party. In the absence of a Palestinian State, it is Canada’s view that the Court does not have jurisdiction under international law. Canada further reaffirmed this position in 2018 and on February 14, 2020, Canada once again reiterated this position in a letter submitted to the ICC.

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Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)

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On February 12, 2020, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a list of 112 companies operating in Israeli settlements (no Canadian companies were listed). Canada had previously expressed concerns to the High Commissioner in writing.

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The BDS movement is a campaign founded in 2005 by Palestinian NGOs. The BDS movement "urges nonviolent pressure on Israel until it complies with international law by meeting three demands”: (i) Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the barrier between the West Bank and Israel; (ii) Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and (iii) Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194. Much of the movement is focused on university campuses in Europe and North America and includes academic and cultural boycotts.

Critics of the campaign argue that the BDS movement is antisemitic and promotes the de-legitimization of Israel. There are also more targeted calls for boycotts of products produced in Israeli settlements in the West Bank or the Palestinian boycott of Israeli goods sold in the West Bank.

Canada’s vote on Palestian self-determination

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Background

On November 19, 2019, Canada changed its vote from “No” to “Yes” on a resolution titled “The Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination” at the UN General Assembly. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 165Y-5N-9A. The only states to vote “No” were the US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Vanuatu. The resolution was co-sponsored by 129 countries including likeminded (EU, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Norway).

The resolution reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to an independent Palestinian state. As such, Canada voted in support of this resolution as it addresses the core issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely the right of both peoples to determine their own future. Canada strongly supports the international consensus on a two-state solution, so that both sides can have a secure and prosperous future.

Although we voted “Yes” on this single resolution, Canada maintains its position at the UN that there are too many resolutions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a situation which unfairly singles out Israel for criticism. We have thus maintained voting record on all other resolutions, voting overwhelmingly “No” on these Israel-related ones.

NATO

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Allies have been working to develop an agreed framework for NATO to undertake a ‘strategic reflection’ on the Alliance’s political dimension. At the Defence Ministers’ Meeting in February 2020, Allies agreed in principle to enhance NMI. In that same month, the Government of Iraq reaffirmed its support for NMI. NMI activities that have been temporarily suspended since January 3, 2020, and will resume when the NATO Military Authorities assess the environment to be safe and secure in Iraq to do so. NATO Foreign Ministers will next meet from April 2-3, 2020, at NATO HQ in Brussels.

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Official development assistance levels

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To enhance transparency and reporting on international assistance, Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 2 aligned the reporting timelines of the Bretton Woods and Related Agreements Act, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Agreement Act, and the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act, which made it possible for their reporting requirements to be met within a consolidated international assistance report, which is to be tabled in Parliament by March 31, 2020, and will be published on 抖淫视频’s website.

Final 2018-2019 figures will be included in this report, and in the Statistical Report on International Assistance.

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Physical security at missions abroad

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Rohingya – Canada’s response

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Repatriation of Rohingya remains highly unlikely in the short or medium term due to a sharp escalation in violence in Rakhine, displacing 60,000 since January 2019. Myanmar has instituted an internet shutdown in several conflict-affected townships. National elections in 2020 are expected to spark further ethno-nationalism and hate speech. Bangladesh has recently approved the delivery of formal education in Cox’s Bazar refugee camps using the Myanmar curriculum - a milestone for humanitarian response efforts. However, humanitarian and development assistance must persist. Bangladesh remains concerned about donor fatigue now 3+ years into the crisis.

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Canada’s gender-responsive development initiatives in Rakhine State promote inclusion and reconciliation through support for livelihoods, nutrition and inclusive governance. Development projects in Myanmar support efforts to counter sexual and gender-based violence, advance sexual and reproductive health and rights and strengthen women’s voice and leadership. Canada supports democratization and the peace process through a commitment of $7 million (from late 2016-early 2021) to the Joint Peace Fund. In Cox’s Bazar, Canada is providing multi-sector, life-saving humanitarian assistance in the camps, and advocates for education and self-reliance opportunities for refugees.

Russia/Ukraine

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Update – Conflict in Eastern Ukraine/Minsk Peace Process

Leaders of the “Normandy Four” (Ukraine, Russia, Germany, France) met in December 2019. While there were no major breakthroughs, the agreements appeared to serve as confidence-building measures. Another Summit was scheduled for April 2020, however, it has been unclear whether it will proceed.

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Canada’s sanctions regime

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On January 29, 2020, Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) Regulations to list six additional individuals to signal Canada’s continued condemnation of Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Background

Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA) allows Canada to target foreign nationals responsible for or complicit in gross violations of internationally-recognized human rights or acts of significant corruption. There are 70 individuals listed under the JVCFOA, including nationals from Venezuela, South Sudan, Myanmar, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Canadians are prohibited from dealing with listed individuals, effectively freezing their Canadian assets, and these individuals are inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) allows Canada to impose sanctions against a foreign state, individuals and entities related to that foreign state. Canada may impose sanctions under SEMA, either, when there has been a grave breach of international peace and security resulting in a serious international crisis, when an international organization calls on its members to impose sanctions, in cases of gross and systematic violations of human rights, or cases of significant corruption.

SEMA sanctions may include a dealings ban for a list of targeted individuals and/or entities, restrictions on trade, financial transactions or other economic activity. Canada uses humanitarian exemptions to mitigate unintended consequences and potentially adverse effects on vulnerable groups, such as women and girls. To maximize sanctions effectiveness, Canada seeks to coordinate sanctions with other countries (e.g., U.S, EU). There are SEMA sanctions on 11 countries: Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Nicaragua, DPRK, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.

When the UN Security Council determines an act of aggression or threat to or breach of the peace has occurred, it may decide what measures member states shall take to restore or maintain international peace and security. Canada enacts regulations under the United Nations Act to implement these decisions. There are 13 countries subject to UN sanctions (Central African Republic, Mali, DRC, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, DPRK, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen).

Budget 2018 announced $19.5 million to strengthen Canada's sanctions regime. 抖淫视频 is implementing this commitment through the establishment of a dedicated, centralized division for policy development, coordination with international partners, regulatory work, and increased engagement with domestic stakeholders.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia – Human rights

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Saudi Arabia’s ongoing human rights violations remain a predominant concern for Canada. According to Twitter posts by Ensaf Haidar, Raif Badawi was moved to a hospital in January 2020 after starting a second hunger strike, following a first hunger strike in November 2019. It is not known whether Mr. Badawi remains in hospital.

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Despite improvements in some areas, Saudi Arabia continues to perpetuate grave human rights violations. These include a high number of executions, the repression of political opposition, the application of corporal punishment, the suppression of freedom of expression, arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment of detainees, limitations on freedom of religion, ongoing discrimination against women and religious minorities, and the mistreatment of migrant workers. A number of civil society and human rights activists have been arrested since mid-2018; it is unclear how many remain in detention. Some of them are facing trials. These arrests provide further evidence that, despite modernization efforts, dissent is not tolerated in Saudi Arabia. Little is known about the trials as diplomats and international groups are barred from attending.

Raif Badawi, a Saudi blogger/activist, was arrested in 2012 on a charge of insulting Islam and brought to court on several charges, including apostasy. He remains in detention. Canada, along with several other likeminded countries and civil society, has advocated for Mr. Badawi, but our ability to discuss the case with Saudi officials is limited given the bilateral dispute. The Saudi government continues to reiterate that the situation is a "private rights" case, as it is a dispute between father and son.

Saudi Arabia – Bilateral dispute

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The bilateral relationship has been fractured since August 2018 and many Saudi punitive measures against Canada remain in place. Saudi Arabia’s ongoing human rights violations remain a predominant concern for Canada. Saudi Arabia assumed the Chair of the G20 in December 2019; the Leaders’ Summit is scheduled in November.

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No progress has yet been achieved in normalizing bilateral relations despite early ministerial-level discussions in 2018. Prime Minister Trudeau had a brief interaction with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the G20 Osaka Summit in June 2019. Minister Champagne briefly met his Saudi counterpart at the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in November 2019. Meetings in February 2020 between Canadian and Saudi officials (ambassadorial level) in Riyadh and in New York were positive and cordial.

At the core of Canada’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is a range of objectives: respect for human rights; international and regional security; and trade diversification and investment. Saudi Arabia’s poor record on human rights domestically and abroad and the humanitarian impact of its actions in Yemen continue to be problematic. However, KSA remains an integral and valued security partner, as well as the key regional bulwark against Iran’s expansionist ambitions and the threat these pose to global and regional security. Its presidency of the G20 is expected to increase Canadian civil society and media attention to the relationship and human rights in Saudi Arabia.

In November 2018 (after Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered), former Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland announced a review of arms exports to Saudi Arabia and imposed a moratorium on the issuance of new export permits for controlled goods and technology during the review period. Officials have found no credible evidence linking Canadian exports of military equipment or other controlled items to any IHRL and IHL violations committed by the Saudi government.

G20 2020 presidency

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Responsive – Attending G20 meetings under KSA Presidency

Update

Finance ministers and central bank governors, including Finance Minister Morneau and Bank of Canada Governor Poloz, attended the first ministerial meeting of the 2020 G20 Presidency in Riyadh on 22-23 February.

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Saudi Arabia’s G20 2020 Presidency is being advanced under the theme of « Realizing Opportunities of the 21st Century for All ». With over 100 meetings and events planned, Saudi Arabia has put forward a packed agenda, seeking to leverage the G20 to show increased focus on global cooperation and openness. While many of the proposals for the upcoming Presidency are in-line with expectations for a G20 Summit year, with a strong focus on economic growth, trade, employment and energy access, the Presidency will not be without controversy given Saudi Arabia’s human rights record. In a July 2019 visit to Canada, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions called on G20 countries to boycott the Summit. NDP foreign affairs critic Guy Caron also echoed this call. Outside Canada, Amnesty International, Transparency International, and Civicus have announced that they will boycott the Civil Society 20 (C20), an official engagement group of the G20, due to the undermining of C20 principles by the Presidency.

Syria

Syria crisis and peace talks

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Despite an early January 2020 ceasefire agreement, the Syrian regime, with Russian air support, relaunched its ground offensive to capture opposition-held territory in Idlib governorate in northwestern Syria. Turkish military forces have dispatched additional troops and equipment to Idlib in an attempt to push back the offensive and curb refugee flows towards its border, resulting in 54 Turkish deaths and raising fears of a direct confrontation with the Syrian regime. This offensive has resulted in nearly 950,000 displacements since December 2019. The humanitarian crisis has been exacerbated by the closing of two of four cross-border humanitarian passages after Russian and Chinese pressure prevented the technical rollover of UNSCR 2504. The Geneva talks remain stalled after the regime walked out in November 2019 over a disagreement on the agenda, and the Astana process lacks the ability to produce a lasting political solution.

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Syria consular cases

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Consular case of orphan child

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Canada’s United Nations Security Council campaign (UNSC)

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Canada-United States relations

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Venezuela

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Canada is currently engaging in outreach to key international partners to discuss a way forward towards a united, global push for change in Venezuela. On February 20, 2020, Canada hosted the 18th Ministerial meeting of the Lima Group. Canada released a Chair’s statement following the meeting, which issued an appeal to the international community to unite in support of a democratic future in Venezuela.

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Canada has played a leadership role in the Lima Group and in raising international awareness of the situation in Venezuela. Over the past year, Canada has had several high-level discussions with Cuba, as part of a coordinated Lima Group international outreach. [REDACTED]

Yemen

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In February 2020, Canada and other members of the Yemen Core Group in issuing a joint statement at the Human Rights Council, expressing deep concern about the continued appalling human rights and humanitarian situation. The UN Special Envoy continues efforts to hold another round of peace consultations and notes progress in implementing confidence-building measures between parties (e.g. prisoner exchange, air lift of critical patients). However tensions have escalated since early 2020 and heavy fighting has intensified.

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Background

Yemen is the Middle East's poorest country and is currently the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. It is host to multiple, overlapping conflicts, namely, since 2015, the civil war between the Government of Yemen (GoY) and Houthi rebels.

In 2018, the UN-sponsored peace consultations in Sweden led to the “Stockholm Agreement”. At the end of August 2019, both parties to the conflict agreed on Martin Griffiths’ proposal of the implementation of the Hodeidah agreement.

In August 2019, tensions raised in southern Yemen between Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the GoY. On November 5, the Saudi-brokered Riyadh Agreement was signed. The Agreement is a power-sharing deal between the Yemeni government and the STC.

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