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Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN) – Briefing material

2021-06-07

Table of contents

A) CACN:

  1. Opening remarks
  2. Scenario note and committee background
  3. Member biographies
  4. Reports on CACN and SDIR meetings
  5. Chine Related Items Currently Active in Parliament
  6. Question Period (QP) roll-up
  7. Senior-level quotes: Canada's position on China

B) Foreign Interference Notes:

  1. Cyber Operations
  2. Five Eyes Coordination
  3. Foreign Agent Registry
  4. G7 Coordination
  5. Mission Monitoring Internationally
  6. Rapid Response Mechanism
  7. Foreign State-backed Interference and Intimidation Activities in Canada

C) Hot Issue Notes:

  1. 5G Review
  2. Arbitrary Detention Initiative
  3. Canada's Arctic Sovereignty
  4. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
  5. Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)
  6. BRI and Economic Dependence on China
  7. Canada's Approach to China
  8. Canada-China commercial relations
  9. Canadian Agriculture Exports to China
  10. CanSino Vaccine/PPE
  11. China Consular Cases
  12. China Human rights
  13. China-US relations
  14. Chinese Sanctions against SDIR members and MP Chong
  15. Coronavirus
  16. Erosion of Hong Kong's Autonomy, Rights and Freedoms
  17. Meng Wanzhou Arrest and U.S. Extradition Request
  18. Military Training between Canada and China (ATIP issue)
  19. Procurement of Physical Security Equipment (Nuctech)
  20. Regional Maritime Tensions/South China Sea
  21. Responsible business, Import Prohibition on Goods Produced by Forced Labour - CBSA QP Note
  22. Taiwan
  23. Tibet
  24. Uyghurs in China
  25. VFS – Visa Application Centre – IRCC QP Note
  26. Winter Olympics/Paralympics

Remarks

The Honourable Marc Garneau Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada

National Security Dimensions of Canada-China Relations Special Committee on Canada-China Relations

June 7, 2021

Mr. Chair, Honourable Members, thank you for this invitation to discuss national security dimensions of Canada's relationship with China.

All countries are reassessing and realigning their engagement with China. For Canada, what's clear is that China's increasing authoritarianism and coercive diplomacy preclude a return to the state of relations prior to the arbitrary detentions of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig.

Our approach is evolving. It acknowledges the complexity of this relationship. It also recognizes that when dealing with China, we must be guided by our principles, values and interests.

Coexisting with China means knowing when to cooperate on global issues of shared interest, when to compete with its authoritarian model, and when to challenge the Chinese government's  violation  of rules and norms.

We aim to protect the rules-based international order and to work with our partners to defend human rights and freedoms.

Consular cases

Mr. Spavor and Mr. Kovrig have been arbitrarily detained by China for more than 900 days. Bringing them home remains a top priority of the Government of Canada, and we continue to explore all pathways to secure their release. Canadian officials most recently held virtual consular visits with Mr. Kovrig on May 26, and Mr. Spavor on May 28.

Mr. Huseyincan Celil's case remains a priority for the Government of Canada, and we continue to call upon the Chinese government to give Canadian officials consular access in order to determine Mr. Celil's well-being.

We also seek clemency for Robert Schellenberg and for all Canadians facing the death penalty.

Canada is also leading globally to end the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention for diplomatic leverage.

Almost one third of the world's countries (63 and growing) have endorsed the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations.

In early May, Canada released a Partnership Action Plan with full G7 support. We aim to turn words into action and raise the cost of this practice worldwide.

Foreign interference

Turning to our domestic situation, Canada is a target of hostile states seeking to acquire information, intelligence and influence to advance their own interests. This includes through espionage that target's

Canada's research ecosystem. Hostile activities by state actors pose strategic, long-term threats to Canada. These could undermine our nation's economic, industrial, military and technological advantages.

Our government has responded to these threats, through utilizing existing regulatory tools and creating new initiatives designed to safeguard Canada's economic security such as the Safeguarding Your Research portal introduced last September by the Minister of Innovation, Science, and Industry.

In March, the Ministers of Public Safety; Innovation, Science and Industry; and Health released a Policy Statement on Research Security, announcing the development of specific risk guidelines to integrate national security considerations into the evaluation and funding of research partnerships. My senior officials remain actively engaged in supporting these initiatives.

When it comes to China, Canada has a number of concerns related to both China's behavior towards Canada and its internal policies that will affect the potential for STI cooperation. Given a number of geo- political, bilateral, and economic policy factors, GAC has initiated a review of the STI relationship with China.

Our Government is equally aware of intimidation tactics being used against Canadians in Canada, or assertiveness against Canadians.

My department has made regular demarches to Chinese Embassy Officials to remind them that their representatives in Canada, like all representatives of foreign governments, have a duty under international law to respect the laws of this country. When they step out of their lane we will call them out.

We are also taking a close look at the PRC's diplomatic footprint in Canada, to ensure that duties and responsibilities of their diplomats are consistent with Canadian laws and regulations and are in line with diplomatic conventions and norms, and our interests.

State actors target the fabric of Canada's multicultural society, seeking to influence communities including through pressure and threats. Activities that seek to control public discourse in ways that are coercive, clandestine or deceptive are unacceptable.

We are also working closely with partner departments, including law enforcement. We are also doing so with partners and allies. The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, for example,  allows us to share  information to effectively counter foreign interference.

Security

We have also witnessed a growing militarization of the waters of the East China Sea and the South China Sea where China claims vast areas leading to increased regional tensions from Japan to Indonesia.

抖淫视频 is taking these actions seriously by balancing our efforts to de-escalate tensions that undermine regional stability and the international rules-based order. By working strategically with partners such as participating in the January Quad naval exercise in the Pacific Ocean, we send a clear message to China that their actions will not go unnoticed.

While Canada generally does not take positions on foreign maritime disputes, we have spoken on the issue in multilateral forums and supported language in negotiated G7 statements that emphasize the importance of respecting the international rules-based order, including in the Arctic.

Conclusion

China's economic heft and growing global influence mean that  it not  going  away as a superpower. It has the will and the capacity to re-shape the international system into something less rules-based and less compatible with Canada's interests and values.

Despite divergent views, Canada will continue to seek dialogue and cooperation where it makes sense  to do so. We will pursue cooperate on global issues of mutual concern such as climate change and health.

Thank you.

Appearance before The House Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN)

18:30-20:30 JUNE 7, 2021

Meeting scenario

Committee membership & interests

CACN committee work

Other committee work regarding China

Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN) Backgrounder

Background

The House of Commons Special Committee  on Canada-China  Relations  (CACN) was established as a result of a motion passed by the House of Commons on December 10, 2019.  When Parliament  was  prorogued  on  August  18,  2020, CACN's mandate was concluded;  however,  upon  the  opening  of the  second session of the 43rd Parliament on September 23, 2020, CACN  was  re-established with the same mandate.

The Committee is mandated to  conduct  hearings  to  examine  and  review  all aspects of the Canada–China relationship,  including, but not limited to, consular, economic,  legal,  security  and  diplomatic  relations.  The  Committee  will  be granted all the powers of a standing committee, as provided in the Standing Orders of  the House of Commons. In addition, the mandate specifically grants the Committee authority to order the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Public Safety, and Canada's Ambassador to China to appear as  the Committee sees fit.

GAC  has  been  heavily  implicated  in  the  Committee, including  through appearances  by  the  Deputy  Minister,  Ambassador  Barton  and  other  officials. Given the CACN's broad mandate, several departments have also been engaged including, but not necessarily limited to Justice, Public  Safety;  Department  of National Defence; Innovation, Science and Economic Development; Finance; Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada.

Membership

The Committee consists of 12 Members of Parliament (MP), with membership weighted in line with the proportion of sitting MPs from each party.

Committee Operations

Statement by Prime Minister Trudeau

In Question Period on December 11, 2019, the Prime Minister made the following mention of the CACN:

Mr. Speaker, over the past year, we have  been  working  at all levels  to ensure the safety of the Canadians being detained, and indeed continue to advocate for their release as we stand up for our canola  farmers, as we protect our beef and pork exporters and as we continue to engage with this important trading partner, while at the same time standing  up  for human rights every step of the way.

We recognize there is an opportunity to collaborate further on the special committee on China. We just certainly hope the opposition parties will be careful not to play  politics and endanger the lives  of those Canadians  with it.

Text of the motion establishing the Special Committee:

That, in light of the prolonged diplomatic crisis with China, the House appoint a Special Committee with the  mandate  to  conduct  hearings  to  examine   and review all aspects of  the  Canada–China  relationship,  including,  but  not  limited to, consular, economic, legal, security and diplomatic relations:

  1. that the Committee be composed of 12 members, of which six shall be government members, four shall be from the official opposition,  one shall  be from the Bloc Québécois and one from the New Democratic Party;
  2. that changes in the membership of the Committee shall be effective immediately after notification by the whip has been filed with the Clerk of the House;
  3. that membership substitutions be permitted, if required, in the manner provided for in Standing Order 114(2);
  4. that  the  members  shall  be  named  by  their  respective  whip  by  depositing with the Clerk of the House  the  list  of their  members  to serve  on the  Committee no later than January 15, 2020;
  5. that the Clerk of the House shall convene an organization meeting of the Committee for no later than January 20, 2020;
  6. that the Committee be chaired by a member of the government party;
  7. that notwithstanding Standing Order 106(2),  in addition  to the  Chair,  there  be one vice-chair from the official opposition, one vice-chair from the Bloc Québécois and one vice-chair from the New Democratic Party;
  8. that quorum of the Committee be as provided  for in Standing  Order  118 and that the Chair be authorized to  hold  meetings to  receive  evidence  and  to  have that evidence printed when a quorum is not present, provided that at least four members  are  present,  including  one  member  of  the  opposition   and  one member of the government;
  9. that the Committee be granted all of the powers of a standing committee, as provided in the  Standing  Orders,  as  well  as  the  power  to  travel,  accompanied by the necessary staff, inside and outside of Canada;
  10. that the Committee have the power to authorize video and audio broadcasting of any or all of its proceedings; and
  11. that the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Public Safety, and the Canadian ambassador to China be ordered  to  appear  as witnesses from time to time as the Committee sees fit.

 

Hon. Geoff Regan, Chair
(LPC—Halifax West, NS)

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Regan was elected the 36th Speaker of the House of Commons from 2015-2019. Regan was a member of the Canada-China Legislative Association (CACN) from October 2011 to March 2015. After the 2004 election, Regan was appointed to act as Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada in matters related to Maher Arar. Regan served as the Liberal critic for Natural Resources under both Michael Ignatieff and Justin Trudeau. In 2003, he was appointed the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. During this time, he was also the Regional Minister for Nova Scotia. Regan was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons from 2001 to 2003.

Notable committee membership:

Background

Regan holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from St. Francis Xavier University, and a law degree from Dalhousie University. He was called to the Nova Scotia Bar in 1984. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1993 and served until his defeat in the 1997 election. Regan was re -elected in the 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, and 2019 federal elections.

Statements about China

MP Regan has not made any statements about China in either session of the 43rd Parliament.

Garnett Genuis, Vice-Chair
(CPC—Sherwood Park-Fort Saskatchewan, AB) Critic for International Development And Human Rights

Key interests

Parliamentary Roles

Garnett Genuis is currently the Conservative Critic for International Development and Human Rights. He previously served as the Conservative Critic for Canada-China Relations and Multiculturalism. MP Genuis has presented a private member's bill and numerous petitions over the past two parliaments to draw attention to the combat against trafficking in human organs.

Notable committee membership:

Background

MP Genuis was elected to the House of Commons in 2015 and 2019. Prior to his election, he worked the Prime Minister's Office under Stephen Harper.

MP Genuis grew up in Strathcona County, Alberta. At age 15, he began writing a column for Sherwood Park News, a newspaper that he continues to contribute to as an MP. MP Genuis holds a Bachelor of Public Affairs and Policy Management from Carleton University and Master's of Science in Philosophy and Public Policy from the London School of Economics (LSE).

Statements on China

MP Genuis is one of the most active and vocal Members of Parliament on China issues and has been highly critical of the Government's strategy regarding China. In particular, he has questioned the suitability of Ambassador Dominic Barton's  role as  Canada's representative in China, noting the Ambassador's praise for the Chinese response to the COVID-19 crisis and his apparent lack of knowledge of Huseyincan Celil's consular situation.

In the 43rd Parliament, MP Genuis has repeatedly raised concerns regarding the Uyghur Muslim population in China, and has introduced petitions, requested late show debates, and asked questions during Question Period. He also played a key role in the Subcommittee on International Human Rights (SDIR)'s work on a study entitled, "Human Rights Situation of the Uyghurs". During the meetings for this study, MP Genuis focused his questioning on the use of targeted sanctions against Chinese officials, population control, the destruction of Uyghur culture, and supply chains. Outside of parliament, MP Genuis is active on social media, tweeting almost daily about this issue and what he perceives to be lack of action on the part of the Government. MP Genuis follows Mr. Celil's consular case closely and has met Mr. Celil's wife, Kamila, several times.

In addition, to his advocacy work regarding the Uyghurs in China, MP Genius is engaged with the situation in Hong Kong. Prior to the committee's study on Hong Kong, he brought up the topic regularly and strongly advocated for the committee to study Hong Kong. MP Genuis has repeatedly stressed his concern regarding the imposition of the National Security Law (NSL) in Hong Kong, the end of democracy and free press in the city, and the end of the one country two systems model . He has raised concerns for the safety of the 300,000 Canadians living in Hong Kong and Hong Kong pro- democracy activists. He is in support of targeted sanctions on CCP and Hong Kong officials responsible for the implementation of the NSL. He is also supportive of immigration options to protect Canadians and pro-democracy activists and help them seek safe haven in Canada.

MP Genuis was mentioned and quoted in a Globe & Mail article published on July 21, 2020, "Conservative MP Garnett Genuis, a member of [SDIR], said the Liberal government's 'complete lack of use' of Magnitsky sanctions against Chinese officials has been 'disappointing.'"

MP Genuis has also been vocal about CCP influence in Canada. During the first session of the 43rd Parliament, he introduced a motion calling for CACN to study CCP influence in Canadian universities. On April 13, 2021 MP Genuis began a new podcast entitled .

Stephane Bergeron, Vice-Chair
(BQ—Montarville, QC) Critic for Foreign Affairs

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Bergeron is currently the Bloc Québécois' (BQ) Critic for Foreign Affairs. He is a member of numerous parliamentary associations and interparliamentary groups, particularly the Canada-China Legislative Association (CACN) and the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (CANA). He also served as the Whip for the BQ from 1997 to 2001.

Notable committee membership:

Background

Bergeron served as a BQ member of the House of Commons from 1993 to 2005 and a member of Quebec's National Assembly from 2005 to 2018. In 2019, he returned to the House of Commons as a BQ member.

Bergeron has bachelors and master's degrees in Political Science. After first leaving the House of

Commons and serving in Quebec's National Assembly for 13 years, Bergeron was Registrar of Rimouski's CEGEP. He was previously a political advisor and a teaching assistant at the Universite Laval within the Political Science department. From 1984 to 1993 he served in the Canadian Forces as a naval Cadet Instructor Cadre officer.

Statements about China

MP Bergeron has been supportive of CACN and its mandate  since its inception in 2019,  stating, "We can speak at length about the reasons the relationship has deteriorated, but there is no denying that Canada-China relations have deteriorated. There is a problem. Once we become aware of the problem what do we do? We can take the Liberal government's approach of late and close our eyes and leave the Canadian ambassador to China post vacant in Beijing for eight months. Yes, I said eight months. That is not a good approach to finding solutions. A minority government needs the good will of the whole House."

During CACN meetings on the topic of Hong Kong, MP Bergeron has been particularly interested in

targeted sanctions levied on CCP and Hong Kong officials as a policy option. He has also asked

numerous witnesses about the Sino-British Joint Declaration and its validity under international law, and if the CCP would prevent Hong Kongers from leaving Hong Kong. Further, during the August 17 meeting of CACN, MP Bergeron asked about the impact of the relationship between China and the current administration of the United States on Canada's relationship with China, asking a witness, "Under the circumstances, is it even possible to form a coalition… with the United States?"

Jack Harris, Vice-Chair
(NDP—St. John's East, NL) Critic for Foreign Affairs

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

MP Harris is currently the NDP's Critic for Foreign Affairs, Public Safety, and the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency. He is also the Deputy Critic for Defence. Among the CACN members, only Harris was a member of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan (AFGH) from 2010-2011, experience which is particularly relevant to this special committee in a minority parliament context.

Notable committee membership:

Background

Jack Harris is a lawyer and politician from Newfoundland and Labrador. He has represented St John's East several times: from 1987-1988, from 2008 to 2015, and winning his seat again in 2019. He was the leader of the Newfoundland and Labrador New Democratic Party from 1992 to 2006.

Statements about China

MP Harris, like MP Bergeron, has been supportive of CACN and its mandate since its inception in 2019.

MP Harris has expressed concerns that Canada has not done enough to protect Hong Kong's status, as was promised in 1997 upon the signing of the Joint Declaration. He has asked witnesses their recommendations for actions Canada could take to ensure the safe immigration of Hong Kongers to Canada.

MP Harris has asked multiple witnesses at CACN meetings if they believe Canada needs legislation in response to foreign interference by the CCP.

MP Harris was mentioned in a Globe & Mail article published on July 21, 2020, "NDP foreign-affairs critic Jack Harris said that while Magnitsky sanctions are an important tool, it is vital that the government work in concert with other countries to address the situation in China."

On July 19, 2020, MP Harris released a statement on his website calling on the Government to, "warn and protect Canadian travellers," related to the NSL. He noted, "These laws extend to foreign nationals and cover activities occurring outside China. Under these new laws, Canadians who have been involved in any activity or public position that the Chinese government considers subversive could be arbitrarily detained and handed over to the Chinese authorities if they stop over in countries that have an extradition agreement with Hong Kong.

Emmanuel Dubourg
(LPC—Bourassa, QC)

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

During the 42nd Parliament, Dubourg served as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Revenue. He was a member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (CANA) from September 2018 to March 2019.

Notable committee membership:

Background

MP Dubourg was born in Saint-Marc, Haiti and emigrated to Canada in 1974. He received a Bachelor of Accounting and a Master of Business Administration. He has been a member of the since 1987. MP Dubourg was a teacher at , ,. He also worked as a Manager and Advisor at the Canada Revenue Agency.

MP Dubourg has been honoured with several awards and citations for his work over the years, including the 's Medal, the Innovation and Excellence prize from in 1992 and the Award in 2006 for his work in the black community.

MP Dubourg was previously a Member of the National Assembly of Quebec from 2007 to 2013. In 2013, he was elected to the House of Commons as an MP in a by-election.

Statements about China

MP Dubourg does not appear to have any specific interests regarding the Canada-China relationship, and typically asks witnesses for their suggestions as to how Canada can repair its relationship with China.

Outside CACN meetings, MP Dubourg does not make mention of China.

Peter Fragiskatos
(LPC—London North Centre, ON)

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Fragiskatos is a member of the Canada-China Legislative Association (CACN), and the Canada NATO Parliamentary Association (CANA).

Notable committee membership:

Background

MP Fragiskatos has a Bachelor of Political Science degree from Western University, a Master's in International Relations from Queen's University, and holds a PhD in International Relations from Cambridge University.

Before being elected to the House of Commons in 2015, MP Fragiskatos was a political scientist at King's University College at Western University. He also worked as a media commentator. His works have been published by major Canadian and international news organizations including Maclean's Magazine, The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star, BBC News, and CNN. MP Fragiskatos served on the Board of Directors of Anago Resources and the Heritage London Foundation.

Statements about China

During the prorogation of parliament between August 18 and September 23, 2020, MP Fragiskatos voiced his interest in seeing CACN return in the second session of the 43rd Parliament, despite being "initially skeptical" when it was created in late-2019.

During CACN meetings, MP Fragiskatos typically asks witnesses about Canadian businesses in China and how they are impacted by the ongoing bilateral tensions between Canada and China.

Outside CACN meetings, MP Fragiskatos does not make much mention of China.

Robert Oliphant
(LPC—Don Valley  West,  ON) Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

MP Oliphant was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2019 and retained this role in the 43rd Parliament.

He is actively involved in parliamentary associations. In particular, he has been a member of the Canada- China Legislative Association (CACN) since December 2015. He is also actively involved in the Canada- Africa Parliamentary Association (CAAF).

Oliphant travelled to China with CACN (association) in May 2019 as the Head of Delegation. Given his position as Parliamentary Secretary, this visit marked the first high-level interaction since bilateral irritants between Canada and China began in December 2018.

Notable committee membership:

Background

MP Oliphant was first elected to the House of Commons in October 2008. He was defeated in the 2011 federal election but was re-elected in 2015 and 2019.

MP Oliphant graduated with a Bachelor of Commerce from the University of Toronto in 1978. During his time at U of T, he was active in the University of Toronto Liberal Club, as well as the Ontario (New) Young Liberals. After obtaining a Master of Divinity from the Vancouver School of Theology, he was ordained as a United Church Minister in 1984. His official title is The Reverend Doctor Robert Oliphant, MP.

MP Oliphant worked in Premier David Peterson's office in 1989. He later worked for two provincial ministers, Christine Hart, Minister of Culture and Communications, and Mavis Wilson, Minister Responsible for Women's issues.

Statements about China

As Parliamentary Secretary for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, MP Oliphant typically takes on a leadership role among the LPC members of CACN.

Generally, MP Oliphant's statements in the House regarding China have focused on defending the government's positions. MP Oliphant raises Canadian consular services abroad in a number of contexts, including committee, social media, and House debate. He has stated a number of times that the return of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor are the top priority of the Government.

MP Oliphant frequently defends Canada's foreign policy, stating it "is based on renewing a rules-based international order that Canadians have built together, protecting universal human rights, supporting democracies," and noting, "We are a leader in the world on critical issues, whether it is in Venezuela, or in the Middle East or in China, all around the world. We will continue to stand with our allies, with NATO partners, as we continue to ensure Canada's leadership is strong and heard in our world with al lies and like-minded who work with us."

Jean yip
(LPC—Scarborough-Agincourt, ON)

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

MP Yip serves as Co-Chair of the Liberal Seniors' Caucus and is a member of the Liberal Party's Caucuses on Housing Affordability, Immigration, and Mental Health as well as Women's and Scarborough Caucuses. MP Yip is a member of the Canada-China Legislative Association (CACN) and the Canadian Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CCOM).

Notable committee membership:

Background

MP Yip was elected to the House of Commons via by-election in 2017. Her predecessor was her former husband Arnold Chan who died in 2017.

She was born in Scarborough, and raised in Agincourt, the riding that she now represents. Her mother is from Shanghai and her father is from Canton but spent time in Hong Kong as a police clerk. Both later immigrated to Canada separately. After completing her degree at the University of Toronto, MP Yip pursued a career in insurance and underwriting and holds the Fellow Chartered Insurance Professional Designation.

Statements about China

MP Yip has highlighted cultural aspects of China, rising in the House of Commons in May 2018 to note the importance of Asian Heritage Month. She is active on Twitter and frequently tweets about different cultural events, as well as highlighting local Asian and Asian-inspired restaurants in her riding.

At CACN meetings, MP Yip asks witnesses contextual questions about the situation in China and for updates on the Canada-China relationship.

Outside CACN meetings, MP Yip does not make much mention of China.

Lenore Zann
(LPC—Cumberland-Colchester, NS)

Key interests

Notable committee membership:

Background

MP Zann is actorand politician. She was elected as a in 2019. Before entering federal politics, she represented the electoral district of l in the from 2009 until 2019 as a member of the (NDP) and from June 9, 2019 until September 12, 2019 as an t.

MP Zann was initially a member of the Nova Scotia New Democratic Party ( NDP). During her first term, she was appointed Ministerial Assistant for Culture & Heritage, Environment and Climate Change, and Deputy Premier. Later as a member of the opposition, MP Zann was the NDP spokesperson for Education, Environment, Status of Women, Human Rights Commission, Aboriginal Affairs & Truth & Reconciliation, Agriculture, Advanced Education, African Nova Scotia Affairs, and Gaelic Affairs.

Statements about China

During CACN meetings, MP Zann focuses her questions on the cultural and people-to-people relationships between Canada and China. In doing so, she tries to highlight the Government's differentiation of the people of China and the Chinese government.

In addition, MP Zann raises the lobster trade between Canada and China at CACN meetings due to the location of her riding.

Outside CACN meetings, MP Yip does not make much mention of China.

Hon. Michael Chong, P.C.
(CPC—Wellington—Halton Hills, ON) Critic for Foreign Affairs

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

MP Chong is currently serving as the Official Opposition's Critic for Foreign Affairs. MP Chong served as the President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and the Minister for Sport from February to November 2006. He has been a member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (CANA), the Canada-China Legislative Association (CACN), and the Canada- United States Inter-Parliamentary Group (CEUS), among others.

Notable committee membership:

Background

MP Chong was first elected to Parliament in 2004 and has been Chair of several House of Commons Standing Committees. He is a co-founder and member of the All Party Climate Caucus since it was formed in 2011. In the 42nd Parliament, MP Chong served as the Official Opposition's Shadow Minister for Infrastructure and Shadow Minister for Science. In 2016, MP Chong ran for leadership of the CPC, but was unsuccessful.

MP Chong's father was born in Hong Kong and immigrated to Canada in 1952. His mother immigrated to Canada from the Netherlands in 1960. MP Chong attended Trinity College in the University of Toronto where he obtained a degree in philosophy.

Prior to his election, MP Chong acted as Chief Information Officer for the National Hockey League Players' Association and as a Senior Technology Consultant to the Greater Toronto Airports Authority for the redevelopment of Pearson International Airport. MP Chong also co-founded the Dominion Institute, now known as Historica Canada, an organization committed to raising Canadians' awareness of history and civics. He currently sits on its Board of Governors.

On March 27, 2021 MP Chong was directly sanctioned by the Chinese government.

Statements about China

On October 12, 2020, MP Chong was directly critical of China, commenting in an interview that COVID- 19 is not an excuse to deny consular access to Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor.

On September 30, 2020, MP Chong stated that China was violating human rights and international treaties in its treatment of Michael Spavor, Michael Kovrig, the Uyghurs, and the people of Hong Kong. He asked if the government would impose sanctions on those responsible in China.

On September 16, 2020, MP Chong posted a readout of his meeting with China's Ambassador to Canada, H.E. Cong Peiwu. In this readout, MP Chong flagged the detention of Michael Kovrig and Spavor, the National Security Law, and Canadians' changing attitude toward China.

On December 10, 2019, MP Chong rose in the House of Commons to speak about Canada's relationship with China. He stated, "I would say this in response to the economic concerns that have been voiced by many about our relationship with China. More important than economic concerns are  the principles and values on which this country is founded, principles such as democracy, human rights and  the rule of law. Those are the very principles we risk undermining and doing away with if we continue to focus on the economic consequences of taking a reset and decoupling in our China relationship". He went on to speak about how China has increasingly used economic blackmail, including attacks on Canadian farmers with regards to pork, beef and canola. MP Chong also raised concerns about Uyghurs in concentration camps and Beijing's systemic campaign to wipe out this population in a genocidal manner. Finally, he asked the government to take a firmer, stronger, and clearer position on Hong Kong.

Pierre Paul-Hus
(CPC—Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, Quebec, QC) Critic for Public Services and Procurement

Key interests:

Parliamentary roles

MP Paul-Hus has been the CPC critic for Public Services and Procurement since 2019, he was also the critic for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in 2017. He is a member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (CANA) and the Canada-United States Inter-Parliamentary Group (CAUS)

Notable committee memberships

Background

MP Paul-Hus is a graduate of political science at Laval University and owner of PRESTIGE Media Group. He is a military officer (Reserve) and a graduate of the Canadian Army Command and Staff College and the Ecole Militaire in Paris, where he also taught. In 1987, he enlisted and joined the Régiment de la Chaudière, reserve unit of the Canadian Armed Forces. During his 22 years of service, he conducted two operational missions: one in Labrador under the aegis of NATO, and the second in Cyprus to the United Nations. He retired in 2009 at the rank of lieutenant colonel. MP Paul-Hus has also been vice president of Sélections Mondiales des Vins Canada (the largest wine competition in North America) for 11 years.

MP Paul-Hus visited Taiwan in January 2018 during which he met the President of Taiwan, Ms. Tsai Ing- Wen.

Statements about China

MP Paul-Hus introduced a motion during the first meeting of CACN, "That the committee study national security issues over four or five meetings, including cyber security and the threat of foreign interference and that the committee provide a report to the House." This motion passed. He also introduced a motion at the first meeting of OGGO, "That, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee undertake a study of the Nuctech security equipment contract; that the study start no later than Monday, November 23, 2020; that the committee send for all documents, memorandums, and briefing materials related to the Nuctech security equipment contract; that the documents be provided to the committee, in both official languages, no later than 5 p.m. (Ottawa time) on December 10." This motion passed.

MP Paul-Hus has raised concerns regarding Huawei, stating, "Trudeau's Liberals have been ignoring Canadian security agencies for months and refusing to take a stand on Huawei's potential participation in Canada's 5G network for purely partisan political reasons. This has put Canada out of the game vis -à- vis our G7 allies, and endangers the future of the Five Eyes intelligence system."

In February 2020, MP Paul-Hus commented on China's involvement in 2017 Equifax hack, noting, "It is extremely worrying that this hack is allegedly carried out by members of the Chinese PLA. If this charge were proven in court, it would mean that the PLA deliberately carried out a state-sponsored cyber attack on Canadians in order to steal their personal information. In the digital age, Canadians need to be confident that their personal information is safe and that the Canadian government will protect them from foreign agents who engage in hacking, espionage or any other cyber crime to obtain that information. This means getting tough on cybercriminals and ensuring that they are prosecuted with all the force of the law."

After a visit to Taiwan in 2018, MP Paul-Hus commented that, "Diplomatic relations between Taiwan and foreign countries are very complicated given its status with China. This is why Canada must get more involved in order to strengthen the friendship and relations between our two countries."

John Williamson
(CPC—New Brunswick Southwest, NB)

Key interests:

Parliamentary roles

MP Williamson has served as the Vice-Chair for the Canada-United States Inter-Parliamentary Group (CAUS). He has been a member of several other parliamentary associations and interparliamentary groups including the Canadian Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CCOM) and the Canada-China Legislative Association (CACN).

Notable committee membership:

Background

MP Williamson was elected to the House of Commons in the 2011 Federal Election. Prior to his election, he was the director of communications in Stephen Harper's Prime Minister's Office (PMO) from 2009 until 2011. MP Williamson was defeated in the 2015 election, but was re-elected in 2019.

MP Williamson graduated from McGill University with a Bachelor of Arts in economics and political science. He later obtained a Master's Degree in economic history from the London School of Economics. He worked for the National Post as an editorial writer and was a founding member of their editorial board. He was a national director of the Canadian Taxpayers Federation and was their national spokesperson from January 2004 to September 2008.

Statements about China

During CACN meetings, MP Williamson regularly raises concerns for the deteriorating democracy and free press in Hong Kong since the introduction of the NLS. MP Williamson has also asked witnesses if they believe Taiwan will be subject to a similar national security law in the future.

In March 2020, MP Williamson tabled a motion, "That the committee express its grave concern over the arrest of Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, Lee Cheuk-yan and Yeung Sum in Hong Kong, and that this be reported to the House." The motion passed, and was subsequently reported to the House.

In 2013, MP Williamson noted that, "While [the CPC] create better policy in Canada, the Liberal leader admires China's basic dictatorship."

 

Summary of Committee Business / Sommaire d'affaires du comité

House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN)/  
Comité spécial sur les relations sino-canadiennes (CACN) 

Date: February 25, 2020 

Time: 6:30pm-8:30pm 

Report Prepared By / Rapport préparé par 
Eileen Young, Parliamentary Affairs Analyst 
T: 343-203-2733  

Topic of Meeting / Sujet de la réunion 

Canada-China Relations 

Members in Attendance / Membres présents 

Witnesses / Témoins  

Summary / Sommaire

The Committee heard from the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Bill Blair. Minister Blair's opening remarks focused on foreign interference in Canada, noting CSIS, the RCMP, and Public Safety are involved to address all forms of foreign interference. The Minister also spoke to the increase in anti-Asian racism in Canada, and fentanyl trafficking. 

Broadly, CPC questioning focused on issues related to national security, including Huawei— and its activities in Xinjiang— 5G, and foreign interference. MP Stubbs asked specifically about the number of people arrested under Operation Foxhunt and foreign interference in Canadian academic institutions. Both MP Stubbs and MP Chong asked about the NSERC-Huawei partnership.  

LPC members posed questions on a variety of topics, including a , foreign interference (including in elections), economic interference, and fentanyl trafficking. Specifically, MP Yip asked about pro-Hong Kong protesters who have experienced threats and intimidation from Chinese officials. Both MP Fragiskatos and MP Zann asked about goods produced in Xinjiang by Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, asking what is being done to ensure those goods produced via forced labour do not enter Canada. MP Zann asked the Minister to speak to the Invest in Canada Act. 

MP Bergeron (BQ) asked the Minister and other witnesses about the VFS Global visa application centre. 

MP Harris (NDP) began by focusing his questioning on the security of Canadian information at the VFS Global visa centre. MP Harris asked about academic interference— specifically research funding at Canadian universities from the People's Republic of China (PRC). He raised concerns regarding intellectual property theft. 

Follow-up Items / Suivis 

Committee's Forward Business Agenda 

Study / Étude 

Next Meeting Dates & Steps / Dates des prochaines réunions et prochaines étapes 

Deadline to Complete Study / Date à laquelle l'étude doit être terminée 

Date Study Agreed To or Referred / Date convenue pour l'étude ou date à laquelle la question a été acheminée 

National security as it relates to China 

The Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure (SCAC) agreed CACN would study issues of national security upon the conclusion of the study of Hong Kong. 

N/A 

, "That, upon the completion of the study of the situation in Hong Kong, the committee study issues related to national security as they relate to its mandate, including, but not limited to cybersecurity and the threat of foreign influence; and that the committee invite the Minister of Public Safety to appear as part of that study." 

Summary of Committee Business / sommaire d'affaires du comité 

House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN)/  
Comité spécial sur les relations sino-canadiennes (CACN) 

Date: March 11, 2021 

Time: 6:30pm-8:30pm 

Report Prepared By/ Rapport préparé par 
Eileen Young, Parliamentary Affairs Analyst 
T: 343-203-2733  

Topic of Meeting / Sujet de la réunion 

Canada-China Relations 

Members in Attendance / Membres présents 

Witnesses / Témoins  

Summary / Sommaire  

The Committee heard from Canada's ambassador to China, Dominic Barton. Mr. Barton previously appeared before CACN on February 5, 2020. Mr. Barton's opening remarks discussed his recent visit to Tibet/Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as part of a delegation of foreign diplomats on the invitation of the Chinese government. He noted that his top priority remains ensuring the safety and security of Canadians, particularly the release of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, and clemency for Robert Schellenberg. He also highlighted the promotion and protection of human rights as an integral part of the Canadian Embassy's work in China. 

Broadly, CPC questioning focused on issues related to national security, including Huawei, 5G and surveillance. There was also a strong focus on human rights, specifically of the Uyghur population. CPC also asked for follow-up questions requested during Mr. Barton's previous appearance. Additionally, MP Chong asked whether the topic of the China-India relationship was raised during Mr. Barton's trip to Tibet and if Mr. Barton is engaged with the Indian ambassador in China.  

LPC members posed questions on a variety of topics, including consular issues, human rights, the Middle Way Approach, and details of Mr. Barton's visit to Tibet. MP Virani asked how parliamentarians can assist Mr. Barton in advocating for reciprocal access to Tibet. MP Yip asked about the freedom of the press in Tibet.  

During BQ time, MP Bergeron asked about culture and tourism in Tibet. He also asked about the National Security Law in Hong Kong and how Ambassador Barton had engaged on that issue.  

MP Harris (NDP) asked if Tibetans outside of the TAR are recognized as the Tibetans by the Chinese government. He also asked if Mr. Barton is engaged on the situation in Hong Kong and about trade agreements.  

Thematic Overview

National security issues were a prominent theme, given the CACN's upcoming study on the issue. MP Williamson asked Mr. Barton to share his thoughts on a Washington Post  discussing Huawei AI that was developed to identify Uyghur peoples, and if he believed Huawei is a company Canada should do business with. MP Williamson asked what the consequences of allowing or not allowing Huawei to participate in Canada's 5G network would be and asked how the Embassy has prepared for the repercussions of Canada's forthcoming decision.

Several MPs asked about consular cases in China. MP Genuis asked Mr. Barton to confirm the citizenship of Huseyincan Celil, actions taken by Canada related to his case, and if the Ambassador considered Mr. Celil's case to be as important as the cases of Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor. When asked by MPs to elaborate on Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor's health and well-being and the conditions of their detention, Mr. Barton noted how their resilience was inspiring but that privacy laws prevented him from disclosing further information. MP Harris asked if the Chinese government has explained why they were not allowing virtual consular visits for Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor, but were allowing virtual consular access to other embassies. Barton clarified that no embassies could meet virtually or in person with individuals involved in national security cases.  Mr. Harris raised the death sentence of Mr. Schellenberg and Fan Wei, asking what efforts are being made to seek clemency for these Canadians.  

MPs of all parties raised human rights and, more specifically, the Uyghur Muslim population in China.  Much of the questioning was led by MP Genuis, who posed questions comparing Tibet and Xinjiang. He asked if relocation operations in the TAR were like those in Xinjiang. MP Genuis asked if birth rates in Tibet are being suppressed via contraceptives and laws, similarly to that in Xinjiang. MP Genuis pressed Mr. Barton on whether the situation of the Uyghurs should be called a genocide and whether he agreed with Bob Rae's  regarding genocide in China. Mr. Barton noted a need for further investigation and information. MP Oliphant read Mr. Rae's statement about the Uyghurs into the record and clarified that that there was agreement on the Government position. MP Paul-Hus asked if Mr. Barton was aware if the personal protective equipment (PPE) bought by Canada had been made using forced labour in Xinjiang. MP Genuis asked about the likelihood of China allowing independent investigators into Xinjiang and whether Canada has a responsibility to protect human rights internationally vis-à-vis the Uyghurs.  

Regarding trade, MP Harris raised the Canada-China Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Agreement (Canada-China FIPA), asking if the agreement has been brought to Mr. Barton's attention by the Chinese. The only other significant mention of trade issues was MP Genuis questions on whether Canada supports the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), noting Canada's involvement in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 

LPC, CPC, and BQ raised language and religion in the TAR. MP Bergeron asked whether primarily Tibetan or Mandarin was used during Mr. Barton's visit to Tibet. MP Virani also asked Mr. Barton to elaborate on the state of linguistic protection in Tibet, based on his visits to schools in the TAR. Regarding religion, MP Genuis asked if Mr. Barton had raised concern with Chinese involvement in the choice of the next Dalai Lama, and MP Virani asked for Mr. Barton to advocate for the Panchen Lama. MP Bergeron asked if other religions, like Buddhism, were targeted by the Chinese Government.  

Domestic issues were raised during Mr. Barton's appearance. In the context of Canada's role as a middle power, Mr. Barton raised Canada's views on human rights, drawing parallels between Indigenous peoples and Tibet, saying, "we speak from some experience" and can advocate for "doing things differently." Mr. Barton noted multiculturalism as one of Canada's strengths, including the nation's bilingualism; however, with respect to the treatment of Indigenous peoples he said, "I don't think is something we are proud of at all. I think we should have some humility."  

The LPC, BQ, and NDP raised the Middle Way Approach, with MP Bergeron asking if this approach was feasible in the current context. Mr. Barton noted that the motion passed by the Committee was "very positive," and said he believed "we should urge for that dialogue." MP Bergeron also asked if Mr. Barton was aware of any Chinese reaction to the Committee's motion. MP Harris asked how the embassy is pushing for dialogue between His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). MP Virani asked if there is a constructive way of promoting the Middle Way Approach and a Sino-Tibetan dialogue, and how Canada can advocate for this. 

LPC and CPC MP's asked Mr. Barton questions related to the environment. MP Yip asked about the impacts of industrialization on the TAR. MP Chong asked if Mr. Barton raised the "mega projects" to  in the in Brahmaputra River during his visit to Tibet. 

Other Committee Business:  

At the conclusion of the Ambassador's appearance, MP Genuis moved the following motion: 

"That, as part of its study on national security, the Committee examine the national security implications of the National Research Council's COVID-19 vaccine collaboration with CanSino Biologics, and invite the following witnesses to appear during the week of December 14, 2020, provided that all parties agree to extend the ability of committees to meet in a hybrid format: 

  1. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness; 
  2. Representatives from CanSino Biologics; 
  3. David Vigneault, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS); 
  4. Iain Stewart, President of the National Research Council, and; 

Any other witnesses the Committee deems necessary and report its findings to the House. 

The motion was not/not voted upon, as MP Oliphant moved to adjourn the debate. 

Follow-up Items / Suivis 

Committee's Forward Business Agenda 

Study / Étude 

Next Meeting Dates & Steps / Dates des prochaines réunions et prochaines étapes 

Deadline to Complete Study / Date à laquelle l'étude doit être terminée 

Date Study Agreed To or Referred / Date convenue pour l'étude ou date à laquelle la question a été acheminée 

Hong Kong 

CACN will continue to hear witnesses for their study on Hong Kong. 

December 11, 2020 

CACN adopted a motion to continue their study Hong Kong on , "That the committee resume its study of the situation in Hong Kong and report to the House before Friday, December 11, 2020." 

NB: this study includes testimony heard during the first session of the 43rd Parliament. 

National security as it relates to China 

The Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure (SCAC) agreed to study issues of national security upon the conclusion of CACN's study of Hong Kong. 

N/A 

, "That, upon the completion of the study of the situation in Hong Kong, the committee study issues related to national security as they relate to its mandate, including, but not limited to cybersecurity and the threat of foreign influence; and that the committee invite the Minister of Public Safety to appear as part of that study." 

Summary of Committee Business / Sommaire d'affaires du comité鈥�

House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN)/鈥�鈥�&苍产蝉辫;
Comité鈥痵pécial鈥痵ur les relations鈥痵ino-canadiennes鈥�(CACN)鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Date:鈥疢arch 22, 2021 

Time:鈥�6:30pm-8:30pm鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Report Prepared By/ Rapport鈥痯réparé鈥痯ar鈥�&苍产蝉辫;
Kathryn Leyenaar, Senior Analyst, Parliamentary Affairs鈥�&苍产蝉辫;
T: 613-371-9261鈥��&苍产蝉辫;

Topic of Meeting / Sujet de la réunion鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Canada-China Relations鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Members鈥痠n Attendance / Membres présents鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

奥颈迟苍别蝉蝉别蝉鈥�/&苍产蝉辫;罢&别补肠耻迟别;尘辞颈苍蝉

6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. 

7:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. 

First Panel: Questions from Parliamentarians 

National Microbiology Lab (NML) 

MP Chong (CPC): In July 2019, one of the researchers at the lab in Winnipeg and her husband had their security clearances revoked and were escorted out of the lab. Can you tell us why? Did you and the employees and the lab cooperate with the RCMP investigation? [A CBC report indicated staff were not able to contact RCMP with relevant information]. Can you tell us what happened exactly with the shipment of live viruses that took place from the lab to China on March 31, 2019?  

Response from President Stewart: That matter was subject to a security investigation, and I can't talk about the details. There is an RCMP investigation underway at this time, and they have our cooperation. Everything we do is according to law and standards.  

MP Bergeron (BQ): Regarding the researchers that went to China in July 2019, after having been in China, why were they let go from the Agency after several months? It leads us to think things weren't done according to the rules. Your refusing to answer a simple question could put you in contempt of Parliament. What did they do wrong? Why were they let go / set aside? [MP Bergeron asked for a written response covered by confidentiality, without which the Committee will have to take action] Follow-up 

Response from President Stewart: The two scientists are no longer with the agency. We undertook investigation / it was completed and they are no longer part of the Agency. I am not at liberty to talk about that.  

MP Harris (NDP): Were these individuals charged with any offence? You talked about the well regarded agency that operated within PHAC for a long time, with an alert system that is recognized world-wide. Can you tell us about the alert from them December 31, 2019?  

Response from President Stewart: They would not be charged with an offence by us, it would come through an investigative body. At this time, I am not aware of them being charged with an offence. You would want to pose that question to the RCMP. Yes, December 31, 2019 we received an alert that evening that there was something going on in Wuhan. On January 1, 2020 a special report was released and Dr. Tam used that the following day.  

MP Genuis (CPC): Has any government lab fired lab scientists due to a security breach or the improper transfer of viruses? Were there cases of people being fired for policy breaches at any lab in Canada? What is a policy breach? Does Canada fund or permit "Gain of Function" experiments where researchers make viruses more deadly for research purposes? Does Canada have a policy that prohibits the transfer of viruses for the purpose of Gain-of-Function Experiments? Does the Wuhan Institute of Virology engages in the Gain-of-Function Experiments related to the Coronavirus?  

Response from President Stewart: That is a difficult question to answer. I can't answer the question as it is currently structured. It would be a security / administrative policy perhaps. PHAC does not fund research as you are describing, but I will ask for confirmation from Dr. Poliquin. 

Response from Dr. Poliquin: They are automatically referred to a committee to ensure any risks associated with them are mitigated. I am not able to answer the question regarding the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Every transfer of materials is assessed on a case-by-case basis. We have never transferred Coronavirus. 

MP Williamson (CPC): Why were the two employees of the National Microbiology Lab terminated? Will you provide this information on a confidential basis through the chair? On assessing the letter from a Chinese entity, do you take these letters from China as the truth and nothing but the truth (what investigations do you go to ensure that the letter will be honored?) 

Response from President Stewart: I am not familiar with security areas / this committee, so what I would like to do is explore what is the appropriate legal response to this request. [Follow-up]  

Response from Dr. Poliquin: The request for an assessment is what is required. There is an extensive approach undertaken prior to the transfer of materials. The Wuhan Institute of Virology is dedicated to public health. 

MP Fragiskatos (LIB): Is it fair to say that you can't answer the questions raised regarding the investigation of those scientists because there is an ongoing investigation? There was an audit recently carried out that suggested the alert system could have been better – thoughts?  

Response from President Stewart: Privacy, security, and I can't speak on behalf of the RCMP – these are the reasons why I haven't been able to answer the questions as posed. We have corrected and restored the alert function. 

Cybersecurity 

MP Emmanuel Dubourg (LIB): Can you expand on discussions you had with China? Since March, how do you qualify discussions with Chinese authorities or your counterparts in China whether dealing with vaccines or with citizens? During this period of the pandemic, have you put in place any type of additional security measures surrounding the research done by agents in Canada at PHAC or anything dealing with cyber-attacks? Did you contact CSIS to know the process in your agency? Have you been in contact with Dr. Scott Halperin from Dalhousie University's Vaccine Centre with respect to vaccinations? 

Response from President Stewart: I was referring to a series of agreements that the Government of Canada and China have reached around collaboration of research, which goes back to a 2007 arrangement focused on life sciences (i.e. vaccines). These are normally done as missions by government officials. Cyber-attacks have been an area of concern for us, but I believe CSIS has put out guidance on research related to the COVID situation. The people responsible for cybersecurity have done outreach, to us and the private sector. Dr. Halperin is a pivotal part of Canada's research community, so I have spoken to him. 

COVID19 Response 

MP Harris (NDP): During the period from January to February 2020, the Global Public Health Commission Network didn't seem to make it to high levels in your department. The Chief Public Health Officer said the situation was under control in that period, but it really wasn't under control. Two weeks later, there was a public health emergency declared and we were in a lockdown. Why was the information garnered by PHAC ignored?  

Response from President Stewart: Different streams come out of alert system– the notice was provided and responded to.  

International Community 

MP Yip (LIB): Can you tell us more about collaboration between Canada and the international community? What is PHAC's policy on foreign recruitment programs?  Are there any Chinese nationals working at the MNL right now? 

Response from Dr. Poliquin: The global community has collaborative extensively – sharing data from China from the weekend of January 10, 2020  illustrates the essential nature of international collaboration. Official agreement is required for visiting.  

Response from President Stewart: Programs of that nature we would see as a conflict of interest.  

Second Panel: Questions from Parliamentarians 

5G and Encryption 

MP Pierre Paul-Hus (CPC): Do you think the Alliance is better able to withstand cyber-attacks from China? In your report, you mentioned Canada has a 5G strategy problem – a lack of policies. Do you think Canada would be vulnerable vis-à-vis China? Do you think the Government of Canada has what it needs to protect services? Businesses that carry out Chinese army operations – do you have something similar according to the information you have – are there operators in Canada in terms of cyber-attacks?  

Response from Janis Sarts: Alliance is collective, so it takes time to develop capabilities.  

Response from Christopher Parsons: While appropriate to be concerned about Huawei, there is an equal need to look at other companies (Nokia, Samsung, and other parties should go through strong assessments). It is not sufficient to remove Huawei alone. Canada cannot go it alone. One of the things Citizen Labs recommends is for like-minded nations to coordinate / work together. There seems to be an incoherence regarding Canada's cybersecurity strategy [it's out of date]. Unfortunately, the Citizen Lab does not have that kind of security intelligence.  

MP Yip (LIB): Mr. Parsons, you mentioned in your brief you thought there should be many vendors. How can we build a strong 5G network? With so many vendors participating, how can we make it a coherent network? How concerned should Canada be about China's involvement in developing the RAND? [to be checked against transcript] Are there any western media platforms that operate transparently? What has the impact been for Canada? In February 2019, you addressed encryption and how Canada should adopt a national encryption policy – how would this protect us from foreign interference?  

Response from Christopher Parsons: This is paralleled by the CSE – a combination of Samsung, Nokia, and other vendors should be assessed, and to work collaboratively with our partners. Where Canada can engage is finding ways of encouraging corporations and academic units to participate (i.e. funds set up by the Government of Canada to allow non-profits, business community to get involved in these discussions). There are not currently any social media platforms that adhere. Facebook does disclose, but we don't have things like algorithmic transparency. There has been a relatively minimal breach of Canada's information to date, but we are learning that the number of victims are going up – the actual assessment will take a longer period of time. We have argued for end-to-end encryption, so only the two parties can access it. If the network is compromised, the communication cannot be accessed.  

Foreign Interference  

MP Bergeron (BQ): Looking at the 2019 election in Europe and the US election there seems to be cause for concern that there was foreign interference involved. It seems Canada's defenses are inferior to other western countries. Why do major powers here agree to being accessible to interference from China? Why can't we establish a system of deterrence with reprisals?  

Response from Janis Sarts: We have been looking at social media companies, and most of the elections play out on these platforms. We have detected that most all of these platforms can be manipulated, and it is difficult for them to eradicate the issue (twitter is better whereas TikTok is defenseless). We have to have an oversight mechanism to make sure this is not simple or easy. It is possible to do if you have the political will, leverage, and resources.  

MP Jack Harris (NDP): In the EU, you said there was the ability to buy data, and then send that data. Can you give us an example of where that would come from (i.e. would this be private operators providing this information for sale or a state actor?) Are there technological defenses against that or how do you deal with it? Can you please explain your experiment regarding data-scrapping to influence behavior among military operatives? There was concern about the disinformation from the Russians in the Baltic States – is that still going on?  

Response from Janis Sarts: There are private actors that do it for sale, and there are state actors and sometimes hybrid networks (business related) – there is a variety of players in the field. Public awareness campaigns are important because otherwise we are more vulnerable. Part of the defenses are the social media companies, and there is a need for some kind of a regulatory framework. You can create algorithm that see these things for what they are, which is not the case at the moment. If there was a better business case for them I believe they would use these algorithms. We tried an experiment with the Latvian Armed Forces to show that open source data can be used to influence human behaviors, and succeeded to have militants leave positions they were supposed to defend. In the wrong hands it can be a dangerous tool, which is a future risk of 5G. Yes Russian influence in the Baltic States is still going on, but as we see from a Russian perspective, they have moved to bigger players. 

Biotechnology and DNA testing 

MP Williamson (CPC): Have you looked at the biotech firm BGI and the approval by Health Canada to offer COVID 19 testing? Do you have concerns about the transfer of the health and DNA of Canadians to mainland China? Why did you highlight the 23andMe as a risk? What do you think Canada should do to protect the biodata of Canadians?  

Response from Christopher Parsons: DNA information is incredibly sensitive, so there is a concern with any sensitive data outside of Canada, which would be inclusive of China. A concern is how the data will be used. Generally, there should be strong requirements that limit how the information is used (no secondary uses without the meaningful consent of the individual). 

Disinformation 

MP Zann (LIB): Can you please explain how you think we can best fight against the creation of divisions in society and the widening of existing fractures in security systems?  

Response from Janis Sarts: We are undergoing profound change in the information environment where social media companies have monetized that environment through promoting information (creating information bubbles and putting citizens in them). Outside hostile actors exacerbate that situation. We have to make sure the laws and rules are applied transparently. 

Social Media Platforms 

MP Bergeron (BQ): Adam Segal has said TikTok should not be on the telephones of American officials. CSIS told members that they should be wary of using WeChat / TikTok – should Canadians be concerned?  

Response from Christopher Parsons: Officials may be concerned; however, in TikTok we found no overt surveillance or censorship. WeChat has used information to build a censor index – I think Canadians are right to be concerned.  

NDP Harris (NDP): You recommend that social media companies should be required to report transparently – do we have the means to force these companies to do that?  

Response from Christopher Parsons: I think we can pass legislation in the countries where they operate. We are seeing pieces of that in the EU and USA, but it isn't an agreed upon. I think Canada can work with our partners on this. It would be something we hope the government looks at. 

Follow-ups (To be checked against transcript):  

Summary of Committee Business / Sommaire d'affaires du comité

House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN)/  
Comité spécial sur les relations sino-canadiennes (CACN) 

Date: March 31, 2021 

Time: 11:00am-1:00pm 

Report Prepared By / Rapport préparé par 
Andre Leclerc, Team Lead 
T: 343-203-3509  

Topic of Meeting / Sujet de la réunion 

Canada-China Relations – Emergency Meeting on PHAC production of papers 

Members in Attendance / Membres présents 

Witnesses / Témoins  

Summary / Sommaire  

The Committee's CPC and BQ members requested an emergency meeting following the March 22 meeting with the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC). During the March 22 meeting there were multiple attempts by the CPC and BQ members to have PHAC President Ian Stewart to reveal details as to why two scientists were removed from the National Microbiology Lab (NML) in Winnipeg. Mr. Stewart, under legal advice, was unable to provide details.  Today's meeting was requested to discuss compelling the Agency to produce materials for the committee's review related to their questions. 

The meeting was entirely centered on the motion to compel PHAC to produce documents as noted above. The motion passed and text will be circulated once a formal version is received by DCL. The Liberal members were opposed to the motion as written, with concerns about possible interference with ongoing investigations and disclosure of protected information. The committee eventually voted to modify the motion to have the documents sent directly to members and receive advice from the Parliamentary legal counsel, as well as giving the Agency 20 calendar days to produce these documents, or April 20, 2021.The meeting ended with an agreement that the Counsel would signal to the committee when he has reviewed the documents and is ready to provide an opinion and advice.  

Follow-up Items / Suivis 

Committee's Forward Business Agenda 

Study / Étude 

Next Meeting Dates & Steps / Dates des prochaines réunions et prochaines étapes 

Deadline to Complete Study / Date à laquelle l'étude doit être terminée 

Date Study Agreed To or Referred / Date convenue pour l'étude ou date à laquelle la question a été acheminée 

National security as it relates to China 

April 12 the committee will hear from DND's Minister, as well as officials from DND, CSE and GAC. 

N/A 

, "That, upon the completion of the study of the situation in Hong Kong, the committee study issues related to national security as they relate to its mandate, including, but not limited to cybersecurity and the threat of foreign influence; and that the committee invite the Minister of Public Safety to appear as part of that study." 

PoP motion  

TBD 

PHAC to provide documents by April 20, 2021 

Summary of Committee Business / Sommaire d'affaires du comité

House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN)/  
Comité spécial sur les relations sino-canadiennes (CACN) 

Date: April 12, 2021 

Time: 6:30pm – 9:30pm 

Report Prepared By / Rapport préparé par 
Andre Leclerc, Team Lead 
T: 343-203-3509  

Topic of Meeting / Sujet de la réunion 
National Security Dimension of Canada-China Relations  

Members in Attendance / Membres présents 

Appearing / Témoins  

6:30pm – 7:30pm  

Witnesses / Témoins  

6:30pm – 8:30pm 

7:30pm – 8:30pm 

Summary / Sommaire  

The first hour of the meeting focused on the appearance by the Minister of the Department of National Defence, for which a full report by DND parliamentary affairs is attached. Lines of questioning focused on military training and cooperation, cyber security and operations, multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, Arctic Sovereignty and defence, and 5G. Overall, the tone of the meeting was respectful and focused on facts. There were moments of political tension during the Minister's appearance on the issue of funding of the Halifax International Security Forum (HISF). 

For the second hour, Minister Sajjan departed and officials from DND and CSE were joined by GAC officials IFM/Costello and OPD/Epp. The panel did not/not have opening remarks but proceeded directly to questions from Members.  

The CPC questions to GAC witnesses focused on Taiwan, travel advisories, the 2022 Beijing Olympics, and Ambassador Barton. MP Chong (CPC) inquired into the Government's position regarding Taiwan's participation in the World Health Assembly meeting taking place in May 2021. OPD/Epp noted that Canada has consistently advocated for Taiwan to be an observer at various international fora. The MP then raised a question regarding Canada's travel advisories, noting that GAC had recently updated its advice for the Xinjiang region and asked if Canada would be advising against travelling to the 2022 winter Olympics in Beijing. OPD/Epp stated that he was unable to comment beyond what was said in the advisory, but that there were active discussions interdepartmentally and with partners on the topic. MP Chong (CPC) then asked about Ambassador Barton's recent travel to Canada, to which OPD/Epp confirmed the Ambassador was still in Canada for meetings and undertaking an intensive outreach program to seek the earliest possible release of the two Michaels. Finally, the Member asked if GAC had conducted an internal analysis of the need for China to grow at a specific GDP to ensure that internal migrants were gainfully employed. OPD/Epp indicated that he was not aware of such a study, but that he would inquire internally. 

Following questions directed to DND on joint training exercises with China, MP Bezan (CPC) asked GAC officials about the decision to continue relations with the People's Liberation Army. This question stemmed from GAC's accidental release of unredacted ATIP documents regarding shared intelligence between Canada and the United States about the South China Sea in December 2020. The member's time ran out before officials were able to answer.  

From the Liberal members, MP Fragiskatos (LPC) inquired into Canada's position regarding the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). IFM/Costello noted that Canada has excellent relations with the members and  looks forward to cooperating with them but is not a formal member. He noted that partnerships such as the Quad were important in the new strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region. The Member then  asked what the Canadian government could do to limit the sourcing of products from Xinjiang made with forced labour. IFM/Costello noted that GAC was working closely with allies in a similar approach to the recent Canadian sanctions  demonstrated. 

MP Bergeron (BQ) asked about GAC's willingness to continue the planned exercises with China as mentioned in the ATIP released in December 2020. IFM/Costello responded that, at the time, GAC had not yet made an evaluation of the situation regarding the arbitrary detention of the Michaels and wanted to keep all dialogue channels open. In a follow up question, the Member asked if GAC would now agree with DND's recent decision to end all military and training exercises. IFM/Costello responded that China as a country has changed in its outlook, and Canada's relations have evolved since then. MP Bergeron (BQ) then remarked on the work of the Committee regarding VFS Global that handles visa processing. However, he did not direct questions to the witnesses on this topic. The Member then turned to Nuctech and the use of this equipment, especially on whether any security screening had been done prior to awarding the standing offer. IFM/Costello noted that no equipment was purchased, and none was deployed to  Canadian embassies. IFM/Costello also noted that the report was shared with the OGGO Committee. In a later line of questioning, MP Bergeron (BQ) asked about Canada's coordination of the G7 rapid response mechanism and if it was in place. IFM/Costello confirmed that the program was in place, described how it worked, and noted that it has seen success in understanding and countering foreign interference.  

NDP's MP Harris (NDP) continued with questioning on the Nuctech issue. Referring to the Deloitte report commissioned by GAC, MP Harris asked if CSE had provided guidance to GAC. CSE's witness indicated they would revert to the committee on specific time frames. In a later round of questions, the Member shifted his questions to China's stance toward Taiwan, including asking about the potential for an invasion of Taiwan and its consequences.  OPD/Epp noted that this situation is of grave concern to likeminded nations and neighbours in the region but did not answer the speculative nature of the rest of the question. 

Follow-up Items / Suivis 

GAC to look into whether the Department has undertaken any economic studies of Chinese internal migration changes and the resulting impacts, including pressure to maintain economic growth to provide employment of internal migrants. 

Committee's Forward Business Agenda 

Study / Étude 

Next Meeting Dates & Steps / Dates des prochaines réunions et prochaines étapes 

Deadline to Complete Study / Date à laquelle l'étude doit être terminée 

Date Study Agreed To or Referred / Date convenue pour l'étude ou date à laquelle la question a été acheminée 

National security as it relates to China 

April 19 the committee will continue to hear from witnesses with regard to the national security dimension. Witness list TBD. 

N/A 

, "That, upon the completion of the study of the situation in Hong Kong, the committee study issues related to national security as they relate to its mandate, including, but not limited to cybersecurity and the threat of foreign influence; and that the committee invite the Minister of Public Safety to appear as part of that study." 

PoP motion  

TBD 

PHAC to provide documents by April 20, 2021 

Summary of Committee Business / Sommaire d'affaires du comité

House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN)/鈥�鈥�&苍产蝉辫;
Comité鈥痵pécial鈥痵ur les relations鈥痵ino-canadiennes鈥�(CACN)鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Date:鈥疉pril 19, 2021 

Time:鈥�6:30pm-9:30pm鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Report Prepared By/ Rapport鈥痯réparé鈥痯ar鈥�&苍产蝉辫;
Kathryn Leyenaar, Senior Analyst, Parliamentary Affairs鈥�&苍产蝉辫;
T: 613-371-9261鈥��&苍产蝉辫;

Topic of Meeting / Sujet de la réunion鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Canada-China Relations鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Members鈥痠n Attendance / Membres présents鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

奥颈迟苍别蝉蝉别蝉鈥�/&苍产蝉辫;罢&别补肠耻迟别;尘辞颈苍蝉鈥�

6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. 

United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission 

7:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. 

As an individual 

8:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. 

As an individual 

Questions from Parliamentarians 

Huawei 

MP Michael Chong (CPC): You talked about the "integrated joint operations platform", which can audit populations - can you tell us what role Huawei plays in developing this surveillance technology and what are your views of Huawei vis-à-vis national security? 

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: Some of the views I express are my own and not the Commissions. A report came out that the Dutch found Huawei in their telecommunications network that allowed them eavesdrop on the Prime Minister. I have been suspicious of Huawei all along. You see what is happening with Alibaba. We all have concerns on the Commission with Huawei.  

MP Bergeron (BQ): On the trade front, Chinese companies have an obligation to comply with the security requirements of the Chinese state, so Huawei sends information back to the Chinese authorities. How can we collaborate with the PRC and its enterprises given that on every possible occasion they might take information to rise up against us? [Referenced a April 2020 article that the Secretary General of ITU was a former official of Chinese telecommunications and promoted Huawei in the 5G market]. Should we be distrustful of Chinese officials and the companies working for the benefit of the Chinese government?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: The reality is we have to find ways to collaborate with China. We can't just cut off relations because there would be concern in other countries (i.e. Germany and France are putting eggs in the trade basket with China). We need to reform the WTO because we have to get at the heart of what is creating this unfair competition. We have to address subsidies. We need to be attentive regarding Huawei / 5G. 

MP Pierre Paul Hus (CPC): Do you agree it is a concern for Huawei to hold a monopoly in the North? Should we abandon Huawei or not?  

Response from Professor Leupreucht: It is completely irresponsible – Huawei in the Netherlands targeted judicial interventions. We should have abandoned Huawei years ago.  

World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization (WTO) / Trade Relations 

MP Michael Chong (CPC): I read in your report that you highlighted the negative influence that China has had on the WHO. Do you think the WHO is in need of reform to curtail China's influence? You indicated you will look at US investment in China to make sure investments are not in opposition to US interests – should the Canadian government do the same?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: I think there are concerns regarding the WHO. Speaking personally, there has been political pressure at the top of the WHO. I am hesitate to tell another government what to do, but my answer would be yes. 

MP John Williamson (CPC): Has there been any review or investigation of investments in mainland China into the US market (stock exchange). In today's world, China has great access to capital and we don't even know how these investments are being made.  Also, why is reform at the WTO reform an issue? Has China not fulfilled its obligation? What is happening to Alibaba? 

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: The Commission has raised concerns regarding Chinese companies on the US stock exchange. We can't get access to audits of Chinese companies. There are all sorts of mechanisms happening for the flow of money (i.e. money laundering). When China joined the WTO we wondered who would influence who. I don't advocate we get rid of the WTO, but I think we need to deal with SOEs because the WTO isn't mandated to deal with the economic steps the Chinese government is consistently doing. There are always some people wanting China out of the WTO. Regarding Alibaba, the Chinese government has pulled back. 

MP Jack Harris (NDP): In 2012, Canada entered into a FIPA with China which has been criticized as being non-reciprocal – it favors China. What do you think of this agreement? What recommendations have you made? Can we influence human rights in China with the help of other nations or are we in a gridlock?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: We will see more recommendations / legislation moving (about to be in the Senate). There is a lot of concern and opposition to creating trade agreements with a country that doesn't abide by the agreement. I think we have to try and influence the situation in China regarding human rights. Their national security law that has destroyed Hong Kong contains a provision, which indicates that China intends to promote Chinese rule of law around the world. We need to engage in the legal system to make sure people are clear and engaged in it. We need to figure out our own united front. It is a clash of ideologies that we are encountering.  

MP Williamson (CPC): Have you considered the case for a slow divergence away from China, since the open democracy / economy we operate in today has too many vulnerable points? Do you think there is a way to change China?  

Response from Professor Leuprecht: We need to be more realistic to the persistent threat instead of homeopathic approaches with our head in the sand, thinking we can turn China into a responsible actor. I think we can raise the cost on Chinese behavior to incentive them. I think there are opportunities (air quality / educational opportunities), and there needs to be a nuanced approach.  

Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 

MP Michael Chong (CPC) What is your view of the Belt and Road initiative and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)? 

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: China is using the Belt and Road Initiative to create markets and increase its own influence. A concern is debt-trap diplomacy and also vaccine diplomacy. If you look at smart cities, to increase efficiency – it allows Chinese access to control the water supply and even traffic, which can all be used against them.  

MP Genuis (CPC): There are those who say the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is completely different than the Belt and Road initiative. What is your view? In Canada, we are putting money into China like the AIIB…when you say united front are you saying stronger infrastructure of democratic governments?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: I think the Chinese government will use all the tools at its disposal to accomplish what it wants. Contracts going out should not be taken all by Chinese contractors and should ensure also that human rights standards are upheld. AIIB should ensure this. Some analysis says that the Belt and Road Initiative won't be what the Chinese Government thinks it will be. I think we have got to figure out ways to work together with countries that are not necessarily good at human rights (i.e. Vietnam). 

MP Yipp (LIB): What are China's vulnerabilities? What can help bolster Canada's innovation? Can you tell us more about the Belt and Road Initiative? 

Response from Professor Leuprecht: In 2025 China will hit peak labor and will have maxed out on productivity gains. China is running out of runway to catch up. Regarding the Belt and Road Initiative, China sold this as a worth-while investment, but it presents risk to them in the aftermath of this pandemic. 

Forced Labour in the Xinjiang Region  

MP Fragiskatos (LIB): How has the US responded to what has transpired in Xinjiang in terms of trade? How is the US responding to goods coming into the US produced in Xinjiang? 

Response from Mrs. Bartholomew: Thinking of President Biden – there are areas we will compete, and other areas we will confront, but we must find areas we can work together. We have to figure this out – China can produce solar cells at a much lower cost. There are some technologies they can produce that we all need access to. The US has banned products coming in and used sanctions.  

MP Genuis (CPC): In Canada our supply chain is complaints based; for instance, the CBSA adjudicates complaints when received but mechanisms by which investigations are undertaken are still being worked out. It would be impossible to investigate China. In the US, the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act was passed at 406 to 3. What is your view on this Act? Can you share why it has such strong bi-partisan support and reflect if other countries should adopt a similar model?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: I think it is a serious attempt to get at the issue you mention. There are many goods coming over here, but few people are tracking it. I absolutely support the Forced Labour Prevention Act. The huge margin in the vote shows the serious concern with what is going on with this situation. Regarding implementation, there is nothing stopping companies from changing their labelling. We need to recognize what products are being produced and focus on those products. I think the Chinese government will use all the tools at its disposal to accomplish what it wants.  

China Relations and Western Democracies  

MP Dubourg (LIB): You worked in Africa on AIDS, do you think investments we are making in developing countries regarding COVID is sufficient?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: Given the vast need, the amount Canada and the US has contributed is just a starting point. I don't know that any vaccines have made it to Haiti. Here is an opportunity to go out and represent our values.  

MP Fragiskatos (LIB): Is there any hope for any relationship between China and democracies like Canada and the US that is not strained or are we seeing the emergence of a second cold war? Are there possible areas of where our relationship can take shape like Climate Change -  is this something that democracies like Canada can work with China on?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: Thinking of President Biden – there are areas we will compete, and other areas we will confront, but we must find areas we can work together. We have to figure this out – China can produce solar cells at a much lower cost. There are some technologies they can produce that we all need access to.  

PS Joël Lightbound (LIB): What is China's most frequent modus operandi when exerting its influence across the world? What are the main principles our democracy should maintain and arm ourselves with against this kind of economic coercion? Do you think a united front as western democratic nations should work together? What could be the impact of western investments in China?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: We absolutely need to work together and be aware that the Chinese government wants to divide and conquer. Some of it is investment banks, and that they will make sure they make money no matter what.  

MP Harris (NDP): Mr. Genuis thinks democracies must get together against China and you suggested a more nuanced response – not disengaging with China, but also making sure we are engaged with other players. Can you please elaborate?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: I think democracies do need to get together. Our values stand for something around the world. We diminish at the importance of these values, but we also have to recognize that we might need to work with countries where we don't align with human rights. We have to acknowledge that there is not a 100% purity test with countries around the world. There is a core group of western democracies that we can work with.  

National Security and Foreign Interference  

MP Fragiskatos (LIB): What can democracies like Canada do to ensure that we are protected and that our system of insuring national security at various levels is protected from threats like China's government? Professor Brady: in terms of lessons learned from New Zealand's experience, what would you point to for Canada to implement?  

Response from Michel Juneau-Katsuya: We are not fighting equally, since we have to return to the ballot every so many years. China does not have to change the course of action, so in strategic planning, their own officials plan on generations. We need reciprocity and more balance between what they offer to us and what we offer them. A few years ago, we sold Nexen Inc. for $15 billion – try to buy a corner store in China – we won't be able to, but when we have a Chinese company in Alberta that can call the premier - that is a power imbalance.  

Response from Professor Anne-Marie Brady: In New Zealand, we are having public conversations in Parliament and passing new legislation. Sunlight is the best disinfectant.  

MP Williamson (CPC): How can we help CSIS to "play well"? What do you think needs to be done to get everyone working together so national security is working with law enforcement? Does this require a legislative change – an oversight body / law to require better behaviour?  

Response from Mr. Katsuya: We need to share information. Our elected officials should be briefed better on challenges coming from any foreign interference, and then go to the business leaders and involve them. Information must be shared among agencies. One of the big flops we had with a Russian case in Halifax was that CSIS refused to share information with RCMP and RCMP had to improvise all the way.  

MP Dubourg (LIB): We have taken measures to see the release of the Two Michaels, but with no results. Do we need to put more pressure on China or should we continue to try and collaborate with China, so we can have a happy ending for those arbitrarily detained?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: I think your diplomats are having to deal with this situation [flaggd the Halifax Security Forum and the award for Taiwan]. I don't think we can put aside our concerns regarding fundamental human rights / rule of law. We have to figure out a way to expand those rather than contract them. Everyone should be aware of China's willingness to detain people. 

MP Jack Harris (NDP): China has tried to dominate academia and financial sectors. How effective have the Chinese been to influence financial sectors and academia?  

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: Some of it is that we have an obligation to fund our institutions sufficiently. Transparency is one of the answers. 

MP Bergeron (BQ): What would be the difference between Chinese Confucius Institutes vs French (i.e. Alliance Française) or German Institutes? 

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew: I think the Confucius Institutes serves as a tool on campus to control Chinese students who are there and spread Chinese ideologies. I am concerned with the ideology, and that they serve as platforms for espionage. Confucius Institutes are fundamentally different than what western institutes are doing. 

MP Pierre Paul-Hus (CPC): Have leaders not been guided properly by Canadian security forces (CSIS)? We know there was $3.9 million given to our IT sector and other money to McGill – what do you think of Huawei financing our universities? Last year, you said Canada had been infiltrated by Chinese influences – what about RCMP?  

Response from Michel Juneau-Katsuya: When it comes to espionage the only way we can defend ourselves is prevention. In the past, CSIS tried to raise more awareness among Canadian companies, now I think they are misguided.  We found in Canadian elections the Chinese embassy had given money to all of the political parties, going against electoral legislation in Canada. In the RCMP they don't understand infiltration of agents of the united front work.  

MP Bergeron (BQ): In your book "Nest of Spies" you talk about collecting information for the Chinese government. What do you think of front companies in Canada? Mrs. Brady, in 2019, you presented to the NZ government saying that there should be a registry of foreign agents to stop foreign interference. What could we develop in parallel in Canada? Is this what the Five Eyes does? 

Response from Mr. Katsuya: Several companies in the 1990s were "front companies" and seemed to want to collaborate with Canadian companies. The Confucius Institutes are basically espionage satellites. 

Response from Professor Brady: I think we would benefit from exchanging information on what works and what mistakes we want to avoid. I think we need a system that is transparent and that enables companies / the public to make decisions about who they are partnering with in China, but we don't want to damage our democracy in the process. Parliaments can talk to each other too, not just the Five Eyes. 

MP Harris (NDP): How would legislation for a foreign registry be effective?  

Response from Professor Brady: We have to be clear that we won't catch everyone. We need to learn from the experience of Finland / Latvia who have been dealing with Russian interference for a long time and have excellent laws on foreign interference. Finland has courses on disinformation for the public.  

MP Jack Harris (NDP): Do you have reason to believe that there is less foreign interference than before? Why do we hear so little about charges for clandestine activities?  

Professor Brady, you did a report on interference with elections in 2017 to your government, can you tell us about the nature of that interference and what we can do about it?  

Response from Mr. Katsuya: It has increased. We see much more interference at all three levels of government. When it comes to prosecution, it lies with RCMP. The CSIS cannot prosecute and they don't play well with other kids in the schoolyard. CSIS should be sharing information. Using the Parliamentary Committee on Security and Intelligence is one way, but the problem is that there are different analysts and committee members every 5 years.  

Response from Professor Brady: After each local government election, Parliament does an assessment afterwards. There were two inquiries into foreign interference in 2017. We found that through proxy groups our politicians had given donations to local and central politicians, but they didn't understand who their partners were, which is why public discussions are important.  

MP Yipp (LIB): What are your thoughts on CSIS Directors recent remarks regarding China?  

Response from Mr. Katsuya: I think it is about time we called a cat a cat and a dog a dog. China is the most formidable threat to our democracy, economy, and society. The Chinese government perceives their relationship with others not as we understand it. They are at war and everything goes at war. They will bribe, cheat, lie, bully because the name of the game is to win. A problem I see in the public service – we had conflict with Huawei – trouble with court procedures, yet GAC gave Nuctech (equally problematic as Huawei) several million dollar to secure our embassies. The right hand is not talking to the left hand. We lack the support of GAC. If one department should have known it was these guys.  

NDP Jack Harris (NDP): Is there a reason why Canada is a particularly subject to Chinese interference? – is it our vulnerability or are we a rich target for IP/ scientific research / minerals?  

Response from Professor Leuprecht: The FBI recently said before Congress that it opens a new investigation of China every 10 hours and there are 2000 active investigations. You would think we should have 75 cases, but we need to have a federal government that can deliver on federal priorities.  

Response from Steve Waterhouse: Federal resources should tackle federal problems. We have weak laws, so the PRC can work their way and even modify laws to their advantage.  

Cybersecurity 

MP Pierre Paul Hus (CPC): Do you think there is inconsistency with Canada's cybersecurity policy? Chinese hackers behind the recent Microsoft hack – what is the risk? Have there been more recent attacks? 

Response from Steve Waterhouse: The threat has evolved over the last 20 years, but the rules and regulations have not so we are at a disadvantage. Despite many warnings from official bodies there wasn't enough talk in the media to allow companies to react. Most recently, thre was an attack against MSPs and CGI and Canada was infiltrated / significant clients of StatsCanada / NRC - web-codes able to intercept and patch. Everyone works in silos, especially in Quebec they don't turn to federal government. Only in the last 2 years, Quebec has asked for assistance / information to take the right decisions about cyber risks.  

Response from Professor Leuprecht: The problem with policy now is that it deals only with cybersecurity. We need to completely overhaul the policy.  

MP Bergeron (BQ): Why is China still a threat to Canada, yet Canada and other western countries are not a higher threat to China when it comes to cyber security? 

Response from Steve Waterhouse: China has a network that is difficult to penetrate. We need to have binding legislation that will discourage people. 

Response from Professor Leuprecht: It's a question of allocating resources – China has optimized resources available to them. Cyber security is a political question and the trade-offs between security and then convenience on the other hand. We don't have clear indicators / boundaries that signal what lines not to cross.  

MP Jack Harris (NDP): Are dormant codes contained in software infrastructure (i.e. TikTok) something we should be concerned about?  

Response from Steve Waterhouse: The history of TikTok as an information platform is that they will influence and induce information. They control the message. The program installed on a phone means that they can activate whatever they want because they control it. That is the reality of playing with open source platforms that exist. 

MP Pierre Paul-Hus (CPC):  You said Canada is the only big democracy without its own foreign intelligence agency compared to other G7 countries that have had a big impact vis-à-vis China? What needs to change in terms of cyber security? 

Response from Professor Leuprecht鈥�: Without a doubt, countries that are well positioned with intelligence (UK, Australia) have a capacity and strategic assessment capability that Canada does not have. We don't have the capacity to give strategic advice / pass on strategic information to government.  

Response from Steve Waterhouse: There needs to be a recognition that it affects departments in all spheres.  

MP Dubourg (LIB): Do you find that security infrastructure in Canada has gone backwards?  

Response from Steve Waterhouse: Canada is a victim of being underdeveloped. There will be corrections in the future with IT codes that haven't been updated. Our society is vulnerable. This committee has to talk to people who maintain this equipment to understand bureaucratic complexity can be overcome to address this problem.  

New Zealand's Context 

MP Williamson (CPC): Can you expand on New Zealand's laws surrounding registry of state media and lobbyists – where these exist and how they are working?  

Response from Professor Brady: We are still having this difficult conversation in our government. NZ only has 3 years for our parliament. In 2017, suddenly, China's political interference was in the public eye. The government did their own assessments, and decided national security trumps economic security. We are slowly passing legislation regarding security requirements.  

MP Yipp (LIB): Has there been an increase in anti-Asian racism in New Zealand?  

Response from Professor Brady: We have not seen anything like the awful incidents in the US regarding anti-Asian racism. NZ government has been talking about this and what to do regarding foreign interference. 

Five Eyes 

MP Fragiskatos (LIB): Do you believe the Five Eyes allies are aligned in understanding China to be a top security threat? What do you make of the Five Eyes? 

Response from Carolyn Bartholomew:  I think the Five Eyes is an important institution. I think our alliances will strengthen under President Biden. I recognize there are different interests within the Five Eyes to protect economic relationships with China, and we have to find ways to work together. What is happening in Australia should be a wake-up call for all of us. 

Arctic Sovereignty  

MP Pierre Paul-Hus (CPC): We know that China has marked the far north with submarines / icebreakers. Do you think their presence changes the balance between powers?  

Response from Professor Anne-Marie Brady: We find each society is slightly different, but Russia and China will find the crack.  

MP Lightbound (LIB): How can we better protect arctic sovereignty?  

Response from Christian Leuprecht: The Arctic is geo-strategically very important. We need to review how we communicate within our defense systems and within the Canadian Armed Forces. We also need to review our command and control system. 

Follow-ups (To be checked against transcript):  

Future Business:  

Until May 31, 2021, CACN will be focusing on matters related to the national security aspect of the Canada-China relationship. Following May 31, 2021 TBD.  

Summary of Committee Business / Sommaire d'affaires du comité

House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN)/鈥��&苍产蝉辫;
Comité鈥痵pécial鈥痵ur les relations鈥痵ino-canadiennes鈥�(CACN)鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Date:鈥疢ay 3, 2021 

Time:鈥�6:30pm-9:30pm鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Report Prepared By/ Rapport鈥痯réparé鈥痯ar鈥�&苍产蝉辫;
Kathryn Leyenaar, Senior Analyst, Parliamentary Affairs鈥�&苍产蝉辫;
T: 613-371-9261鈥��&苍产蝉辫;

Topic of Meeting / Sujet de la réunion鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Canada-China Relations鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Members鈥痠n Attendance / Membres présents鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

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6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. 

As an individual 

7:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. 

As an individual 

8:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. 

As an individual 

Questions from Parliamentarians 

Huawei 

MP Pierre Paul-Hus (CPC): Regarding Huawei, do you think the government already has the necessary recommendations on 5G? 

Response from Mr. Fadden: If I worked for CSIS – hearing from politicians saying we are still waiting for answers, I would be very insulted.  

MP Pierre-Paul Hus (CPC): What do you think of the delayed decision with Huawei? Do you think it is simply political? Do you think the Canadian government lacks leadership with China? Should it go further to form coalitions / partnerships and be stronger?  

Response from Ward Elcock: I would prefer to see a decision taken, but I would also prefer to see the two Michaels back in Canada and that might take a while too. I think it is difficult for me to conceive of a situation where the government would proceed with allowing Huawei to operate in Canada given all of the circumstances. There is an opening to a partnership with the US and other NATO partners that will take us in the direction many would like to go. 

MP Jack Harris (NDP): Are you more comfortable with the ability to mitigate telecommunications issues with China (i.e. Huawei)?  

Response from Ward Elcock: It is possible since encryption / computers have advanced. Whether to take the Huawei case and build the system with Huawei equipment - you have to ask if it is backdoor. 

MP Bergeron (BQ): Why has the government not announced the decision regarding 5G whereas other Five Eyes partners have?  

Response from Ward Elcock: I can't answer that question because I don't sit in government anymore. I suspect it will have an impact on the two detentions of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig. In my view, I would be very surprised if the decision were to be yes, so I think the decision is a no. The issue of 5G is not simply an issue of Huawei. It is potentially attackable by a wide-variety of agencies around the world.  

Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor 

MP Bergeron (BQ): It appears China is making things worse. Canada has tried to make nice with China, and this has led to nothing. Is it true that we have tried but not succeeded?  

Response from Professor Paul Evans: The fundamental problem is the three Ms problem: Michael Spavor, Michael Kovrig, and Madame Meng – this is coercive hostage diplomacy. We need a diplomatic solution, and that will involve the United States. 

Universities and Research 

MP Michael Chong (CPC): Universities have told us they have not received advice on partnerships with companies like Huawei (i.e. UofT entered into a partnership with Huawei and said the Government had not advised them against it).  Would you be comfortable if the Federal Government said to universities that they are advising against certain companies (clear advice to universities)?  

Response from Professor Paul Evans: I think that universities don't want to see directives from the top that they are not part of discussion. The Americans have thrown a blanket over many collaborations (i.e. Huawei), but if we say "certain kinds of activities" "in certain fields" (general guidelines) that would work. With no disrespect to Ottawa, the scientific knowledge is not yet seen as persuasive. 

MP Bergeron (BQ): Exchange with the National Genome Institute with Beijing – what do you think?  

Response from Professor Gordon Houlden: Clearly we don't want to provide Chinese authorities with any information that could be used against Canada, but there is space for scientific collaboration that doesn't involve security risk.  

MP John Williamson (CPC): What weight do you give to a free society to be the spark to trigger research and innovation? Why if citizens can't vote in China, why do you think that exchange is so important when in fact they are in free countries around the world?  

Response from Professor Houlden: Free societies and free universities have more creativity. If the Chinese have more graduates that will be tremendously important in the future. 

Response from Professor Paul Evans: The most useful collaboration has been with Chinese officials on how to deal with multilateral institutions in Asia. We need multi-tiered activities with Chinese colleagues. We need to discuss who we should not collaborate with in China, and often we don't have those discussions. 

MP Jean Yip (LIB): Should we continue to open our doors to Chinese international students or should we be wary? What can we do to protect Chinese students in Canada from their government?  

Response from Professor Gordon Houlden: We don't want universities to be dependent on Chinese funding. On balance international students are a good thing. Perhaps there should only be restrictions on certain types of programs. Any student who felt there was influence by a foreign government should have a way to reach out (CSIS a key player in that regard). 

MP Jack Harris (NDP): Mr. Fadden, you suggest Chinese students shouldn't be collaborated with. How is it that you have such a hardline / how would you justify that?  

Response from Mr. Fadden: I agree we need to have exchanges with Chinese students, but some sectors of activity (national security) are put at risk. I think Parliament could propose legislation that says "no foreign power as indicated.. provides grants or contributions in this sector." 

China's Confucius Institutes 

MP Jack Harris (NDP): Confucius Institutes – why are universities relying on Confucius Institutes?  

Response from Professor Paul Evans: Universities don't rely on them. UBC decided not to partner with the Confucius Institutes because we saw it was connected to the propaganda side of the Chinese government. I think we should have complete transparency and go in to investigate. In and of themselves they are not an evil or an outreach location for deep subversion, but a foolishly considered way for the world to learn Chinese culture / language. 

MP Jack Harris (NDP): Have you heard that Confucius Institutes have been called centers for espionage? (MP Pierre Paul-Hus asked the same question) 

Response from Justin Li: I can't speak to it. 

MP Garnett Genuis (CPC): Mr. Li, what kind of information about your operations do you provide to China? What would be your recommendation on attending a reception with the Dalai Lama / would you choose to attend a reception with the Dalai Lama? How are human rights discussed in regards to the Confucius Institute at Carleton University? Do you receive funding from China? Do you consider Taiwan to be part of China?  

Response from Justin Li: We don't report anything to China, only to Carleton University. I am not in a position to answer this question – I don't have the knowledge about the Dalai Lama. I have heard / read from news, but haven't heard anything at Carleton. We receive funding from China for the Confucius Institute. We have visiting scholars from China who follow Carleton curriculum.  

MP Garnett Genuis (CPC): In 1989, student protestors were massacred in cold blood. Do you believe that the figures are accurate on the number of those killed in Tiananmen Square massacre? Do you think the Chinese government was wrong to open fire on these students?  

Response from Justin Li: My employment is with Carleton University, and I don't think it has anything to do with China. I don't have the figures of those killed. It was an unfortunate event of course. 

MP Jean Yip (LIB): Has there been increases to the Confucius Institutes? In October 2014, Toronto removed Confucius Institute involvement due to not aligning with community values? Is CI present in any schools now? Is there open transparency at Carleton University to discuss human rights?  

Response from Justin Li: I can't speak to that Institute. Our curriculum is Carleton's. We adhere by Carleton's guidelines.  

MP Dubourg (LIB): How does China uses Confucius Institutes as a public relations tool? Do you fear the increase in the number of Institutes?  

Response from Professor Ong: These institutes are used to promote Chinese culture overseas. People in charge may self-censor. I think there is potential risk of influence, which could become foreign interference.  

MP Dubourg (LIB): Mr. Li, you have been Director at the Confucius Institute at Carleton since 2011, but you must know witnesses have come to tell us about foreign interference through Confucius Institutes. How do you defend yourself personally when you hear all of these comments?  

Response from Justin Li: The Confucius Institute follows the rules and procedures at Carleton. 

MP Lightbound (LIB): Would you agree to hire a Falun Gung practitioner at the Confucius Institute at Carleton University?  

Response from Justin Li: I am the only one at the Confucius Institute.  

VFS Global Partnership / Beijing Visa Application Centre 

MP Bergeron (BQ): What is each agent doing at the Chinese diplomatic mission in Canada? Do you think it is important that we identify those carrying out security operations, even if they are unofficial? Is there something worrying about the left hand not knowing what the right is doing – should we be doing more checks on those with whom we are doing business? What can you tell us about VSF Global in Beijing?  

Response from Mr. Fadden: It can be difficult to determine who is in charge of what. The federal government must have whole-of-government activities. Governments in Canada doesn't really pin-point specific countries like the US and France do, and I think they could. This centre in Beijing and elsewhere do have access to Canadian databases to make decisions, and it doesn't take imagination that the Chinese could take advantage of this situation to enter our databases. We should not have allowed this possibility to exist. 

MP Bergeron (BQ): Mr. Elcock, what do you have to say with regards to the fact that no background checks were made by the security agency? Do you think things are safer now than in 2000?  

Response from Ward Elcock: That office functions entirely within the Chinese intelligence services. I am not convinced by the arguments that the processing of information in the facility in Beijing is secure.  

MP Jack Harris (NDP): Mr. Fadden, you have said that Canada should end its relationship with VFS Global in Beijing. This started in 2008, and VFS indicated they advised who their local contractor was – where was CSIS when this was going on? Where does the fear-mongering stop and the targeted / illegal activity begin?  

Response from Mr. Fadden: I never heard of this when I was at CSIS, but one of the challenges we face is to develop an understanding of what we will do if we accept the view that China is a risk.  

Response from Professor Ong: I see a lot of fear mongering in the media. One area of the government / any party doing better is to make inroads in grassroots communities in China, so that they don't have to rely on Chinese media. 

Bilateral and Multilateral Relations with China 

MP Pierre Paul Hus (CPC): If we look at the evaluation of threats when talking about China, can you tell me what the level of threat is from one to ten? Do you know what games China was playing with the CanSino contract? What do you think of Canada's approach to the 1000 talents program among others? You came to testify on Bill C-59 (cybersecurity), recently with COVID, Canada has not had offensive operations to deal with external threats. Do you think Canada should become better equipped to deal with threats? Why is it that Canada should be frightened / economic or other issues?  

Response from Mr. Fadden: I would place the level of threat near eight. Chinese authorities are completely determined to advance their objectives. I don't know the details of that contract. I think we need to accept that we have a problem. As long as we don't have a consensus about these activities, it is difficult to deal with it. We give security agencies a broad mandate, but don't always give the resources needed. Yes, Canada should be better equipped to deal with threats. The digital environment is so dangerous, we need a proper legislative framework / something needs to be done. I think we should be worried about economic issues, it is no secret that Canadian secrets are stolen, and that costs us a lot of money and it is difficult to deal with.  

MP Bergeron (BQ): How is the Canada Chinese relationship now? Would you say the West has lost the battle diplomatically?  

Response from Professor Paul Evans: I would say some of us have hoped once we solve the two Michaels issue we could go back to where we were. We are now in the context not just of a storm with China, but we have entered into a new season. If the US-China relationship deteriorates further we will be in a new game. The balance of forces is changing and China / other non-western countries are more important than we could have imagined 4-5 years ago. 

MP John Williamson (CPC): Professor Ong, can you please expand on your recommendations you didn't have time to tell us? How do you take an agnostic approach when talking about China?  

Response from Professor Ong:  Recommendations include 1) Boost immunity by educating Government agencies / being more prepared about risks; 2) Official discussion on foreign interference; 3) Increase funding of Chinese media to reduce reliance on foreign media sources coming from China; 4) Recognize the diversity of the Asian community in Canada. Being agnostic means we can avoid racial profiling and finger pointing.  

MP Michael Chong (CPC): "Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy" doesn't seem like a good way for China to advance its diplomacy. Why is China using this type of diplomacy? What third countries does China invest in Canada? [no time to respond to last question] 

Response from Professor Gordon Houlden: There is a national streak in China. 

MP Jean Yip (LIB): How do we build multilateral institutions in China and will that help relations in China? Where is there room to influence China?  

Response from Professor Paul Evans: We don't teach them how to play the game, they are designing the rules for the game (i.e. sovereignty in the Arctic / islands). They are on a path to overt supremacy in the world. We must work with them, but also with our allies / partners like Australia. 

MP Peter Fragiskatos (LIB): How can we stand up as a country to China in a constructive way, but also avoid a narrow-minded approach that leads to racism / that limits the discussion to zero-sum outcomes?  

Response from Professor Paul Evans: Anti-Chinese sentiment and anti-racism is not the same thing. Extreme anti-China statements can fan embers. 

Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper 

MP Lenore Zann (LIB): Oz Ventures in Toronto seems to have attracted former Conservatives to its ranks - do you advise former Prime Minister Harper on policy as it relates to China? Do you work with China? Former PM Stephen Harper appointed Vance in 2015 and O'Toole was at his cabinet table – when Vance was under investigation apparently days after the CPC appointed him, the police investigation was dropped. According to ATIP, the commanding officer said he was under pressure. Operationally, Mr. Novak said you led the process for appointing Vance and would have been liaising  - were you the one who pressured the commander to stop the investigation into Vance? 

Response from Mr. Fadden: I joined before former PM Harper and I don't advise him on anything. One of the policies of Oz is not to deal with China and Russia. I had no association with former PM Harper. I served him as I served other Prime Minister's. I coordinated a number of candidates, and we interviewed them.  

PS Joël Lightbound (LIB): Mr. Fadden, in 2010, you said that many politicians / government officials were under foreign influence from China. You were thrown under the bus by former PM Harper. Has the government now taken these threats seriously? Why did you not mention China specifically in your past report (unlike current Director David Vigneault)? Can you tell us about the importance of the Five Eyes?  

Response from Mr. Fadden: I think that opinions within government have changed.  

I don't think there was a consensus at the time within our allies / Five Eyes. I think the Five Eyes group has gone quite far with this issue, but there are so many issues worldwide that it is hard for G7 countries to focus on China.  

Beijing Olympics 

MP Jean Yip (LIB): How do you feel about Canadians participating in the upcoming Olympics?  

Response from Ward Elcock: The last time we didn't participate in the Olympics was not a success. I am not sure the Olympics is the best venue for matters to be discussed. A boycott of the Beijing Olympics won't achieve anything.  

MP Bergeron (BQ): In 1936, would you have advised the government to have boycotted the Munich Olympics?  

Response from Ward Elcock: Different issue – the Nazi Party is not quite the Communist Party of China. More comparable to the Olympics that were boycotted in the Soviet Union. I don't think the Olympics is the venue to negotiate. 

Foreign Interference 

MP Bergeron (BQ): Asked a question related to the threat level ranking from Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Why is China a threat to Canada whereas Canada is not a threat to China? 

Response from Mr. Fadden: I disagree. I don't think China is in the rank listed in regards to cyber capacity. They are certainly in the first five. They are a fundamental threat.  

MP Pierre Paul-Hus (CPC): In 2016, there was news about Chinese donations to PM Trudeau (45 cheques to his riding association) and two to the Trudeau Association. What can you say about this?  

Response from Mr. Fadden: There are clear rules around donations. The perception that an agent from a foreign country gives money to a riding association is not a good one.  

Climate Change 

MP Jack Harris (NDP): Chinese diplomats tell us we can work together on climate change. Is this an area we could do something positive with China after the issue of the two Michael's is solved?  

Response from Professor Gordon Houlden: There is no solution to climate change without China. They are the biggest producers of greenhouse gases. Climate Change, environment, health and perhaps some dimensions of culture are safer prospects for collaboration once the two Michaels problem has been resolved.  

Rare Earth Minerals / Foreign Investment 

MP Jack Harris (NDP): We know China is interested in rare earths minerals in Canada. Do you see that as a potential issue, and is the Canada-China Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA) a barrier to us having a say in what China's activities are in rare earths?  

Response from Ward Elcock: My understanding is it would not prevent Canada from preventing such an acquisition. The Government could take issue if it was a national security risk. 

MP Michael Chong (CPC): Can you please elaborate on Chinese investment abroad? [Also mentioned that many Canadians of Chinese descent have been intimidated online and in-person for not falling into line according to fellow Chinese and someone needs to give them a voice]. 

Response from Professor Gordon Houlden: Chinese investment abroad leads to incredible distortion of numbers. 

Follow-ups (To be checked against transcript):  

Future Business:  

Summary of Committee Business / Sommaire d'affaires du comité

House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations (CACN)/鈥��&苍产蝉辫;
Comité鈥痵pécial鈥痵ur les relations鈥痵ino-canadiennes鈥�(CACN)鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Date:鈥疢ay 10, 2021 

Time:鈥�6:30pm-9:30pm鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

Report Prepared By/ Rapport鈥痯réparé鈥痯ar鈥�&苍产蝉辫;
Kathryn Leyenaar, Senior Analyst, Parliamentary Affairs鈥�(613-371-9261) 

Topic of Meeting / Sujet de la réunion鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

The Public Health Agency of Canada's response to the following motion moved by MP Garnett Genuis (CPC) at CACN Committee March 31, 2021:

That the Committee send for all information and documents in the possession of the Public Health Agency of Canada or any subsidiary organizations relating to the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in March of 2019 and the subsequent revocation of security clearances for, and termination of the employment of, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng, provided that 

(a) these documents shall be deposited with the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, in an unredacted form, within ten days of the adoption of this order; 

(b) the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel redact all information that might reasonably be expected to compromise national security, or reveal details of an ongoing criminal investigation, other than the existence of an investigation, and provide the redacted versions to the Committee; 

(c) the committee hold an in-camera meeting with the Law Clerk, within seven days of the conclusion of his redaction of the documents, in order to determine which documents could be made public; and, 

(d) should the Public Health Agency of Canada not provide documents in their unredacted form within ten days, the President of the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Acting Vice-President of the National Microbiology Laboratory be scheduled to appear for three hours before the committee, within 17 days of this motion passing, to explain why the documents were not provided. 

Members鈥痠n Attendance / Membres présents鈥�&苍产蝉辫;

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Questions from Parliamentarians related to Motion 

MP Chong (CPC): Here, like in China, the Government of Canada is blocking the investigation into why these two scientists in Winnipeg were terminated. Open and accountable government is not the law, it is a guidance document produced by the PMO. You [PHAC] are not in compliance with the law (Privacy Act 8.2.c) which compels the production of this kind of information. What do you say to the fact that you are not complying with that section of the Privacy Act?  

Response from President Stewart, PHAC: I am complying with the Privacy Act and its requirements. I have taken expert advice in that regard.  

MP Oliphant (LIB): I would like to know about the legal advice you got regarding the redactions that you put into the documents. I find them frustrating myself. Can you explain what criteria you would use as Public Servants? Also, did the ongoing investigation with the RCMP enter into your decisions regarding redactions?  

Response from President Stewart, PHAC: I have mentioned the Privacy Act and also security considerations. We endeavored to ensure that nothing we were relating was part of the RCMP investigation (we are not part of that). It might be appropriate to raise this with the RCMP.  

MP Bergeron (BQ): You have said there is no link with these viral transfers and the dismissal of those two scientists. The Privacy Act allows certain fora to ask for documents and obtain them. We offered an in-camera option, but you chose not to respond to any of our requests. You have not given us un-redacted documents, or responded to our questions. Mr. Roy, what leads you to think that PHAC is authorized to not respond to our requests?  

Response from Mr. Roy, Justice: We recognize the power of Committees to ask for documents and call witnesses. Section 8.2 talks to being compelled and there is a difference of opinion. We don't recognize the Powers of Parliamentarians being able to "compel".  

MP Harris (NDP): Can you further explain the Powers of Committees? Can you explain what precautions this Committee has to ensure information that shouldn't be public will not be made public?  

Response from Philippe Dufresne: Section 18 of the  Constitution gives the power to send for people and powers. This is higher than ordinary statutes. 2010 Speaker Milliken's ruling makes it clear that the Constitutional authority of Committees supersedes the Privacy Act or ATIP Act. Options include confidential briefings, in-camera meetings, or redactions reviewed by a third party (Law Clerk's office). My office was to review and an opinion given to the Committee.  

MP Genuis (CPC): Mr. Roy, can you respond to this? Is your position consistent with Speaker Milliken's?  

Response from Mr. Roy, Justice: The Power is not absolute. There are limits on the ability to Production of Papers. I don't think we can square the two regarding Speaker Milliken's ruling. I believe Speaker Milliken had the authority to make the ruling, but there is a separation between the Executive and the Legislature.  

Note from MP Oliphant (LIB): My advice to PHAC is to get a second opinion because the Department of Justice is not giving you [PHAC] the best advice.  

MP Zann (LIB): Can PHAC forward un-redacted documents for the Law Clerk to review?  

Response from President Stewart, PHAC: Me providing materials to you is a disclosure and that is where I run afoul of the Privacy Act. We have done all that we could according to our legal obligations.  

MP Zann then moved a motion that was debated for the remainder of the Committee meeting and unanimously passed:  

That the unredacted documents from the Public Health Agency of Canada be provided to the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel within 10 days to review and ascertain the fairness of them and should the documents not be provided, that the committee report the following to the House: Your Committee recommends that an Order of the House do issue for all information and documents, in the care, custody or control of the Public Health Agency of Canada and subsidiary organizations, respecting the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in March 2019 and the subsequent revocation of security clearances for, and termination of the employment of, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng, provided that (a) these documents be deposited, in both official languages, with the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel no later than two weeks following the House's concurrence in this recommendation; (b) the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel discuss with the committee, in an in camera meeting, information contained therein, which in his opinion, might reasonably be expected to compromise national security or reveal details of an ongoing criminal investigation, other than the existence of an investigation, so that the committee may determine which information is placed before a committee in public [motion to be checked against the meeting minutes] 

MP Zann (LIB):  With regards to the investigation, were you clear if that was provincial or federal that were doing the investigation?  

Response from President Stewart, PHAC: I am not sure what group within the RCMP are conducting the investigation.

MP Pierre Paul-Hus (CPC): Do employees at the National Microbiology Laboratory all have security clearance? Did those employees who were terminated have security clearance? Will you listen now to this order from the Committee? You said there was no link between what you had redacted and the RCMP investigation, so how did you decide whether it was a question of national security if you are not an expert on these matters?  

Response from President Stewart, PHAC: It depends on their job responsibilities. I won't be able to respond to the question about the employees for the reasons discussed previously. We will be guided by experts on the appropriate response. I made no connection to the matter with the RCMP, just that we can't speak to it. 

MP Yip (LIB): What circumstances would a material transfer agreement require and why it was not appropriate for the lab in Wuhan? What has happened to the students from China and are they being investigated? Is the investigation at the NML completed? Have there been other policy breaches like this in the past and what has been done?  

Response from Mr. Poliquin (PHAC): MTAs are used as part of the transfer of materials under a set of circumstances when warranted, including protection of intellectual property rights. There are additional legislative requirements in order to proceed with the transfer of these kinds of viruses, so in this case it was deemed unnecessary since the use of the material was covered in other documentation. 

Response from President Stewart, PHAC: I am not able to speak to those matters and yes it has been completed.  

Follow-ups (To be checked against transcript):

Future Business:

Summary of Committee Business / Sommaire d'affaires du comité

Subcommittee on International Human Rights/ Sous-comité des droits internationaux de la personne (SDIR)

Date: May 4, 2021 

Time: 6:30pm-8:30pm 

Report Prepared By/ Rapport préparé par   
Tazmin Mitha, Parliamentary Affairs Analyst   
T: 343-571-9028

Topic of Meeting / Sujet de la réunion   
Briefing on the Current Situations in Hong Kong and in the Philippines  

 Members in Attendance / Membres présents

Witnesses / Témoins    

6:30pm to 7:30pm: Briefing on the Current Situation in Hong Kong 

Alliance Canada Hong Kong 

As an individual 

Hong Kong Watch 

7:30pm to 8:30pm: Briefing on the Current Situation in the Philippines 

International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines - Canada 

As an individual 

Mining Watch Canada 

Canadian Network on Corporate Accountability 

Summary / Sommaire

First Panel: Current Situation in Hong Kong 

Ms. Lau stated that Hong Kong's autonomy has been decimated and that inaction from the international community has made the situation worse. She noted that the Hong Kong government uses the National Security Law (NSL) to silence dissenting voices and that Beijing has been able to institute sweeping institutional changes. She said that pro-democracy Hong Kongers are living in fear and have been subject to countless coordinated attacks by police. She highlighted that many Hong Kongers holding foreign passports have fled the city in fear of retaliation for their involvement in the protest movement. She was very concerned about a new law coming into effect on August 1st which can prohibit people from leaving or entering Hong Kong. She shared three recommendations for Canada: create a dedicated asylum pathway for those fleeing Hong Kong, hold Hong Kong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials accountable by imposing sanctions, and address foreign state harassment operations. 

Mr. Chan was an elected politician in Hong Kong for 31 years before relocating to Vancouver. He shared that he was arrested and subject to police brutality after burning the Chinese government's white paper. His last arrest was in 2016 for participating in the Occupy Central protests. He spoke about the witnessing the deterioration of the rule of law, human rights and civil liberties in Hong Kong. He argued that Hong Kong is now ruled under state terrorism and that the government las legitimized tyranny. He compared the current situation to Shanghai in 1951 and to Nazi Germany. He shared recommendations for Canada: invoke Magnitsky sanctions, create a coherent plan to rescue the 300,000 Canadians living in Hong Kong, and re-evaluate pandemic travel restrictions which make it difficult for Hong Kongers to enter Canada. He expressed concern that Canada has not done enough to address what is happening in Hong Kong and has not spoken out against the CCP. 

Mr. Goodman spoke about extreme censorship in Hong Kong given the restrictions on local and international journalists. He stated that the speed at which Beijing has dismantled Hong Kong's autonomy was possible because of economic coercion. He urged the Subcommittee members not to believe that the treatment of Uyghurs, Tibetans and Hong Kongers at the hands of the CCPs is simply a result of cultural differences, despite Beijing's rhetoric. He recommended that Canada introduce Magnitsky sanctions, make it easier for Hong Kongers to claim asylum in Canada, work towards the creation of a UN Rapporteur for Hong Kong, and urgently review its economic dependency on China. 

Ms. Siu stated that the NSL has become the most actively used tactic to silence voices in Hong Kong. She was concerned about a recent resolution that was passed to overhaul Hong Kong's electoral system as more than 380 district councilors expect to face potential disqualifications and it is now almost impossible for pro-democracy candidates to run for office. She stated that books were being pulled from library shelves and school curriculums include brainwashing national security education. In addition, many teachers have been disqualified over complaints of providing sharing materials on freedom and democracy. She noted that many people have been left with no choice but to leave Hong Kong and was concerned that this may no longer be an option after August 1st. She recommended that policies should be improved to allow Hong Kongers to seek asylum in Canada. Finally, she stated that turning a blind eye to the situation is no different that encouraging escalating repressions. 

Questions from Parliamentarians 

MP Khalid (LPC) stated that Canada and the international community have taken swift actions against what is going on in Hong Kong and asked about the impact of these measures and how the Chinese government has responded. She asked Mr. Chan if he had experienced foreign state harassment in Canada. MP Sidhu (LPC) asked Mr. Chan to speak about his experience has a former politician in Hong Kong. He asked Ms. Lau about immigration pathways that should be created by the Government of Canada. Finally, he asked Mr. Goodman about some of the potential challenges that a Special UN Rapporteur would face. 

MP Chiu (CPC) asked the witnesses for their views on several statements. For example, he said that "many Canadians hold the view that Canada should not be admitting lawless rioters into Canada" and asked Ms. Lau to respond. Other statements were on Chinese sovereignty, foreign interference, and the steps Canada had already taken to respond to the situation in Hong Kong. MP Williamson (CPC) asked the witnesses to speak about the resiliency of Hong Kongers. He asked about the possibility of expelling China from the WTO.  

MP Brunelle-Duceppe (BQ) asked the witnesses if they feared any reprisals from the CCP for appearing before SDIR. He asked if they were in contact with any activists that were arrested under the NSL. Given Mr. Chan's experience, he asked about the CCP's final goal with respect to Hong Kong. He asked about the current state of the pro-democracy movement and asked witnesses to provide names of those responsible for human rights violations. He also asked if the measures taken by Canada had achieved their intended impact on the CCP. Finally, he asked about boycotting the Beijing 2022 Olympic Winter Games.  

MP McPherson (NDP) asked Ms. Lau what she would like Canadians to know about what is happening in Hong Kong with regards to human rights abuses. She asked Mr. Goodman about the silencing of journalists and how Canada could support them. She asked about the August 1st immigration law how Canada should respond. Finally, she asked each witness to share their final thoughts on what Canada should be doing in response. 

Second Panel: Current Situation in the Philippines 

Ms. Palabay spoke about the climate of fear in the Philippines given the Duterte regime's arbitrary arrests, detentions, murders, death threats and red tagging targeting human rights advocates. She stated that courts deny legal protections for human rights defenders and that no perpetrators have ever been convicted. Mr. Beaudoin shared recommendations for Canada. First, he stated that Canada needs to end its policy of discrete diplomacy with the Philippines as it is not working. He stated that GAC should make a public statement expressing Canada's concern regarding the grave deterioration of the human rights situation and the restrictions of civic space in the Philippines. He stated that GAC should also ask the Canadian Ambassador in the Philippines to take concrete immediate measures to apply Canada's guidelines for the support of human rights advocates. Finally, he recommended that Canada accelerate the issuance of visas to facilitate temporary relocation to Canada.  

Ms. Ressa's comments focused on the weaponization of the law, online state sponsored attacks, normalization of the abuse of power, jailing of journalists, and the killing of human rights workers, activists, and lawyers. She shared her own experiences and how the state has repeatedly attempted to prevent her from speaking truth to power. She stated that she feels lucky compared to other women who have been shot and killed so that they cannot testify against the government.

Ms. Coumans spoke about her experience working with local Indigenous communities in the Philippines which have been negatively impacted by Canadian mining companies including TVI Pacific, Barrick Gold, and B2Gold. She stated that she testified at SDIR, in camera, in 2005 with Indigenous witnesses and that the report published by SDIR and endorsed by FAAE in 2005 remains highly relevant. She stated that there has been a severe deterioration of human rights in the Philippines and that the abuses suffered by local communities are prevalent at Canadian mine sites. She stated that Canadian companies need to be held accountable when there is evidence of environmental and human rights violations. She said that Canada should not be selling military equipment to the Philippines and that consular staff should be mandated to protect human rights. Finally, she stated that the government needs implement mandatory due diligence legislation and provide the CORE with the powers to compel, as promised.

Questions from Parliamentarians 

MP Vandenbeld (LPC) asked about the impact of countries speaking about the importance of press freedom. She asked Ms. Ressa about the current dangers for human rights and democracy defenders.  

MP Chiu (CPC) asked about the extent of drug use in the Philippines before and after President Duterte's war on drugs. He asked about the population's level of support of the President's war on drugs. He asked about fair and free elections, human rights for political dissenters, and about how LGBTQ2+ minorities groups have been impacted. 

MP Brunelle-Duceppe (BQ) asked Mr. Beaudoin for specific names of government representatives and police that should be sanctioned by Canada. He asked for more details about which corporations should no longer be provided financing and cooperation from Canada. 

MP McPherson (NDP) asked Ms. Palaby to speak about her personal experience given that 13 human rights workers from her organization have been assassinated. She asked if the Canadian Embassy had reached out to the organization or taken any steps to protect and support human rights workers in peril. She asked the witnesses why Canada should not continue to support, fund, or cooperate with the Philippine government on counterterrorism. Finally, she asked about how the law is being used to stifle political dissent and constrict democratic spaces.  

China-related items currently active in parliament:

Legislation

The department has a piece of legislation (Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act) that's undergoing a minor amendment in Bill C-30, Budget Implementation Act.

Regarding Senate Bills, there are two that the department is watching:

the Senate. MP Garnett Genuis (CPC) is the bill's  sponsor  in the  House.  S- 204 was introduced and placed on the Order of precedence on May 10.

Finally, in Private  Member's Business,  there  are two  items  which  the  department is also watching:

As the Consideration List is currently at #45 on the list of active PMB items, it is unlikely that these two items will be active before the summer recess.

Committee Studies:

"That the committee resume its study of the  situation  in Hong  Kong and report to the House before Friday, December 11, 2020."

Report 2 -   (Presented  to  the  House: Thursday, February 25, 2021) A Government Response has been

requested, and is due  to Parliament  by June 25,  2021.  Global   Affairs is the lead on this Response.

"That, upon the  completion  of  the  study  of  the  situation  in  Hong Kong, the committee study issues related to national security as they relate to its mandate, including,  but  not  limited  to  cybersecurity  and the threat of foreign influence; and  that  the  committee  invite  the Minister of Public Safety to appear as part of that study."

Study was expected to last  10 meetings.  Your  appearance  should be the final meeting in the series.

"Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the subcommittee on Wednesday, July 9, 2020, the subcommittee commenced its study of the Human rights situation of the Uyghurs."

Report 4 " was completed and tabled in Parliament on March 12, 2021. A Government  Response   has  been  requested   and is due  to Parliament by July  11,  2021.  Global  Affairs Canada  is the  lead  on this Response.

"That, pursuant  to  Standing  Order  108(2),  the  committee  undertake a study of the Nuctech security equipment  contract;  that  the  study start no later than Monday, November 23, 2020; that  the  committee send  for all  documents, memorandums,  and  briefing  materials related to the Nuctech security  equipment  contract;  that  the documents be provided to  the  committee,  in both  official languages, no later than 5 p.m. (Ottawa time) on December 10."

Committee is currently considering the report, and it should be released soon. However, there have been no updates from the committee as to exact timelines.

Late shows:

Of GAC's 12 active late shows, none are related to China. All previous late shows have either been debated or expired.

Opposition Day Motions:

There are currently three China-related opposition day motions on the Notice Paper, both put forward by the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC).

  1. October 15, 2020 — Mr. Chong  (Wellington—Halton  Hills)  — That  the House: (a) recognize that the People's  Republic  of China's  decision  to impose a national security law on Hong Kong is a violation of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which guarantees  Hong  Kong  a high  degree  of autonomy in the "one country, two systems" framework, and which guarantees the people  of  Hong  Kong  rights  and freedoms,  including  those of the person, of  speech,  of  the  press,  of  assembly,  of  association,  of travel,  of movement,   of correspondence,   of strike, of choice of occupation,  of academic research and of  religious  belief;  and  (b)  call  on  the government to work with Canada's allies to immediately  impose  sanctions, such as Magnitsky sanctions as per the  Justice  for Victims  of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, on officials responsible for the violations of this international treaty.
  2. November 12, 2020 — Mr. Chong (Wellington—Halton  Hills)  — That,  given that (i) the People's Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese  Communist  Party, is  threatening  Canada's  national  interest and our values, including Canadians of Chinese origin within Canada's borders, (ii) it is essential that Canada have a strong and principled foreign policy backed by action in concert with its allies, the House call upon the government to:  (a)  make  a decision  on  Huawei's  involvement  in Canada's 5G network within 30 days of the adoption of this motion; and (b) develop a robust plan, as Australia has  done,  to  combat  China's growing foreign operations here  in Canada  and its  increasing  intimidation of Canadians living in Canada,  and  table  it within  30 days of  the  adoption of this motion.
  3. January 25, 2021 – Mr. O'Toole (Durham) — That, (a) in the opinion of the House, the People's Republic  of China  has  engaged  in  actions consistent with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 260, commonly known as the "Genocide Convention", including  detention camps and measures intended to prevent births  as  it pertains  to  Uyghurs and other Turkic  Muslims; and  (b) given  that  (i) where  possible,  it has been the policy of the Government of Canada to act in concert with its allies when  it comes  to  the  recognition  of a genocide,  (ii) there  is a bipartisan consensus in the United States where  it has  been  the  position  of two consecutive administrations that Uyghur and other  Turkic  Muslims  are being subjected  to  a genocide  by the  Government  of the  People's  Republic of China, the House, therefore, recognize that a genocide is currently being carried out by the People's Republic of China against Uyghurs  and other Turkic Muslims, and call on the government to officially adopt this position.

Order Paper Questions (OPQs):

There are no active China-related OPQs tasked to GAC, as of June 7, 2021,

Petitions:

N/A

Question Period:

China has been a topic of active discussion  in Question Period  across  all  parties. The CPC are the most vocal  and have  repeatedly raised  question  on  Hong  Kong, the Uyghurs, Coronavirus (COVID-19) including questions on the  CanSino partnership, Huawei,  joint military exercises between  Canada  and  China,  VFS Global and the visa processing centres, and  the  appointment  of  Ambassador Dominic Barton. BQ  and  Greens  are less  active  but  have  asked  about  the Uyghurs, Hong Kong, and the Foreign Investment Promotion and  Protection Agreement (FIPA). The NDP  have  had  a few  questions  on  the  vis  application center in Beijing, as well as the CanSino vaccine.

See Tab 6 for a full list of questions asked.

Senate motions:

Prime Minister, Minister, and Deputy Minister quotes on China

General

Arbitrary Detention – Kovrig & Spavor

Would you call them hostages?

Arbitrary Detention Initiative

Diplomatic Immunities – Michael Kovrig

Meng Wanzhou

Human Rights

Human   Rights  - Uyghurs

Religious Freedom

Taiwan

Hong Kong

Hong  Kong-  National  Security  Law

Rule of Law

Rule of Law - Trade

COVID-19

South China Sea

Sanctions

Genocide

Tibet

U.S./China Relations

2022 Olympics

BEJING-HOM

Cyber operations

ENG:

Background

Following royal assent of Bill C-59 on  June  21, 2019,  the  new  Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Act entered into  force on  August  1, 2019.  This  Act grants CSE the authority to engage in cyber operations. Cyber operations differ from cyber espionage in that rather than seeking only to collect information, they seek to degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with the  capabilities  of  foreign entities.

Given  that  cyber operations  are only  authorized  for use  against  foreign  entities,  they can have important impacts on the interests of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. For that reason, the CSE Act designated a role for the Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  authorize such activities. The mechanism for authorizing cyber operations is the issuance  of Ministerial Authorizations (MAs) by the Minister of National Defence. As such, prior  to issuing  an  MA  for  Defensive  Cyber  Operations  (DCO),  the  Minister  of  National Defence  must  first consult  the  Minister  of Foreign  Affairs.  The  Minister  of Foreign Affairs can also  request  Active  Cyber  Operations  (ACO),  for example,  where  the Minister  believes  a cyber  operation  would  be  a useful  tool  in advancing  Canada's foreign policy objectives. Prior to issuing an  MA  for  ACO,  the  Minister  of National Defence must obtain the  consent  of  the  Minister  of Foreign  Affairs. MAs are not  limited to specific operations; they can also authorize entire classes of activities.

In broader terms, the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect to cyber operations is to ensure that both the risks involved, and the outcomes sought are coherent with Canada's foreign policy. An important consideration  is Canada's commitment to promoting stability in cyberspace and responding to cyber security threats. Canada's approach is composed of the following  mutually  reinforcing elements:

Five Eyes Coordination

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

The post-World War II FVEY intelligence  sharing  partnership  grew  out  of the  vital wartime signals intelligence   and  cryptographic  relationship  between  the  United Kingdom  and  the  United  States.  In the  post-war period,  several  bilateral  and multilateral agreements between Canada, the US, the UK, Australia and New Zealand solidified and expanded this partnership.

The FVEY partnership provides senior decision makers with intelligence products on different themes and geographical areas [REDACTED].

Foreign agent registry

ENG:

Background

Unlike the United States and Australia,  Canada  does  not  have  a foreign agent  registry that requires those acting on behalf of a foreign state to register their activities.

United States - Foreign Agent Registry Act

The Foreign Agent Registry Act (FARA) was enacted in 1938 and requires  certain individuals acting on behalf of foreign principals (governments, entities or individuals) engaged in political activities, or other  activities  under  the  statute, to  register  as  a "foreign agent" with the Department of Justice. The Act also requires foreign  agents  to make periodic public disclosures  of  their  relationships  with  the  foreign principal,  as well as activities, receipts and disbursements in support of those activities.

The central purpose of FARA is to promote  transparency  regarding  foreign influence  in the US by ensuring the government  and  the  public  know  the  source  of certain information from foreign agents intended  to  influence  American  public  opinion,  policy and decision-making.

The penalty for willful violation of FARA is a maximum of  five  years  in prison  and/or  a fine of up to  $250,000.  There  are also  civil  enforcement  provisions  that  empower  the US Attorney General to seek an injunction requiring  registration  under  FARA.  Since 2016, FARA violations have resulted in Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counter- intelligence investigations, some of which have led  to  criminal  charges  and/or immigration proceedings against foreign agents and foreign principals.

FARA  has  been  relied  upon  in several high-profile  prosecutions,  including  Michael Flynn in 2017 for making materially false  statements  in FARA  documents;  13 Russians and 3 Russian companies (including the Internet Research Agency) for a number  of charges including conspiracy to defeat Department of Justice Efforts to administer and enforce FARA; and a United States law firm, which ultimately entered into a settlement agreement resolving its liability for violating FARA.

Australia: Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act

The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme  (FITS)  was  enacted  in December  2018 and is intended to increase transparency of foreign influence on Australia's

government and politics. The Scheme is administered by the Attorney General's Office (AGO).

FITS establishes registration obligations for individuals and entities that undertake certain activities on behalf of foreign principals. These include activities for the

purpose of "political or governmental influence". That term  is broadly  defined  in the  Act and includes any influence over matters such as federal elections or votes, or the

decision-making processes of the Government  of  Australia.  Communications  to  the public, or financial  support  for the  purpose  of  influencing  governmental  decision- making  processes,  are also  registrable  activities  under  FITS.  The  registry  is not intended to restrict or criminalize lawful activities that may benefit  foreign principals.  Of  note: former cabinet ministers have a lifetime obligation to register any  activity  they undertake on behalf of a foreign principal unless an exemption applies.

An individual acting on behalf of a foreign principal can be penalized for failing to register or update information with the AGO, misleading or lying to authorities, or destroying relevant records. Penalties for violations under FITS range from fines to prison terms of six months to five years.

G7 coordination

ENG:

Background

G7 foreign and development ministers met in London from May 3 to 5, 2021. The Communiqué released following the meeting summarized the consensus positions reached on China-related issues, including:

Mission monitoring internationally

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Background

The threat of espionage targeting the Government of Canada has grown due to an increasingly volatile global environment with evolving bilateral and  multilateral relationships. Additionally, developments  in technologies allow for greater espionage gains with a lower risk of exposure.

抖淫视频 (GAC) is the government department  with the largest presence abroad, significantly augmenting  our exposure  to  a wide  array of espionage  actors  at the same time as increasing our  vulnerability.  Incident data  and  analysis  is maintained on a need-to-know basis. 抖淫视频 cannot share  any  information   on specific espionage or interference concerns due to operational security reasons.

China

[REDACTED]

Rapid response mechanism

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

At the 2018 G7 Summit in Charlevoix, leaders  agreed  to  establish  the  G7  Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)  to  strengthen  G7  coordination  in identifying  and responding to diverse and  evolving  threats  to  democracy.  Canada  has  committed  to lead the Mechanism on an ongoing  basis,  working  to  operationalise  and consolidate  it  to maximise information sharing and promote  coordinated  responses.  The  Mechanism has proven valuable  in the  COVID-19  context  to  address  pandemic-related disinformation campaigns that are supported by foreign state actors.

Foreign state-backed interference and intimidation activities in Canada

ENG:

People's Republic of China.

Supplementary messages

Responsive: How is Canada holding hostile state actors accountable?

Responsive: What measures does Canada have in place to secure its institutions from cyber-attacks or breaches of information?

5G Review

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Responsive, if asked about specific vendors:

Update

Arbitrary Detention Initiative

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Update

Since the February 15, 2021, Declaration launch event hosted by Minister Garneau, 4 additional countries – the Philippines, Bahamas, North Macedonia, and Nauru – have endorsed the Declaration, bringing total endorsements to 62.  Advocacy  to  secure additional  endorsements  is ongoing.  The  next  step  is to  implement  the  activities outlined in the Partnership Action Plan. Canada will implement activities in close collaboration with FVEY partners and other endorsing countries.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Following the successful launch of the Declaration in February and the Foreign and Development Ministers' meeting on May 5, 2021, Canada's Partnership Action  Plan (PAP) received full G7 support. The PAP outlines a set of six voluntary areas of cooperation and engagement to sustain momentum on the initiative such as: joint advocacy; multilateral engagement; research on cases;  awareness  raising;  civil society engagement; training; and other forms of joint action on specific cases.

Canada's Arctic Sovereignty

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Responsive – AIIB Projects and Forced Labour

Supporting facts and figures

Background

AIIB: The AIIB was established in January 2016 and is based in Beijing, China. It is a relatively  new  MDB  focused  on  economic  development   through   infrastructure financing in Asia. The majority of the AIIB's active  projects  are co-funded  with  other MDBs,  and  are therefore  governed by  well-established  rules  and  norms,  including those regarding financial sustainability. The AIIB has not co-financed any projects with Chinese policy banks, such as the China Development Bank (CDB) and Chinese Export-Import Bank (ExIm Bank).

AIIB Projects in China: To date, the AIIB has approved  funding  for four  projects  in China: Legend Capital Healthcare Technology Fund; Emergency Assistance  to China Public Health  Infrastructure  Project;  Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei  Low  Carbon  Energy Transition and  Air Quality  Improvement  Project:  and  Beijing  Air Quality  Improvement and Coal Replacement.

Belt and Road Initiative

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Responsive – BRI and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

Update

In April 2021, Australia used the Foreign Arrangements Scheme  (2020)  to  cancel  two BRI deals between China and the State of Victoria, citing foreign policy concerns.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Established in 2013 as President Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy strategy, the BRI  aims  to  foster  greater  economic  linkages  and  improve trade  routes,  primarily  across the Eurasian, African and South American continents.

The BRI provides  opportunities  for China  to leverage  its economic  capacity  to  diversify its international commercial  relationships,   secure  strategic  supply  chains  and resources, gain regional influence and advance long-term geopolitical objectives. No specific time limit  has  been  imposed  on  the  BRI,  nor  is there  a defined  budget, fixed list of projects, or a specific template or definition for what constitutes a BRI project.

Significant and widespread concerns have been  raised  by the international  community  as to whether the BRI conforms to established principles, rules and norms for

international development surrounding human rights, financial sustainability and environmental protection.

Foreign Interference

Canada has been studying the issue of foreign agent registries, including  examining those in place in US and Australia. On April 13, 2021 MP Kenny Chiu introduced bill

C-282 creating an act to establish the foreign influence registry. This Bill  is currently  at First Reading.

[REDACTED]

BRI and Economic Dependence on China

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative" (DSSI), which aims to provide immediate and long-term solutions for low-income and debt-distressed countries around the world.

Responsive – Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

Background

As the world's largest official creditor, China's vast and opaque lending practices  are a driver of unsustainable  debt  levels  in many  developing  countries.  China  is also  the largest official bilateral lender in nearly all countries in which Canada is a creditor.

Concerns with China's lending include a lack of transparency, the  collateralization  of debt and debt seniority clauses.

The COVID-19 pandemic, and accompanying liquidity and solvency crises, have made addressing Chinese  lending  and  debt  treatment  practices  a key  policy  objective  for many countries in the international fora: the G7, G20, IMF, World Bank, Paris Club, the OECD and the UN, among others. China's participation in the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and its  Common  Framework  represent  its  first engagement in multilateral debt relief. [REDACTED].

BRI and AIIB:  The  Asian  Infrastructure  Investment  Bank  (AIIB)  includes  members such as Australia, France, Germany and the UK.  The  majority  of the  AIIB's  active projects are jointly funded with other multilateral development banks (MBDs) and are governed in accordance with established rules and norms, including for financial sustainability. The AIIB has not  financed  any  projects  in partnership  with  Chinese policy banks, which are commonly associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

[REDACTED]

Canada's Approach to China

EN:

Canada-China Commercial Relations

EN:

Supplementary messages

Commercial Relations

China/Xinjiang

China/Hong Kong

Supporting facts and figures

Background

On September 18, 2020,  Canada's  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs stated  that  conditions were no longer right for Canada and China to  negotiate  a free trade  agreement.  In October 2020, Prime Minister  Trudeau  said publicly  that  Canada  will  continue  to  stand up against China's coercive diplomacy and human rights abuses in Hong Kong  and Xinjiang.

While it is important to  continue  to  stand  up  for our  values,  it remains  in Canada's interest to continue  engaging  with  China  on  issues  of  global  interest,  such  as  trade. The Government of Canada  remains  committed  to supporting  Canadian  businesses  in  the Chinese market.

Canadian agricultural exports to China

EN:

Supplementary messages

Canola Seed Trade

COVID-19 and Impact on Agricultural Trade

Responsive: World Trade Organization (WTO) Case Against  China on Restrictive Canola Seed Trade Measures

Responsive: U.S.-China trade dispute and Phase One agreement

Supporting facts and figures

Background

China/Canola: In March 2019, alleging discovery of pests, China Customs suspended canola seed shipments  from  two  major   Canadian  exporters,  Richardson  and  Viterra, and increased inspection of all Canadian canola seed exports to China. These two companies remain suspended. Canada held World Trade Organization  (WTO) consultations  with  China  in  October  2019.  Despite  these  consultations   and subsequent technical engagements – including a June 2020 submission of a comprehensive investigative report to support reinstatement  of  the  two  companies  – China has  notreinstated  exports  for the  two  companies.  Given  the  limited  progress made through bilateral engagement (e.g., technical discussions  between  plant health experts), the  Government  of  Canada  is  currently  evaluating  options   available   to resolve this issue with China.  While  trade  continues,  market  access remains unpredictable and Canadian exporters continue to receive notices  of  non-compliance, most recently on February 1, 2021.

China/COVID-19 import measures on agricultural products: Beginning in June 2020, China has imposed a series of COVID-19 related import measures on food

products (affecting mainly meat, fish and seafood) from trading partners based on alleged concerns that food or food packaging may  be a source  or route  of transmission of the virus. China's measures have also included testing of imported food products and suspension of imports from establishments  where there have been outbreaks  of COVID-19  among  workers.  Canada's  position,  shared  by  most  other trading partners, is that there is currently no evidence that  food  or food  packaging  is a likely  source  or route  of transmission  or route  of transmission  of  COVID-19.  As a result of  these  measures, there  are currently  10  Canadian  meat  establishment  (8 pork,  2 beef) suspended from exporting to China. Canada is engaging with China for the reinstatement of suspended establishments.

China/Trade relations: On September 18, 2020, Canada's Minister of Foreign  Affairs stated that conditions were no longer  right  for Canada  and  China  to  negotiate  a free trade  agreement.  In October  of  2020,  Prime  Minister  Trudeau   said  publicly  that Canada  will  continue  to  stand  up  against  China's  coercive  diplomacy  and  human rights abuses in Hong Kong  and  Xinjiang.  As part  of the Canada-U.S.   Roadmap, Canada and the U.S. agreed to closely align our approaches to China.

U.S.–China trade dispute and Phase  One  deal:  The  U.S.-China  Phase  One agreement requires China to purchase an additional $200 billion of U.S.  goods  and services in 2020 and 2021 over 2017 levels. Chinese purchases  under  the  agreement were insufficient to meet the first year's target. The U.S. is conducting a review of U.S.-China trade policy and is expected  to  engage  with  China  in the  near  term  to assess the implementation of the  Phase  One  agreement.  Given  the  current wide- ranging impact of the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  impact  of  the  Phase  One  agreement on Canadian industry is unclear.

CanSino vaccine

 ENG :

Supplementary messages

Update

The National Research Council (NRC)  announced  on  August  25,  2020,  that  it would move on to focus on partners other than CanSino as part of the global effort to combat COVID-19.

Background

In the early days of the pandemic, the CanSino candidate was among  the  most advanced in the world and was just one  of  many  leads  the  government  pursued. Under the agreement, CanSino would  have  provided  its  vaccine  technology  to  the NRC at no cost to the NRC or Canada, as well as sufficient vaccine doses for early clinical trials.

Despite the department's sustained  advocacy  efforts  with  Chinese  interlocutors, Chinese authorities did not grant  the  necessary  approval  for the  shipment of the CanSino vaccine candidate to Canada. In mid-July 2020, when  exports  of  Chinese vaccine candidates  to  countries  other  than  Canada  were  first approved,  the  Embassy in Beijing and the National Research Council (NRC) agreed that all possible efforts to secure approval had been made.

After these lengthy delays in receiving the CanSino vaccine, more promising candidates emerged, and the government decided to focus on those other opportunities to protect Canadians.

Vaccine Research and Support for CanSino Biologics

QUESTION: How much did the Government of Canada pay to Chinese vaccine maker CanSino as part of its failed vaccine deal?

 Key messages (100  words)                                                                                                       

 Supplementary messages                                                                                                  

If pressed on how Government of Canada funding was used for the CanSino collaboration:

Background                                                                                              

The Canadian Center for Vaccinology (CCfV) was ready to start Phase 1 clinical trials of CanSino's vaccine candidate doses as early as June, after Health Canada's review and approval of the CanSino clinical trial proposal. The CCfV is a collaboration of Dalhousie University, the IWK Health Centre, and Nova Scotia Health Authority.

The agreement between the NRC and CanSino was reviewed prior to signature by CanSino's collaborators in the Chinese government – the Beijing Institute of Technology and the Ministry of Science and Technology – who had provided funding to CanSino.

Due to the delay in the shipment of the vaccine doses to Canada, and the fact that CanSino's candidate was already in advanced testing in other countries, the NRC moved on to focus on other partners and COVID-19 priorities.

The NRC works with a range of Canadian therapeutic and vaccine companies, including:

China consular cases

Supplementary messages

Update

After access was interrupted in January 2020,  Canadian  officials regained  consular access to Michael Kovrig, Michael Spavor, and Robert Schellenberg in October 2020. Canadian officials most recently held virtual consular visits to Mr.  Kovrig  on  May  26  , 2021, and Mr. Spavor on May 28, 2021 and Mr. Schellenberg  on March 17, 2021. [PLACEHOLDER Canadian officials have requested to conduct  next  consular  visits  in May 2021].

The trials of Mr. Spavor and Mr. Kovrig took place on March 19 and March 22, 2021, respectively. Canadian officials sought consular access  to  both  men  prior  to  the hearings and requested to attend the trials. Both  requests  were  denied.  The  verdict  in both cases remains pending.

Canada is deeply  troubled  by  the  total  lack  of transparency  surrounding  these hearings and continues to work toward an immediate end to the arbitrary detention  of  these men. Canadian officials continue  to  seek  ongoing  and  meaningful  consular access to Mr. Spavor and Mr. Kovrig, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the China-Canada Consular Agreement.

Canadians have received a death penalty sentence in China. Canada has raised its opposition to the death penalty with China and continues high-level  advocacy for clemency in these cases.

[REDACTED]

Human Rights and Religious Freedom in China

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Update

On May 5, 2021, the G7 Foreign Ministers Communique acknowledged the deteriorating human rights situation in China and called for an independent investigation to observe the situation on the ground in Xinjiang and report back.

On January 12, Canada announced that it was adopting a comprehensive approach to addressing  the  human  rights  situation  in Xinjiang,   including  measures   to  address forced labour. In coordination with the U.S. and  the  UK,  and  in solidarity  with  the European Union, on March 22 Canada announced that it is imposing sanctions  on  4 officials and 1 entity  for their  participation  in gross  and  systematic  human  rights violations in Xinjiang.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Increasing authoritarianism and  assert  of Party-State  control  under  Xi Jinping  has led to a sharp erosion of rights and  freedoms  in China,  including  in Xinjiang,  Tibet  and Hong Kong.

Human rights are an integral part of Canada's engagement with China. Efforts include official exchanges, statements, demarches, programs, and advocacy work. Canada continues to express concerns bilaterally and in multilateral forums through the UN, including in the UN Human Rights Council.  Among  other  issues,  Canada's  concerns relate to civil  and  political  rights,  such as freedom  of expression, freedom  of association, and of assembly in China, including in Hong Kong. They also include the ongoing persecution of religious and ethnic minorities, including Muslim Uyghurs  and Tibetan Buddhists, as well  as  Falun  Gong  practitioners.  Additional  human  rights concerns have arisen from the  Chinese  authorities'  response  to  the  COVID-19 pandemic, including the increased  use  of  digital  surveillance,  censorship,   media control, and a crackdown on freedom of speech, especially on criticism on  the government's handling of the outbreak.

Canada-U.S. Cooperation on China

ENG:

Background

As stated in his January 2021 Senate confirmation hearing, U.S.  Secretary  of  State Antony Blinken  believes  that  China  poses  the  most  significant  challenge  of  any  state to the U.S. Supported  by  a bipartisan  consensus  in Congress,  counter-balancing China's growing  global  influence  and  safeguarding  U.S.  national  and  economic security is a high priority for the U.S. administration, which is expected to adopt a whole-of-government approach to China. That  said,  President  Biden  and  his top national security officials have also stated that the U.S. must find ways to coexist  with China,  noting  that  competition  and  cooperation  are not  mutually  exclusive.   Canada also recognizes that we need to work with  China  to  address  global  issues  such as climate change, health, non-proliferation, and finance.

The Biden administration  is seeking  to  act in concert  with  like-minded  democratic partners to address  shared  concerns  about  Chinese  domestic issues  such  as repression of human rights (including  in Xinjiang  and  Hong  Kong),  media  freedom,  rule  of law, growing  military  expenditures,  conditions  for foreign  investors,  market  access, and technological competition. The U.S. is also  seeking  to  work  with  allies  to  counter other Chinese activities  it sees  as problematic,  such  as assertions  of its maritime/territorial claims in the South China Sea, foreign direct investment/financial assistance under the  Belt  and  Road  Initiative,  coercive  diplomacy,  state-sponsored cyber program (including 5G  network  concerns)  and  foreign  interference.  Long- standing concerns about Taiwan and  growing  Chinese  interest  in the  Arctic, Latin America, and elsewhere will also preoccupy the United States.

Canada shares many of the U.S. concerns with respect  to China's  assertive behaviour both internationally and  domestically,   notably  with  respect  to  trade,  intellectual property,  human  rights,  rule  of  law,  security  issues  and  industrial  policies.  For example, as part of the CUSMA Canada and the U.S. jointly signed on to new

obligations that prohibit each country from importing goods made in whole or in part by forced labour. On March  22,  in coordination  with  the  U.S.  and  U.K.,  and  in  solidarity with the E.U., Canada  announced  new  sanctions  against  4 officials  and  1 entity  under the Special Economic Measures (Peoples  Republic  of  China)  Regulations ,  based  on their  participation  in gross  and  systematic  human  rights  violations   in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The U.S. has joined Canada and  60  other  parties  in endorsing the Declaration against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations. The U.S. has also pledged to raise the arbitrary detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor systematically  with China at every level and treating it as though they were American citizen.

To counter China's aggressive foreign policies,  the  Biden  administration  has  argued that the U.S. should focus on ad hoc coalitions or issue-specific groups to increase pressure on China. Increased U.S. engagement  in multilateral  organizations  such  as the U.N. as well as regional groupings such as Quads, ASEAN and APEC are also expected to be instrumental in a Biden strategy to counter-balance China.

Chinese Sanctions Against SDIR Members and Michael Chong

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

A motion calling on the government to recognize  the  situation  in Xinjiang  as  genocide was put forward by CPC MP Michael Chong. The motion was  carried on February  18, 2021, in the House  of  Commons with  multi-party  support.  Final  votes  were  266  in favour and 0 against.

The study, "Human Rights Situation of the Uyghurs" was initiated on October 4, 2018; however, it was not completed  prior  to  the  federal  election  in 2019.  SDIR  continued the study during  the  43rd  Parliament,  including  the  evidence  heard  between October and December 2018, which was  captured  in its  final  report.  The  Subcommittee  has been vocal about its work, holding  a press  conference  as  well  as  issuing  a news release.

On March 12, 2021, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE)  tabled  the  Subcommittee  on  International  Human  Rights (SDIR)'s report, "the Human Rights Situation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China". The Government has 120 days from March 12 to table a response.

Origins of Coronavirus

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

On March 30,  2021,  Canada  was  among  14 signatories to the  U.S.-led  joint  statement in response to the  Final  Report  from WHO-convened  COVID-19  Origins  Study.  The joint statement reaffirms the importance of transparency, openness and collaborative scientific inquiry for investigating outbreaks of unknown origin. The statement also expressed concerns, including delays and  a lack  of access to data  and  samples  from the early days of the outbreak.  The  EU and New  Zealand  subsequently  released  their own statements.

Hong Kong

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Canada's immigration policy and Hong Kong

Hong Kong Immigration (Amendment) Bill and fears of "exit bans"

Supporting facts and figures

Background

In June 2020, the National People's  Congress  of China  imposed  the  National  Security Law in Hong Kong, which led to the rapid erosion of rights and freedoms in the Special Administration Region. Hong  Kong's  protest  movement  has  weakened  considerably since the introduction of the law and the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The escalating clampdown on rights  and  freedoms  by  authorities  has  compelled Canada, in concert with its international partners, to issue numerous statements  of concern with respect to Hong Kong, including  most  recently  regarding  the  targeting  of ten of Hong Kong's most  prominent  pro-democracy  activists  for participation  in a peaceful assembly.

Meng Wanzhou arrest and U.S. extradition request

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Bilateral military training with China

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Update

The Canadian Armed  Forces (CAF)  have  traditionally  maintained  limited  defence  ties with the People's  Liberation  Army  (PLA),  guided  by  the  Cooperation  Plan  Initiative (CPI) signed  by  the  Canadian  and  Chinese  Defence  Ministers  in 2013.  The  CPI outlines the types of military activities to be  pursued  between  the  CAF  and  the  PLA. While the CAF has not conducted any  recent  bilateral  engagement  activities  with the PLA, the CPI remains in force as a non-binding agreement. The last formal CAF-PLA bilateral training activity took place in February 2018, when a PLA delegation  observed winter survival training at CFB Petawawa. The last major  multilateral  activity  hosted  in China was  the  participation  of  a  CAF  delegation  in the  World  Military  Games  in October 2019.

Supporting facts and figures

Procurement of Physical Security Equipment (Nuctech)

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Update

PSPC and GAC, in consultation with CSE, are collaborating  on an interim procurement strategy for GAC's x-ray machines and services requirements for cases where x-ray machines have become obsolete are unrepairable or there is an imminent need.

GAC is also moving forward with  the  establishment  of National  Security  Exemptions on key security equipment.

Regional maritime tensions

 ENG:

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Regional tensions have heightened as China has pursued a more assertive policy to advance its claims in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) through repeated entries by Chinese naval, coast guard and militia fishing vessels in disputed waters, including off the coasts of Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam.

In March 2021, a large fleet of more than 200 Chinese vessels were anchored around Whitsun Reef in the SCS, prompting protests from the  Philippines  and  Vietnam,  which both have claims there, as  well  as  the  United  States. China  has  also  increased  the pace and scale of land reclamation and construction of military facilities on disputed features and artificial islands.  These  escalatory  and  destabilizing  actions  are  eroding the rules-based international order. ASEAN claimant states (the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam), as well as Indonesia, have become increasingly  outspoken regarding China's actions in the  SCS.  Japan  has  also  criticized  the  increasing presence of Chinese vessels near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu  Islands  in  the  ECS, which reached a new peak in 2019-2020.

Tensions between the U.S. and China have escalated concurrently. In July 2020, the U.S. announced a more forward leaning  policy  towards  maritime  claims  in the  SCS, which includes a rejection of any Chinese claim to waters beyond a 12-nautical mile territorial sea derived from land features it claims in the Spratly Islands.  The  U.S.  and Japan reiterated their objections to China's  "unlawful" maritime  claims  and  activities  in  the SCS in a joint statement  in April  2021.  The  U.S.  has  also  increased  the  frequency of its "Freedom of Navigation Operations" (FONOPs) to challenge China's claims.

Question Period Note
Date: March 9, 2021

Classification: unclassified Branch / Agency: CTB/CBSA

Responsible Business, Import Prohibition on Goods Produced by Forced Labour

Issue: Recent media coverage regarding shipments from companies suspected of using forced labour.

Proposed Response:

Background:

Canada has imposed an importation ban on goods that were produced by forced labour, as described in An Act to implement the Agreement between Canada, the United States of America and the United Mexican States, which received Royal Assent on March 13, 2020. As described in paragraph 202(8), Chapter 98 item No. 9897.00.00 of the Customs Tariff, the law has been amended to include a reference prohibiting goods mined, manufactured or produced wholly or in part by forced labour. These amendments made under the Act came into force in Canada on

July 1, 2020, as outlined in CBSA Customs Notice 20-23, Import prohibition on goods produced wholly or in part by forced labour.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) is the Government of Canada's lead department for labour-related programs and the CBSA works closely with ESDC to identify  goods that have been produced by forced labour and prevent their entry into Canada. ESDC's Labour Program is actively monitoring and researching evidence related to problematic supply chains, and documented evidence of goods being produced with forced labour is transmitted for CBSA's consideration. The CBSA conducts risk analyses on goods entering the country to determine if they are admissible. The CBSA may use this information to identify and intercept shipments containing goods that have been identified as suspected to have been produced by forced labour.

The CBSA and ESDC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on February 24, 2021, which establishes the enforcement strategy for preventing the importation of goods produced by forced labour.

Shipments containing goods suspected of being produced by forced labour will be detained at the border for inspection by a border services officer. If in the judgement of the officer the goods were produced by forced labour, the officer will apply the tariff classification under chapter 9897 and prohibit the goods from entering Canada. Importers of goods classified under tariff item No. 9897.00.00 may appeal the classification as prohibited, re-export the goods or abandon the goods.

Tariff Classification determinations are made on a case-by-case basis for each specific shipment, based on available supporting evidence and analysis.  As  such, the Customs Tariff can not be used to prohibit  the importation of goods solely on the basis of originating  from a specific country or region, though it can serve of as a key indicator of risk. Implementing such restrictions would fall under the purview of 抖淫视频.

The Customs Tariff import prohibition is the only legislative enforcement tool in Canadian law regarding the importation of goods produced by forced labour.

Importers are encouraged to work with their foreign suppliers to ensure that any goods imported into Canada have not been mined, manufactured or produced wholly or in part by forced or compulsory labour.

The Government of Canada expects companies to take  every  step possible to ensure that their supply chains conform to Canadian law with respect to the prohibition  on  the import of forced labour. It is the responsibility of the importing company to conduct due diligence  on its supply chains to ensure that it is not directly or indirectly sourcing products from entities implicated in forced labour or other human rights violations.

Taiwan

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Canada's One China Policy

Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations

Cross-Strait tensions

Canada-Taiwan Economic Consultations

CPTPP Accession and Canada-Taiwan FIPA

Responsive: Taiwan CPTPP accession

Update

In recent months, PLAAF aircraft have increased the frequency and scale of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait.

In November 2020, when the World Health Assembly  resumed  its session,  Taiwan  was once again not invited to participate as an observer in the Assembly  over objections from the PRC and its international partners.

Supporting facts and figures

Tibet

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Update

Canada's Ambassador to China, Dominic Barton participated in a Chinese government hosted visit to Lhasa, Tibet from October 26-30,  2020.  This  was  the first visit to Tibet by a Government of Canada official since 2015.

On March 11, 2021,  at the  46th  session  of  Human  Rights  Council  in Geneva, Canada expressed concerns over deeply troubling reports of deaths in custody of Tibetans.

Supporting facts and figures

Uyghurs in China

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Responsive: Has Canada blocked any shipments due to forced labour concerns related to Uyghurs?

Responsive: Why were these measures announced if they cannot be enforced?

Update

Supporting facts and figures

QP Note

VFS Global Issue

Issue:

Proposed response:

If pressed on China law:

QUESTION PERIOD NOTE
Date: Mar. 18, 2021

Classification: Department: IRCC

If pressed on the breach:

On expanding the contract to include digitization of paper applications

Contact:
Pemi Gill
Director General, IN
Tel. No.:
Cell. No.:

Approved by:
Daniel Mills
Assistant Deputy Minister, OPS
Tel. No.:

Visa Application Centres

Background

VACs provide administrative support and biometric collection services in the local language to applicants before, during and after their application is assessed by an IRCC visa officer

VACs do not represent the Government of Canada. They play no role in the decision-making process and are expressly forbidden to provide any visa- related advice to applicants

VACs are run by private companies and are governed by a formal contract with the Government of Canada

For a fee, VACs can:

For an additional fee, VACs offer other services, including making  photocopies, assisted services for filling forms and self-service computers for those wishing to apply online. Value-added services may vary depending on  the VAC locations.

Winter 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Games

ENG:

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

The Winter 2022 Games will begin in Beijing on February 4, 2022. The International Olympics Committee (IOC)  selected  Beijing  as the  location  for the  Winter  2022  Games in 2015. Since that time, the human rights situation in China has worsened.

In 2017, the Olympic Host City Contract was revised to include specific responsibilities,  including  human  rights  protections,  and  measures   to  counter  fraud and corruption as they relate to the organization of the Games. However, the revised Contract takes  effect in 2024  and  will  not  apply  to  the  2022  Winter  Games.  The Games are expected to be leveraged for propaganda  efforts  by  the  Government  of China, and increased censorship of critics.  The  right  of athletes  to  demonstrate  has been a topic of  heated  debate  within  the  International  Olympic  Committee  and  is likely to intensify during the 2022 Games.

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