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Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) on foreign election interference

June 13th, 2023
Published: January 25th, 2024

Table of Contents

  1. Scenario Note
  2. USS Opening Remarks
  3. Biographies of PROC Members
  4. Overview and Analysis of Press and Social Media Coverage
  5. PCO Summary Report of NSIA appearance (June 1, 2023)
  6. PCO Summary Report of ISR appearance (June 6, 2023)
  7. Unofficial Transcript (Blues) of NSIA appearance (June 1, 2023)
  8. Unofficial Transcript (Blues) of ISR appearance (June 6, 2023)
  9. Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE)
  10. Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP)
  11. Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)
  12. Disinformation – China
  13. Disinformation – Russia
  14. Vienna Conventions – Persona Non Grata Declarations
  15. Foreign Interference – General
  16. Foreign Interference – China
  17. Allegations of Chinese Interference in GE43
  18. Allegations of Chinese Interference in GE44
  19. Canada-China Bilateral Relations
  20. Allegations of PRC “Police Stations” and Recent Diplomatic Engagement
  21. IPS – General & Standing Up to China
  22. Diplomatic Representation in Canada / in China

Scenario Note

For Your Awareness

Timeline of this Study

Since November 1, the Committee has held numerous meetings on Foreign Election Interference, and has heard government witnesses from Elections Canada, CSIS, CSE, GAC, and the RCMP.

Committee Membership

Context

Your invitation was precipitated by the following motion:

The committee proceeded to the consideration of matters related to committee business.

It was agreed, — That, in relation to its order of reference of Wednesday, May 10, 2023, concerning the intimidation campaign orchestrated by Wei Zhao against the Member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other Members, the committee:

  1. make use, for the purposes of this study, of the evidence received during its study on foreign election interference, without limiting the witnesses who may be called;
  2. make use, for the purposes of this study, of the evidence received by the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics during its study on foreign interference, without limiting the witnesses who may be called;
  3. invite each of the following to appear on their own:
    1. the Honourable Michael Chong, for one hour;
    2. Eric Janse, Acting Clerk of the House of Commons, for one hour;
    3. the Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for one hour;
    4. the Honourable Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety, for one hour;
    5. the Honourable Bill Blair, President of the King’s Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Emergency Preparedness, for one hour;
    6. Jody Thomas, National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, for two hours;
    7. David Vigneault, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, for two hours;
    8. David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Acting National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, for two hours;
    9. Mike MacDonald, former Acting National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, for one hour;
    10. Vincent Rigby, former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, for one hour;
    11. Michael Duheme, Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for one hour;
    12. Cong Peiwu, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Canada, for two hours;
    13. Ward Elcock, Former Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
    14. National Security and Intelligence Review Agency;
    15. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians;
    16. Dan Stanton, Former Executive Manager-CSIS, Instructor on National Security at University of Ottawa;
    17. Michael Wernick, Jarislowsky Chair in Public Sector Management, University of Ottawa;
    18. Artur Wilczynski, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa;
    19. Wesley Wark, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation;
    20. Stephanie Carvin, Carleton University;
    21. Jessica Davis, Expert and President of Insight Threat Intelligence;
    22. Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa;
    23. Thomas Juneau, NSI Expert, Associate Professor at University of Ottawa;
    24. Andrew Mitrovica, Writer;
  4. direct the parties to provide their preliminary lists of other witnesses to the clerk of the committee within one week.

Please see Note 4 for a detailed press and social media analysis on this file.

USS Opening Remarks

Good morning to the members of the committee.

Thank you for inviting me this morning.   

Foreign interference is an important issue that continues to be at the heart of our national agenda and deserves our constant attention.

Madame Chair, I know that at least part of the reason you invited me here today is because I was acting National Security and Intelligence Advisor from early July 2021 through early January 2022. 

It was of course during this period that a July 20, 2021, CISIS report on Chinese foreign interference was produced and disseminated, a report that has proven quite controversial since key aspects of it were published in the Globe and Mail on May 1st of this year.   

Privy Council Office records show that the report in question was in my reading pack on August 17th, 2021.  For the record, I have no recollection of receiving it or reading it then.  Like Jody Thomas I was at the time fully occupied with the evacuation from Afghanistan, as Kabul had fallen only two days before. 

I believe I did read the report when the dust from Afghanistan settled, because I was interested enough to have commissioned a follow-on piece by a different group within our intelligence community, in an attempt to gain the fullest possible picture of Chinese foreign interference in Canada.  I would be pleased to come back to this point if members of the Committee are interested. 

But there are two important aspects of the July 20th, 2021, CSIS report that seem to have been widely misunderstood. 

First, the report was never intended to spur action by readers, whether around targeting of MPs or any of the other examples of foreign interference it lists. 

In its own words, as published in the Globe, the report was intended to establish a “baseline for understanding the intent, motives, and scope” of Beijing’s foreign interference in Canada. 

It was not a “memorandum for action”.  It was a report for awareness. 

Intelligence agencies in Canada and elsewhere produce a range of products for consumers: These products are short reports containing fragments of information, sometimes from a single source, that tend to be concise and timely; as well as longer, periodic “assessments”, that often rest upon earlier intelligence, and are designed to build understanding of complex issues.   

It is like the difference between the kind of “breaking news” that appears on the front page of the Globe and Mail, and the deep dive reports that often appear in the middle pages of the weekend edition.

The July 2021 CSIS report a was very much a deep dive.  It was not intended to spur action by me, as acting NSIA, or by anyone else.  It was certainly not something that I would have rushed to brief up to the Prime Minister. 

Importantly, as reported by the Globe and repeated by Jody Thomas, the report did not name Michael Chong or any other MP.  Indeed, it would have been highly irregular for this kind of piece to go into that kind of detail. 

The second key aspect of the July 2021 report that seems to have been widely misunderstood is that anyone reading such a report could have safely assumed that any necessary action, on any of the specific points raised, had already been taken. 

Indeed, this was the case for the reference in the report to Chinese actions against Canadian MPs. 

To recall for the Committee: as reported in the Globe, the targeting of Canadian MPs by China was linked to a February 2021 parliamentary motion, sponsored by Michael Chong, condemning Beijing’s oppression of Uyghurs, likening this oppression to genocide. 

You will recall that, after the motion and subsequent sanctions imposed several weeks later by Canada on people and entities in China, China responded by sanctioning Michael Chong and the entire membership of the sub-Committee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development.

It was in this context, as shown in the David Johnston’s report, that China “built profiles” and “contemplated action” against Michael Chong and other MPs.

And it was in response to that Chinese activity that in May 2021 CSIS wrote their Issues management brief, referred to in the David Johnston report as an IMU, to the Minister of Public Safety.

If you look at page 27 of the Johnston report, you will see that this was not an “action note” seeking a decision from the Minister.  It was an information note telling the then minister that CSIS intended to provide a “defensive briefing” to MPs who, intelligence showed, China intended to target.   

Now I know there have been questions about how this Issues Management Note was sent and who received it and so on.  I’m aware you have already asked Minister Blair about this.  And I know you will be raising those questions with my colleague David Vigneault when he appears before you this evening. 

But the larger picture is this: intelligence emerged in the spring, around the time of the Uyghur motion, that the Chinese government was looking for information on parliamentarians, and, in particular, on Mr. Chong and his relatives.

That intelligence was actioned, in that it led to an information memo to the Minister of Public Safety, and then, in June 2021, to a “defensive” briefing to Mr. Chong and another MP.  All of this is on page 27 of Mr. Johnston’s report. 

Madam Chair, some may find that all of this took too long. The point has already made that if the then Minister of Public Safety was not aware of the intelligence with respect to Mr. Chong and other MPs, there were obviously deficiencies.    

But Madam Chair, I would submit that the system did function according to the protocols that were in place back in 2021. 

Importantly, as you are aware the system has now been changed: the new Ministerial Directive issued on May 16th of this year means that in the future any intelligence received with respect to specific MPs will be briefed up to ministers. 

Getting back to where I started Madame Chair, all of this is to say that in my view the focus on the July 2021 CSIS report – who was the NSIA at the time, who else read it, whether it went into a black hole – has been misplaced.  Action with respect to the targeting of MPs had already been taken before the report was even published.

Before closing, Madame Chair, allow me to make a two final points.

First, much has been made of the term “target” in the sense of being a “target of Beijing”.  I do not intend to diminish for one moment how unsettling it must have been to Mr. Chong and other MPs to learn that China had been building profiles on them and possibly preparing to take action, including against family members living abroad.

At the same time, Jody Thomas, Wesley Wark, Thomas Juneau and others have already indicated, there is nothing inherently nefarious about foreign governments discussing Members of Parliament or anyone else in Canadian society. Members of the Committee should be aware that all embassies, including Canadian embassies around the world, create “influence maps” that list individuals through whom they intend to pursue their national objectives.

The important thing to keep in mind is whether the activity in question in clandestine, deceptive or threatening to an individual or an institution. As previous witnesses have stated, intent and capability are key.

For the record, while government with values that differ from our own do not always appreciate Canada’s activity abroad, Canadian diplomats do not engage in foreign interference. Everything they do is overt and above board.

That brings me to my second and last point, Madam Chair. 

While our recent focus recently, and appropriately, has been on Members of Parliament, in the case of China, many of the Canadians on the lists – whether you wish to call them “targets” or part of larger “influence maps” – will be ethnically Chinese. 

These diaspora members are in my view, the most vulnerable populations when it comes to China’s interference in Canada. 

They are Canadian citizens and permanent residents, and they deserve the same protections as everyone else living in Canada. 

When it comes to foreign interference, I view this as an area of the greatest long term threat. 

We need to know much more about ongoing foreign interference in these communities – what forms it takes, and how it can be combatted. 

Public hearings with these communities were to have been included in the second part of the process led by David Johnston, and I hope the importance of this focus does not get lost in whatever process is agreed for the future.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Biographies of PROC Members

The Honourable Bardish Chagger, Chair
LPC – Waterloo (ON)

Bardish Chagger

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

China:

Disinformation:

John Nater, Vice-Chair
CPC – Perth—Wellington (ON)

John Nater

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

China:

Russia:

Disinformation:

Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Vice-Chair
BQ – Laurentides—Labelle (QC)

Marie-Hélène Gaudreau

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

Foreign Interference:

Disinformation:

Luc Berthold
CPC – Mégantic—L'Érable (QC)

Luc Berthold

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

China:

Russia:

Foreign Interference:

Disinformation:

Rachel Blaney
NDP – North Island—Powell River (BC)

Rachel Blaney

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

Russia:

Disinformation and Misinformation:

Blaine Calkins
CPC – Red Deer—Lacombe (AB)

Blaine Calkins

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

China:

Foreign Interference:

Russia:

Disinformation:

Michael Cooper
CPC – St. Albert—Edmonton (AB)

Michael Cooper

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

China:

Foreign Interference:

Disinformation:

Greg Fergus
LPC – Hull—Aylmer (QC)

Greg Fergus

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

Foreign Interference:

Mark Gerretsen
LPC – Kingston and the Islands (ON)

Mark Gerretsen

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

China:

Russia:

Sherry Romanado
LPC – Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne (QC)

Sherry Romanado

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

Disinformation :

Foreign Agents:

Foreign Interference:

Cyberwarfare:

Ruby Sahota
LPC – Brampton North (ON)

Ruby Sahota

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

Foreign Interference:

Ryan Turnbull
LPC – Whitby (ON)

Ryan Turnbull

Election to the House of Commons

Professional background

Political and parliamentary roles

Committee membership

Points of interest to GAC

Disinformation:

Foreign Interference:

During the same meeting, MP Turnbull expressed concern regarding the algorithmic transparency of social medial companies and asked if this yielded an impact on Canadian elections and, if so, whether it could be considered as foreign interference.

Overview and Analysis of Press and Social Media Coverage

Subject: Allegations of Chinese Interference in GE 43 & 44

Coverage Start Time: November 07, 2023

Coverage End Time: May 31, 2023

Updated Media Analysis

Introduction

Media coverage of China’s alleged interference in Canadian elections from November 7, 2022, to May 31, 2023, was very high in volume and overwhelmingly negative in tone.

In November 2022, all the articles urged the government to be proactive and take China's alleged interference in the 2019 elections seriously. Overall, article angles aimed between criticizing Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to investigating how this interference infiltrated the Canadian political system, or what concrete solutions could be. Many articles promoted taking a more critical approach towards China in the hope that this will be the case in Canada's new Indo-Pacific strategy ()()()()(). Several articles also highlighted Prime Minister Trudeau’s confrontation with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the G20 ()()().

Early in 2023, nearly all the publications were aimed at scrutinizing the responses of the Prime Minister. Of note, a December 2022 article from the highlighted that Minister Joly claimed to not have been made aware of the fact that 11 elected officials were under the radar of foreign forces. Her use of the term "increasingly disruptive" to describe China has been positively received ().

National Security

The issue of national security was mentioned in several articles. A piece written by Terry Glavin () denounced the dichotomy between Trudeau's discourse on national security and that of Canada's national security and intelligence agencies. Glavin argued that the 1984 CSIS Act needs to be updated, since the threats have evolved since the end of the Cold War era and now come from new world powers. An analysis by journalist Emanuelle Latraverse () and another by Stéphanie Grammond () reiterated the same arguments. Shortly after the publication of the Global News investigation, articles were published criticizing the inaction of the government, pointing out that this interference was foreseeable, but that the issue had been ignored for several years ()()()()(). Similarly, former Canadian ambassador to China, Guy Saint-Jacques, pointed out that the Chinese have long understood that they can exploit Canada's political system (). There were many articles denouncing the ease with which Chinese interference has taken hold in the country, and political commentator Tasha Kheiriddin argued that Chinese expats in Canada need better protection from people acting in the interest of the Chinese government (. The new Indo-Pacific strategy spearheaded by Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly was cited as a hope that Canada will take an aggressive () and realistic () stance on its relations with China.

In February 2023, the Chinese consulate in Vancouver made a statement in denying any involvement with the alleged electoral interference. The article referenced foreign powers weaponizing diaspora communities within Canada to attack the multicultural fabric of Canada. Political commentator Tasha Kheiriddin wrote another op-ed on the topic, this time highlighting the CSIS report that details the ways in which China attacked Canadian democracy and called for further measures to protect Canadians (). columnist Konrad Yakabuski, in a February article, compared measures undertaken by the Australian government to counter Chinese influence with those taken here in Canada.

Following the publication of an article in calling Chinese interference the biggest threat to security in Canada, there have been consistent demands in the media for Canada to strengthen its laws protecting Canadians against foreign interference and more specifically for the creation of a foreign agent registry ()(). According to Eric Montigny, Research Chair in Democracy and Parliamentary Institutions member (Université Laval), “By refusing to bow to the vote in the House of Commons demanding a truly independent commission of inquiry, Justin Trudeau has become China's accomplice on this front” ().

Impact on Democracy and Pressure for Investigation

Other articles emphasized the consequences of this interference in the 2019 federal election on Canadian democracy, including concerns from Conservative Party members (), such as Conservative leader Pierre Poilièvre (). Journalist Mélanie Marquis also highlighted requests from Conservative MPs for answers (). Other publications stated that Canada is not immune to this type of interference and that Canada would be at fault if it assumes that foreign meddling could not have occurred on its soil. Columnist Andrew Phillips () called for Canadians to refocus discussing problems with American democracy to addressing problems in their own country and complained about the government dodging questions.

In general, both news articles and commentaries have expressed frustration with the lack of details that have been released to the public about the alleged election interference and noted increased pressure from the opposition on government officials to say and do more (). Columnist Brian Lilley criticized and claimed government inaction in countering foreign interference in Canadian institutions and denounced the status quo (). Other critics claimed and denounced Trudeau's low level of aggressiveness on the issue ()()()(). An article in argued that the defence of democracy should be addressed as a non-partisan issue.

There was also confusion about the timeline of events regarding when the Prime Minister received what information and how it was presented ()()()()()(). There were questions about the Prime Minister drawing a link between these allegations and interference in U.S. elections ()(). Several sources reported the assertion of Canada’s Chief Elections Officer Stéphane Perrault that Canada’s elections have been free and fair ()(). Various outlets also reported on the Prime Minister’s statements during the House of Commons question period on November 23, writing that he dodged questions and remained vague about the details of the interference, referring to Perrault’s statements ()().

Commentaries increasingly called on Trudeau to be honest with Canadians and release information about which candidates were targeted by Chinese interference ()()(). Others expressed confusion and doubt about the Prime Minister’s assertion that he had not been briefed about candidates receiving money from China and wondered, in that case, what it was that he had discussed with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the G20 ()()()()()(). Considering this confusion, columnist Lorrie Goldstein, in the , examined the various statements that have been made and concluded that nobody has denied that the interference has happened, but the details of the severity and how it was evaluated remain obscure.

Throughout the end of 2022 and start of 2023, Prime Minister Trudeau's claimed ambiguous comments and lack of transparency continue to be strongly criticized (). Trudeau's refusal to respond to the allegations was echoed in several articles published in December ()(). The publications were unanimous that the Prime Minister must stop playing with words, offer a clear and truthful answer to the Canadian public, and demonstrate that the government is taking these allegations seriously ()()()()()(). In a February piece, Lorrie Goldstein states explicitly that any foreign interference must be made public.

Two Globe and Mail articles illustrated that a document detailing an active foreign interference network was indeed presented to the Prime Minister The Globe and Mail) (The Globe and Mail). The government was then supposedly aware of the issue (Canadian Press). An article in the Journal de Québec stated that foreign interference in the electoral process is not a new phenomenon.

Others said that the Prime Minister's complete ignorance of the facts and misleading statements gave the false impression that China had never interfered in Canadian elections ()()(). A piece argued that Trudeau is too soft towards totalitarian states. The difference between the government's words and actions have also been repeatedly denounced ()().

Further coverage in the was also critical of the government for its failure to release a foreign interference report after the 2021 election despite it taking seven months for the 2019 report to be made public. A article from Steven Chase and Robert Fife highlighted comments from former Chief Electoral Officer Jean-Pierre Kingsley, in which he called for an independent inquiry into China's sophisticated strategy to interfere in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.

Heading into spring 2023, journalists remain highly critical of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and the government's reluctance to open an inquiry. Editorials in both English and French language newspapers were keen to remind the Prime Minister that China is not Canada's ally () (), and that even if it were, interfering in a third country's electoral process is totally inconceivable and unacceptable (). Some articles have also questioned the veracity of these allegations, repeating that obtaining intelligence from CSIS does not necessarily correlate with facts, as stated by David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs ().

Publications on Canada's domestic political debate between the Liberals and opposition parties, which unanimously called for a public inquiry, were featured in a significant number of articles. The expulsion of a Chinese diplomat was also mentioned several times in the coverage. The announcement of a report was greeted with doubts as to its veracity and reliability () (). Columnist Alexandre Sirois () and journalist Mélanie Marquis () urged the Prime Minister to call an independent inquiry. Paul Journet, also of , pointed out that the Prime Minister is trivializing the problem of interference in Canadian elections with his detached attitude and ignorance of the facts. Criticism of RT Hon David Johnston's nomination was also reflected in a publication due to his personal ties to the Trudeau family. Despite statements from the Prime Minister reiterating his full confidence in the Special Rapporteur, all editorials reflected great skepticism about the choice () () () () () (). The even argued that the Prime Minister "could have written Johnston's report".

Mr. Johnston answered these allegations in an open letter published in , reaffirming his determination to complete his work even though his conclusions are far from being unanimously endorsed. An article published in showed the results of a poll revealing that most Canadians are in favor of an independent inquiry into the alleged interference, demonstrating a paradox between democratic principle and the political will of the party in power. In other words, there is a significant dichotomy between the ruling party and the harsh criticism revealed in the media about the conduct of the process chosen by the Prime Minister. The adjective "indolence" was used to illustrate the government's reaction (). All these elements demonstrate the great dissatisfaction not only with the allegations of interference themselves, but with the government's response and the attitude of the Federal Government. Consequently, a op-ed raised the possibility of an election, while another from the cast uncertainty on the Prime Minister's political future.

Public inquiry

Media coverage of interference allegations also reflected demands for a public inquiry (). Hélène Buzzetti’s commentary piece in stands out. She argued that "the problem with a public inquiry is that it would probably tell us nothing, and would duplicate existing processes," since it would allow an overview and only an understanding of the factors that led to the problem. She emphasized not the lack of information on allegations of interference, but rather the lack of disclosure. Buzzetti added that "foreign interference is a difficult concept to define". In the , Chantal Hébert questioned the veracity of the intelligence gathered by spy agencies, which is an important factor to consider.

Chinese diaspora ignored

Members of the Chinese diaspora, who have been targeted by the Chinese government's intimidation tactics on Canadian soil, have expressed criticism of David Johnston's report. They say that Canada is not ready to take concrete action to prevent foreign governments from interfering in the country (). This statement echoes the comments made in opinion articles in both English- and French-language media in Canada. Other members of the Chinese Canadian diaspora reminded readers that they have been hammering away at Chinese foreign interference in Canada for years, but their voices have always been ignored ().

Diplomatic escalation

In response to the expulsion of Chinese diplomat Zhao Wei for alleged involvement in an interference operation, the press was unanimous: the diplomat's expulsion will have an impact on diplomatic relations between the two countries () and could have significant commercial () and business () consequences. The Star Editorial Board asserted that this action was necessary (). However, while the government's decision to expel a Chinese diplomat was greeted very positively in some outlets, an article in the questioned the timing of the Chinese diplomat's expulsion, wishing that Canada would have reacted more quickly.

Disinformation and Social Media

The role of disinformation and misinformation in social media was highlighted in the media. An article in the blamed META (Facebook) and the weak regulation of web corporations when it comes to preventing national security concerns. Professor Margaret McCuaig-Johnston argued that governments must have more sophisticated tools and concrete strategies to prevent foreign propaganda campaigns from reaching Canadians, especially the Chinese diaspora ()(). The Canadian government is called to act ()().

Prime Minister Trudeau and President Xi’s Confrontation at the G20 Summit

There was heavy coverage of Prime Minister Trudeau’s interactions with President Xi at the G20 Summit in Bali. Coverage escalated especially after a video surfaced of Xi berating Trudeau for allegedly leaking details of an unofficial conversation in which Trudeau addressed election interference to the press ()()(). Furthermore, reported Conservative MP Michael Chong’s evaluation that the entire episode was evidence of China’s lack of respect for Canada and that Canada needs to clarify its foreign policy toward China.

Commentaries about the confrontation were mixed in tone. Some authors wrote that Xi’s irritation was evidence that the Prime Minister is doing his job and urged him to continue to stand up to China ()()()(). In the , columnist Sabrina Maddeaux argued that Xi’s behaviour was an attempt at bullying Trudeau into standing down on investigating Chinese interference, and that Canada should not give in. Others criticized Trudeau for appearing to be weak and looking chastened in the released video, as well as for taking too long to address the CSIS report ()(). Some commentaries appreciated the Prime Minister addressing the allegations with Xi but expressed displeasure that the government does not appear to have addressed them in the months since the original security briefings ()()(). A few authors expressed displeasure at partisan politics ()().

Following the G20, the reported on a statement released by the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa exclusively in Chinese denying the allegations. According to Guy Saint-Jacques, these remarks are an attempt at misinformation specifically towards the Chinese diaspora in Canada.

Social Media Overview

The issue of Chinese interference in the Canadian election was discussed in 22 posts on Twitter from December 2022 to late February 2023. The tweets raised Trudeau's response, and some reiterated that the issue is not the government source that told the Globe and Mail about the Chinese interference's report, but the impact it has on democratic stability in the country. The publications echo statements by Minister Joly and Trudeau that these allegations must be taken very seriously. The tweets also highlighted questions put to the Prime Minister that have not been answered.

From February 24th to the end of May 2023, there was a spike in tweets about Chinese interference in Canadian elections, totaling 116 tweets in just over 3 months. These tweets mainly voiced concerns about the threat to democracy and the need for transparency and a public inquiry. David Johnston's role as a special rapporteur received mixed reactions, with some criticisms indicating dissatisfaction. Some tweets also accused the media of propagating misinformation and undermining the Trudeau government by publishing potentially erroneous leaked information. Several other tweets reported on political exchanges with the PM, Katie Telford’s committee testimony, and the expulsion of a Chinese diplomat from Canada.

PCO Summary Report of NSIA appearance (June 1, 2023)

Good afternoon,

Please find below a summary, prepared with notes from both PCO and Public Safety Canada, from today's meeting of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC). The committee continued their study on the Question of Privilege Related to the Intimidation Campaign against the Member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other Members. The committee heard from Jody Thomas NSIA, and the Minister of Emergency Preparedness.

The tone of the committee was generally calm, save for several interactions between CPC MP Michael Cooper and the NSIA where Mr. Cooper asked the NSIA to comment on political considerations around the Prime Minister. Additionally, on questions related to the July 2021 CSIS memo, the NSIA indicated several times she would not comment on actions taken when she was not in the position of the NSIA.

Three undertakings were noted during the meeting (highlighted below); two for the NSIA and one for Minister Blair.

The committee is expected to meet again on Tuesday, June 6, with the Right Hon. David Johnston appearing for 3 hours in his capacity as the ISR.

Thanks,

Legislation and House Planning (PCO) // Législation et planification parlementaire (BCP)

Summary of Committee Proceedings

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC)

Thursday, June 1, 2023

10am - 1pm

Report Prepared By

Legislation and House Planning (PCO)

Topic of Meeting

Question of Privilege Related to the Intimidation Campaign against the Member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other Members

Members in Attendance (Visible on the Webcast)

Witnesses

10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.

Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas, National Security and Intelligence Advisor

12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.

Hon. Bill Blair, P.C., M.P., Minister of Emergency Preparedness

Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

Tricia Geddes, Associate Deputy Minister

___________________

Panel 1

Questions

Michael Cooper (CPC) asked about the July 2021 CSIS memo regarding MP Michael Chong, and when she learned about it. Ms. Thomas noted that she learned about the memo in the Globe and Mail. She was asked when the Prime Minster learned about the targeting of MP Chong, as well as MP Kwan and MP O'Toole, and Ms. Thomas stated only in the last few weeks, since May 1. Ms. Thomas noted she became aware of this same targeting within the last 3-4 weeks through a briefing from CSIS. Mr. Cooper asked how it was possible that the NSIA and the PM were completely unaware of this targeting of sitting politicians until now, and that it was a breakdown of the machinery of government. Ms. Thomas stated she agreed there needs to a better management of security intelligence information coming into senior officials' offices. She indicated she would not speculate on what happened in 2021 as she was not in the position at the time. Mr. Cooper noted that on May 3, the PM told reporters that CSIS made the determination that this wasn't information that needed to be relayed to a higher level, and that this was found to not be true. Ms. Thomas noted that they were not aware that the information from CSIS had been moved through the system, and that she was the one who told the PM this, and that she didn't know what information had left CSIS. Ms. Thomas noted that when she found out where the memo had actually gone, she notified the PM and MP Chong. She noted that the information had gone to the NSIA, the DM of Public Safety, the DM of Foreign Affairs, and the DM of National Defence. Mr. Cooper asked Ms. Thomas to confirm that the information went nowhere. Ms. Thomas noted that the memo was distributed and was not briefed to the Prime Minister. Ms. Thomas noted that she was the DM of National Defence at that time, and was on leave at the time, and the information appears to have gone into a "black hole" as when she returned to her job she was focused on Afghanistan. Mr. Cooper asked if Ms. Thomas could provide the transmission records from the memo from CSIS arriving to PCO in July, and in August it was presented to the A/NSIA. Ms. Thomas noted that PCO would provide what they have in regards to who the memo went to and where it went.

Mr. Cooper asked if it seemed reasonable that Minister Blair would not have a log-in to his system to view the information, as reported by the ISR's report. Ms. Thomas noted that she did not believe that is an accurate representation of what happened as Ministers are given information to read, and they are not the ones logging in themselves. Mr. Cooper asked if Ms. Thomas was involved in any political conversations with the Prime Minister or other Cabinet ministers. Ms. Thomas said she is generally not.

Sherry Romanado (LPC) asked about the volume of intelligence information that comes into her office each month. Ms. Thomas noted her daily reading package is anywhere between 50 and 100 pieces of intelligence information. She noted that there is a process in the works to make sure that intelligence that is distributed is acknowledged and seen, which she acknowledged was a previous breakdown in process. Ms. Thomas also noted that intelligence agencies holdings are large, and make determinations on what to share based on credibility, and based on the PM's recent direction, they now brief up on any intelligence that comes in with an MP and foreign interference whether or not the information is deemed credible. Ms. Romanado asked about raising the awareness of foreign interference. Ms. Thomas noted the importance of having conversations about this issue, and that the conversations that normally occur between the intelligence community and Parliamentarians is not overly specific. Ms. Thomas also noted that the Panel of Five will begin, this summer, to meet in between elections so that panel members understand the full context of what happens before and during elections.

Marie-Hélène Gaudreau (BQ) asked about the PM's direction on briefing MPs. Ms. Thomas noted that the Minister of Public Safety issued a Ministerial Direction to CSIS, based on the PM's directive, to brief up on MP's and foreign interference regardless of credibility. Ms. Thomas confirmed this was not the process previously for various reasons, so as to not worry an MP needlessly. Ms. Gaudreau asked if this change in direction makes it seem as though MPs were not previously well protected. Ms. Thomas noted that the physical security of MPs was never in question. Ms. Thomas noted that a more robust system is now in place to ensure that information is moved to who needs to know it at the right time, including associated advice. Mme Gaudreau asked whether a public inquiry should be held so they can know what's going on, and to reassure the population. Ms. Thomas noted that there would be little more than she, in her capacity as the NSIA, could say at a public inquiry that she hasn't already said publicly, and that the hearings that the ISR would be holding would be a good venue to discuss these issues. She noted that a public inquiry could be seen as not necessarily moving forward.

Rachel Blaney (NDP) noted that it sounds like there was a fix for the problems that had happened quickly, in weeks, and if it was this simple, why didn't it happen before. Ms. Thomas stated that she couldn't speculate on what her predecessors did. She noted that intelligence agencies do not provide advice, they provide information, and she felt this was a gap when she came into this job. Ms. Blaney noted that perception matters, and it appears right now even though we are changing things moving forward there needs to be accountability for what happened in the past. Ms. Blaney asked whether the issue of someone being on leave and missing information has been rectified. Ms. Thomas stated that they have fixed this going forward but that it is important to note that the information from July 2021 was a "can read", not a "must read", and that she was the only person who could read it but it did not affect the day-to-day running of her job. Ms. Blaney asked again about a stop-gap, and that it seems as though if something is not a "must read" it can fall by the wayside. Ms. Blaney asked about the structure of the NSIA and their office. Ms. Thomas noted that in her team, they have directed to the intelligence communities on which information needs to go to DMs for discussion and advice and how that information is disseminated.

Ryan Turnbull (LPC) asked whether information or a threat that is deemed not credible is provided to an MP, whether this could psychologically and emotionally impact an MP and the way they do their work. Ms. Thomas noted that it's important to note that there is a distinction between a threat and information. Mr. Turnbull asked Ms. Thomas to explain the way the PM is briefed, and she noted that information is not held back from the PM when it is received.

Blaine Calkins (CPC) asked when the PM became aware of the name of the diplomat involved in the foreign interference activities? Ms. Thomas noted she would have to look for the exact date and provide it to the committee after this meeting, and she noted that she could provide the date where this information was discussed by her, but not necessarily previously. Mr. Calkins asked why the government only expelled the diplomat after the Globe and Mail article came out. Ms. Thomas noted this question would be better posed to GAC. Mr. Calkins also asked if there were any other diplomats who were behaving in this way and Ms. Thomas noted she could not speak about this in this open forum. On Chinese police stations, Ms. Thomas noted that they were aware of these stations and work is underway to try and shut down their activities.

Greg Fergus (LPC) asked about the caveating of intelligence information. Ms. Thomas noted that the action often taken on information is "continue to investigate/collect". Mr. Fergus asked if the caveating of information to MPs would be included as part of the briefings to Parliamentarians. Ms. Thomas noted that they would be relying on Parliamentarians to keep certain pieces of information protected in order to ensure investigations and collections could continue.

Ruby Sahota (LPC) asked if the polarization of politics in this discussion is making it more difficult for the security intelligence community to do its work. Ms. Thomas indicated she hoped this committee's work and the general discussion around foreign interference would help make it clear that this is an important issue. Ms. Sahota asked about what kind of changes should be made to better deal with foreign interference. Ms. Thomas noted that thing such as the Foreign Interference Transparency Regime (FITR), changes to the Security of Information Act, and changes to the CSIS Act to better deal with movement of information in a digital age. Ms. Thomas spoke more about the FITR, including changes to the Criminal Code to give the FITR more teeth. On the CSIS Act, Ms. Thomas spoke about being able to disclose, somewhere between classified information and general terms, on threats.

Luc Berthold (CPC) asked about the NSIA's accountability for information flow. Ms. Thomas noted that if information did not flow to the PM during her tenure, she would take on that accountability but she cannot comment on what happened prior to her tenure.

Panel 2

Questions

Michael Cooper (CPC) asked Min. Blair about his statement that he was never briefed on the foreign interference threat specifically to MP Chong. He noted that he had a number of conversations with the Director of CSIS about interference from the Chinese government, but not about any specific MP. Mr. Cooper asked the Minister about the July 2021 CSIS memo and the lack of the log-in to the top secret system. Minister Blair noted that there is no email account where top secret information is shared with Ministers. He noted that the Director of CSIS would note which information the Minister would need to know, and print it out in hard copy, and bring it to the Minister. The Minister noted that the information was authorized by CSIS to share with him as the Minister, but it was not shared with him. Mr. Cooper noted that the ISR said the Minister did not have access to the terminal, and Minister Blair noted this was correct, he did not have access to this terminal. Minister Blair reiterated that he was accountable for the information that was presented to him, at the discretion of the intelligence agencies who make the decision about what to brief him on. Mr. Cooper asked the Minister for details about third parties in the warrants that he signed related to Mr. Chan. The Minister indicated he took an oath and could not discuss those details. Mr. Cooper then posed the question more generally, and asked about the details of any of the warrants he signed. Minister Blair indicated again he would not discuss this in an open setting. Mr. Cooper asked how he knew Mr. Chan, and he said he encountered him when he was a police officer, but did not consider him a friend. Mr. Cooper asked if the Minster had received the PCO Daily Foreign Intelligence Brief dated February 1, 2020 that said there was an active PRC foreign interference network in the 2019 election. Minister Blair said that he did not recall. Mr. Cooper said that he was quoted in news story as saying he had received that memo. Minister Blair said that he had seen a number of documents but that he couldn’t recall the particular memo in question. He added that he wanted to take the opportunity to confirm that he was briefed on the memo and would report back to the committee.

In response to questions from Ryan Turnbull (LPC), Minister Blair noted that the details in the Globe and Mail articles were not factually accurate. Mr. Turnbull asked the Minister to detail the steps the Government has taken to address foreign interference. Minister Blair noted the establishment of NSICOP, authorities for NSIA, and legislative remedies.

Marie-Hélène Gaudreau (BQ) asked the Minister about the timeline described in the Globe and Mail article. The Minister agreed that timeline was not good, but that it was not factually accurate, but there always needed to be due diligence on the information that is collected. Mme Gaudreau noted the classification of information and how some of it can be discussed publicly. The Minister noted we need to do a better job of classifying information and figuring out what to disclose in order to be transparent. Mme Gaudreau asked the Minister about Michael Wernick's statement from Tuesday at PROC that the PM should stand up and announce that legislative measures on foreign interference are forthcoming, and that this should be raised to the Prime Minister in Cabinet. The Minister indicated it was an important question and that there are legislative measures being considered and that if they are introduced, the legislative response needs to be robust and be done thoughtfully and carefully.

Rachel Blaney (NDP) noted that the trust of Canadians in our institutions is paramount, and that is why the NDP wants a public inquiry led by someone who is approved by all opposition parties. The Minister was asked about how he received briefings , and the Minister noted that as the Minister of Public Safety said that he would received hard copy briefs in secure locations. He added that there were areas for improvement for the way in which intelligence is shared for Ministers and others.

Greg Fergus (LPC) asked why, in the current system, there is a reticence to share unvalidated intelligence information. The Minister indicated unvalidated intelligence could cause harm, and also not wanting to compromise those who are collecting that information.

PCO Summary Report of ISR appearance (June 6, 2023)

Good afternoon,

Please find below a summary from today's meeting of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. The committee continued their study on the Question of Privilege Related to the Intimidation Campaign against the Member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other Members. The committee heard from the Right. Hon. David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur (ISR) on Foreign Interference.

The committee met for over three hours, with the ISR answering questions from all parties. Questions focused on the appearances of conflicts of interest including the ISR’s relationships with former Supreme Court Justice Iacobucci and attorney Sheila Block, the content of the ISR's First Report and who the ISR met with, the choice of public hearings vs a public inquiry, what the government can do to counter foreign interference, and Mr. Johnston's response to the House motion calling on him to resign.

The tone was overall calm and productive, with members expressing gratefulness for Mr. Johnston’s appearance especially as he stayed for an extended sitting.

No undertakings or motions were noted during the meeting.

The committee is expected to meet again on Thursday. The notice for the meeting and potential witnesses has not yet been posted.

Thanks,

Legislation and House Planning (PCO) // Législation et planification parlementaire (BCP)

Summary of Committee Proceedings

Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

Tuesday, June 6, 2023

10am - 1:25pm

Report Prepared By

Legislation and House Planning (PCO)

Topic of Meeting

Question of Privilege Related to the Intimidation Campaign against the Member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other Members

Members in Attendance (Visible on the Webcast)

Witnesses

As an individual

The Right Hon. David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference

___________________

Mr. Johnston gave an opening statement, touching on his work as the Independent Special Rapportuer and his first report.

Questions

Larry Brock (CPC) as Mr. Johnston about his relationship with the Prime Minister. Mr. Johnston noted that his relationship with the Prime Minister was when the PM and his children were kids, and they had no specific relationship outside of that for 40 years. Michael Barret (CPC) then took up the time and asked about Mr. Johnston in his capacity with the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation. Mr. Johnston stated he had nothing to do with the decision-making of the Trudeau Foundation. He noted that the first knowledge he had of potential foreign interference was when he information appeared in the media. Mr. Barrett asked about Mr. Johnston's relationship with former Supreme Court justice Frank Iacobucci, and Liberal donor Sheila Block. Mr. Barrett noted that it seemed like there were quite a few connections between Mr. Johnston and the Liberal Party, and asked if Mr. Johnston did not see a conflict of interest. Mr. Johnston indicated he did not see this as a conflict of interest Mr. Brock asked if anyone other than Navigator was assisting Mr. Johnston. Mr. Johnston indicated no. Mr. Brock asked if Don Guy, Brian Topp, or anyone else from GT & Company were assisting him. Mr. Johnston stated both Mr. Guy and Mr. Topp were assisting him. This advice started 10 days ago or so. Mr. Johnston was asked if he was paying for this advice, and Mr. Johnston stated no. Mr. Brock asked who wrote this report considering he misremembered several parts of his Report. He said he received assistance, from a legal team, such as Ms. Block. Mr. Johnston said there was no assistance from the PMO in drafting the report. Mr. Johnston noted he had discussions with PMO when seeking information. He had no assistance from PCO in drafting, either.

Ryan Turnbull (LPC) noted Mr. Johnston's report and its comments on the discourse on foreign interference becoming political and partisan, and becoming theatre. Mr. Johnston noted that the committee members should read the report and take the issue seriously. Mr. Turnbull noted that he wondered why the Opposition continued to attack Mr. Johnston's character, and stated that he thought it was because they did not like Mr. Johnston's conclusion in his report. Mr. Johnston noted that his report, while h indicated that he did not see evidence of anyone in the Prime Minister's Office ignoring foreign interference intelligence, there are still serious shortcomings in the system. Mr. Turnbull asked if Mr. Johnston was impeded on speaking publicly given his security clearance to view the documents he viewed as the ISR. Mr. Johnston stated no.

Alain Therrien (BQ) spoke to protecting our confidence in Canada's democratic institutions as a core tenant of the committee looking into this matter. He noted again the need for an independent public inquiry into foreign interference, and asked Mr. Johnston why he rejected the idea of one. Mr. Johnston noted that there is a dilemma in dealing with classified information in public. He noted that in the second phase of the ISR's mandate they will deal with the issue in public hearings. Mr. Therrien noted there are precedents to deal with sensitive information in public. Mr. Johnston noted the public hearings will deal with what can be spoken about in public regarding this matter. He also noted that previous commissions on Foreign Interference, such as the MacDonald commission, took time to come to their conclusions (five years, in that case). Mr. Therrien asked about the difference between the information classified in this case, and the information classified in the Maher Arar case. Mr. Johnston noted this was a good question that they hoped to address in the public hearings over the next five months, to figure out the issues with the system of classification in the government. Mr. Therrien asked about the experts who were originally against a public inquiry, and after Mr. Johnston's report, have indicated they are now in favour of one. Mr. Johnston stated that his report set out the reasons why he believed a public inquiry was necessary but that public hearings would be the best option. In response to a question from Mr. Therrien, Mr. Johnston noted that some public sessions at the public hearings could have in-camera meetings. Mr. Therrien noted that in the ISR's report he seems to blame the media and the public service for the shortcomings, but not the current government. Mr. Therrien asked if Mr. Johnston had met with the Canada Elections Commissioner, and Mr. Johnston stated no but they expected they would meet with them later. He noted this was the same for the Canada Elections Officer.

Jagmeet Singh (NDP) noted that he made it clear that he disagrees with Mr. Johnston's finding that there should not be a public inquiry, and that the NDP recommended he step down as the ISR given the appearance of bias. He also noted that he was disappointed that the ISR rejected the majority vote in the House on the ISR stepping down. Mr. Singh asked about the impact of foreign interference on diaspora. He asked Mr. Johnston whether there were any steps being taken to protect diasporas from foreign interference threats. Mr. Johnston noted we haven't done the things we should do to protect these communities. He noted that there was more effort needed in informing diaspora communities to inform them of what kinds of harms could come to these communities. Mr. Singh noted that it seems at no time did the PM or his office reach out to CSIS proactively on whether foreign interference was impacting Members of Parliament. Mr. Johnston noted that overall, the government is slow to react to the threats of foreign interference, and there has not been the curiosity or flow of information necessary to deal with the issue. On a question related to Erin O'Toole, Mr. Johnston noted that he had the chance to meet with Mr. O'Toole shortly before the report was completed, and that since the time his report was issued there has been much more information gathered about what should have been done in his case.

Luc Berthold (CPC) asked if Mr. Johnston continued to receive compensation as a former Governor General. Mr. Johnston noted that he does not receive any pay as a former Governor General, but he receives a pension as a former public servant. Mr. Berthold asked how long Mr. Johnston was a member of the Trudeau Foundation. Mr. Johnston noted he was not a member of the Board of Directors at all, but he only voted as a shareholder, and he resigned in March of this year when he was appointed as the ISR. Mr. Berthold continued the line of questioning from previous CPC members over Mr. Johnston's relationship with Liberal donors and Mr. Iacobucci. He asked if Mr. Johnston after all of these questions still did not see an appearance of a conflict of interest with being the ISR. Mr. Johnston stated there was no conflict of interest and he wouldn't have undertaken this role if it were a conflict of interest. He asked that the committee continue to look at the issue of foreign interference and what they can do on the issue.

Jennifer O'Connell (LPC) noted that the CPC members had fifteen minutes of questions and did not ask any questions about foreign interference, only about Mr. Johnston's perceived conflict of interest. Ms. O'Connell asked whether the Conservative Party ever provided any information to Mr. Johnston about a dossier related to an internal party review on foreign election interference. Mr. Johnston noted he asked Mr. Poilievre on four separate occasions to make submissions and meet with the ISR on this report and he chose not to. A few days before the report was published, he did receive a large package of media reports from the Party but that was it.

Jenny Kwan (NDP) asked about the Global News report that officials warned PMO before the 2019 election that there was potential election interference. She noted that according to the report, there was a draft of a memo that was significantly revised before it went up to PMO. She asked Mr. Johnston if she inquired about who revised that memo. Mr. Johnston noted that the memo referred to in the news report was an early draft that was not circulated further. Ms. Kwan noted that she took that to mean that Mr. Johnston did not ask who changed the memo. Ms. Kwan noted that the ISR's report noted that there were irregularities observed with MP Han Dong's nomination in 2019 and that were tied to the PRC. She asked if Mr. Johnston looked into those irregularities, and if he asked if the PM knew what these irregularities were. Mr. Johnston stated they asked the PM, and he was aware of the nomination issues but not of specific irregularities from his understanding.

Michael Chong (CPC) noted that Mr. Johnston had noted that Parliament needs to do its work on foreign interference. Mr. Chong noted that Parliamentarians' job was to hold the Government to account, and that their hands have been tied by the Government itself on getting information on the PRC's interference. Mr. Johnston noted that during the public hearings they will be looking closely at Parliamentary bodies such as NSIRA as to how they can provide proper oversight. Mr. Chong asked Mr. Johnston about rejecting the idea of a public inquiry that was called for 3 times in the last 3 months in Parliament, and if this undermines confidence in democracy. Mr. Chong asked about the three advisors for the second part of Mr. Johnston's mandate. He said he has not appointed them yet. Mr. Chong also asked about how to include members if diaspora in the public hearings when many in those diasporas have indicated they do not agree with the ISR's approach to public hearings as opposed to an independent public inquiry.

Greg Fergus (LPC) asked Mr. Johnston about the structural issues that he identified in his report, and possible solutions. Mr. Johnston noted that the last pages of his report refer to possible solutions, such as amendments to the CSIS Act that might assist in fighting foreign interference, the role and structure of NSICOP, machinery of government issues including how to get information to the right people at the right time, and a government-led process rather than an agency-led process for declassification of documents. Mr. Fergus asked if he understood that the NSIA has put mechanisms in place to address systemic issues, as she noted at committee last week. Mr. Johnston stated he understood that to be the case and that it was welcome from his perspective. Mr. Fergus asked if NSICOP, compared to our Five Eyes partners, has the right level of access to documents and if its structure was the right form as a committee of the executive.

Michael Cooper (CPC) asked about Mr. Johnston being able to reconcile the briefing that Erin O'Toole had from CSIS (that he and the CPC were targeted by Beijing) versus Mr. Johnston's own conclusion that he could not trace that information to a certain case. He asked Mr. Johnston if he was stating he did not have all the evidence available. Mr. Johnston stated they had the intelligence available from CSIS and other sources when they drafted the report. Mr. Cooper noted that there seems to be information that the Beijing regime was involved in foreign interference, and he could not understand how Mr. Johnston could not reach the conclusion that they were involved. Mr. Johnston stated that the information they were provided at the time they drafted the report did not allow them to trace the attribution of the information. In response to questions about briefings to former Minister of Public Safety Minister Blair, Mr. Johnston noted there were clearly breakdowns in communication in warnings going from CSIS to Min Blair due to system issues, which have been made clear (such as access to systems to retrieve information). Mr. Johnston was asked why he didn't interview Mr. Dong, and Mr. Johnston noted Mr. Dong was proceeding with his lawsuit at that time.

Sherry Romanado (LPC) asked if Mr. Johnston needed more information to continue his work. Mr. Johnston noted he was not sure how they could have absorbed any more information than they absorbed in the eight weeks they worked on the report. She asked whether PROC members should receive the necessary top secret clearance in order to view the TS annex. Mr. Johnston noted that there is precedent, in are other jurisdictions, of expanding the "cone of silence" that currently extends to NSICOP members to other Parliamentarians to let them do their jobs. Ms. Romanado asked Mr. Johnston if there were things that could be done to be ready for the next fixed election date in October 2025. Mr. Johnston noted that in his next report he would like to identify reforms that may be under consideration (such as the Foreign Registry and CSIS Act amendments) and get timelines for when these would be undertaken.

Ruby Sahota (LPC) asked Mr. Johnston about his previous work with Ms. Sheila Block. Mr. Johnston noted he was asked to review allegations of involvement between Mr. Schreiber and former PM Brian Mulroney. Ms. Block reached out to help with this matter as an attorney. Ms. Sahota ran through several of the media allegations that Mr. Johnston covered in his report, especially those where it was noted that the Prime Minister did not ignore any advice or recommendations regarding foreign interference. Mr. Johnston also noted that the conversations between Mr. Dong and the PRC consulate in Toronto about extending the detention of two Michaels were shown to be "misinterpreted".

Peter Julian (NDP) asked if Mr. Johnston was aware of Ms. Block's Liberal donation history before working with her. Mr. Johnston stated no, and that it never occurred to him to ask because of her reputation and history as an attorney. Mr. Julian asked if Mr. Johnston really respected the role of Parliament if he was ignoring the majority vote in the House to resign as the ISR. Mr. Johnston noted that he believes the vote was based on allegations that are false. Mr. Julian noted that Mr. Johnston should heed that Parliamentary vote. Mr. Julian asked about Mr. Johnston's knowledge of Ms. Block's donations to the Liberal Party. Mr. Johnston noted that he believed Ms. Block had also donated to other political parties in order to support former students, but had no specifics.

Raquel Dancho (CPC) asked Mr. Johnston about the Chinese police stations and asked why this was not included in the ISR's report. Mr. Johnston noted that they are the subject of RCMP investigation and because of that, they were not included. Ms. Dancho asked about the Foreign Registry Act, and the Government's delay on introducing this. She noted that the delay would have been a well-placed criticism in his report.

Unofficial Transcript (Blues) of NSIA appearance (June 1, 2023)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE AND HOUSE AFFAIRS

NUMBER 079

1st SESSION

44th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, JUNE 1, 2023

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

(1000)

[English]

:

Good morning, everyone. I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 79 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

The committee is meeting today to study the question of privilege related to the member for and other members.

I would like to remind all members and witnesses that care must be taken with regard to the earpieces for interpretation. Please be mindful to not place your earpiece near the microphone, as this can result in feedback that may cause an acoustic shock, which could in turn cause injury to the interpreters. Basically, if you're using an earpiece, keep it in. If you're not, leave it to the side. That's probably the best way. Playing with it may not be the best option right now.

I will remind you that all comments will go through the chair. The clerk and I will maintain a consolidated speaking list.

We have with us today Ms. Jody Thomas, national security and intelligence adviser.

Ms. Thomas, you have up to five minutes to present.

I really want to thank you and your team for responding to us so quickly with your availability. I'm hoping that others hear this message, because then they will get praise. I will give you praise for responding so quickly and for being here with us this morning.

The floor is yours.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair. It is a pleasure to be here again today.

[Translation]

The committee is studying one of the most serious issues, and I am pleased to be here today to participate in that discussion. This isn't the first time the committee has invited me to appear as part of this study. The issue is evolving, as is the public debate around it.

There have been a number of important changes since my last appearance.

[English]

As you know, the independent special rapporteur issued his first report on May 23, which reached a number of conclusions.

First, the independent special rapporteur concluded that foreign governments are undoubtedly attempting to influence candidates and voters in Canada, and that while much has been done already, more remains to be done promptly to strengthen our capacity to detect, deter and counter foreign interference activities in our elections.

Indeed, the government and the intelligence agencies have communicated regularly about the pervasive, growing threat of foreign interference, and while work has been done to mitigate and counter the threat, more work is required to effectively counter the evolving threats of our adversaries.

On April 6, and the Clerk of the Privy Council submitted a report to the that outlined the progress made so far in implementing recommendations of previous reviews on foreign interference and election security and laid out a path for future actions.

This spring, Public Safety Canada launched and completed a public consultation on a foreign influence transparency registry.

Work is also well under way to develop legislative proposals to modernize legislation so that intelligence and law enforcement agencies can better detect the threat, assist Canadians in protecting themselves against it, and hold to account foreign interference actors.

In addition, the security and intelligence threats to elections—SITE—task force has begun enhanced monitoring and assessment of foreign interference threats, as four concurrent by-elections are under way.

The independent special rapporteur also concluded that there are serious shortcomings in the way intelligence is communicated and processed from security agencies through to government. We have already made a number of changes to improve how intelligence is communicated and coordinated in government.

Public Safety Canada has established a national counter-foreign interference coordinator, who will drive the government's proactive response to the threat of foreign interference.

We have also strengthened our governance. I have created a new deputy minister committee—the deputy minister committee on intelligence response—which will examine intelligence, direct appropriate response and develop related advice for the government.

In addition, the recently issued a direction that parliamentarians will be informed of threats to them, whenever possible and within the law, while protecting the integrity of investigations. The direction also calls for the Minister of Public Safety to be informed of all instances of threats to the security of Canada directed at Parliament or parliamentarians in a timely manner.

As you are aware, the work of the independent special rapporteur is being complemented by the work of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, NSICOP, and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, NSIRA, which have both undertaken reviews of foreign interference in Canada's democratic processes. The independent special rapporteur has also recommended that the confidential annex to his report be referred to NSICOP and NSIRA for their review.

We are working to support the work of these bodies and the second phase of the independent special rapporteur's mandate unreservedly. We know that further longer-term changes are required to ensure that Canada and Canadians have the tools they need to stop foreign interference. The work of this committee, as well as the continued analysis of the independent special rapporteur and the ongoing reviews of NSICOP and NSIRA, will all contribute to informing these changes.

I thank you very much and I look forward to your questions.

(1005)

:

Thank you very much.

We will now start the six-minute round with Mr. Cooper, followed by Mrs. Romanado, Madame Gaudreau and then Mrs. Blaney.

Mr. Cooper, you have the floor.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Ms. Thomas, for being here.

Through you, Madam Chair, to Ms. Thomas, we are here because of the July 20, 2021 CSIS memo that indicated that a Beijing diplomat accredited by the Liberal government was targeting a sitting member of Parliament, , by threatening to sanction his family in Hong Kong.

This memo was sent to the 's department, the PCO, and for two years, the Prime Minister did nothing. The government did nothing. The Prime Minister repeatedly claims that he first learned about this memo in The Globe and Mail. When did you learn about the memo?

:

As I said to at the time of the CSIS briefing to him, I learned about it in The Globe and Mail. I had not previously seen the report, nor had the .

:

You learned about it in The Globe and Mail and then, suddenly, after it was reported in The Globe and Mail, two more MPs, and , were briefed by CSIS that they, too, were targets of the Beijing regime.

When did the first become aware that these MPs, including the former leader of the opposition, had been targeted by Beijing?

:

The was not made aware of the targeting against or before recent events and reporting. That has been done by CSIS. CSIS has brought this forward to him in the last two to three weeks.

:

You said that the Prime Minister wasn't aware in the cases of or . What about ?

:

Or .... That is my understanding.

:

He would have learned about that, you're saying, since May 1.

:

Yes.

:

When did you become aware that and had been targeted?

:

It was in the last three to four weeks.

:

It was in the last three to four weeks, and how did you become aware of that?

:

It was through a briefing from CSIS.

:

It seems to me inconceivable that we have at least three sitting members of Parliament who were targeted by Beijing, including by an accredited diplomat, and you didn't know, and the didn't know, and only now, coincidentally, that it has been revealed in The Globe and Mail is action being taken.

How is that possible? How is that conceivable that the national security adviser, who is you, former national security advisers and the were completely in the dark about this? It seems to me, Ms. Thomas, and I'll let you respond, that this is a breakdown of the machinery of government under this Prime Minister's watch.

Would you at least agree with that?

:

Mr. Cooper, as I said previously, I wasn't here in 2021. I cannot account for the lack of information flow to the and the Prime Minister's Office, and I'm not going to speculate.

I agree that there needs to be a better management of intelligence that comes in to deputy ministers' offices, ministers' offices and the NSIA office in order to brief the Prime Minister and brief ministers.

We have taken steps to ensure that will happen, not only to brief but to provide advice on what should be done with the intelligence, because reading the intelligence is one element to this problem. Giving advice on what to do about it is the second part of the problem, and we have strengthened both of those processes.

:

Ms. Thomas, you've said that the didn't know and that you didn't know. That's not just a matter of what to do about it or how to act on it. You said that he just didn't know, except for the fact that what we do know is that in the case of , the Minister of Public Safety was emailed about it by CSIS in May 2021, but he didn't have log-in information to his email after 18 months on the job. Then this memo was sent by CSIS, not to anyone but to the PCO and specifically the Prime Minister's national security adviser.

Again, how is it that the didn't know? Why were those MPs kept in the dark, and, in the face of all of that, would you not at least concede that it is a colossal breakdown of the machinery of government under this Prime Minister's watch?

(1010)

:

As I've said, I cannot account for and I will not speculate about what went on in 2021. I know you are seeing my predecessors and I know you're speaking to CSIS. I think there was a breakdown in process—not only a breakdown in process, but I think insufficient process—and so we have rectified those problems.

:

I would submit that it's more than a breakdown in process. It is a colossal failure on the part of this that we would have three MPs who have been targeted. How many more MPs have been targeted by the Beijing regime?

:

CSIS will speak to you about their holdings when they're here.

:

Are those MPs going to be briefed, or are we going to find out about it in The Globe and Mail and then be briefed?

:

I think it's very clear from the direction given by the , and the ministerial directive from to CSIS and to the other intelligence agencies in his portfolio, that the expectation is, yes, MPs will be briefed on the totality of the holdings against them, regardless of the depth, the severity and the reliability of those holdings. Members of Parliament who are in the holdings of CSIS will be getting very thorough briefs.

:

Thank you.

Madam Romanado, go ahead.

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Through you, I'd like to thank Ms. Thomas for being here and for coming back to PROC.

We've been hearing a bit about the process by which information flows and the amount of intelligence that someone in your position as national security and intelligence adviser would receive. At a macro level, how much intelligence would actually come to your team every day?

:

Our security agencies collect somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 pieces of intelligence, sovereign intelligence, a month. That's then compounded and multiplied by the intelligence we receive from Five Eyes.

I have a reading file in which I follow very specific issues. Obviously, I follow what is going on in Ukraine. I follow what is going on in China and foreign interference. I have a reading package put together for me, based on either subjects or geopolitics, or where we have, for example, Canadian Armed Forces troops stationed. My reading package on any given day can be somewhere between 50 and 100 pieces of intelligence. Sometimes it's smaller. Sometimes it's larger. There's no regularity to it.

Some pieces of intelligence that are sent to me in PCO only I can read, and then I make the determination on who it will go to. We are working to ensure that when there are pieces that must be seen by somebody, the client relations officers who work in departments for CSE and distribute intelligence make sure that the intelligence is seen and that it is acknowledged that it has been seen. I think that was a breakdown in process previously, that it was not seen.

:

Perhaps you could walk us through this. You receive intelligence that can be very vast with respect to anything with respect to our Canadian Armed Forces, with issues abroad or with domestic issues as well. How is that packaged and gotten to you? What kind of apparatus is sending you this kind of information? We know that obviously it's CSIS and CSE, but are you receiving it from multiple parties? How does that get to you in terms of your package?

:

There are people who are certainly far more capable of explaining the system to you, because they work in the system. Essentially, it is put into a system called Slingshot, or it is sent through a TS or secret method to certain addressees. In my case, it is printed for me. I can access it myself, but generally it's printed for me. I get a reading package every day, and I read that package.

There is a range of types of pieces of intelligence. We can get assessed pieces. The intelligence assessment branch in PCO does assessed pieces. That means they take the raw intelligence and they use the techniques they've been taught and the analytical methodology that they refine here in Canada and with Five Eyes to tell us what the raw intelligence means.

We also get single-source, uncorroborated pieces that say that X may have happened.

The intelligence agencies keep all of that. Their holdings are substantial. What they share is not everything that is in their holdings. It is critical to understand that they try to ensure that senior leaders in the intelligence and security world are aware of what they're capturing and they identify its credibility. They'll say, “We think you need to know this, but it's not yet credible.” That will become the basis for potentially more reporting. It builds a dossier on any particular file or person.

It is rare that a piece of intelligence is a smoking gun. It is a story. It is built over time. It requires analysis and judgment on what to do with it.

(1015)

:

Thank you so much.

In that regard, it's like a puzzle piece. You have a small piece of the puzzle, so what may be interesting at first glance may not be a situation in which it needs to move up.

I'm assuming that when we have the other witnesses coming, we can ask them to explain to us how that judgment is made for when that meets the level of needing to send this up to the next level. I'm assuming they are making those decisions based on the little pieces of the puzzle they have and once they have a more accurate picture...unless of course, as you said, there is something very significant, very credible and very imminent that would require immediate attention.

Would that be correct?

:

Yes, I think that's a very good summary of how the system works.

What we have now done, based on the 's direction, is ensure that anything that mentions foreign interference and an MP gets briefed up, regardless of its credibility or how confident we are in the reporting.

We also then take that intelligence and ask CSIS or CSE for what else they have on that particular thread, to try to build a bigger picture and give advice to the government. Sometimes that advice will be that there is nothing to do yet. Sometimes that advice is that we should not brief yet. Other times it will be that they think we need to take action.

:

That's something new that you've just put in place. Is that correct?

:

Yes, that's correct.

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

:

Thank you.

Madame Gaudreau.

[Translation]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I just heard that the gave a direction. One has to wonder why we are here, despite the measures put in place to try to increase the flow of intelligence.

What direction did the Prime Minister give regarding the level for alerting members? I'd like to know more. You may not have had a chance to talk about that during our first two meetings.

[English]

:

The , I think, was quite unequivocal. He directed the intelligence agencies to ensure that MPs are briefed and that he is to be briefed on any information and intelligence that is received about foreign interference that targets a member of Parliament.

then further put that into a formal document that is called a ministerial directive. The ministerial directive tells CSIS that regardless of the credibility of the threat, if there is something that comes in on an MP, he is to be briefed and that MP is to be briefed.

[Translation]

:

Am I to understand that's how it will work going forward, but that it didn't work that way previously?

[English]

:

Yes, absolutely. That is going to happen from now on.

It wasn't the case previously, because there is a range of information that comes in. Some of it isn't credible. It is concerning. It would worry the MP, if they were told.

I think the lesson learned out of this is that early reporting is better, even if the piece of intelligence that has arrived is not a credible piece or cannot be verified.

(1020)

[Translation]

:

I fully appreciate that between 3,000 and 4,000 reports or memos come in a month, as you said, but what I'm finding out today is deeply troubling. We thought the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs had better things to do, but it turns out that the work we are doing is extremely important.

Previously, communication and reports weren't handled the same way. All the witnesses the committee heard from talked about the epidemic of over-classification by Canada's intelligence agencies, even describing it as a culture within the intelligence community. In fact, we are only talking about it now because someone was brave enough to bring it to the media's attention. Otherwise, we wouldn't be trying to put things right as we speak.

How did we get to this point? I'm giving you an opportunity to answer frankly, in order to restore people's confidence.

[English]

:

I would say, first and foremost, that the evaluation of the panel of five, based on the information given to the SITE task force—the two post-election reviews, the work done by NSICOP and the analysis by the independent special rapporteur—assures us that the elections were free, open and safe, and that the outcome of the elections should not be questioned. I think that's really important.

In terms of informing the , ministers and relevant MPs about particular pieces of intelligence.... Previously, CSIS has been very strict in interpreting their act about defensive briefings and threat reduction measures. has given them very stringent direction about how they are to move forward. I think that is reassuring.

[Translation]

:

We now know that at least three of our fellow members were targeted, and that's why we are here today. Is it not? We are here to consider a question of privilege related to the intimidation campaign against the member for . Something was done because it came out publicly.

That makes me think that, ultimately, the government wasn't able to adequately protect parliamentarians before. Do you agree?

[English]

:

First, it's an important point that you're making. It's important to note that the physical security of any of these MPs has not been in question, and there is no physical threat.

I understand completely that the information that has been leaked to the media, or now briefed to members of Parliament, is shocking and disturbing to hear. It should not have happened in this manner. I acknowledge that.

I cannot speak about what happened previously. We are going forward in a completely different direction, which I think will assist the government, all members of Parliament and all Canadians in understanding the threat that is foreign interference and how we are going to deal with it. It will be through more transparency and more discussion about what is actually happening.

[Translation]

:

Were you missing something in order to do your job and better understand the reports or threats themselves?

Our last witnesses talked about the large volume of information and the way it was analyzed to identify what required urgent or more urgent attention.

Were you missing something, or on the contrary, were you told that, because there was so much information, it was necessary to focus on what was most serious?

[English]

:

I think what is important to note is that we should not be relying on any single individual to read intelligence and decide it's going to move up, and that if it's not read by that individual, it falls by the side of the table. If I miss my reading package for one day because I'm travelling, that should not mean that information is not shared with the Clerk of the Privy Council, ministers or the .

We now have a more robust process to ensure that actionable intelligence and non-actionable intelligence, particularly in the foreign interference space, are discussed and moved to ministers, the Clerk and potentially the and the Prime Minister’s Office—not only the raw intelligence, but advice on what to do about it.

(1025)

[Translation]

:

Thank you.

[English]

Mrs. Blaney.

:

Thank you, Chair. I thank you, Ms. Thomas, for being here with us today.

I'm listening and really trying to wrap my head around this, because this is incredibly serious. The impacts are profoundly concerning. The way in which people are learning and the timeline on which they are learning are highly concerning. I think when we look at this whole process, what I'm seeing is an increase of distrust in Canadians and parliamentarians. I think, hopefully, that's something we would want to see avoided.

I just have to go back to a couple of things. You're saying that the and you only found out about this two or three weeks ago. Then you're saying that now we are strengthening the process of intelligence receiving, reviewing and providing advice.

Are you really telling me that this was completely broken, and in two or three weeks you fixed the problem? That's what it sounds like to me. I just can't put that together. Can you explain how that works?

It just doesn't make sense, because if it was this simple to fix, then why on earth was it not fixed earlier? Why are we here today?

If you could explain that, it would be very helpful to me.

:

As I said, I was not in this job in 2021. I was the deputy minister of national defence. In July 2021, I was most concerned about Afghanistan. I didn't read the intelligence on foreign interference. As I said, everybody has their reading packages, and there are things that are relevant to them.

As the national security and intelligence adviser, I certainly have to have a broader view and see different and more intelligence than I did in the past.

What my predecessors did.... They will be here. You will have to speak to them.

My observation, even before the foreign interference issues were in the press and were a priority discussion, is that we collect and assess a lot of intelligence. What we don't do a good job of is giving advice to government. The intelligence agencies don't give advice. The deputy ministers give advice to ministers, to the Clerk of the Privy Council and to the . I felt that was a gap. We were moving forward on, for example, advice on what to do on intelligence that we saw on Ukraine, in a different way. It wasn't significantly different from what I've described to you in terms of assessing the intelligence—deputy ministers and the chief of the defence staff, in the case of Ukraine, having a discussion about what the intelligence means and what the government should do with it. What you do with it is the critical part of intelligence.

Sometimes the answer is nothing, because you need to continue collecting, because you need to investigate further. Sometimes it is—

:

I'm sorry. I have only a few more minutes.

I guess that your answer is, yes, we've fixed the problem. I'm really interested in seeing how that works. I don't know if you're going to tell us as clearly as I was hoping you would.

You keep saying as well that you can account...and I hear that the folks previously in this role will be here for us.

My question to you, then, is this. When you arrived on the scene, did you have discussions with your predecessor? When you had those discussions, was there no moment where there were discussions about intelligence and how it might be impacting parliamentarians? There were no concerns brought forward to you. Did you just come with a clean slate, and all of a sudden these things erupted?

I'm hoping you can clarify that.

:

The director of CSIS certainly spoke to me about foreign interference, and not only threats against parliamentarians, but foreign interference writ large. These sorts of activities that are taken on by adversaries are much broader than just elections.

:

I understand that, but we're actually talking about a point of privilege, so I think it's important that we stay clear on that.

Was there any passing on...? Again, it feels like this was a bit of a surprise. Emails were sent out to ministers. They didn't know how to open the emails.

It's just so confusing, but the impacts are profound. It does create a sense of distrust. I think when we look at this, perception matters. We can debate a whole bunch about what this and that means, but perception matters. In our systems right now, parliamentarians are feeling concerned that they don't know. I remember asking a question several weeks ago in which I said that I could happily be walking down the street doing my job as a member of Parliament, as a candidate in an election. I could be targeted, and no one would tell me.

How do you fight something that you don't know is happening to you? What I'm trying to understand is how this got left behind. How is it that all of these things have happened? They've been reported in the media. We can talk about the source of those reports and where they're coming from, but the real issue for me is why this was not caught as an issue.

Why do we have to be here? How are we going to fix it moving forward but also take accountability for the history?

(1030)

:

I think everything you are saying is very important, and I don't disagree with it.

I would not characterize it as ministers being unable to open their email. The top secret email system means we deliver email to them. That's a responsibility of the public service.

The transparency with which we need to speak to parliamentarians is evident. I would say that CSIS has been limited by their act. They are not able to share all their intelligence, except through a formal threat reduction measure. They are now using those more aggressively than they have in the past.

:

Thank you.

Mr. Cooper is next, followed by Mr. Turnbull, Madame Gaudreau and Mrs. Blaney.

Go ahead, Mr. Cooper.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. Thomas—through you, Madam Chair—on May 3, two days after The Globe and Mail reported that had been a target of the Beijing regime and that CSIS had been aware of this, the told reporters that “CSIS made the determination that it wasn't something that needed to be raised to a higher level, because it wasn't a significant enough concern.”

We know that statement isn't true. Why did the Prime Minister say that?

:

In the early days of our understanding what the scenario was and the intelligence that led to the document written in July 2021, which referenced an MP.... It did not reference . Nonetheless, it talked about an MP being targeted. We were not aware that the underlying intelligence had been moved from CSIS into the system and distributed. It was an error in terms of the information provided to the .

:

Did you tell the that?

:

Yes.

:

Did you specifically tell him it had not been raised to a higher level?

:

I told him it had not been briefed to him and that I didn't know what had left CSIS.

:

Well, that's very different from what the said. He didn't say he wasn't briefed. He didn't say he didn't know where it went. He made a very specific declaration that it had not been raised. He said more than that.

Again, why did he not state what, in fact, happened? Why did he mislead Canadians?

:

Madam Chair, I don't think that's an appropriate question.

:

I think it is an appropriate question. Canadians have a right to know why it is that the would make such a statement, when it has turned out to be patently false.

:

I think the reflected the information he had at the time. He told us to keep working. He organized a meeting with , and we briefed Mr. Chong.

:

Yes, and suddenly, 24 hours later, you called and advised him—contrary to what the had said only 24 hours earlier—that it wasn't so and that, in fact, the memo had gone to PCO, specifically to the then national security adviser to the Prime Minister.

What happened between the 's making the very affirmative statement that it had not been raised to a higher level and your phone call to , in which you said, in fact, that it was exactly the opposite of what the Prime Minister said?

:

Madam Chair, , in his briefing, asked me whether the memo had been distributed and who received it. I told him I did not yet know. Upon finishing the review of where it had gone, I briefed the and returned the call to Mr. Chong, as I'd promised I would.

(1035)

:

What did you find out, and how did you find that out?

:

We traced all the addresses. We found out who it had been sent to and tried to determine why it had not been briefed up.

:

Upon tracing all the addresses, you discovered it had gone to the national security adviser. Is that correct?

:

We did.

:

Who else did it go to?

:

As I told , it went to several deputy ministers. It's incumbent upon the deputy ministers to brief those ministers.

:

It went to several deputy ministers. Which deputy ministers...?

:

It was the deputy minister of public safety, the deputy minister of foreign affairs and the deputy minister of national defence.

:

It went to three deputy ministers, plus the 's national security adviser.

:

That's right.

:

That happened in 2021—

:

Yes.

:

—and it went nowhere.

:

That is correct.

:

Do you want Canadians to believe that?

:

Madam Chair, I don't think the integrity of my statements here and what I said to are in question. It is absolute fact that the memo was distributed, and it was not briefed to the .

:

Was it shared with any ministers?

:

Not that I am aware of.

:

Well, you were a deputy minister.

:

I was. I was on leave in July 2021 when it was sent to my office. When I got back, I focused on Afghanistan. It was not put in front of me.

:

Whom did it go to in your office?

:

No one, it was—

:

It went into a black hole.

:

That's right.

:

Is that your answer?

:

I was not briefed. I told you there was a flaw in the process. We've corrected that.

:

A big flaw.

:

I'm going to take a minute, because I think we do pretty decently, but then there's this giving the question and giving the answer.

I think we invited someone here today who comes with a really serious role, at least for me, so Ms. Thomas, your time and your being here means a lot to me and, I think, to most members.

I would say that, when we ask a question and we say we're going to give them time to answer, then we give them time to answer; we don't provide them the answer.

From the best I know, Mr. Cooper, you are not in the role that Ms. Thomas occupies, and she is here today to provide us the insights we have asked for.

:

Madam Chair, I respect Ms. Thomas, but she is in a very serious role, and what we're dealing with is a very serious matter. I'm posing serious questions, and I think that's quite appropriate.

:

I think you let her answer; you don't provide her answers for her.

Thank you.

Mr. Turnbull, the floor is yours.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thanks, Ms. Thomas, for being here again today. We appreciate your participating in this important, ongoing study.

I have numerous lines of questioning, but before I get into some of them, I want to clarify something. What you've said to date is that there's a new directive from the that's leading to essentially more thorough briefs being given to MPs when they or their families may be under threat. That sounds like there's a change in process there. I'm repeating back to you what you've said, if I have it correctly.

You're now briefing MPs on those threats, whether they're credible or not, whether the information has been verified or not, whether it's a complete picture or not and whether it requires any action on their part or anybody else's part. Is that correct?

:

Yes, that is the approach we're trying to take. It requires some trust, because the investigations that are going on with regard to some of this intelligence mean that sources can be compromised, so we are trusting that when the information is shared, it is not then made public by the member of Parliament.

:

There's a responsibility that goes along with sharing that level of information and a level of trust that you're pointing to that's important, and I would agree with that. With the disclosure of information comes responsibility, and I think it's a pretty important one when dealing with national security, so I appreciate that.

I also appreciate that members of Parliament would appreciate that information—I know I would if I were in 's shoes—and I think you've acknowledged that.

One flip side of this is that if information and threats are not credible, do you worry that there's a risk that members of Parliament would then feel threatened in a situation that has been uncorroborated? Essentially, you are letting them know about a threat that is not real, and that could psychologically and emotionally impact them and the way they do their work.

(1040)

:

It's a really important point. I think the clarification would be about the word “threat”. That a foreign government is speaking about a particular member of Parliament doesn't necessarily mean that there is a threat against them, and I think the criticality here is going to be how CSIS briefs the information.

I think that as we get into a process where we are more transparent, this will become less frightening and less worrisome. There will be some situations, as we have learned with , for example, when it is more serious, but for the majority of parliamentarians, if there is a brief to them, I hope that, through practice, through transparency and through this being a bit more routine—certainly not an everyday event, but a more routine kind of briefing—if we give it to an MP, we will be able to reduce the amount of anxiety it causes.

:

Thank you.

We've heard from Mr. Johnston's report...and you've acknowledged fully that the coordination of information and communication is a challenge and there are some shortcomings, and that you're already moving to address those in implementing new processes, which I appreciate.

I also appreciate, based on your other testimony, given the questions from Ms. Romanado, that there are vast amounts of intelligence, that there are numerous agencies involved, that there is a funnel of information that's quite large, and that not all of it is always shared with you—CSIS has a lot of it that it may sit on for a while.

I'm wondering how you see your office's relationship with the 's Office and how information is ideally supposed to flow to the Prime Minister's Office.

:

I think it's an important element of this process. The can receive intelligence through the reading package of the issues that he is tracking. That would go to the Prime Minister's Office. It is shared with him. As Katie Telford said, intelligence is not held back from him. If there is something in particular that I feel he needs to see, that a fellow deputy minister or agency head feels he needs to see or that the Clerk of the Privy Council determines that he should see, then we ensure it is put in front of him via his office.

:

Thank you.

Next is Madame Gaudreau.

:

Is that the end of my time, Madam Chair?

:

Yes, it is, Mr. Turnbull. It went quickly.

:

It did.

Thank you, Ms. Thomas.

[Translation]

:

Go ahead, Ms. Gaudreau.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'd like to again discuss the culture within Canada's intelligence community, specifically within the Prime Minister's Office.

Are people outside the Prime Minister's Office who have expertise able to understand all the raw intelligence you have to sift through in order to identify what is really serious? I'd like to know, because my sense is that something in between is missing. It's coming to light that there was an empty space, a gaping hole, and now you're trying to fix it.

I'd like to hear your views on that.

[English]

:

Thank you.

I think what's important to note is that senior members in the 's Office have daily reading packages on daily intelligence, similar to mine, generally on geopolitics—where we have troops stationed, points of interest in terms of the Prime Minister's international work—the same as every G7 leader.

Specific with FI—foreign interference—what has not happened and is now happening is that the unverified pieces of intelligence, or the unnamed sources or the unnamed individuals, are now being shared with him in a more regular manner.

The 's Office gets reading packages. They're put together by the client relations officers. It's the same process everybody follows. They also get weekly briefings by a group that works for me—the intelligence assessment secretariat in PCO—and either they will have a weekly brief on a range of issues or they will ask for a curated package on a specific issue.

(1045)

[Translation]

:

I have just a few seconds left.

What wasn't that information systematically identified before, when it's being done now?

[English]

:

Again, I can't speculate on previous practice, and you will hear from my predecessors.

In my opinion and per the direction of the , he wants to be briefed, period, whether it is credible or not, and so he will be provided that information.

:

Thank you.

Mrs. Blaney is next.

:

Thank you, Chair.

I want to go back to the discussion we had about the fact that you gave the example of being away on leave for a month and there was information and nobody was there to read it, so it was a bit of a black hole. I'm just wondering if you could explain if that's been remedied, if there's a process in place to remedy it, but also, is that not an issue of security in itself? Was that not something that was sort of concerning when you came back after being gone for a period of time, and you saw, oh, there's this stuff...?

I understand what you're saying. There are big things happening all over the world, and you have to respond, and Afghanistan was hot, but you don't know what's hot in what's left that hasn't been read, so I'm just trying to understand.... Was that not something that was concerning about security? Again—

[Translation]

:

I have a point of order, Madam Chair.

Sorry, but the interpretation isn't coming through anymore.

[English]

:

Thank you.

Is it working now? Can you hear what I'm saying now? It works again.

I think it's fair that Ms. Blaney go from the top. Thank you.

:

Well, hopefully you got most of that question, but I know that my friend did not, so I will repeat it.

I'm just trying to get clarification. What we heard from your testimony is that you were on leave for a month. During that time there was information provided, and it sort of fell into a black hole. I acknowledged that when you returned there were important things happening in the world that, of course, were brought to your attention.

My concern is that when things are left behind, isn't that an issue, potentially, of national security? If nobody is reading, the group isn't reading, so that you can draw attention to things, that's concerning to me.

I also want to know if that has been remedied, or if you're in the process of remedying that. How are you doing that?

:

I think that's a really important question.

Number one, there should be, as I said previously, no single point of failure in terms of intelligence. That's why we are now bringing critical intelligence to deputy ministers to analyze and to give advice on.

That piece of intelligence, in July 2021, named the only people who could read it, so the deputy minister of defence was the only person in defence who could read it. That's different from “must” read. Sometimes there are pieces of intelligence of which the collectors—CSIS or CSE generally, sometimes the RCMP, sometimes CFINTCOM—say, “No, you must read this,” and then it's put in front of me.

That particular piece of intelligence was less pertinent to my job as the deputy minister of defence. I was the only one in the department who could read it, but it wasn't necessary for me to read it in order to function as the deputy minister of defence. There is a difference there.

:

Then what I'm hearing you say to me is that things can get lost. That's what worries me. Again, I go back to that point. We're talking about a point of privilege for a member of this place who did not know the circumstances in which he was living. Really, that's how I perceive it. There are other names that are being added to this list.

It wasn't pertinent for you, so where is the stopgap to make sure that nothing falls through? Again, what I'm hearing is that we have a black hole. If nobody says we must read it, then the black hole will continue, and one day, hopefully, somebody will figure it out.

:

Thank you.

That's not exactly what I said. I said we have fixed this going forward. For particular pieces of intelligence that reference members of Parliament.... That one in July did not mention by name. Going forward, when there is a reference to a member of Parliament, it will be brought to the attention of the deputy minister community. It will be read by me, or whoever is acting for me, and by other deputy ministers. It will be discussed, and a plan on what to do about it, going forward, will be made. That will often include informing the MP about the situation. It certainly includes informing ministers and the , per their direction.

(1050)

:

Thank you.

We will now go to Mr. Calkins, followed by Monsieur Fergus.

Mr. Calkins.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair, and through you, thank you, Ms. Thomas, for being here today.

I want to talk a bit about Zhao Wei. When did the first become aware that Zhao Wei was the accredited diplomat at Beijing's Toronto consulate, and that he was the diplomat involved in the foreign interference activities?

:

I can't give you a precise date. In the analysis and the discussion of the information regarding , it came to light that there was a particular individual. I would have to go look at my notes to give you an exact date.

:

Would you be able to provide that to the committee after you leave today?

:

I would be able to provide you with the date on which it was discussed by me. I can't tell you if it was discussed previously.

:

Thank you.

We know that Zhao Wei was targeting a sitting member of Parliament and his family. He was spying on Chinese Canadians.

The Globe and Mail reported, on May 12, 2023, that CSIS was providing information to Global Affairs on Zhao Wei's activities as early as 2020. In the same report, Dan Stanton, a former manager in counter-intelligence at CSIS, said that this information would have been shared with the Privy Council Office.

Why was it only when The Globe and Mail reported that Zhao Wei was targeting Michael Chong and his family that the government saw fit to expel Zhao Wei?

:

I think that question is best directed to 抖淫视频.

:

It looks a lot to me like it's political damage control. It's very hard for me to believe, Ms. Thomas—and maybe you can shed some light on this—that only one accredited diplomat from Beijing is currently acting in this way. Are you aware and can you tell this committee of any other diplomats who are behaving in this way?

:

I don't think I can speak about that in this open forum.

:

Illegal police stations.... The government has made a claim, as well.... We've already heard Mr. Cooper talk about the fact that the made a claim that we knew a day later was actually not true. It seemed like he made a statement that he was fully aware that information wasn't passed up and then was trying to lead Canadians to believe that he actually didn't know. He made a very specific statement about something, and then he said as his defence a day later, when it turned out to be false, that he didn't know.

We see the same pattern happening here with illegal police stations. The government has said that they have shut down. The has appeared before this committee and actually said that the police stations have shut down. We learned almost immediately after that statement was made that there are two Beijing police stations still operating in Canada.

You're the national security adviser. How many of these police stations are still operating in Canada? Can you tell us? The government won't tell us.

:

There are continual investigations by the RCMP into the police stations. We are aware of two in Montreal, and work is being done to ensure that they cease to operate. Unfortunately, they're not police stations. They're often staffed and managed by Canadian citizens, and what we have to do is shut down their activities.

:

If they are conducting United Front operations, whether they're using Canadian citizens or not in their employment.... Are you saying that because of who they're using in their employment, they're not running a covert police station in Canada?

:

I'm saying that sometimes the individuals who are working these are unwitting, coerced or forced.

:

It that sometimes, or is that what's actually happening? I don't mean to interrupt you, but is that what is actually happening, Ms. Thomas?

:

Every situation is different. There is no one pattern.

The tools used by the RCMP to shut down the police stations, reduce their impact and reduce their credibility are different in every situation and every scenario. There would be value in our ability to arrest people for them, and those investigations are under way by the RCMP.

(1055)

:

Early in your presentation, you made a statement about—and we can refer to the document that the has made—where there's been a change in directive. The directive has been issued now that parliamentarians are to be made aware if there is any foreign influence intelligence that they should be advised of. However, you didn't say anything at all about political parties and the infiltration of political parties. I don't see the directive from the government on that at all. Is there going to be, or am I unaware of, a directive whereby political parties will be informed of any infiltration into either their nomination processes or their financing mechanisms?

:

In terms of their financing mechanisms, I think that belongs with Elections Canada as opposed to the national security adviser and the security committee.

:

Elections Canada would get that intelligence from you—

:

I'm sorry. The time has—

:

—would it not, Ms. Thomas?

:

It has to be actionable, so that something can be done.

The nomination process is a distinct problem that has to be examined, and I think we will have to have some significant conversations with the parties. What we have done as a first step is stand up the site process to analyze the by-elections, which is a new measure that we put in place to keep by-elections safe.

:

Thank you.

Mr. Fergus.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Ms. Thomas, for being present here today and for your service as the security intelligence adviser and previously as deputy minister of national defence.

From your testimony today, as well as from previous testimony, we've heard that everyone would agree that when information is brought in and when intelligence is brought in that is partial, sometimes it doesn't tell the whole story, and it can actually be wrong. It's laden with caveats and cautions and the like. How does one paint a complete picture to assess the information that is arriving in, admittedly, a piecemeal fashion?

:

That's a really important question.

CSIS and CSE, as I said, have significant holdings, not all of which, by a long shot, are released to officials like me. What they do is that over time, using the techniques they need to keep highly secure to protect both the methodology and sometimes individuals, they continue to collect. Often the action taken out of a single piece of intelligence is to continue to collect.

Within CSIS, they have a process where they analyze what they're going to release and what they're going to continue to investigate and just hold. I think it's fair to say that they try to release things that are pertinent to the geopolitics of the period in time, or relevant to other investigations and other concerns by government, but it is an art rather than a science.

:

I'm a bit of a public policy nerd. Going forward now, you're going to be informing the minister responsible for public security and the if any intelligence comes up that relates to a member of Parliament—or senator, I would imagine. That information, by its very nature, is going to be partial or incomplete.

When you come to me and say, “Greg, here's some information that we've collected,” I'm going to have a lot of questions. I'm wondering if you're going to provide the same caveats that you would normally provide to the member of Parliament, to say, “We've heard this, but we want you to understand that this is based on one piece of information, or perhaps two pieces of information, which we can't confirm, can't assess and don't have a complete portrait of.” Is that the kind of briefing members of Parliament and senators will receive?

:

Yes, that's a really critical element that needs to be discussed. By being more transparent, you can raise the level of anxiety, but I hope we normalize the kinds of briefings that we have with members of Parliament, whether they are caucus briefings, briefings to all parliamentarians or just individual briefings on intelligence that has been gathered. We rely on parliamentarians to keep that information protected so that investigations can continue.

:

That's a big demand. As we've seen since these partial bits of information have made their way into the media, some people have taken that as the gospel truth.

(1100)

:

There is absolutely a risk to transparency. There is a greater risk to not talking about foreign interference.

:

Going on another angle on this, can you identify some of the systemic barriers that prevent a fluid exchange of intelligence between agencies and actors? What checks and balances are going to be necessary going forward? How can we better streamline the intelligence-gathering and intelligence-sharing on a go-forward basis?

:

In terms of intelligence-gathering, I think it's important to have the agencies who collect speak to that, rather than have my observations on collection. The work that is done is difficult. It's highly technical. People put themselves at risk, and it's really important to the security of Canada that they be able to continue to do that job.

In terms of the analysis and the advice that is given based on what's been collected so that Canada's national security is protected, individuals are protected and investigations can continue, I think some of the processes we've laid out will be useful and will in fact help close some of the gaps we've seen.

We're not going to rest on that. I'm going to contract with some security experts to come in and look at our process and give us advice on how we can make it even better. I'm certainly working with my colleagues in the Five Eyes to help us improve our process, based on their experiences.

:

Thank you, Ms. Thomas.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

:

Thank you.

Ms. Thomas, we're entering into our second hour. Are you good to go? The rest of us are able to at least get up in between our rounds.

You're okay. That's perfect. If you need anything, we'll get it to you after the second hour.

We'll enter back into a six-minute round. That's best, I think, so that people can maximize their time here.

We will start with Mr. Cooper, followed by Mrs. Sahota, Madame Gaudreau and Madam Blaney.

Mr. Cooper, you have six minutes through the chair.

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Ms. Thomas—through you, Madam Chair—correct me if anything I'm saying is inaccurate. As I understand it, the July 20, 2021 memo from CSIS that indicated MPs were being targeted by a Beijing diplomat—one of those MPs being —went to you, as the deputy minister of national defence at the time. It was a “read only” for you. In other words, no other official in your department was authorized to read that memo, but you were on vacation.

Is that correct?

:

Yes.

:

Okay.

Presumably, you came back from vacation. What happened to the memo?

:

It would have been destroyed through destruction processes. It wasn't lying around as a risk. If it had been relevant to the operating of the Department of National Defence, or information we had to provide to the then minister of national defence, somebody else in the Department of National Defence would have read it and actioned it.

:

Okay. It was destroyed by the time you came back. It went to the 's then national security intelligence adviser.

What happened to the memo when it reached his desk? Did it go into a black hole, as well? Do you know?

:

No. As I said to you, I'm not going to account for what happened with my predecessors.

We know it was not presented to a national security and intelligence adviser until mid-August, for various reasons, and I don't.... That's just because of the reading packages being created.

:

Who would have been in that role?

:

At that time, David Morrison was acting in the job.

:

It didn't actually get to PCO, you're saying, for almost a month.

:

No. It arrived in PCO in July.

:

It would have arrived in July. To whom, then, did it go, and from whom did it come? I'm just trying to get an understanding of where these things go. This was a very significant memo. The information contained in it ultimately resulted in a diplomat being expelled from Canada.

Where did it go?

:

In August, it was presented to the acting national security and intelligence adviser.

(1105)

:

It was in August. Okay.

You reviewed the transmission records. Is that right?

:

We've done some forensics on what occurred.

:

Would you undertake to provide the transmission records to this committee, or at least provide—

:

I'm not sure I can call them “transmission records”. We'll provide what we have.

:

As far as where the memo went, to whom and when, on what dates—

:

Yes.

:

Thank you for that.

Do you have access to the top secret network email? Do you have your log-in credentials?

:

I have log-in credentials up to secret. Everything that is TS is presented to me.

:

Do you think it is appropriate that then minister of public safety did not see an issues management note from CSIS, sent in May 2021, which indicated that was a target of Beijing, because he didn't have his log-in information?

Do you think that's acceptable?

:

I don't think that is, in fact, what the reality is.

:

What is the reality?

:

would have been given a reading package.

What happened in the Department of Public Safety at that time, I can't speak to. You'll have to speak to the officials who were there at the time.

doesn't walk around with a secret laptop, logging into it. No minister does. We give them the information they need to read.

:

At the time of the July 2021 memo concerning Beijing targeting MPs, Mike MacDonald was the acting director. Is that correct?

:

Yes.

:

Last Thursday, a job opportunity was posted for Mike MacDonald's job within the office of the NSA.

Why did he depart your office?

:

Mike MacDonald is leaving for a different opportunity in the national security world, having done the job he is in—which is a 24-7 job—for three years.

:

Okay.

Do you agree that the failure to alert that he and his family were targets of the Beijing regime was a serious failure? Will you at least concede that point?

:

I acknowledge that should have been told.

:

Who is ultimately responsible for this failure?

:

There is no one person. There's no single point of failure. I've said that already.

:

Do you accept that the is responsible for the machinery of government?

:

I do.

:

Do you accept that the has special responsibilities when it comes to national security?

:

I do.

:

Do you accept that the has special responsibilities for the government relationship with Parliament?

:

Yes.

:

You must acknowledge, then, that this failure ultimately rests with the if that is so. Isn't that right?

:

The cannot brief parliamentarians on things he's not been told.

:

Okay, thank you.

:

Thank you.

Mrs. Sahota, you have six minutes.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Through you to the witness, I'm sure she's looked at the independent special rapporteur's report. In his report, the special rapporteur noted, “There has been too much posturing, and ignoring facts in favour of slogans,” when it comes to foreign interference.

As our most senior and non-partisan public servant on national security matters, do you believe that the polarization we're seeing right now on this topic has made your work and the work of our security agencies more challenging or more difficult?

:

I'm not sure how I'd characterize it. I think the partisan nature of the discussion we're having clouds the ability to discuss foreign interference in a mature way, as a G7 country should. I hope the work of this committee will bring to light the seriousness of foreign interference and the work that needs to be done going forward to ensure that Canada is safe from foreign interference.

:

Thank you for that. I appreciate your honesty.

It's been questioned many times what the proper forum for this is. Whether it's an independent investigation, like the special rapporteur had, or anywhere, for that matter, polarization has gotten so strong that it's been difficult to really find a venue where it doesn't exist right now. It's been challenging, even for us as members of Parliament, I think, to dig through this and get to a place, like you said, where we can discuss this in a sophisticated manner.

The Right Honourable David Johnston also wrote, “Canada requires a more sophisticated approach to national security,” and we've just realized this through the current challenges we're having.

Would you agree with that? What kinds of changes do you think should be made, other than the ones you have mentioned that have been made recently, in the weeks prior to coming here?

(1110)

:

I have outlined process changes that have been made to ensure that the material is put in front of the right decision-makers, so that decisions can be taken as to how to action intelligence. I also think that it's time, and this has been said by and others, that we have a foreign interference transparency regime, that we look at changes to the Security of Information Act and that we look at CSIS changes. The CSIS Act came into being before the Internet age and the movement of information we see now, the polarization we see now and the rise of China that we see now, so I also think that it is time to look at how we modernize CSIS to be able to respond to the threats of today.

:

Do you have some ideas, when it comes to how we could modernize? What particular changes should be made to the act, since it has been so long?

:

There are a few things, in particular.

Number one, with the foreign interference transparency regime, there need to be Criminal Code changes that make it a Criminal Code offence not to disclose. Other countries that have this same regime have taken that step, and it has given some meat and teeth to the regime itself.

In terms of CSIS, there are a few things that need to be done. CSIS cannot disclose information that is protected to other levels of government or opposition parties. That was created in its day for a reason, but I don't think it meets the need any longer. They need to be able to discuss classified information.

It would be very useful if they had a method of disclosing that somewhere between their defensive briefs—which is the kind of brief you hear from CSIS when they speak to parliamentarians about, “Here is the threat,” and they speak about it in very general terms—and the threat reduction measures, which are a very formal process, because there is a specific threat against a specific individual, for example.

There should be something in between to allow them to have more general conversations with some protected, classified material, not necessarily disclosing the totality of it but allowing them to have a conversation that is less general.

One of the things we hear from members of Parliament when they have conversations with CSIS is, “I don't really understand at this point if I'm under threat.” That's not because CSIS doesn't want to share information. It means it is limited in what it can share, so that modernization of the CSIS Act would be extraordinarily useful.

:

Your answer is very informative. I appreciate that, and I think it's very useful in enabling this committee to take some action and recommend some steps the government can take.

I don't remember whether you said there was a need to modernize NSIA as well. Do you have any comments on that?

:

I'm not sure I'm the best person to analyze what should be done with this job. In other countries, it is a job that has more authority, perhaps. PCO convenes. I don't direct the security agencies, although we are giving more direction to them now in terms of the communication flow and the dissemination and management of material.

I heard Mr. Wernick say it should be a five-year job. I'm not sure anybody should do this job for five years, again, because it's a 24-7 job, and you need to be a senior person in government to do it. That said, recommendations, I'm sure, would be appreciated.

:

We thank you for your service. We hope that you can stay well while doing it.

:

Thank you.

We'll go to Madame Gaudreau.

[Translation]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. Thomas, we certainly hope that you'll be on the job as long as possible for the sake of all the changes you're making.

The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs has been studying foreign interference since November, and I've come to three conclusions. A number of witnesses told us or confirmed that the thresholds for reporting cases of interference were much too high. They told us that there was no culture of sharing intelligence, as we talked about earlier. In any case, sharing intelligence is obviously not the mantra here, in Canada. They also told us about the chaotic manner in which the various departments and security mechanisms carry out their intelligence analysis, something we also discussed.

We want to get to the bottom of the situation and bring in legislation to protect the integrity and credibility of our democracy. This morning, we are finding out about a new protocol and new measures in order to keep the same thing from happening again. We are finding that out only because we asked the witness to appear before the committee.

I also want to talk about the culture of silence. The media are watching, and thanks to them, the public will be informed. It's a fact that two out of three people in Canada think the Chinese government is trying to interfere in our elections.

Do you think it's appropriate for parliamentarians to call for an independent public inquiry, so that you can enshrine the process you're undertaking and ultimately reassure the public?

(1115)

[English]

:

There are lots of questions there, Madam Chair.

First of all, our threshold is too high, potentially. It is something that has to be examined. Again, CSIS is limited by the act. I know the director will have a view of this for you when he is here.

The culture in the intelligence community is to protect information and to continue to collect more information. I think that changes to the CSIS act, working with RCMP, perhaps, and the ability to move intelligence from intelligence to evidence will aid in our ability to do something of consequence with this intelligence.

I don't agree with chaos as a characterization. There are some extraordinarily good, analytical minds working on intelligence analysis in CSIS, CSE, the Privy Council Office and other departments. What we do with that analysis is where we need to raise our level of sophistication and our level of clarity.

I agree that we need to speak more about national security. We have to do it in a manner that is transparent, clear and understandable in French, English and other languages. We are not good at that, because we are protecting information all the time. That leads to my concern about a public inquiry. There would be very little more than what I've said here today that I would be able to say in a public inquiry. The Security of Information Act protects it. Protecting the sources of the intelligence is critical. Protecting the techniques in terms of how we collect intelligence is critical.

I think, with the hearings that Mr. Johnston has recommended and will be undertaking, it's really important that they be as open and transparent as possible with stakeholders, with diaspora communities and with you, about what the next steps are.

I think an inquiry could mean that we are examining this rather than moving forward with change. I think we have an opportunity right now to make change in how we do things that would be very important to the national security discussion and the level of understanding and sophistication of Canadians about national security issues.

[Translation]

:

I just want to clarify something, Madam Chair. When I referred to chaos, I really meant chaos. I wasn't characterizing the expertise of the people doing the analysis. Rather, I was referring to a missing link, a void, information that's overlooked because someone is taking a well-deserved vacation, as was the case for the witness. When people hear that, they think two things: one, changes are needed, and two, the general public needs to be made aware.

I'm a member of Parliament, and even I don't know what's going on right now. That is why I am making this appeal. It's only right for us to want to see this through and call for an independent public inquiry so we can get to the bottom of what's going on. My constituents tell me that they know what's going to happen and that nothing will change when it's all said and done. That is deeply troubling. There's going to be another election, and it's not four years away. I am deeply concerned.

I'm going to use my last few seconds to ask you a question. You'll be going on vacation again soon, so what are you going to do to make sure nothing goes wrong while you're gone?

(1120)

[English]

:

Again, if the intelligence that had been received when I was on vacation was pertinent to how we did our job in defence, it would have been actioned.

There is a difference between “must read” and “may read”, and that's really important to understand. I am being transparent with you when I say I was on that list in July 2021.

I think it's important for Canadians to understand that the work done by our security agencies and senior public servants, through the SITE committee and the panel of five, to ensure that elections are safe and sound is critical. It also has concluded that there was no—

I'm sorry, Madam Chair. I'll conclude. I will say that cleared parliamentarians in NSICOP have access to this material. NSICOP should be listened to and used to the benefit of all parliamentarians.

:

Thank you.

Mrs. Blaney is next.

:

Thank you, Chair.

You mentioned earlier that Mr. Wernick had suggested that the government should legislate the position, and you said that you thought that five years might be a little too long, which is fine.

You also spoke about how other countries give this role a bit more authority. I think, when Mr. Wernick was talking about this, he was talking about a higher level of accountability, especially in the giving and receiving of information, which seems to have a bit of a gap within the system.

If you look at what other countries are doing—and I expect that you're focusing on our Five Eyes partners—what kind of change in this role would you see making sense for us, moving forward?

:

I would like to say, first of all, that I am accountable, and I take my accountability very seriously. If there is a failure—

:

I'm sorry, but I want to interrupt you on that. I apologize. I'm not talking about your accountability.

I think what Mr. Wernick was saying was that by legislating it, there would be a formal process of accountability that would track the exchange between information given and how it's received. One of the challenges we are hearing very clearly, from your testimony today and from other people's testimony, is that sometimes things don't go where they're supposed to go, and that's causing this problem.

You're also saying that you're working very diligently to fix that issue. I want to make it clear that I'm not calling you personally into question about accountability. That can be a conversation for another day.

What I'm trying to get, firmly, is what we need to have within the role you now fill so that we have some accountability that we can measure. Right now, it feels like we're trying to get to a moving target, instead of having something very clear and precise, so that accountability can be there.

I hope that helps you.

:

It does. Thank you.

Deputy ministers have accountability as accounting officers in the department. That is, of course, different in the Privy Council Office, because the Clerk is the senior public servant. In my role, I think that more ability to direct within the national security community would be useful.

The Privy Council operates under Crown prerogative. There's a whole series of things that need to be examined, and the Clerk has directed us to look at it.

After hearing Mr. Wernick's comments, I have not yet given it perhaps the thought it needs, as he said this just two days ago. I'd be happy to discuss it in the future with you, once we've had a chance to look at the range of options for what the structure of this job should be.

I will note that the announced yesterday a deputy national security and intelligence adviser, so that we are able to operate at both the tactical level and the strategic level.

(1125)

:

Thank you.

You mentioned—and I just want to clarify—during your initial testimony that there will be new staff coming in for intelligence review and to provide advice. That seems to be one of the gaps. That advice has not necessarily been provided.

I'm trying to understand the structure better. Is this your team? Is it expanding the people who work with you directly? How does that relationship work? Again, I'm coming back to how we measure the accountability.

It is unclear, because of the way the information is being shared, where information is going, when it arrives, who sees it, and why they don't see it. I'm wondering, is this going to work, and is it working as a team, and what role do you play within that team?

:

Yes, intelligence collection, dissemination and analysis in Canada, and with all of our Five Eyes allies, is a team sport. Various agencies collect, analyze and make determinations about that intelligence.

In my team, we have directed what information needs to come to deputy ministers for discussion and advice, so that it is not, as I said, a single point of failure when something isn't briefed, and that it is not only one person's view of what we should do with that intelligence.

We've also recently—today—given direction to agencies and collectors of intelligence on how it will be disseminated and logged in terms of who has read it. There's an accountability framework that we're putting in place for the individuals who are named who should read a piece of intelligence to ensure that they have or have not...and so that we have a weekly report that tells us who's reading, who isn't, and what has happened to that particular document.

It is a system that has operated for years, and we're bringing more structure to it.

:

Thank you for that.

One of the things we're trying to figure out.... I understand now that you're saying MPs will be briefed immediately. My question is around the threshold level. We've heard again and again that sometimes the threshold level is far too high and it doesn't really meet the needs that we have within our systems.

I'm wondering, with MPs now being briefed immediately, does that mean you're changing the threshold, or is it specifically just for this? How are you going to manage educating members of Parliament and other parliamentarians about how to receive this information in a way that is helpful to them?

:

If I said “immediately”, I apologize. They will be briefed, but there will be a period of analysis about what can be briefed and what should be said. The threshold can be too high, and that's a limitation within the CSIS Act. As I said, there is work to be done on that front.

The education element that you raised is, I think, the most critical in all of this. We do not brief members of Parliament frequently enough on national security issues, foreign inference and their own threats.

You saw yesterday an article in the CBC about ministerial security and public official security. It's not just ministers, by a long shot.

Another thing that we don't talk about enough is the physical threats to members of Parliament.

We are embarking upon a transparency regime to share more information and to talk about this differently in Canada.

:

Thank you.

:

We will now go to Mr. Berthold.

[Translation]

After him will be Mrs. Romanado.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Good morning, Ms. Thomas.

Ms. Thomas, my fellow member Mr. Cooper asked you earlier who was ultimately responsible for the failure to alert Michael Chong that he was being targeted? If I'm not mistaken, this is what you said:

[English]

no one person is responsible for the failure.

Is that correct?

:

I'm sorry. I didn't hear the last part.

:

You said that no one person is responsible for the failure.

Is that correct?

:

I said, “There's no single point of failure.”

[Translation]

:

I've heard that before, Ms. Thomas.

I represent the riding of Mégantic—L'Érable, the site of the Lac鈥慚égantic disaster that cost 47 people their lives. After extensive study and analysis, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada determined that the process had been riddled with mistakes, but no one ultimately took responsibility for all of those failures.

How has the situation in the country come to this? No one has the courage to accept responsibility for their failures.

[English]

:

I will say that if a lack of information flow to the were to happen while I'm the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, it is my accountability.

I will not speak to what happened in the past, but I can speak about what happens during my tenure working for the Clerk of the Privy Council and the .

(1130)

[Translation]

:

Nevertheless, you do acknowledge that, ultimately, certain individuals are responsible for these failures. Imagine if something had happened to Mr. Chong or his family when he was unaware of the threats against him. We would all feel very guilty today for not doing something.

[English]

:

If the intelligence collected had indicated that there was going to be imminent action, would have been briefed under the CSIS Act threat reduction measures.

Should he have been briefed on the information that was available at the time? I think the conclusion now is yes. There was no physical threat to him, and I want to make that very clear. That doesn't mean this is not serious.

[Translation]

:

However, we can't assume there was no such threat. We can't assume that CSIS has access to every measure that's employed or every discussion that takes place on foreign soil.

[English]

:

Absolutely. That is why the direction from is quite clear that MPs are to be briefed.

[Translation]

:

Don't you think an inquiry should be held to determine who exactly did not do their job?

[English]

:

I think you will be hearing from my predecessors. You need to ask them what their logic was in the moment and at the time that these reports came forward.

I think it is critical—before we leap to conclusions that there was negligence—that you hear from them on why they made the decisions they did in that moment.

[Translation]

:

I heard the same thing regarding the Lac鈥慚égantic tragedy, so that's why I'm worried, Ms. Thomas.

I want to pick up the discussion on Beijing's secret police stations. You acknowledged earlier that two secret police stations were operating in Montreal. I'm having a lot of trouble understanding why the Minister of Public Safety stated on April 27 that the police stations had been shut down when they were still active. The member tried to find out how many secret police stations were operating or had been operating in the country, and you said two, but the discussion ended with Montreal.

Are there others operating elsewhere in the country?

The Journal de Montréal painted a clear picture showing that police stations were operating in Toronto and Vancouver. Are those police stations still active?

[English]

:

My understanding, as of today, is that the ones that had been operating in Toronto and Vancouver are no longer operating.

[Translation]

:

Do you know whether members of the Chinese diaspora are still being monitored by police officers, diplomats or people with diplomatic protection who are still on the job? Yes or no?

[English]

:

I do not have any further information about police stations. New information could come to light as soon as I leave this room, but as of today I do not know of any others.

There are, yes, proxies of diplomats who are working contrary to the interests of the diaspora community. That is a significant element of—

[Translation]

:

How many?

[English]

:

I could not give a number.

:

Is it because you can't or because you don't know?

:

Do I know a precise number? No.

Proxies work in a range of ways, so I can't give you a number.

:

Thank you.

Mrs. Romanado is next.

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Through you, again, to the witness, focusing on the question of privilege, I want to pick up a bit on where my colleague MP Blaney was focused in terms of educating members of Parliament. We heard testimony, very clearly, that the intelligence community doesn't understand the business of politics, and politicians don't understand the business of intelligence.

When came to testify before our committee, he mentioned that he had four briefings with CSIS, the first one initiated by CSIS on June 24, 2021, and three subsequent meetings that he initiated with CSIS.

Now, having been a parliamentary secretary in the defence portfolio, and having sat on the defence committee, I have had various intelligence briefings, so I understand what they are. Would you not agree to perhaps having all members of Parliament, senators and their staff be briefed on what to look for, on what foreign interference looks like, on whether it's to be on the lookout for someone who is trying to be involved very much in your campaign, or putting up information that's a bit erroneous so that you will correct it, or things of that nature?

As you understand, the intelligence community is always looking at gathering intelligence. There's a lot of information that members of Parliament probably have, but they're not aware that they have that information, because they're not aware of what to look for. Once they have the understanding of what intelligence agents are doing, they are able to provide the appropriate intelligence agencies feedback also. We heard from another witness that Canadians writ large may be privy to information that would also help the intelligence community.

This is a sort of whole-of-Canada approach. We have a state actor that is trying to undermine our democratic institutions, and I think all Canadians would agree that we need to work together to counter that, to deter and counter. Those missing pieces of the puzzle all together might be able to ensure that in two years' time, when there's another election, we're not in the same situation that we are in here today.

Could you elaborate? In your opinion, do you think providing members of Parliament, senators and their staff, but also Canadians writ large, with at least a better understanding of what foreign intelligence looks like...? Also, then, what would be the channel for them to feed information through, so that they can help and be part of the solution?

(1135)

:

I think you make a very important point or series of points. The director of CSIS has been before this committee and other committees, and certainly in the public, talking about the need to talk about foreign interference and the national security of Canada. It's not a conversation that we generally have. We talk about a lot of other things in Canada. Raising the level of understanding of what national security threats are, who is interested in Canada, who could possibly be working at cross-purposes to Canadian interests, is a really critical conversation.

It is absolutely a criticism of the national security community that the conversations we have with parliamentarians are potentially anodyne, not specific enough, not descriptive enough in terms of the things to watch for. That is something we are working to change. I think some of the things we have done with regard to elections and that continue to evolve are really important for Canadians to understand. The panel of five and the SITE task force are normally connected to a caretaker convention when there is a general election. Well, we stood up the SITE panel to analyze what's going on in five by-elections right now.

It was recommended by Mr. Rosenberg that the panel of five actually meet between elections. The panel of five will begin to meet this summer, to ensure that there is continuity of the period before a general election, so that the panel members, when they see a piece of intelligence during that election period, understand what's come before them. They'll see the totality of the picture. It's critical that this kind of action, I think—which we could certainly report back to parliamentarians—be transparent, to raise the level of awareness, to know what to be on the lookout for, and to know what techniques are being used by adversaries, so that, in the election, we can not only watch for them but prepare all of you.

:

Thank you.

Madame Gaudreau.

[Translation]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I have two and a half minutes.

I want to say this again. How is it that this is the place, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, where we are finding all of this out, as the public watches? I want to thank the media. The idea is to provide transparency and information to reassure the public, but this is not at all reassuring.

I want to use my time to ask the government to state clearly which measures it's taking right now and what it's game plan is. We can get that information out or make an appeal.

You can have the next few minutes to talk about what's coming in three months, six months or a year, not what you've just done.

(1140)

[English]

:

I don't have a crystal ball. I would hope that members of Parliament and Canadians—

[Translation]

:

I have a point of order. Sorry, the interpretation isn't coming through.

[English]

:

I'm pausing the time.

Ms. Thomas, did you get the question? Did you hear the question? Is it working for you now? Okay.

:

Thank you.

I don't have a crystal ball. I would hope that I can reassure you that over the next months you will see more communication from the national security community; that you'll see more dialogue with Canadians, with diaspora communities; that we will talk about foreign interference in a more open and transparent manner; that it can be done without revealing national security classified information; and that the briefings we give to members of Parliament will be more specific and in plainer language and give you examples of what to look for and what the concerns are.

I hope that members of Parliament will be briefed more frequently if they are a target, and the direction from is very clear about that. I would hope that, in terms of internal process and dynamic, we will have a steady flow of information and advice to government—and the advice part, as I say, is critical—about what to do about particular scenarios and situations; and that we will start to address and change the tools that are needed by the national security agencies in order to be able to do their jobs.

[Translation]

:

I'll just conclude by saying I would hope to see real transparency and the truth uncovered, so you can reassure the public, given your expertise and influence. As it stands, the situation is extremely worrisome.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

:

Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Blaney.

[English]

:

Thank you.

I have a brief comment before I ask a question. I heard what you said earlier about a public inquiry. I agree that this discussion has become far too partisan, which is part of the reason the NDP feels it's important to have a person leading this process who is selected by all parties. We need to move out of this rhetoric and really deal with the issue, but we are also at a place where Canadians' sense of trust in our systems has been profoundly impacted. That, I think, can be solved only by a public inquiry.

I appreciate your sharing your opinion. I just took my opportunity to share mine.

My question to you is.... , when he spoke, talked about the fact that he was briefed generally quite a while back about what foreign interference looks like. He said he heard that about 40 MPs received that briefing to just alert them.... It was not on specifics around his own reality, but just in the broad strokes of what it looks like when that could be happening to you.

It makes sense to me that all parliamentarians should be briefed on what that looks like, so that there is a better understanding. Again, part of what I'm hearing in a lot of the testimony is that we need to raise the literacy of parliamentarians and Canadians on how to address foreign interference and how to start to see it. I'm wondering if you have any thoughts on whether that's a good thing to move forward on.

We also heard testimony that more parliamentarians should be going through a process similar to what they do in NSICOP. Go through that, have clearance and have more access to information, so that we can, again, remove the partisan reality and have more parliamentarians...not understanding top secret issues necessarily, but having a better understanding of what's going on and taking that promise and oath not to share that information.

When you look at this, do you not feel concerned that maybe parliamentarians themselves are not being given the right tools to address this issue and to better understand it when they are briefed?

:

Thank you.

That's a complex set of questions you've asked. I think that NSICOP could be used more effectively with its cleared members to understand the intelligence being collected and how it's being actioned within the national security community. I think that it's a very critical committee.

Clearing more parliamentarians is complex. Intelligence is, of course, based on the need to know. I'm not sure that clearing more parliamentarians is the answer. Talking about the threats in an unclassified, but very clear and precise manner, I think, is part of the solution.

I don't think one-on-one briefs with parliamentarians are necessarily needed or possible, but when we speak to parliamentarians as a group, I think we have to change the way we do it.

(1145)

:

Thank you.

We'll have Mr. Cooper and Mr. Turnbull, and then we'll have Ms. Thomas on her way.

Go ahead, Mr. Cooper.

:

Ms. Thomas, through you, Madam Chair, I want to pick up from my last round on a few points.

When I raised the fact that Minister Blair did not have his log-in to access the issues management note provided by CSIS that indicated that was being targeted by Beijing, you said something along the lines that my question wasn't grounded in reality, or that it was not the reality.

At page 27 of Mr. Johnston's report, it states:

Neither the Minister nor his chief of staff received the IMU. Both indicated (and we have confirmed with the public service) that they do not have access to the Top Secret Network e-mail on which it was sent.

What part of what I asked you is not grounded in reality?

:

The way I heard your characterization was that they simply didn't have a log-in and, therefore, did not access the system. They don't have access to the top secret network. The material is printed and provided to them as is appropriate.

:

Mr. Johnston goes on to further indicate:

It is certainly the most prominent, but not the only, example of poor information flow and processing between agencies, the public service and Ministers.

Would you dispute that?

:

No. It's why we're changing process.

:

It's quite late in the game.

To follow up on my last round, when I asked you about the July 2021 memo that indicated that MPs were being targeted by Beijing, including , you indicated that the memo had been presented to David Morrison, who was then national security adviser to the .

You then said that the was not briefed about it, had no idea about it. I would remind you that the memo from July 2021 was a month before the federal election campaign and involved allegations of interference targeting democratically elected members of Parliament. If that doesn't get to the Prime Minister, then what does?

:

Madam Chair, I've said I'm not going to speculate, and you have the opportunity to ask the incumbent of the job that question when they are here.

I ensure, as the national security and intelligence adviser to the , that he receives the information he requires, particularly on foreign interference but also on a range of other subjects.

:

You said, when you last appeared before this committee, that the is briefed frequently on matters of foreign interference. The Prime Minister's chief of staff, Katie Telford, has said that the Prime Minister reads everything and that nothing is held back, and there we were, one month before an election in which MPs were being targeted by Beijing, and suddenly the Prime Minister hasn't been briefed. Suddenly the Prime Minister, who reads everything, hasn't read this memo.

How is that believable? What does it say about this and how seriously he takes Beijing's threats to our democracy and interfering with the ability of members of Parliament to do their jobs? They were being targeted because they were doing their jobs, speaking on behalf of their constituents and speaking on behalf of Canadians, and the Prime Minister suddenly, conveniently, was in the dark. What does it say about him?

:

You're drawing fallacious conclusions.

The cannot make determinations about information he was not given, and he was not given the information, period.

:

The , who's responsible for the machinery of government, who establishes information flows to his office and who is so concerned about national security suddenly knows nothing. How convenient.

I think that Canadians can very easily draw the conclusion that this is a who doesn't take Beijing's interference seriously and that this is a Prime Minister who very conveniently acts as though he didn't know. I think he did know. I think most Canadians believe that he did know, and if he didn't know, it's just as big of an indictment on his total lack of leadership.

Moving on, are you involved in political discussions with the , the PMO, the cabinet or Liberal MPs?

(1150)

:

I have a couple of things I'd like to say.

:

I asked you a question.

:

The was not provided that information. This isn't question period, so the conclusion that you drew is political; it's not based in fact. The Prime Minister wasn't provided the information.

:

It's based in fact that he supposedly didn't know, and he should have known, and that's an indictment on his lack of leadership.

:

I think it's an indictment of the process—

:

I'm sorry; I am going to just pause.

Ms. Thomas, please keep your train of thought.

Mr. Cooper, the buzzer has gone off. I did provide you your 12 seconds back that you had earlier given to me.

With that, Ms. Thomas, please, the floor is yours.

:

When political conversations are occurring, I am not generally in the room.

:

Thank you.

Mr. Turnbull, you have the floor.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I think what we just witnessed was both fallacious arguments and salacious conclusions drawn from those deeply flawed arguments that Mr. Cooper, while pounding the desk, has been making in this committee over and over again. It's shameful, if you ask me.

I would like to get down to the facts.

Ms. Thomas, in Mr. Johnston's report, he says very clearly, “There is no intelligence indicating that the PRC took steps to threaten his family”, referring to .

Is that your understanding?

:

Yes, that's my understanding.

:

There was no actual threat or action undertaken to realize that threat.

:

That is correct. There is no doubt the information that was provided to Mr. Chong is disturbing, but there was no action taken.

:

We can all agree that it's disturbing to think of any elected official or their family even being considered in terms of threatening activity or intimidation, and I agree completely with you on that.

In terms of this top secret network email, which seems to be the source of a bit of confusion, you have said clearly and very consistently with Mr. Johnston's report that the ministerial direction in place at the time should have meant that CSIS would have briefed the minister at the time.

Would you not agree with that?

:

CSIS should have briefed him, yes, probably, and there was a role for the deputy minister in there.

:

Okay.

You're saying you don't have access to that top secret network either. I think you said you have access, but it's a lower level of access. Is that correct?

:

I can log into the secret network, but I don't log into the top secret network. Top secret material is provided to me by what we call a CRO, a client relations officer, from CSE.

:

Thank you for that clarification.

You have said that the minister should have had whatever intelligence was related to this printed out, and you would have viewed it in a secure location.

Is that correct? It would not have been through the top secret email?

:

That's correct.

:

Thank you.

From your testimony today, I have become interested in statements about credibility ratings on intelligence.

Is a credibility rating always included in intelligence documents?

:

Yes. When we receive raw intelligence from any of the agencies, they normally tell us a range of things about the credibility or the soundness of the report.

:

How important is the credibility rating?

:

It allows us to draw conclusions about whether something is actionable, whether we need to wait for more information, and how we should assess what we are reading. If it's a single source or it's not a credible source or there's no further intelligence about a particular element or any allegation or any action that could be taken, we gauge ourselves accordingly.

One piece of intelligence, as we said, is generally not a smoking gun, for lack of a better term. There is a totality. As a member said, it's a puzzle piece.

(1155)

:

Yes, you have said that. Thank you for that.

How useful, then, is intelligence that doesn't come with a credibility rating?

:

It could be, at the end of the day, enormously important and significant in a total picture. In and of itself, it gives you an indication of something that might happen or that maybe is happening or maybe is not. As I said, it's an art, not a science.

:

It could be as irrelevant as it is important, so it's a bit of a coin toss in terms of how relevant it will end up being, given the fact that it doesn't have a credibility rating.

Is that right?

:

That's right in that you have to see the totality of anything that came before it and what continues to be collected. That credibility is part of how the agencies determine, with limited resources, whether they are going to continue down this particular thread of investigation and collection.

:

I think it's notable that the leaks in the media haven't included a credibility rating, as far as I know. I think Mr. Johnston said something about drafts having been made. Does that point to the source of the various leaks that have come through the media, how credible that information is, and maybe where it originated from within the security and intelligence environment?

:

Mr. Turnbull, I would usually give the floor back to Ms. Thomas, but our time has come to an end.

Ms. Thomas, if there is anything else you would like to share with committee members, please just send it to the clerk and we will—

:

Madam Chair, could I have a quick answer to that last question? It's a pretty important one.

:

Yes, if it's really quick.

:

I'm not sure I actually understood the question. I apologize.

:

I can't have you repeat the question, Mr. Turnbull, because we just don't have the time. I apologize.

I apologize, Ms. Thomas, but we have joining us for the next hour, and our resources are very limited. I will have to deal with that, and I don't want to.

With that, on behalf of PROC committee members, we thank you for your time and attention. Again, if there is something else you would like to share, please send it to the clerk and we will have it put out in both official languages.

We're suspending really quickly. We will be back at noon.

Thank you and have a good day.

(1155)

(1200)

:

Good afternoon. I call the meeting back to order.

In our next panel, we have the Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of Emergency Preparedness and, from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Tricia Geddes, associate deputy minister.

Minister, you have up to five minutes for your opening comments. The floor is yours. Welcome to PROC.

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you, colleagues, for the kind invitation to appear before you today.

I will try to be brief in my opening remarks, to give us all sorts of opportunities to ask lots of questions and have a conversation.

There is a single, core issue at the heart of this study. Let us be clear: no parliamentarian or their family should ever be threatened for advocating their beliefs, for representing their constituents or for acting on behalf of their constituents.

Colleagues, Canadians elect us to speak on their behalf about the future of this country. We can and do disagree often, but it is utterly unacceptable that any member of Parliament be made the target of possible violence, and I want to assure all of you that I stand behind anyone who is the victim of such malicious behaviour.

I first learned about the possible threats against the when they were published in The Globe and Mail last month, on May 1. They were serious claims and particularly disturbing, as they named both the member and his family.

While security considerations restrict the information I am able to share, I can tell you that at no point was I ever briefed on a threat of violence by a foreign actor against any parliamentarian. I want to assure all of you in this committee that if I had ever received such intelligence, I would have asked that it be swiftly referred to law enforcement and that action be taken to protect that member and his family. If there is ever evidence of a threat of violence against a Canadian, it is critical that the matter be referred to the police immediately for further and appropriate action.

Foreign interference has been a significant threat to Canadian interests since before this government was elected, and it has become even more serious in recent years. In our very first mandate, we took our first steps towards addressing this problem, including investing in cybersecurity capacities and passing legislation to strengthen the security of our elections.

Shortly after I became the Minister of Public Safety, COVID-19 drastically changed all of our lives. The national security landscape evolved rapidly, and new threats emerged at a near unprecedented rate. There was an observable increase in activity from hostile foreign actors attempting to interfere with Canada's national interests.

In response, in 2020 I sent a letter to each member of Parliament to advise them on the severity of this threat and to explain our government's efforts to combat it. As I wrote at the time:

This Government values above all the wellbeing and safety of Canadians. Whenever malign foreign states seek to harm our communities, undermine our values or jeopardize the very institutions on which our country is built, we will take action.

This remains true today.

We were—and still are—seeing interest from malicious foreign actors to attempt to intervene in Canadian politics, behaviour that went well beyond normal diplomatic activity. That's why I explicitly instructed CSIS to provide awareness briefings to those they believed could be a target, so that they understood those risks and knew how to defend themselves against these attempts.

Let me be clear again, though: I was never informed of any attempt by a foreign actor to harm a parliamentarian or their loved ones. While CSIS made the determination of who should have a briefing, I understood that several MPs received one in advance of the 2021 election.

Our government's work on this issue is far from done. We have continued to make important progress since the last election.

Budget 2023 included $13.5 million to establish a national counter-foreign interference office at Public Safety Canada. The RCMP has also received $48.9 million to strengthen its capacity to protect Canadians from hostile foreign actors.

Also, my colleague, , has been holding consultations on a foreign interference transparency registry, and I am pleased to report that these consultations were wrapped up earlier this month. We have received positive support to proceed.

Colleagues, as the Right Honourable David Johnston said in his report last week, there are questions that are “too important for partisanship”. In his words: “What hangs in the balance for all of us is confidence and trust in our democratic institutions. The very confidence and trust that foreign interference seeks to undermine.”

We must continue to review these matters in a way that respects all of our national security obligations, including for those who put their lives at risk collecting intelligence in the field. While I will caution that I am limited by what I can speak to in a public setting, I very much appreciate and respect this committee's work to raise awareness of the serious threat to all Canadians and to Canadian institutions.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I'll happily respond to any questions my colleagues may have.

(1205)

:

Thank you, Minister Blair, for keeping your comments so concise.

We're now entering six-minute rounds, starting with Mr. Cooper, followed by Mr. Turnbull.

[Translation]

Then we will go to Ms. Gaudreau and Ms. Blaney.

[English]

Mr. Cooper, the floor is yours through the chair.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Minister.

Through the chair, Minister, you very specifically stated that you had not been briefed about any MPs who were the subject of threats of violence. However, were you briefed about intimidation or interference concerning MPs? “Violence” is a very specific word.

:

Yes indeed. Thank you very much for the question. I appreciate the opportunity to provide clarification.

I had a number of discussions with the director of CSIS with respect to the issue of foreign interference and particularly the activities of the Chinese government, but I did not receive any specific information about interference targeting any individual MP. I was aware that there was concern within CSIS that interference could be directed towards unnamed MPs. That's why I asked CSIS to conduct awareness briefings for those individuals.

:

Thank you, Minister.

You indicated moments ago that you first learned that member of Parliament had been targeted by Beijing through The Globe and Mail, but we know that CSIS had attempted to inform you that MPs were being targeted, including specifically MP Michael Chong, in an issues management note that was sent to you and to your chief of staff via a top secret email, and that you didn't see that note because you didn't have the log-in information, and neither did your chief of staff.

How is that possible?

(1210)

:

First of all, what you have just described is not correct. You have your facts wrong, but I'm happy to have the opportunity to explain how that actually works, if you'd like me to.

:

Please explain.

:

Yes, of course. First of all, there is no email account in which top secret information is shared with ministers. There is a secure terminal that is located in certain offices, but not in any political office, and certainly not in the minister's office. I had no access to a terminal in which this information was shared.

The way in which the information was brought to the attention of the minister was that it was determined by the director of CSIS what intelligence information the minister needed to know. They would then print out a copy of that and have me attend at a secure location, and the director of CSIS would brief me—

:

Minister, with the greatest respect, Mr. Johnston in his report stated that CSIS had sent this to you and your chief of staff, presumably because they wanted you and your chief of staff to see it, and you didn't see it, because you didn't have access to it.

That's what Mr. Johnston said. Is he wrong?

:

Allow me to clarify that the information was not shared with me. It was authorized by CSIS to be shown to me, but they determined.... I would leave that question as one that perhaps you might want to put to the director. The director determined that this was not information the minister needed to know, so I was never notified of the existence of that intelligence, nor was it ever shared with me.

:

Mr. Johnston said you didn't have “access”. You didn't have “access”. Those were Mr. Johnston's words.

:

Yes. In fact, that is factually correct. There's no terminal where such information would ever be made available in a political office, and certainly not in the minister's office. It was in a secure location. I did not have access to that terminal. The only way in which the top secret intelligence provided on that terminal would ever be brought to my attention would be if a positive decision were made by CSIS to bring it to my attention, and then I would attend either at a SCIF, a secure location, or at their offices, where that information would be briefed to me.

:

Mr. Johnston characterized this as the “most prominent” example in terms of a breakdown in information flow. You were the Minister of Public Safety. It was under your purview. It was under your watch as minister.

What does ministerial responsibility mean to you?

:

My responsibility is to deal with information that our national security and intelligence agencies bring to my attention. In this case, the national security and intelligence agency made a determination that this was not information that needed to be shared with the minister, and they did not share it with me. It is a concern, and I think that concern has been well addressed by a recent ministerial directive issued by my successor in that role, , in which he has directed, by—

:

With the greatest respect, Minister, I take it from your answer that ministerial responsibility means to you that you just don't take responsibility.

:

I would submit that that is completely incorrect. I take a great deal of responsibility for every matter under my mandate and my responsibilities.

This is a situation where it's an operational decision of CSIS as to what information needs to be passed along to government. In this case, they made an operational decision that this was not required. Two years later, when it was leaked to the press, that information was subsequently shared with me.

At the time, I had no knowledge that it existed. I had no knowledge that it was not being shared with me, because I wasn't aware that the information was available. CSIS, quite appropriately, made a determination that they didn't believe it was necessary to pass that information along.

:

Minister, I would submit to you that the buck stops with you, as Minister of Public Safety. It is quite an indictment of this government that you, as Minister of Public Safety, the and the current national security adviser found out about this in The Global and Mail. It's quite an indictment.

(1215)

:

That wasn't in the form of a question, Madam Chair. Did you want me to respond?

:

The way committee works is I try to provide some opportunity for people whom we have invited to provide some responses. Sometimes what happens is...we are individuals in political fields and it's tough. I need the information you are providing.

:

Then if I may respond—

:

Quickly.

:

—I disagree, Mr. Cooper.

:

Thank you.

Mr. Turnbull, go ahead, through the chair.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Blair, through the chair to you, I think what we've just heard is another fallacious argument coming from the Conservative benches, which we hear quite regularly. It's unfortunate.

I want to go through a few of those, but before I do I'll ask you a quick question: Can you act on what you don't know about?

:

I think, rather obviously, Mr. Turnbull, I cannot.

However, I think the collection of intelligence is important, but it's all.... The RCMP, for example, which also reports to me as the Minister of Public Safety, don't brief on operational investigations. They come with the results of that. It's very similar with the national security intelligence agencies. They make a determination based on their own assessment of the intelligence.

Intelligence can take many forms. It can have many sources, and CSIS has a responsibility to determine its validity, its credibility and whether in fact it needs to get action from the government in response to the intelligence it has gathered. CSIS makes that determination.

Quite clearly, if they determine that information is not required to be shared with us and I have no knowledge of that, I would not have the opportunity to act on it if it's not being shared.

:

That's very clear.

I guess what is implied here is that they did not think that information needed to reach you. For what reason would you be able to cite that this was the case?

:

Again, I'm a bit reluctant to speculate. I think that's a question more appropriately put to the director of CSIS with respect to the decision he made not to share that with government, with the minister responsible or with anyone else. I would not want to speculate as to how they came to that determination.

I am aware, having worked, frankly, in the intelligence field for a number of years myself, that various assessments are made about the validity of intelligence, its importance and the urgency of taking other actions with respect to that.

One can only conclude by the decision not to share this information that CSIS did not believe that was in fact necessary, but I think that's a question better put to the director.

:

That's very fair.

There's been another allegation in relation to surveillance of an elected official, namely, Michael Chan. The allegation is that it took too long to sign off on that surveillance. There have been allegations on this that have circulated in the media. Basically, the implication the Conservative Party has made is you dragged your heels on this and you should have signed off sooner.

I believe there's a whole process of due diligence you've spoken to. This would be a very serious matter that you wouldn't take lightly when making a decision about choosing to surveil an elected official at the provincial level.

Could you speak to the process without getting into specifics? I know you can't speak about that, but what is the due diligence that would be necessary?

:

Thank you for acknowledging that, Mr. Turnbull. I have, in fact, taken an oath not to discuss the particulars of any investigation or any warrant that may or may not have been issued. I'm not going to break that oath. There's a good reason those matters are kept confidential.

However, I can state categorically, first of all, that the information reported in The Globe and Mail was false. It contained factually incorrect information. I can also advise you that, quite appropriately, in all warrant applications—not any one in particular or specifically—there is an appropriate process of due diligence and also, always, an acknowledgement that this work must take place expeditiously.

I would like to assure Canadians that, notwithstanding the false suggestion put in the newspapers, there was never any unnecessary delay. In no case were the timelines described in the paper even close to what actually may or may not have transpired in this case—and I have taken an oath not to discuss its particulars.

(1220)

:

Thank you.

Something else we've heard quite regularly from the opposition party is the false claim that our government has done nothing when it comes to combatting foreign election interference. I note that you spoke about this briefly in your opening remarks—your response to the December 18, 2020 motion on foreign interference. I've read that, and it's quite detailed.

By way of dispelling, again, this myth the opposition parties seem to be trying to perpetuate out there in the public that our government has done nothing, could you speak to some of the particulars of the very real things and the steps we have taken to demonstrate the seriousness with which we take this matter?

:

Thank you very much, Mr. Turnbull.

I would like to assure this committee, my colleagues in Parliament and all Canadians that we took this issue very seriously right from the outset of our forming government in 2015. Some very positive steps were taken with the establishment of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and additional authorities for NSIRA. Some very positive steps were taken in order to deal with this. There have been a number of legislative remedies brought forward that, I think, also strengthen Canada's resiliency.

In response to the motion that was passed in Parliament, I thought it was very important to fulsomely respond and specifically name the issue of foreign interference and some of the countries, particularly China, involved in that. I had a number of discussions with the director of CSIS on how to respond appropriately.

I also thought it was so important for me to not just table the report but also mail a copy to every parliamentarian. I thought that information was critically important to them in doing their jobs. I wanted to make sure they were all well informed, and subsequently—

Oh, we're done.

:

Yes, thank you.

Go ahead, Madame Gaudreau.

[Translation]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Would it be possible, Madam Chair, to ask the minister to slow down? That would help the interpreters, who are doing a great job, but they have been at it for nearly two and a half hours. It would also help me, so I don't miss anything.

I want to follow up on a comment that was made earlier. I may have misunderstood what was said about how long it took to get authorization and the much talked-about four-month time frame.

The committee heard from Richard Fadden, a former national security adviser and former CSIS director, and he said he found the time frame to be quite long. What do you say to Mr. Fadden about that very long time frame?

[English]

:

I will try to speak more slowly, and I apologize to the translators. It is a very important point. Thank you for the reminder.

First of all, I don't disagree with Mr. Fadden. The timeline described in The Globe and Mail was a very long one. I want to assure you that it's not true. It just didn't happen. That timeline is absurd. There is, however, important work of due diligence undertaken by CSIS, the Department of Justice, Public Safety Canada and even officials in my office to ensure.... The signing of any section 12 warrant is a very significant intelligence effort, but it's also a significant intrusion upon people's privacy and therefore requires due diligence.

There were also issues the Federal Court raised with respect to the duty of candour, for example, that CSIS has a responsibility for. There is always an appropriate level of scrutiny and diligence that must be applied. I can't speak specifically to any case—you will forgive me—but when these matters were brought before me for my approval, it was always done in a secure location. Frankly, it took hours, not days, weeks or months, to form that approval.

I recognize the importance of being diligent and of acting expeditiously. I want to assure you that this took place in every case.

[Translation]

:

Thank you.

Minister, you have extensive experience, so I'd like to hear your thoughts on the expert opinions the committee heard. The experts said that documents from the intelligence community were over-classified. Ms. Thomas said earlier that up to 3,000 or 4,000 pieces of intelligence came in a month.

Is the culture of intelligence sharing deficient in cabinet? Tell us about that. We'd like to know.

(1225)

[English]

:

I wouldn't necessarily characterize it as deficient. However, let me make some acknowledgements, if I may.

I think transparency is very important. Canadians want to see evidence of the actions that their government takes, so I think we should always attempt to be as open and transparent as possible. I also know, having worked in that area for a number of years prior to becoming a politician, about the importance of maintaining secrecy around the collection of information, the people who may be involved in that collection, investigative techniques and how that information is collected. Some of that information is of a very sensitive nature and could impact the reputation of our government or our country or private Canadian citizens.

There are some things, quite frankly, that must be kept secret and should always be kept secret. However, I think we should also reflect on things that can.... We don't, in my opinion, have a good system of declassifying secret material, and not everything is as sensitive as some things are. I think that's work that we need to reflect upon and work that we need to do.

As this committee has heard from many witnesses, transparency and trust are at the heart of everything we do. I think it's important for us to explain to Canadians why some things must be kept secret and why other things should be more publicly available.

[Translation]

:

I want to use the little time I have to talk about transparency and confidence.

The statistics say it all. I mentioned this earlier: two out of three Canadians think the Chinese government is trying to interfere in our elections. Nearly half of people feel the next election will be less free and fair. I find that troubling, Minister.

From the previous discussion, we learned about a host of new measures I didn't even know existed.

The public clearly isn't aware of them either, so how do you plan to make them aware? Are you humble enough to say you're fixing the situation and announce what's coming?

People need reassurance because, right now, they can't keep track of it all. What would you tell people about what you're doing?

[English]

:

It's a very important question. I think public trust is the currency of the work that we all do as politicians and the work here in Parliament. Without the trust and consent of the public, we don't have the ability to do our job.

There are a couple of points that I would clarify.

You said that the Chinese are intent on doing this. It's the People's Republic of China. It's the government of a foreign nation, a hostile nation, that is actually targeting...and they are targeting to interfere not only in our democratic institutions and our elections, but in many other aspects of our society as well. We have an absolute responsibility to protect those Canadian institutions and to protect Canadians.

I think to earn that trust—

:

Thank you.

Mrs. Blaney.

:

Thank you so much to the chair. As always, everything that I say goes through the chair.

Minister, thank you so much for being with us today.

I think public trust is the very essence of what we're discussing. That is why the NDP put forward a motion that said every party has to agree on the person who's leading this process that we would like to be a public inquiry.

I think it's become fraught with political rhetoric. The key issue for me is that I want to have Canadians trust their institutions. If they don't trust their institutions, that becomes a very scary place to be.

We're here today, specifically to talk about the question of privilege, but also to try to unpack what happened and where the gaps are.

My first question is around how you received information from CSIS in that role. What is the process, and is there a problem with this process that needs to be addressed?

We heard testimony, which was shared from experts who said that intelligence is going...but there's not necessarily appropriate advice. When intelligence is going over to someone, there doesn't seem to be a very good process of making sure that this intelligence was consumed, how it was consumed and what came out of that.

I'm wondering if you could talk about the process part, from the history you've lived through, where we might want to see that improved and whether you felt at any time that this was a concern for you.

(1230)

:

Let me explain perhaps how intelligence was shared with me while I was the Minister of Public Safety. I would receive information, usually from the director of CSIS or one of his staff, that they had information they needed to share with me. There is a secure room for those types of briefings here in Ottawa—actually, there are a couple of them—and there's one in Toronto. I would very frequently, depending on where I was at the time, go to that secure location. At that location, I would then be brought into a room, and in hard copy—never by email—that information would be shared with me. I would have the opportunity to read it and ask questions about it.

The question you raise, I think, is the most important one. It's just consuming intelligence and information—what people think is happening or might have happened, or what someone suggested is happening to them. This really raises questions. Then what? What's next? What do we do about this?

For example, Mr. Johnston asked me, if I had become aware of any threat to any parliamentarian or their family, what my response would be. I said, “Call the police.” How could you not? Our first responsibility is to protect people, and we cannot leave people in jeopardy. That question arises with every intelligence briefing.

I think there are ways to improve how that information is shared with various people in government, particularly the Minister of Public Safety and others.

:

This leads me to a second question.

Of course, I heard what you said about wanting to call the police and hoping that it would be addressed. The concern, of course, is that we now know MPs were being targeted, and they didn't know for an extensive amount of time. It's hard to respond in any way if you don't know that you're being targeted.

The other issue, which and have both brought up, is that there are ethnic communities being targeted, and people have come forward to the RCMP—to the police, as you noted. When they come forward with this information, what they're finding is that actually there isn't a lot of awareness of how to respond to that. People get a file number, and then they never hear back. They feel under threat. They may have more experiences, but they stop going to get help, because that help doesn't seem to be there.

I wonder if, in your previous role, there was any discussion about what we need to do in terms of building our infrastructure within Canada, so that when we call the police or the RCMP when things like this are happening, there's actually the capacity and the understanding of foreign interference in a meaningful way to respond to it. That's where I'm concerned. I appreciate what you're saying, but it seems to me that what we're hearing is that the police and the RCMP actually don't have the skills necessary to respond to that. Why would we be hearing from so many communities saying they've gone for...they have a file number, but nobody ever called them back?

:

Madam, there are a couple of things.

First, when CSIS advised me that there were activities of a hostile state, the People's Republic of China, in particular, directed towards Canadians, and it could include parliamentarians—although they didn't name any individual or...any specific interference on any individual in most of those cases—I asked that, in fairness to those parliamentarians and in fairness to those Canadians, we conduct awareness briefings. You had to tell people that this is what interference looks like; here's how to recognize it; here's action you can take to protect yourself from it. You can't just leave people vulnerable to such attacks, because they can be quite insidious and quite serious. I asked that intelligence briefings take place. I think that was important.

Secondly, I think you've identified a significant challenge, and it's this issue of intelligence to evidence. It's where the national security intelligence agencies collect intelligence, and the ability to then take that intelligence and use it for a criminal investigation or prosecution can be quite challenging—it's ongoing work. I think there are some legislative and judicial responses and considerations we need to concern ourselves with.

Let me also acknowledge that I also work very closely with that diaspora right across the country. There have been situations in which they have been intimidated or threatened, and those are very serious matters. We have a responsibility to protect all Canadians, and our national institutions, like the RCMP and CSIS, have a responsibility. We have to make sure they're adequately resourced.

As you said, and as I mentioned in my opening remarks, we are putting significant additional resources into the RCMP, for example, to enable them to do those investigations and to protect those Canadians, but I would also acknowledge to you that there's more work to do.

(1235)

:

Thank you for that.

We have Mr. Cooper, followed by Monsieur Fergus.

Mr. Cooper, you have five minutes.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

To the minister—through you, Madam Chair; always through the chair—are you familiar with the 1988 Supreme Court Vanweenan decision, otherwise indexed as R v. Chesson?

:

No, I'm not.

:

Okay. The Vanweenan decision stipulates that CSIS must identify the individuals it believes will be intercepted talking in the surveillance process while applying for the warrant.

Does that ring a bell?

:

I know what you're talking about now, yes.

:

Thank you.

Are you aware that CSIS has to provide a list of third parties who may be intercepted talking to a target of surveillance during the application process for a warrant?

:

Yes.

:

In the warrant application for Mr. Chan, which you approved, did CSIS identify any individuals who may be intercepted in the course of surveillance who are members of cabinet, any sitting members of Parliament or senior officials in government?

:

Mr. Cooper, I took an oath not to discuss or disclose any information—

:

I understand, Minister—

:

—relating to any of those matters, and I intend to uphold my oath.

:

—so I'm going to put this to you in general terms.

:

There's nothing general about your question, Mr. Cooper, and I'm not going to answer it.

:

I will ask you a question—

:

I'm going to pause the clock really quickly. I feel that sometimes that helps.

As we know, one person speaks at a time.

Minister Blair, I know you don't frequent this committee, but we appreciate your taking the time to come, and you responded really quickly. That's something I said to Ms. Thomas as well.

Because of the culture of this place, members who sit on the committee tend to, I guess, have the time. Whenever I see that you're not getting time, I will make sure that some is provided to you to answer, but sometimes, just with the importance of this topic, we know where it's headed.

I'm just going to let us get through this together. Okay. That's all of us. That's great.

Mr. Cooper, the floor is back to you.

:

I will pose the question more generally.

In any CSIS warrant application that you approved, did CSIS identify any individuals who may be intercepted in the course of surveillance who were members of cabinet, any sitting members of Parliament or senior officials in government?

:

I'm sorry, Mr. Cooper. That information is something that I am not prepared to discuss in a non-secure setting, simply because I've taken an oath not to, and I intend to uphold that oath.

:

Are you aware of Mr. Chan in any way communicating with members of cabinet, any sitting members of Parliament or senior officials in government?

:

Is there any context to your question? Mr. Chan has been around for a long time. I will tell you that when I was police chief, I encountered Mr. Chan on a number of occasions.

Is that the nature of your question?

:

Okay. How long have you known Mr. Chan? Has he been involved in any of your political campaigns?

:

I don't believe so, directly, but I'm aware of the man. Like I said, I've known him since I was the police chief in Toronto.

:

Do you consider him to be a friend?

:

No, sir.

:

How long has your chief of staff known Mr. Chan and worked with him?

:

I don't have any idea, sir.

:

You have no idea. Okay.

Minister—through you, Madam Chair—did you receive the PCO daily foreign intelligence brief dated February 21, 2020, which stated there was an active foreign interference network by Beijing in the 2019 election?

:

I'll have to check. I don't recall that particular date.

:

Maybe to help refresh your memory...on December 21, 2022, you were quoted in a Global News article, acknowledging that you had received certain information from that memo, so I presume you have seen that memo.

:

Again, it's a classified document, and I can't discuss classified documents in this setting.

:

I certainly appreciate that you're not able to talk about classified documents, but what has been produced to this committee in that memo—so it's not classified—spoke of an “active foreign interference...network” by Beijing in the 2019 election. That isn't classified.

Did you see that?

(1240)

:

I'm sorry, Mr. Cooper. I've seen quite a number of documents. I can tell you that during that period of time, we were taking action to respond to foreign interference by the People's Republic of China against our government, but I can't speak to this particular document.

:

Madam Chair, this is not intended to be a prop. I'll try to refresh the minister's memory. This is a document, a memo, that is one of the very few documents that have been produced to this committee, so it has been asked about multiple times. I'm surprised you're unfamiliar with it, given that fact, given that you're appearing here on foreign interference, given that you were the minister of public safety, and given that you stated on December 21 that you acknowledged having received certain information.

I'll put it to you again. Did you receive that memo? Were you aware of that interference network by Beijing? What did you do with that information?

:

I would like an opportunity to confirm. I want to give a forthright answer to this committee on whether, in fact, that particular memo was shared with me. Again, I can't see, from this distance, what you've held up, and it appears to be heavily redacted in any event. However, I'll certainly determine whether or not that briefing, in fact, took place and when it took place, and I'll happily report back to this committee.

:

Just very quickly—

:

No, there's no “really quickly”. The members who sit here.... You guys know that the beep goes off, and then you know how I am. If I don't run a tight ship, then you guys complain to me that I didn't run a tight ship and that we didn't get all our rounds in. I wouldn't sit on the fence for too long because after a while it starts to hurt.

Mr. Fergus.

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and through you, I'd like to thank the minister and his ADM for being here today to answer our questions on this important issue.

Minister Blair, can you go into more detail about the steps the government is taking to combat foreign interference?

:

There have been a number of very significant efforts on how we've been dealing with foreign interference, and election interference in particular, in this country. They began as early as 2015.

There was, for example, the establishment of NSICOP in order to provide parliamentarians with insight into all of the intelligence that we were receiving and the actions that we were taking.

I actually have quite a list here that I'll be more than happy to share with you, but there have been a number of fairly significant investments made, as well, into how we respond to this. In particular, the RCMP, as I mentioned recently, received $48 million to strengthen its capacity to protect Canadians from hostile actors. There's been a significant investment of $13.5 million in the national counter-foreign interference office at Public Safety Canada. We have also made a very strong attempt to improve our intelligence collection and our intelligence sharing to the extent possible.

I would simply point out that during my tenure, Mr. Fergus, when I was the public safety minister, CSIS continued to advise of a growing threat of interference from a number of hostile state actors, including the People's Republic of China in particular. We made a very conscious decision to be very forthright and public about that threat, to tell people about it. That's one of the reasons I tabled a report before Parliament in December 2020—to make sure that people had an awareness. I worked very closely with the director of CSIS, who made a number of very significant public pronouncements, and in July 2021, there were also reports that were published that particularized the nature of this threat.

While the government was making significant investments and taking significant steps to protect our elections.... As well—as you're well aware—I should have mentioned that there was also a group of officials that was stood up in order to monitor the impact of political interference on our elections. They did important work on our behalf in order to determine it, and as well, Elections Canada was notified of information that could also be relevant to its important work of maintaining the integrity of our elections—where foreign money, for example, might be contributed. There are a number of significant steps that have been taken, and what has clearly been identified—which we fully acknowledge—is that there's more to do.

That's why I would respectfully suggest that the important work of Mr. Johnston going forward, in examining the issues and bringing expertise and information forward, will enable us to identify additional steps that we can take as a nation in order to protect these important institutions.

(1245)

:

This is really important in terms of the “going forward” aspect of things, but there also has to be some accounting for the past. You mentioned in your testimony, in response to questions from some of my colleagues across the way, that you weren't provided this information beforehand.

How can you act on information you don't have?

:

Very obviously, Mr. Fergus, you can't.

I want to be very careful though. I'm not suggesting that CSIS purposely withheld information from me. They make a determination on the credibility and the seriousness of the intelligence they've gathered, and they make a determination as to what needs, therefore, to be shared with a minister or with the Prime Minister, or even publicly.

In this case, they did not come to that conclusion.

:

This is going to be a really tough question to answer in a short period of time, but why is it that within the system there is a reluctance to share national security allegations that are unproven, uncorroborated, with government?

:

I think there are two very valid considerations in that question.

The first is that the information is sensitive in its nature and it can have a significant impact on our reputation, on our international relations and on the interests of Canadians. I think there should always be thoughtful consideration of how intelligence is being used or shared.

There's also the issue of not wanting to compromise investigative techniques or those who risk their lives to collect this information or who are the source of that information to our government.

There's a process in intelligence gathering. Intelligence is not, in and of itself, facts and evidence. It's information that is assessed by our officials, who do their best to determine what it means.

:

Thank you.

:

Madam Chair, out of fear of rebuke, I thank you very much for letting me have that extra time.

:

Madame Gaudreau, we'll go to you.

[Translation]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Minister, on Tuesday, the committee met with the former clerk of the Privy Council, Michael Wernick—whom you know well—for a second time.

In answering one of my last questions, he said that the should bring forward strong legislation in the House. He even said that, during yesterday's caucus meetings, it was urgent for members to press the issue to show the importance of being transparent, taking all the factors into account and, above all, restoring confidence.

Where do things stand on that front? We can't know what was discussed during a caucus meeting, but is there something on the horizon?

[English]

:

Yes, ma'am. It's an important question.

I think Parliament does have a very significant role to play here, and a responsibility. We've already identified, and there have been consultations on the establishment of, a foreign agent registry, which I think is going to be very important and which will provide us with very important tools.

I think there's also been some reflection on the application of the CSIS Act. It was written in 1984. The world has changed quite significantly, and we believe there are some legislative remedies that would be appropriate and that need to be brought forward.

There are significant impacts and implications for Canadians, for our privacy rights and for our Charter of Rights and Freedoms with respect to this type of legislation. That's why it's so important not only that we bring forward legislation but that it be subject to vigorous debate in Parliament and to the work of our committees. We all need to make sure that the legislative response to these circumstances is robust and effective, but it also has to be done thoughtfully and carefully.

I also hope that Mr. Johnston's review is going to provide us with insight and advice from a wide variety of Canadians and perspectives that will inform the important work of how we should respond to these issues. It's not just an operational issue. There is a legislative response that I think we need to consider very carefully.

(1250)

[Translation]

:

I want to point out that, if all parliamentarians together had chosen an individual, a commissioner or a judge, we would've been satisfied. The committee even heard that a non-Canadian could be appointed to lead the inquiry to ensure impartiality.

Whenever we talk about the special rapporteur appointed by the , my constituents can't believe it.

The government can do something, and I think the government knows what that is, but the government doesn't want to do it.

:

Thank you.

It's now over to Ms. Blaney.

[English]

:

Thank you, Chair.

Minister, when you were in the role of Minister of Public Safety, the government launched the Nova Scotia Mass Casualty Commission. Of course the mandate was to find out what happened on those two days.

I'm just curious about the process. For this commission, did they have to deal with any secure documents or information that couldn't be made public? If so, what sorts of protections were in place so that the commission could deal with those and see those sensitive documents that couldn't be made public?

:

For the public inquiry headed up by Justice MacDonald for the Mass Casualty Commission, there were a number of primarily RCMP investigative documents that were relevant and that were made available to the commission, some in a redacted form. The circumstances of that tragic event, and the information and evidence that was brought before the commission, did not cross as significantly into the realm of that which would be considered highly sensitive top secret information. Some of it was of a secret nature, which is a different level of classification, and we were able to work very carefully, through the Department of Justice, with the Mass Casualty Commission to make as much information available to that commission as possible.

:

Thank you for that.

My next question is probably my last, with the limited amount of time that I have. You spoke earlier, when we were having that discussion back and forth, about the intelligence and how it moves into evidence. I think this is something that is very interesting, because it is the part that really allows action to happen.

When we look at things such as foreign interference in our systems and in our elections, where are the gaps in that, and what do we need to look at more broadly? Have any of our Five Eyes partners, for example, done any of that work that we could look at? Is it a legislative remedy, or is it something else?

:

I think it's a question perhaps better directed towards our Justice officials, because there are fairly significant legal impediments to the.... The way in which intelligence is gathered, and some of the legal authorities used for the gathering of intelligence, actually preclude that intelligence information from being used as evidence in a court of law on a criminal charge.

There are some legislative remedies, but I don't consider myself an expert on how to navigate through those things. It's a question better put to Justice.

:

Thank you.

Monsieur Berthold.

[Translation]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Blair, if I understood correctly, you basically said earlier that you didn't deny that the warrant application you received to monitor Michael Chan referred to other members and other Liberal ministers.

Is that correct?

[English]

:

I suspect not, sir. I was neither confirming nor denying it. It's information that, quite frankly, I had no intention of discussing. I've taken an oath not to.

[Translation]

:

I see. You're not denying it either. Had it been that easy, you could've denied it.

[English]

:

To be very clear, sir, I'm neither confirming nor denying. I'm simply not speaking to it.

[Translation]

:

You said earlier that the Globe and Mail article in which it was reported you took four months to approve the warrant was fundamentally incorrect.

Is that correct?

[English]

:

That's correct. It's correct that it was incorrect.

[Translation]

:

It's quite handy to call the story false and to hide behind confidentiality when it's time to talk about the facts surrounding the warrant.

I want to point out that your government did the same thing in the SNC-Lavalin affair: deny the Globe and Mail story. We all saw the outcome in that affair. We all know how it ended.

You said you had been advised that the regime in Beijing had interfered with unnamed MPs. When were you informed?

(1255)

[English]

:

I don't believe that I actually said that. I said that they were undertaking.... They were conducting an effort to interfere.

I was concerned that there would possibly be some members of Parliament who might be interfered with without any knowledge. I wanted to make sure they were given sufficient information and awareness of that interference, of how to recognize it and of how to take steps to protect themselves. I asked CSIS to conduct awareness briefings, but they did not tell me who, or tell me the nature of any interference they might be experiencing.

[Translation]

:

When, then, did CSIS advise you that those unnamed MPs, as you called them, were possibly being targeted by the regime in Beijing?

[English]

:

To be very clear, CSIS did not advise me of any individual MP or even any number of MPs. My concern was for all of us, for all of you and us. If you could be subject to it, we should provide you with awareness to protect yourselves.

[Translation]

:

You didn't just wake up one morning and think that you should warn all the members of Parliament. You received a report, and it worried you enough to decide that members needed more information.

When were you advised that those activities could be going on? It's a straightforward question.

[English]

:

You may recall, because I sent you and every other member of Parliament a letter in December 2020, in which I outlined political interference by the People's Republic of China. It was a 12-page letter. I tabled it in Parliament; I posted it on the website and I sent you a copy.

:

I know. When did CSIS inform you that it would need you to inform the MP that this happened?

:

CSIS did not tell me that they needed me to inform the MP. We discussed—

:

No. When were you informed that something had to be done? Someone has to have told you that.

[Translation]

Someone must have advised you, as the Minister of Emergency Preparedness. You didn't just take it upon yourself one morning to send a letter to every member of Parliament telling them to be careful.

What happened? How did you come to that conclusion? Who advised you to send that letter?

[English]

:

As the Minister of Public Safety, I received information with respect to the activities of hostile state actors, including the People's Republic of China. No one told me to act to warn you. It was a decision that I made. It was my job to protect you and to protect all Canadians and our institutions.

I believed the best way to do that was to provide you with information so that you could have an awareness of the threat. I also then suggested to CSIS that if there were individuals who they believed would be particularly vulnerable to threats of interference, they should conduct awareness briefings with those individuals. They did not tell me who or why, but I have learned subsequently that they in fact did a number of those briefings.

:

Why didn't you ask? It was a threat to our democracy. It was a threat to members of Parliament. Why didn't you ask if there were some MPs who were specifically targeted? That was your responsibility as minister. Why didn't you?

:

Well, these are operational matters of intelligence and a responsibility for CSIS. They were collecting intelligence and they were taking the steps and working with other national security intelligence agencies in order to protect the members.

I did not have any information that any individual MP was targeted or in any way threatened with interference. However—

:

I am going to end that. Sometimes it's just nice to get a fulsome answer without my speaking in between. Members know that when the beep goes off they don't get to comment again, but it's just a matter of giving somebody from whom we say we want important information the opportunity to give us the information.

Minister Blair, I'm sure you're noticing that one o'clock is approaching. Are you able to provide me some leniency, please?

:

Yes, ma'am, of course.

I have some responsibilities in about 15 or 20 minutes' time, but I'll be happy to give you what I am able to.

:

Our interpreters have been going for almost three hours, so we don't want to leave it too long, but just quickly, five minutes will go to Ms. Romanado.

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Through you, I'd like to thank the minister for being here.

I want to touch base just in following up on the previous round of questions.

Minister Blair, I know the communication you sent out to members of Parliament was actually your initiative in response to a December 18, 2020, motion in the House on foreign interference. I want to thank you for taking that initiative at the time to bring awareness to the issue by tabling a report in the House and writing directly to members of Parliament. I believe, if I remember correctly, that we even received it through snail mail, with an actual printed copy, to make sure we received it, given the number of emails we receive. I want to thank you for bringing it to the attention of members of Parliament.

We heard a little earlier, when I was speaking with the national security and intelligence adviser, about the importance of making sure that members of Parliament, senators and their staff understand what foreign interference is, what it looks like and what kinds of tactics are used by hostile state actors in terms of trying to get information from members of Parliament.

Can you elaborate a bit on what your thoughts are on its being a reciprocal responsibility? For instance, intelligence agencies really don't understand politics, and politicians sometimes don't understand intelligence agencies. Members of Parliament may be privy to information that would be useful to intelligence agencies, but we're not aware of the fact that the intelligence might be helpful.

Again, could you talk a bit about the importance of increasing awareness about it among parliamentarians, and what we can do to help each other make sure we are working together to combat and deter any foreign interference?

(1300)

:

It's a very important question.

As politicians, first of all, we work in very diverse communities with diasporas that have come from all over the world to make Canada their home. They also have representation from various governments and government officials from their home country. It is one of our responsibilities as politicians to work with that diaspora but also with some of those other government agencies or actors.

Every government, I think, attempts in a positive way to gain some influence with the Government of Canada. It's something that we're all aware of and subject to, but it's very important that politicians be aware that sometimes that attempted influence can exceed the limit and take the form of interference. Sometimes it's important for people to understand nefarious intent and who is in fact a hostile state actor. It's not just normally trying to have good relations or serve their communities; they may have other intents.

Educating and informing parliamentarians so they recognize when that influence attempt that we all experience every day can translate into acts of interference.... We need to be aware of that. We need to make sure that we protect the integrity of what we do, the integrity of our institutions and, of course, the integrity of our elections. Keeping people aware of that, I think, is our first line of defence.

There are other things that we can do and we do in order to protect our Canadian institutions, but our best line of defence is informing, first of all, those of us who are working in the communities, and, as well, sharing information with Canadians so that they know how to protect themselves and how to be more resilient in the face of some of the interference attempts or even some of the things we know have taken place in our country. Shining a light on that, informing people on that, is very important. I think it's an important question.

It's what I was trying to do when I issued that.... I tabled it in public. It was on our website. I wanted to make sure Canadians could see it, but I also knew that sending it to all parliamentarians was the best way to extend that information out to every part of Canada, into every community, through our colleagues in Parliament.

:

Thank you very much.

On another point, I know we talked a little earlier about this reference to a secret email that you didn't access. You've made it very clear; that is not, in fact, how it works.

Information that needs to get to you doesn't go into some email, like your Gmail account, that only you have the password to. This is a physical terminal that is not located in your office. It is located in a secure location and, to be able to access that information, someone with top secret clearance would get the information printed and make sure you're briefed on it in a secure location. Is that correct?

:

That is correct. There was no top secret secure terminal located in the minister's office, nor should there be. That information is highly classified and sensitive, and needs to be handled with great care. CSIS would, in fact, identify that which needed to be.... With this concept of need to know, national security intelligence agencies would make an assessment that this is information the minister needs to know, and they would bring it to me. If they didn't make that determination, I would not get the opportunity to see it.

(1305)

:

Thank you very much.

:

Thank you very much for your time and attention.

Ms. Geddes, you didn't get any questions or comments, and the minister didn't need you to provide any insight, so he's well aware of his file. Did you want to add anything today?

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I would underline that it is the department's and the agency's responsibility to be able to access those networks to be able to provide information. In fact, as a deputy minister, I don't have access to those terminals either. We rely on our staff to ensure that we're provided with intelligence in a timely fashion.

:

If there is anything that comes to mind, whether it be later or whenever, please send it to the clerk, and the clerk will have it translated in both official languages and shared with members.

With that, we thank you, on behalf of PROC committee members, for your time and attention today. We wish you the best of everything.

For PROC committee members, Tuesday, June 6, we will have the Right Honourable David Johnston appearing. We have been successful in our deviation request, so it will be a three-hour meeting that morning.

We will see you soon. Keep well and safe. See you next Tuesday.

Unofficial Transcript (Blues) of ISR appearance (June 6, 2023)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE AND HOUSE AFFAIRS

NUMBER 080

1st SESSION

44th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 2023

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

(1005)

[English]

:

Good morning, everyone. I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 80 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. The committee is meeting today to study the question of privilege related to the member for and other members.

I would like to remind all members and witnesses that care must be taken with regard to the earpieces for interpretation. Please be mindful to not place your earpiece near the microphone, as this can result in a feedback loop that may cause an acoustic shock, which could in turn cause injury to the interpreters. Sometimes when we're speaking we don't notice that we're doing it, so be mindful.

All comments will be addressed through the chair. I have asked members and our guests today to keep an eye on each other when the exchange is happening because you'll see a little bit of a nod to say “I want the floor back.” That would just help with me not having to interrupt because I would like to maximize the time that we have.

We have with us today the Right Honourable David Johnston, independent special rapporteur on foreign interference. To declare any conflicts of interest, he was the president at the University of Waterloo when I not only attended, but graduated, so we do know each other from the region of Waterloo.

Mr. Johnston, you will have up to 10 minutes for your opening comments.

Before I do that, there are some rumblings or thoughts that there might be votes taking place today. As there might be votes, I would just like agreement that if a vote takes place during opening comments or the first round of questions, we would use the voting app and continue working. Are we okay with that? I will pause just to make sure everyone can get their pictures in, and once everyone's set and in place, we will continue. That would maximize our time together.

Because we have three hours together, I am also going to change up the way we do questions. We will start off with 10-minute rounds instead of six minutes, and then we will continue with the normal five, five, two and a half, two and a half, five and five minutes. We will take a pause halfway through the meeting just to have a quick break as needed.

With that, Mr. Johnston, the floor is yours.

[Translation]

Welcome to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

You will have 10 minutes.

[English]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the members of the committee for having me today to speak on this important issue and the work I am conducting.

On March 15 of this year, I was appointed by the government as the independent special rapporteur on foreign interference, with a broad mandate to assess the extent of foreign interference and make recommendations on how to better protect our democracy.

My first report found that foreign governments, including the People's Republic of China, are working in hostile and clandestine ways to undermine our democracy. I came to that conclusion after an intensive review of top secret intelligence and interviews with senior intelligence, security and elected officials.

Methods of foreign interference are rapidly becoming more sophisticated. I have identified significant shortcomings in the government's ability to detect, deter and combat this threat.

This must be remedied urgently.

[Translation]

That is why how to best fight foreign interference will be the focus of the next phase of my work, which will be a public process.

Beginning next month, I will hold public hearings where Canadians will hear publicly from government representatives, security and intelligence officials, subject matter experts—and critically—those diaspora communities who are most impacted by the hostile efforts of foreign governments.

For this work, I will be supported by three special advisors with expertise in national security intelligence, law, and diaspora community matters.

Together, we will develop recommendations on the urgent changes necessary to protect Canada’s democratic institutions and, crucially, Canadians’ faith in them.

(1010)

[English]

Before I conclude, I think it is important that I acknowledge the motion passed last week in the House of Commons. I have deep respect for the House of Commons, and for its right to express an opinion on my work.

I have heard clearly the disagreement with my recommendation not to call a public inquiry, as well as allegations about my integrity and my independence. These allegations are, put simply, false, and the decision to repeat them does not make them true.

The issue of foreign interference deserves serious and robust debate. I will continue to invite disagreement on my recommendations, but I will not be deterred from completing my work.

I would respectfully remind this committee, and all Canadians, that I am not simply asking you to take me at my word. Experts and parliamentarians with the necessary security clearance will be able to review not only my work but also the detailed intelligence on which it is based.

Should NSICOP, NSIRA and opposition leaders disagree with my conclusions, I have asked them to say so publicly, which they are very much permitted to do.

[Translation]

To conclude, I would remind Canadians and the members of this committee that my mandate is only one part of an array of work and initiatives that can be undertaken to address this threat.

[English]

Therefore, I encourage the contributions of others, including this committee, to help ensure Canada is well equipped to detect, deter, and combat foreign interference.

Thank you, and I welcome questions.

:

Thank you, Mr. Johnston, for those opening comments.

I will share that the bells are ringing. The screen is on for everyone's information. I do believe we can get through our first two rounds, so I will start with 10 minutes for you, Mr. Brock, followed by 10 minutes for Mr. Turnbull.

Mr. Brock, go ahead.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair. I'll be splitting my time with my colleague, Mr. Barrett.

Good morning, Mr. Johnston, and thank you for your attendance today.

Mr. Johnston, in 2010, , as a private citizen, before entering into politics, told CBC Radio that you were a great dinner companion. He specifically said, “We had great conversations around dinner tables around all sorts of things.” This was said around the same time you were being appointed as our Governor General.

Were you aware of that statement, sir?

:

Madam Chair, I was not aware of that statement in connection with . My meeting with him occurred when he was 10 or 11 years old, skiing with my children four or five times—

:

Thank you, Mr. Johnston. We'll get into those areas. My time is very limited—

:

I have had no meeting with him since that time—

:

I have another question for you.

As Prime Minister, described you as a lifelong “family friend”, a friendship cemented over many summers as neighbouring cottagers in the Laurentians. You never corrected the Prime Minister in his characterization of your relationship with him. Isn't that correct?

:

Madam Chair, the connection I had with —

:

Mr. Johnston, I apologize for interrupting you, but the question is, did you—

:

I'm going to pause. I didn't think it would be this early into the meeting. Mr. Brock, you and I have had this exchange before, so you know very well that comments are through the chair.

I can assure you that the and I have not gone to the cottage together, so let's just pause and take a second. That's why I wanted to provide a bit more time. I will provide leniency to ensure we get to where you need to get to.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

The question to Mr. Johnston was, did you characterize, or did you change the statement that , as Prime Minister, made about you being a lifelong “family friend”, a friendship cemented over many summers as neighbouring cottagers in the Laurentians? Did you confirm or deny that, sir?

:

Madam Chair, I was not familiar with the statement that has just been made. I was friends with the father of , through his life in politics. We tried to engage him with the Université de Montréal to be a professor on his return.

My last particular meeting with the current —

:

Thank you, Mr. Johnston. I'm going to be getting into areas where you can expand upon things that you've done with the .

I need to move on, because my time is limited.

In 2016, six years into your role as Governor General, you gave an interview to CTV. You were asked about your views of having the Trudeau family living on the grounds of Rideau Hall. Without pause or hesitation, you said, “It's wonderful because their children play in the garden where our grandchildren play and it's pretty exciting to have the next generation together bringing the place alive”.

Was that statement accurate?

(1015)

:

Madam Chair, I don't remember that particular statement, but it is true that the Trudeau family lived in the Rideau Cottage—

:

Thank you, Mr. Johnston.

You further state, in the same interview, that the Trudeaus were “very good tenants”.

:

I have a point of order, Madam Chair.

:

On a point of order, go ahead, Mr. Turnbull.

:

We've seen, now repeated, Mr. Brock cutting off the witness, who is not being given the chance to respond.

I would appreciate it if we could at least let Mr. Johnston respond to the question he's being asked. I think that's decorum and normal practice.

:

Madam Chair, if I may respond, my time is very limited. The question was centred on whether or not the statement was accurate. It did not require the witness to elaborate.

:

I'm going to respond really quickly.

I feel that PROC has high ratings. We've been here for a long time. I think you now know how I operate as chair, as well.

I do believe these points of order and me interrupting, which I don't want to do, actually take away from the time, which we're talking about being so precious. Allowing the witness to finish a sentence I do not think would take too much time. I think it's appropriate to let the witness answer.

Mr. Brock, I agree that the time is yours, but let's just be mindful and I think we can get through this. I know you can, Mr. Brock, so I'm going to pass you back the floor.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

You further stated that your wife Sharon and you became good friends with the Trudeaus, that your relationship with Pierre Trudeau went back to “children's days” when the families would get together to ski at Mont Tremblant. You stated that the three Trudeau boys were the same age as your five daughters, and that you became a “ski party” at Mont Tremblant.

You stated that your children had “enormous respect” for Pierre Elliott Trudeau. He was “a wonderful father and very good with children”, who at this point were teenagers, and he would lead them into discussions such as about democracies in the world.

In 2017, sir, you interviewed with Paul Wells. You talked about knowing Justin Trudeau since he was six years old, as both families shared adjacent cottages in the Laurentians.

In 2017, sir, the Prime Minister paid tribute to you, calling you “a family friend” and “a friend of [his] father”. He ended his comments by saying to both you and your wife, “Thank you, my friends.” You privately or publicly did not object to the assessment of your friendship with Justin Trudeau.

Let's fast-forward to your press conference of May 23. You are on record stating the following basic facts of your so-called friendship with Justin Trudeau. These are your words, sir: that when your children were ages seven to 12, you had a condo at the foot of Mont Tremblant. Pierre Elliott Trudeau had a country home 50 kilometres away. On five occasions over seven years, he and his three kids came and parked their car in the lot. On one occasion, you drove the kids back to their mother's house. You knew Justin Trudeau as a student at McGill. You had no contact with Justin Trudeau until he was an elected MP, and later, as Prime Minister.

The point is, sir, that you said you had no contact with Justin Trudeau for 40 years, not as a friend. You said those are the facts. Later that day, you interviewed with CTV anchor, Omar Sachedina, and stated that your relationship with Justin Trudeau was “an unfortunate allegation”. You largely confirmed the same details as at your press conference, but changed the frequency of ski trips to “five occasions, over two or three years” as opposed to over seven years.

Mr. Johnston, what we have before this committee are two completely different descriptions of your relationship with Justin Trudeau. Those two different descriptions cannot be accurate at the same time.

My question is simple and direct, Mr. Johnston. Were you telling Canadians the truth on May 23 or back in 2016?

:

Madam Chair, I am telling the truth in connection with my relationship with Prime Minister Trudeau, which goes back to when our children were teenagers. During the course of almost 40 years, we had no meetings, no dinners at one another's homes, no particular contact. I was a friend of the father, etc., but that was the extent of the contacts.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair. I'll resume the time there.

Sir, you were a member of the Trudeau Foundation until your appointment to this position. Is that correct?

(1020)

:

Madam Chair, I was a member of the association—which is like shareholders in a general meeting—of the Trudeau Foundation, not a member of the board of directors.

I joined it in 2018, just a year or so after I stepped down as Governor General, because I've had a very long concern and interest in student support—graduate students, scholarships.

:

Thank you, sir.

:

The role, as a member of the association, is to attend annual general meetings and to vote in the board of directors, but I have had nothing to do whatsoever with any of the decision-making of the Trudeau Foundation.

:

Were you aware of the reporting that the Trudeau Foundation was targeted for a foreign influence campaign by Beijing and that the foundation accepted $140,000 from the Communist dictatorship in Beijing?

:

Madam Chair, the first knowledge I had of that particular gift was when it appeared in the newspaper and, as a member of the association, I received a memo from the CEO, as I think other members of the association did, that they had started a press release indicating that this gift was being returned.

:

Thank you for confirming your knowledge of it.

Given your ties to the foundation, the foundation's involvement with Beijing and Beijing's role in your report, do you see a conflict of interest?

:

Madam Chair, my connection with the association of the Trudeau Foundation had no role whatsoever in the decision-making of the board of directors, the acceptance of gifts and so on, and—

:

Thank you, sir.

You've been friends with Frank Iacobucci for decades. Is that correct?

:

Madam Chair, Professor Iacobucci and I were young law professors at the University of Toronto, when I was about 25, and yes, he's been a lifelong friend.

:

Mr. Iacobucci, also a member of the Trudeau Foundation, is whom you sought an opinion from on the matter of whether you were in a conflict of interest, for which he provided you the exemption or excuse that you were looking for.

:

Madam Chair, Justice Iacobucci was not a member of the Trudeau Foundation. He was a mentor to one or two students who were scholars of the foundation. The function of the foundation is not only to provide scholarships but to provide the possibility of mentorship for those students by people who are respected in their area, and he served in that capacity.

:

Thank you, sir.

:

Yes, when allegations were made about me having a conflict of interest—

Mr. Michael Barrett: Thank you, sir.

The Right Hon. David Johnston: —he's known me for a long time, and he indicated I had none.

:

Sir, I believe there are at least 12 retired Supreme Court justices who aren't associated with the Trudeau Foundation like Mr. Iacobucci.

Mr. Iacobucci's law firm, Torys LLP, was also hired. You hired them to assist you. Working for Torys was long-time Liberal donor Sheila Block.

We have you with an association to the Trudeau Foundation. We have Mr. Iacobucci, who is associated with the Trudeau Foundation. We have Ms. Block, who is a lifetime donor and supporter of the Liberal Party, including attending fundraising events with the in recent time. Given all of that, don't you see a conflict of interest?

:

Madam Chair, with respect to the question of Ms. Block, she is a pre-eminent counsel. She—

:

The question is with respect to conflict of interest, sir.

:

Okay, let's just pause. You just took 23 seconds to ask that. Let's just provide the witness 23 seconds to answer that.

I can't believe I'm sitting here timing how much time it's taking for the questions and the answers so that I can run a functional meeting. All members have asked for three hours of time from this person—three hours. That's a long time to be meeting. We talk about how important our time is, but then you want me to keep interrupting.

Mr. Johnston, the floor is yours.

:

Madam Chair, I do not see a conflict. Sheila Block is a pre-eminent counsel. She served me very faithfully when I was invited by Prime Minister Harper to undertake another very difficult inquiry 15 years ago or so. She is renowned for the quality of her work, and certainly important work that's done well, but that said, the conclusions in the report are mine.

Whatever lawyers in practice or others do with respect to contributions to political campaigns, these are all on the public record and well understood.

(1025)

:

Next is Mr. Turnbull.

:

Thanks for being here, Mr. Johnston.

I would say that we all owe you a debt of gratitude for your service to Canada over decades. I want to thank you for the many roles you've taken on and faithfully served and fulfilled, and for the latest role you've taken on.

I do recognize that your report has come with some questions, and there have been some concerns that others have expressed. Maybe I'll quote PM Harper, which I don't often do. When you were originally appointed as the Governor General, he said that you represented “the best of Canada”.

I appreciate the fact that you're here today in front of all the parliamentary members answering our questions for three hours. It really is a testament to your service to Canada.

I want to start by mentioning a few things that we've heard here at this committee, online, in press conferences and in House proceedings.

Mr. has said that Han Dong is “an agent for Beijing”.

has said repeatedly that Justin Trudeau “is acting against Canada's interest and in favour of a foreign dictatorship”. That was on March 7.

Pierre Poilievre also said that the PM “expressed his admiration for the basic Chinese Communist dictatorship.... Seeing this ideological bond, Beijing decided it had a friend and wanted to help the Prime Minister get elected. It interfered in two successive elections.” Poilievre also said, “We also know that the Prime Minister has been aware of many of these facts for a very long time and yet chose to do nothing.”

Mr. Cooper, who is on this committee, said, “The invitation of a 'briefing' is a blatant trap to muzzle Poilievre under national security laws.” The truth is now a trap, apparently.

In the long list of baseless and absurd claims that the Conservative Party is making, the latest is on their website. It says, “Trudeau’s Fake Rapporteur Continues Interference Coverup”.

I would submit to this committee, and to you, that these are not just harmless exaggerations or isolated instances of partisan hyperbole. They're intentional and inflammatory. They're baseless allegations, and they're harmful and false. They erode the trust in our democracy. They're stoking anti-government sentiments for political gain.

In your first report, Mr. Johnston, you said that you incorporated into it a wide range of sources, including the proceedings of this committee. You noted that at times members of this committee asked “insightful questions”. You also referred to the “element of political theatre”.

Do you think this debate, and the importance of providing answers to the Canadian public, is well served when the political theatre element drowns out the probative fact-finding work that we're all called upon to do?

:

Madam Chair, I would encourage the members of the committee to read the report we have prepared and to focus our attention on the real danger we have here, which is clear, present and pervasive foreign interference in our elections.

In our report, we tried to avoid the discussions of the partisan kind that you refer to and to follow the facts and apply the law thoroughly and thoughtfully. I would urge us to get on with this important matter of foreign interference, which does require immediate attention by this body and the institutions of Parliament to protect our national security and protect our citizens.

:

Thank you, Mr. Johnston.

It seems to me, based on our conversations in this committee, that there are some members participating in these debates and proceedings who want to get to the facts and the matter at hand, and there are others who are painfully avoiding the facts and don't seem to want to talk about them.

Mr. Johnston, it's clear to me that the Conservatives sang your praises and extolled your virtues for over a decade. In fact, in 2007 Pierre Poilievre himself said this about you on your appointment to the Mulroney-Schreiber inquiry:

I think we're dealing with a very credible individual, and I think that that distant history bears little relevance to the fact that he has a very distinguished career. If we're suggesting just because at some point in history he was appointed by a former Conservative prime minister that he should be disqualified from participating in public life, I think that is a little bit extreme. This is a very qualified individual, and frankly, I haven't heard anybody question his integrity, and I have no reason to do so.

Mr. Johnston, why do you think Mr. Poilievre has changed his mind from 2007 until now?

(1030)

:

Madam Chair, I think my focus throughout this has been on dealing with the facts of foreign interference, trying to apply the law and putting before you as comprehensive and as thoughtful a report as we possibly could, knowing it would be reviewed by NSICOP and NSIRA, and, I hope, with the participation of the leaders of the three major parties—and I thank for agreeing to be one of those—who will review what it is we're about.

Quite apart from changes of positions by people on whether my integrity evaporated three or four years ago for some reason with the change of government, I'm anxious that we get to the real issue here, which is foreign interference. Let's look at this report with our recommendations. Let's review it, and let's move with urgency on dealing with a problem that is very, very serious and is affecting not simply our national security but our citizens in very direct, immediate and difficult ways.

:

Thank you, Mr. Johnston.

The Conservatives seem to claim that you suddenly betrayed your character, that you built up this character over many years that they said was credible and had high integrity, and all of a sudden you just abandoned your principles and integrity when you were appointed by for this particular position, which to me is utterly absurd.

The best predictor of future behaviour is past behaviour, and you've built your character over time to be an honourable person who has integrity and is credible. Many people have said that about you over many years, and yet here we are.

I ask myself, why is it that they're so intent on attacking your character? The only thing I can come up with is that they don't like the conclusions of your report. The main one that I think they're scared for anyone to report on or talk about is the main finding, where you said in your report, on page 2:

I have not found examples of Ministers, the Prime Minister or their offices knowingly ignoring intelligence, advice or recommendations on foreign interference or being driven by partisan considerations in dealing with these issues.

Yet we still often hear and see claims to the contrary, with facts often distorted, misconstrued and misrepresented. We see here, in a parliamentary setting, and outside of the parliamentary setting that sort of rhetoric, those claims that are being made without evidence and the often bad-faith mis-characterizations.

Does this kind of activity itself do damage to our democracy, in your view?

:

Madam Chair, I would say several things.

One is that the whole review and the work that you're engaged in is to build trust in our democracy and reinforce it when it is in peril by foreign interference.

In the quote you just read, we continued on to say that, in our review, we found very serious shortcomings in our systems of dealing with foreign interference, which require very substantial review and improvement, and the responsibilities of this committee and other agencies of Parliament are to do exactly that.

Foreign interference has been growing like this, and our ability to adapt has been growing like that. We have to close that gap, but it's the work of Parliament to get at the facts and to come up with recommendations and improvements, using the precedents from other jurisdictions, especially the Five Eyes, which have had to deal with this for longer periods of time, with more difficult threats in their case, which are now very much present in our home. Our job is to look forward and to determine how we can do a much better job of putting together a system that deals with foreign interference in a constructive and very protective way for Canadian interests.

:

I agree completely that it would be nice if other parties would contribute to those discussions in a constructive manner and operate based on the facts, but what we've seen is.... You've built in validation for your findings, but members of opposition parties are not willing to review the annex to your report.

Is this what you meant in your report by referring to operating behind “a veil of ignorance”?

:

Madam Chair, in our report, we presented what we could publicly while paying full respect to the classified information that we were able to receive. We prepared an annex to that report, in which we go into detail on the classified information that permitted us to come to some of those conclusions.

That classified part, of course, will be with the report before the NSIRA and NSICOP committees, to be reviewed and corrected, but it means getting on with the job and Parliament doing its work, which is to deal with this danger of foreign interference in our elections in a constructive and thoughtful way.

(1035)

:

Thank you.

[Translation]

We have three minutes left before the voting period begins. I am going to give Mr. Therrien the floor for 10 minutes. Then we will suspend so everyone can go and vote.

Mr. Johnston, you may answer in either official language; that's your choice. The time used for the interpretation won't be included in Mr. Therrien's speaking time. Take the time to listen to the question and comments, and you may take the time you need to answer.

Go ahead, Mr. Therrien.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Good morning, colleagues.

Thank you for being here, Mr. Johnston.

Today we are trying to mount the greatest possible defence of our democracy, which is under attack by foreign interference. What we're doing today is extremely important.

When I go door to door, people tell me they aren't sure they'll vote. I'm sure you hear the same thing. So I encourage them to do so by telling them that it's important to vote and to get involved because their choice may decide the colour of the government and of the policies that are adopted.

However, more and more people are abstaining, and we're struggling against that trend. Unfortunately, when we see these threats of interference, people's trust in democracy and in our institutions declines. That can lead them to think that the dice are loaded, to wonder what's the point of voting and to question whether foreigners are deciding for them. This can take on extremely large proportions. It's this trust that we have to protect, and it’s our institutions that we must protect.

According to the latest Léger poll, 72% of people want an independent public inquiry because the situation is critical. It's important to shed all possible light on this matter, and people think that's the only way to do it. I won't cite you a whole list of reasons, but many experts in the field tell us we need to hold an independent public inquiry. Most of the members in the House have said that we need to strike a public and independent inquiry.

In his report, Mr. Johnston rejects this option. I'd like to know why he rejects the idea of an independent public inquiry, which so many people have called for.

[English]

:

Madam Chair, first of all, I warmly reinforce the comments that have just been made with respect to people losing interest in and understanding of democracy and that we must work very hard to build that trust.

I would also say that what we're seeing around the world is a diminishing trust in democracies all over. As people move away from the rule of law, which is so important here, and move to the law of rule, strong people, autocratic governments, come into place. That's the danger we face.

With respect to the question of a public inquiry, we thought long and hard about this. The dilemma is that we're dealing with classified information. It is not possible to discuss classified information in public, nor to report it in your reports. This has been apparent in other inquiries that have had to deal with this difficult matter.

What we have done is say that, having dealt as best we can with the classified information on the questions of responsibility within the government for dealing with foreign interference, there are very serious shortcomings. We'll proceed in the second phase of our mandate, the next five months, to deal with those issues in public hearings, inviting the public to come in and participate with experts to do so, and to put a focus on the urgency of getting on with this. We'll begin with public hearings with diaspora communities, whose voices have been explaining these concerns to us but without adequate protection and response up until now.

In the balance of our work, we hope to address that and a number of other issues that will place a very strong focus on the urgency of dealing with foreign interference, encouraging and strengthening our parliamentary institutions to develop the appropriate reforms, put them into place, and then see that they operate in a way that does, in fact, build trust in our democracy.

(1040)

[Translation]

:

Madam Chair, there are precedents for an independent public inquiry into extremely sensitive matters that sometimes involve issues potentially related to the safety of certain individuals in the event information is disclosed. That's why in camera meetings have been held in previous independent public inquiries in order to obtain that kind of information. That's the best way to shed light on a matter.

Three secret services from foreign countries were involved in the Maher Arar inquiry. Ultimately, an independent public inquiry was established, as was the case of the bombing of Air India flight 182. There are precedents.

Mr. Johnston says that the subject matter of an independent public inquiry has been discussed and considered but that certain factors prevent one from being held. I would very respectfully respond to him by saying that it has previously been done.

I'd go even further. Dan Stanton, former executive manager of the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency, gave compelling testimony on this point. He feels that Mr. Johnston is wrong in saying that a public inquiry is impossible. Mr. Stanton said that foreign interference is one of the easiest issues to explore through a public inquiry, and knows what he's talking about.

Mr. Johnston, I'd like to know your opinion of Mr. Stanton's statements and past experiences that show that an independent public inquiry is possible.

[English]

:

Madam Chair, the issue of public inquiries is important, and what we realize is that when we're dealing with classified information, it becomes very difficult. It has been possible in other reviews to have sessions that haven't dealt with classified information and to shine the light of day on those. That's what we intend to do with the public hearings regarding the reforms in our system that are most important.

When Justice O'Connor finished the Arar inquiry, his comment was that public inquiries under the Inquiries Act are very difficult tools to use for something whose job is to shed light on situations, particularly situations of negligent responsibility and so on. Because they are led by lawyers with cross-examination, they have difficultly getting at information that is classified. We can't do that in public. They are very expensive and very time-consuming and often do not result in providing that light.

What we had hoped to do, of course, in the many months of our mandate, was exactly that—to have public hearings on matters that are not part of the classified information. I think we may recall an earlier inquiry. It was the McDonald commission that led to the creation of the CSIS Act to take over from the RCMP responsibilities regarding foreign interference. That commission took five years to complete its work.

[Translation]

:

I'm astonished, Madam Chair.

We're being told that an independent public inquiry can be expensive. What's the price of a democracy? What's the value of democracy?

Two parties are currently neck and neck in the polls, and the colour of the government may be decided by a few ridings. But we're being told that shedding light on this matter might be expensive. People agree on this: the only way to shed light on the matter is with an independent public inquiry. It may be a long process, but we may live a very long time in darkness if we do nothing. That wouldn't be better.

Mr. Johnston says that some aspects are classified "secret" and can't be revealed in public. How is that worse than what we saw in the Arar affair, where three secret services from three different countries were involved in the inquiry.

[English]

:

Madam Chair, certainly with respect to the public hearings we have in mind, it will be possible to invite representatives of CSIS and other experts from both the government and outside of the government to comment on this.

With respect to the issue of cost, I want to emphasize the costliness in terms of the time that is wasted in getting at the real issues of how we address foreign interference and come up with reforms and changes and improvements, and the careful oversight of our operations to be sure that we will do a much better job than we're doing at the present time on something that is a very serious and not fully recognized danger to our democratic society in Canada.

(1045)

[Translation]

:

May we proceed with the vote, Madam Chair?

I'll suspend my speaking time. Does that suit you?

:

Yes. We will now suspend and come back in a few minutes for a question or two.

:

All right. You're very kind.

Thank you.

:

We can all vote. Tell me if you haven't voted.

[English]

We're pausing for votes.

(1045)

(1045)

:

I'm going to call us back to order. I'm glad everybody was able to vote.

[Translation]

Mr. Therrien, you have the floor for 1 minute and 38 seconds.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

We're hearing that the process is a long one, but I think it's essential. It's important that we shed light on this situation in order to resolve the issue once and for all and that we build trust in the general population.

It's true that we received Mr. Johnston's report within a fairly short time, but when I read it, I see virtually nothing that leads us, first, to understand that we can trust Mr. Johnston for the next steps and, second, to say that we've shed light on the situation.

I'm going to go back to one simple question, Mr. Johnston. I'm appealing to your intelligence because I know you're a brilliant man. Your experience proves that. What's the difference between the "secret" classification of information in the case of foreign interference and the "secret" classification of information in the Arar affair? Why is the present case worse than the Arar case?

It's a simple question. I'll come back to it if you don't answer it because I think it's important.

[English]

:

Madam Chair, that's a really important question of when information moves into the sphere of evidence and when it's classified or not classified. It's one of the issues that we hope to address in depth in the public hearings that will be held over the next five months, the issue of whether we have the right direction and the right balance in determining what must be kept secret and what can be put into the open situation.

We have experience from other jurisdictions that have dealt with this very particular problem. It seems to me that we can learn from those experiences and try to find a better balance of what must be classified to protect our people who are working, as well as our Five Eyes allies.

(1050)

[Translation]

:

Mr. Johnston, I just want to tell you that what you said is very important.

What I understand from your answer is that we don't know why we can't hold an independent public inquiry. That's what I heard. You said it would take several months to determine the difference between pieces of information and the importance of classification. So you aren't even prepared to tell me today that we don't need an independent public inquiry because you'll have to take a few months to think about it.

:

Mr. Therrien—

:

I just wanted to conclude our conversation. What Mr. Johnston said is extremely important.

:

We will continue with you, Mr. Singh. You have 10 minutes.

[English]

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Madam Chair, through you, I would like to thank Mr. Johnston for appearing today. Thank you for appearing to discuss the report.

I want to lay out a couple of opening statements. You've also addressed the question, but I want to make it clear as well. I've made it clear that I disagree with your finding that there should not be a public inquiry. I believe there should be a public inquiry. I think that is the only way to really restore public trust and confidence in our electoral system.

Last week, we passed a resolution in the House. You alluded to it, but I also want to state that we recommended that you step down as special rapporteur for a very specific reason, given the appearance of bias. I gave one concrete example that, to a reasonable person, it would seem that there is a clear appearance of bias: the fact that the lead counsel had repeatedly donated to the Liberal Party and attended a fundraiser with the as late as 2021. This appearance of bias, to a reasonable person, would undermine the work you're hoping to do, and that work cannot be achieved because of the appearance of bias, which is so fundamental.

I am also disappointed that you rejected the majority vote. The will of the House was expressed, and you rejected that vote. I think that's disappointing.

I want to use my time to talk about some of the details of the report. I'll turn to my first question, through you, Madam Chair.

My first question is in relation to a question I asked of the on May 9. I asked a question in question period about the impact of foreign interference on the diaspora, which, as you alluded to, will be a major part of your public hearings. I asked a question of the Prime Minister about the impact on diaspora communities of foreign interference. In response, the Prime Minister said, “the diasporas, whether the Chinese Canadian, the Iranian Canadian, Russian Canadian or Indo-Canadian communities, are often the first communities to be targeted by foreign interference.”

In fact, the national security and intelligence adviser, Jody Thomas, also highlighted that foreign interference, particularly from India, has an impact on Canadians and especially the Sikh community. Many people from diaspora communities will tell you that they left communities of repressive regimes and came to Canada hoping for security, liberty and safety, only to be pursued by that same interference. In the Sikh community, many people will share stories of being denied visas, or of their communities or their family members being threatened for raising concerns about the human rights track record of India, for example.

Given that it is well known that this exists, and particularly that the has expressed that these threats to diaspora communities exist, how do you expect that people from diaspora communities—knowing that they are already targeted and that they're already at risk of personally being targeted or their families being targeted—would have any sort of confidence to attend a public hearing, given these threats to themselves or their community and potential backlash and repercussions to their families?

How would they have the confidence to show up to a public hearing? How would that process work for them? Are there any steps being taken to protect their security, given the concerns they have?

:

Thank you for those questions, which are really vital and important and require very thoughtful attention.

You're quite right: The diaspora communities have been beset with interference and the disturbance of their tranquility, their own safety and their well-being in ways that are unconscionable. It behooves all of us to see this as a very serious threat in our community, where pluralism and respect for one's cultural heritage are very important values to us. It has been neglected for far too long.

I look at Mr. Chong over here, who has chaired the Canada-China relations committee, for example, where there are reams of testimony from diaspora communities about this particular matter. We have not done the kinds of things we should do and we must do—because it is real, it is damaging and it is simply unacceptable for Canadian citizens.

What we hope to do in the balance of the five months is to put a real light on this issue of the threats that diaspora communities are under and develop much more effective ways of, first, equipping ourselves and our intelligence agencies to deal with them more effectively than now, and second, acquainting Canadians with the fact that so many people in the diaspora communities are unwitting victims of something that lies far beyond them. We, as Canadians, have a responsibility to protect them, to embrace them and to say that this is not acceptable and we will not sit here and let it stand. We must recognize that it's happening to these communities and take adequate steps in terms of our governmental protections to see it.

In the last month or so, we have seen a step forward in at least trying to provide a better understanding and warnings to members of Parliament and others who have been subjected and whose families have been subjected to these things. That, too, requires very important remedies.

(1055)

:

Thank you. Again, I'm hoping you will also address how those families will feel safe to come forward or how those individuals will feel safe to come forward.

In my second question, I want to touch on how you identified the serious shortcomings in communication between security agencies and the government. You made it clear that there were “no examples...of Ministers, the or their offices knowingly or negligently failing to act on intelligence, advice or recommendations.” So it is conceivable, in your report, that the ministers or the Prime Minister were not properly informed. However, you also recognize in your conclusion that it is very clear that foreign governments are absolutely or undoubtedly attempting to interfere in our democracy and that this is something that's been well known.

Given how clear it is that there is foreign interference going on and that the government ought to have known that, generally speaking, there is foreign interference going on, my question is about the utter lack of curiosity of this government. Despite clear and credible evidence of foreign interference, in your investigation, at no point in time did the Prime Minister or ministers ever actively or proactively ask CSIS or other security agencies whether or not members of Parliament were being targeted.

Was there never an attempt to proactively assess threats to members of Parliament? While you accept that they were not maybe advised of this by CSIS, did they never have the curiosity to say that if we know there's foreign interference going on, maybe it's impacting our members of Parliament? Was there never any evidence of that curiosity and interest in following up?

:

Madam Chair, thank you for both questions. I'll answer very briefly but I hope helpfully.

With respect to whether we would expect members of the diaspora community to be able to appear before a public hearing in openness, I'm quite confident they will, in many instances, and in instances where they do not want to be there, we would receive submissions. We've already received perhaps half a dozen or so submissions from diaspora communities, very painfully and eloquently setting out the burdens that they're bearing and crying out for help. In the cases of people who feel they can't come in person, we would invite and encourage whatever information they could give us and, in particular, what steps we can take.

Now, let's come to the question of curiosity in dealing with those foreign threats. In our report, as you know, we've been quite critical of the shortcomings of the government, indicating that it has been slow to react and slow to anticipate in many instances, and that must be changed, but it must be changed with the work of this committee and other parliamentary committees. NSICOP and NSIRA—one in place since 2017, the other since 2019—are review and oversight committees. That's the kind of responsibility to see whether our agencies are working properly or not, and we must bolster that kind of thing.

I'm quite in agreement that we have not had that kind of curiosity, and particularly the flow of information so that we may act upon [Inaudible—Editor], and I hope we can address that.

(1100)

:

I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Johnston.

Finally, through the chair to you, Mr. Johnston, I want to point out something particularly concerning: a different conclusion that you arrived at in comparison to Mr. O'Toole. I want to highlight that Mr. O'Toole raised a question of privilege, and I just want to quote a portion of what he said:

The briefing from CSIS confirmed to me what I had suspected for quite some time, which is that my parliamentary caucus and I were the target of a sophisticated misinformation and voter suppression campaign orchestrated by the People's Republic of China before and during the 2021 general election.

So, members of the Conservative caucus and he, himself, were targeted.

In your report, you find, in reference to Mr. Chiu—who was of course a member of the Conservative Party and a candidate in the 2021 election—that misinformation could not be traced to a state-sponsored source. We have two very different conclusions: one is from the CSIS briefing that Mr. O'Toole is referring to, and then you're stating in your report that there was no clear evidence that it was state-sponsored. How could you have such different conclusions from what Mr. O'Toole received?

:

Again, Madam Chair, I appreciate that particular question. I've been asked to be brief.

We did have an opportunity to meet with Mr. O'Toole shortly before our report was completed and did take into consideration what he had to say to us. I must say that he has been a very knowledgeable, thoughtful person about this and has much more to contribute.

The evidence we had before us that permitted us to come to the conclusion you suggested was what was available to us at that time. Since that time, with the conversations that Mr. O'Toole has had with the director of CSIS, I think there's been a much greater step in terms of what should have been done and what must be done in the future.

:

Thank you.

[Translation]

I give the floor to Mr. Berthold for five minutes.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thanks to Mr. Johnston as well.

Mr. Johnston, I was somewhat shocked when you said in your opening statement that the comments made about your integrity were false and that repeating them doesn't make them true. To my mind, that statement alone puts you in a conflict of interest, particularly with regard to the opposition party leaders.

Mr. Johnston, you are a former Governor General of Canada, a position in which you did not play a political role.

However, you are still receiving compensation as a former governor general. Is that correct?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, could I have the question repeated?

[Translation]

:

Are you still receiving compensation as a former Governor General?

[English]

:

No, Madam Chair, I don't receive any payment as former governor general. I have a pension as a public servant, and that is the pay.

[Translation]

:

Thank you.

For how many years have you been a member of the Trudeau Foundation, Mr. Johnston?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, thank you for that question.

I joined the association of the Trudeau Foundation. That's like a shareholder in a general meeting, not a member of the board of directors, not involved in any decision-making—

[Translation]

:

That's not the question, Mr. Johnston.

[English]

:

[Inaudible—Editor] an annual general meeting to vote in the board, to approve the financial statements—no involvement in fundraising of any kind. That was 2018, and I resigned in March of this year, when I was appointed to this role.

[Translation]

:

During an interview in 2016, you said, with respect to your relationship with thePrime Minister's family, that you had gotten to know the children and that your friendship and relationship was really built on exchanges between the children.

Do you acknowledge making those comments, Mr. Johnston?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, I do recall referring to the fact that my own children and , as a young boy, did have opportunities to ski together four or five times. Between that time and when he became Prime Minister, I had no meetings with Mr. Trudeau, and our children, to my knowledge, did not.

When they became neighbours to us at Rideau Hall, I think I referred to the fact that it would be very nice for our grandchildren to have the chance to play with his children. That didn't occur, I don't think, on any occasion, but it still would have been a pleasant experience for us.

[Translation]

:

Mr. Johnston, I would ask you please to answer more briefly. I want to address a number of points, and I want to be respectful and allow you the time to respond, but I have some very specific questions for you.

In 2017, you visited the University of Chongqing in your capacity as president of the University of Waterloo. You met the President Xi Jinping, and you later said that it was wonderful to be back in China and that you felt as though you had come home.

Is that correct?

(1105)

[English]

:

Madam Chair, if I understand the question correctly—that it was wonderful to be back home—I think that was going back to 24 Sussex Drive, and that was not available. The secretary to the office of the Governor General very gallantly said that he would be happy to vacate Rideau Cottage, and that's why Mr. Trudeau's family moved in there.

[Translation]

:

Madam Chair, I think we're having interpretation problems because the questions I've asked and the answers I've received haven't really matched up from the start.

So I ask for a little indulgence on your part. I'll try to speak more slowly, but we really are having interpretation issues because Mr. Johnston isn't answering my questions.

Mr. Johnston, you asked Mr. Iacobucci, a former mentor from the Trudeau Foundation, for his opinion as to whether there was a potential conflict of interest in your mandate as the Prime Minister's special rapporteur.

Is that true?

[English]

:

Yes.

[Translation]

:

You hired Sheila Block, a major Liberal donor, as senior counsel in drafting your report.

Is that true?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, it is true that Ms. Block was my senior counsel with respect to the Mulroney-Schreiber inquiry. I reached out to her to be the senior counsel for this review as well.

[Translation]

:

I have many other statements like these that you've claimed are false, Mr. Johnston, but I'm unfortunately out of time as a result of the interpretation problems.

You have written a book entitled Trust, which I have here. There is no French version. You say in this book that the worst leaders engage in manipulation and fail to disclose vital information or disclose only the information that supports their opinions, decisions and actions.

Do you remember writing that?

[English]

:

I do remember writing that chapter of this book, yes.

[Translation]

:

Mr. Johnston, with all due respect, and having regard to your years of experience, I find it hard to believe that, in your opinion, not a single one of the facts I've just stated suggests an appearance of conflict of interest for someone who is called upon to present an independent report on interference in our democracy by the Beijing regime, interference that apparently favoured the Liberal Party.

Do you sincerely believe that none of those facts can give the impression that there is a conflict of interest and that Canadians should take you at your word?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, to answer the question, I don't believe I have a conflict of interest, and I would not have undertaken this responsibility had I had a conflict of interest.

What I would say is that, for 55 years, I've chaired or served on advisory committees, perhaps two or three dozen times, because of my non-partisanship and my integrity. This is the first time that it's ever been called into question or that it's been suggested that I have a conflict of interest.

My suggestion, Madam Chair, is that one looks at a record of service and comes to one's conclusion on conflict of interest. I would, again, plead that you focus the attention on foreign interference, this report, which will be reviewed, and others, where we must do a much better job of getting on with an important matter.

:

Thank you.

Ms. O'Connell, you have five minutes.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Johnston, for being here today. Actually, where you just left off is part of where I want to go with some of my questions.

Before I get to that question, though, Madam Chair, I want to point out that the Conservatives just had a total of 15 minutes' worth of questions and they didn't ask a single question about foreign interference, not a single question. Madam Chair, it was nothing more than a character assassination or conspiracy theories around children playing together.

Mr. Johnston, given your opening comments about how serious and pervasive this issue is, I find it incredibly frustrating and disappointing that 15 minutes' worth of questioning time from the official opposition consisted of zero questions on foreign interference. However, what has already happened—and, Mr. Johnston, you wouldn't know this—is that Conservative member Mr. Barrett has already posted clips—I'm sure to help fundraise or stoke fears and conspiracy theories around your non-partisanship.

Some of the questions earlier by Mr. Brock brought up things about, again, children playing together—your grandchildren playing with the current 's children. That's what they think is the smoking gun here: children playing together. I point out that, Mr. Johnston, in some of the responses that you were providing.... Even though the Conservatives wanted you here and the opposition wanted you here for three hours, they didn't want you to answer a single question. I find that very telling, and again, they got their clips. That's what this is really about. This isn't about foreign interference and protecting our democracy, because if it were, they'd ask serious questions instead of playing partisan games.

Mr. Brock mentioned a time period when, as you mentioned, the current was 11 years old. However, my colleague Mr. Turnbull pointed out that, since the time you spent with the current Prime Minister when he was 11 years old, the leader of the opposition, , actually defended your reputation. We can't find anything that has changed in your conduct or behaviour, so all I can conclude is that opposition members are not serious about foreign interference. They're not serious about preserving democracy. They're just looking for partisan attacks. Mr. Johnston, you pointed out that some of the people you used for the Mulroney-Schreiber inquiry are the same individuals you used to help you or assist you in this writing, yet Conservatives are conveniently neglecting that point.

Let's get to the actual issues around foreign interference, because I think we owe it to Canadians to be serious about this. We can leave the partisan games to the Conservatives, because Canadians will judge them on that. I'm going to follow up on some of 's questions about . We heard testimony in this committee from Mr. Chiu. I actually asked him, at the time, if he could table any of the evidence he had or the examples that he had been concerned about. He said that he never saved any of that information.

Was there anything...? Did the Conservative Party provide any information? talked about a dossier. The Conservative Party also, in 2022, did an internal review into the 2021 election results. Was any of this information provided in the package that you would have received and reviewed?

(1110)

:

Through the chair, could you be more specific about that package? I just don't have a context for it.

:

Sure. Mr. Singh had commented on some public reporting from , and he spoke about a dossier that the Conservative Party had about some of the WeChat information. Mr. Chiu demonstrated that there was all this evidence submitted to him, but he had no longer saved it, or something along those lines. Then, in January 2022, the Conservative Party received the results of an internal review that they did, led by James Cumming.

Did you receive any of that documentation in your review?

:

Madam Chair, I want to be careful in my answer, because I don't have a specific recollection of receiving those specific documents.

What I do have is that we asked on four different occasions to make submissions, if he could, and to meet with us, but he chose not to.

I think two or three days before our report was published, we had a package of documents, which were largely reports from newspapers and other media reports. I don't recall the specific document you mentioned.

:

Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Therrien, you have two and a half minutes.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'm going to ask some brief questions, and I'm hoping for some short answers this time. I don't want to put any pressure on Mr. Johnston, but I only have two and a half minutes.

Mr. Johnston, we agreed that it's very important to a restore the public's trust. That, among other things, is the purpose of this exercise.

Which do you think will restore the public's trust, an independent public inquiry or no inquiry at all?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, thank you for the question.

Clearly, that is our job: to restore confidence. In the balance of our report and of our work for the next five months, we hope to devote ourselves to having as much light as we possibly can on the key issue, and that is, how is our system of dealing with foreign interference working? According to the report that you've read, not at all well. It needs significant improvement.

Through those public hearings, hearing from experts and from others, and with your help as the review committee continuing your work, I hope we can treat this with the urgency it deserves and can stand proud before Canadians to say we are doing everything in our power to protect them.

(1115)

[Translation]

:

What I'm hearing is that Mr. Johnston is going to shed some light, that we shouldn't worry, that this is why he's here, and so on.

The problem is simple. Before Mr. Johnston tabled his report, experts were opposed to an inquiry, but they're in favour of it now that the report has been submitted.

Does that mean that the attempt to shed light very quickly and at low cost, as Mr. Johnston proposes, is a failure? I have some names here: Daniel Stanton, whom I mentioned earlier, formerly of CSIS, Michael Wernick and Artur Wilczynski. Those people changed their minds after the report was tabled.

Does that ultimately mean we need a report from a commission of inquiry? You haven't convinced people. Since your report was submitted, they've mainly been convinced that an independent public inquiry is really necessary.

[English]

:

Madam Chair, again, thank you for that question.

We have set out the reasons why we think a classic royal commission public inquiry would not serve the process of rebuilding trust, but the public hearings that I mentioned will.

I come back to Justice O'Connor, following the Arar committee, who said that public inquiries, in the traditional sense, are not particularly useful and can be horrendous in dealing with these kinds of things. There are appropriate ways to deal with them. That's what we have to do in the next five months.

[Translation]

:

Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Kwan.

[English]

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Global News reported on February 8, 2023, “National security officials [warned] and his office more than a year before the 2019 federal election...that Chinese agents were 'assisting Canadian candidates running for political offices'”. In Mr. Johnston's report, an early draft of the memo containing “similar but not identical language” was noted. The draft was “significantly revised”, according to the report, before the memo went to the Prime Minister.

Did Mr. Johnston inquire as to who changed the memo, and why it was changed?

:

Madam Chair, thank you very much for this question.

I want to go directly to our report. There are two parts of my brain functioning here. One is the part that deals with classified information, and the other is the part that deals with open information. It's important that I not cross that boundary.

To deal specifically with the question that has just been raised, Madam Chair, page 23 of our report, dealing with these statements and conclusions in the press, states:

The PRC Interfered with the Nomination of Han Dong as the Liberal Party Candidate in Don Valley North (Global News, February 24, 2023)

Then it says:

Irregularities were observed with Mr. Dong’s nomination in 2019, and there is well-grounded suspicion that the irregularities were tied to the PRC Consulate in Toronto, with whom Mr. Dong maintains relationships. In reviewing the intelligence, I did not find evidence that Mr. Dong was aware of the irregularities or the PRC Consulate’s potential involvement in his nomination.

The Prime Minister was briefed about these irregularities, although no specific recommendation was provided. He concluded there was no basis to displace Mr. Dong as the candidate for Don Valley North. This was not an unreasonable conclusion based on the intelligence available to the Prime Minister at the time.

:

Mr. Johnston, if you just reference where you would like us to note that, we'll take it, because time is limited.

I'm going to go back to Ms. Kwan

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I read the report several times over. Quoting it again to me is not going to answer that question.

My question was, did Mr. Johnston look into who changed that memo and why it was changed?

:

Madam Chair, again, I must be conscious of the classified information. The memo that appeared in the Global News—

:

Sorry, I'm going to interrupt for a second. It's a yes-or-no question.

Did Mr. Johnston look into who changed it, yes or no?

:

The answer to that question is that the memo that was referred to in the Global News report was an early draft that had certain statements. That draft was not circulated further. There was a final draft that came to quite a different conclusion about what transpired.

(1120)

:

Thank you.

:

Madam Chair, if I can finish my thought, I take that to mean that Mr. Johnston did not ask who changed it and why it was changed.

:

Madam Chair, again—

:

I'm not going to comment, but I think, Mr. Johnston, your comment does stand as to what your response is. How people received information is not the debate today, but the focus is on foreign election interference.

We're going to continue.

We're going to go to Mr. Chong for five minutes, followed by Mr. Fergus.

[Translation]

Then we will suspend.

Go ahead, Mr. Chong.

[English]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Johnston, for appearing.

You've made several mentions during this hearing today about the need for Parliament to do its work. You've said that it's the work of Parliament to help counter what you call the ever-increasing threat of foreign interference. You've pleaded with us and made pleas to us to focus on the issue of foreign interference.

Our job here is to hold the government accountable. It's set up in the opening clauses of the Constitution Act from 1867. Section 18 gives us immense powers to do that.

The problem is that Parliament has not been able to do its work because our hands have been tied by the government. We haven't been able to get the answers we are seeking to questions concerning the PRC's foreign interference in Canada. Government documents that are requested aren't released. When they are, they're often so heavily redacted that they make little sense. Government witnesses aren't forthcoming with answers to our questions.

Not only are we not able to do our work because of that, but the government is deliberately bypassing Parliament through the very entities that you've referenced in your report and your testimony: NSICOP, NSIRA and even—with respect, sir—your position. All of these entities are appointed by the government. They're appointments of the and serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister.

We've been unable to do our work. It's been incredibly frustrating. Over the last four years, we've spent a lot of time and effort holding hearings on foreign interference. We've had four committees of this House examine the matter: the foreign affairs committee, the Subcommittee on International Human Rights, the Canada-China committee and this committee, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. By my count, these four committees alone have held 70 meetings where PRC's foreign interference was examined, heard from 364 witnesses and received 152 hours of testimony. The testimony consisted of 1,902 pages of evidence and resulted in five reports with 31 specific recommendations relating to foreign interference.

Despite all of this work, we still haven't gotten the answers we sought from the government and, with respect, neither will you. In your first report, you've indicated that your upcoming hearings will not be focusing on who knew what and when. The focus will not be on looking at government records and speaking to government personnel.

If Parliament hasn't been able to get the answers over the last four years, if you're not going to seek the answers in your upcoming hearings and if we're not getting a public inquiry with all the powers of subpoena to call witnesses and to gather evidence, then how on earth are we to get the answers we need to play our constitutional role and hold this government accountable?

:

I should say that my counsel and I spent a very profitable hour and a half or two hours with Mr. Chong going through some of these things. We benefited enormously from the work that he himself has done on this matter and other matters.

First of all, NSICOP and NSIRA—assisted by the leaders of the three major parties, I hope—will have an opportunity to review our report, review our conclusions and find out if there is fault in us not assessing responsibility where it lies.

With respect to the question of the inability of Parliament to move government, we will be looking very carefully at the oversight bodies. We will look, in particular, at NSIRA, which has been in place since 2019, and NSICOP, which has been in place since 2017.

We'll have expert testimony from foreign intelligence experts and advice that we get from you, Mr. Chong, which we will very much welcome, including what you've said has been done over four years. We'll have a much more strengthened, robust role of those two committees to provide proper oversight and ensure that the operations of our foreign interference oversight are much more effective than they are at the present time.

(1125)

:

Thank you for that answer, Mr. Johnston.

I'd like to also follow up and ask you a question about how you can restore public trust and confidence in our institutions. Eight months ago, when this foreign interference scandal first blew wide open, reasonable people could have argued that public trust could be restored without an independent public inquiry. That door closed a long time ago.

The House of Commons, three times in the last three months, has voted for an independent public inquiry. The majority of Canadians in polling want a public inquiry. You, however, have recommended against a public inquiry. Do you not see how recommending against a public inquiry undermines confidence in our democratic institutions?

:

Thank you again for that question, Mr. Chong.

What we have recommended—and what we intend to do in the next five months—is having public hearings on these very important questions of whether our systems are adequate and, if they are not, how we improve them in very substantial measure. We intend to focus on that as a really important matter of Parliament and our agencies, and for the public generally, to ensure that we do a much better job than we are doing at the current time.

:

Thank you.

Go ahead, Mr. Fergus.

:

Thank you, Mr. Johnston, for coming to committee today. Thank you for your report as independent special rapporteur, as well as for your lifetime of service to our country in many roles.

Mr. Johnston, you noted in your report a series of structural issues in the way information is shared by our security agencies. Can you please expand on that? What could be the initial view of possible solutions?

:

Madam Chair, in the last pages of the report, we refer to issues for review in the public stage of the work. In particular, we speak about:

The role and structure of NSICOP and whether it can be strengthened.

Amendments to the CSIS Act that might assist in fighting foreign interference.

Machinery of government issues, including:

Processes for funneling intelligence to top officials, including greater accountability for ensuring that the right people see the right intelligence, including at the most senior public service and political levels.

Tracking protocols so it is possible to reconstruct who saw what, and when.

Clearer lines of responsibility for recommendations as to how to react to intelligence.

A government-led process (rather than an agency-led process) for declassification of information to enhance transparency.

We also speak of the case for a national security committee of cabinet, to put foreign interference in a context where it should be dealt with at the highest level and with a sense of urgency and importance.

:

I get you on that. I'm looking for, perhaps, a little preview or a further sense as to where you think we should be going, because as you just quoted from your report, you talked about the problem of information sharing that seems to be happening.

We had testimony before this committee from the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, Jody Thomas, who also identified that there were gaps in the process. We understand that she has already implemented a process to address those gaps. Is that also your understanding, and how do you think this would be helpful?

:

It is my understanding, Madam Chair, that this process has been initiated by the national security and intelligence adviser. It's a very welcome one.

I think there are very important reform initiatives using the experience of other allies, like the Five Eyes, dealing with precisely these problems that we can take and put into effect.

I think what we need is more encouragement with respect to our agencies to be proactive in suggesting those changes, and then ensuring that Parliament and committees like this understand that and say, “We can do better, and we are going to do everything possible to be sure that we do better quickly.”

:

On the parliamentary aspect of it, we have the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. You wrote about them in your report. Do you feel this is a good forum where documents can be reviewed by parliamentarians while ensuring that we maintain their classification system? More importantly, does NSICOP, speaking comparatively with our Five Eyes partners, have the right level of access?

(1130)

:

It's interesting. Another one of the issues that are in this list of things to be reviewed in the next four or five months is “Whether NSICOP is properly constituted as a committee of the executive, rather than a committee of Parliament.” NSICOP has a very fundamental role, as does NSIRA.

We've now had six years of experience with NSICOP. It's made some recommendations. I think there is much more that can be done with that to improve our system. NSICOP, NSIRA and this oversight committee have very fundamental roles to play.

:

Are there ways that you are able to share with us, before this committee, questions that we should be looking at in making NSICOP and NSIRA more functional?

:

In preparing for these public hearings, we'll try to list a series of questions and then invite experts from outside the government, and some from within the government, to provide their advice on just that.

:

Great.

Mr. Johnston, very quickly, you made some recommendations in terms of changes that should be made to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. This is something that we've also heard from other witnesses. Can you expand on what types of changes you would like to see?

:

Madam Chair, the first observation to make is that the act was passed in 2003, I believe, and has not been substantially amended since that time. It does call for a significant review.

In fact, the director of CSIS has called for that, with some recommendations, on a number of occasions, so it's another area where I think attention is urgent and should be done. The—

:

I'm going to let you just hold that thought, because there was a nice pause there and I think that was a great exchange.

With that, bells are ringing. We do have another vote. I'm going to ask committee members to take a 10-minute break. When we return, we will re-enter into six-minute rounds. I believe we can get through two rounds, and then we can vote.

Do we have agreement to do what we did for the first vote so that we can vote by the app? I'll pause to make sure all votes have been registered, and then we'll continue, to maximize our time together. Excellent.

We'll see you back in 10 minutes. Thank you so much.

(1130)

(1140)

:

I call the meeting back to order.

We are going to go through six-minute rounds. I'm watching the clock as well. I believe we can get through two or maybe three six-minute rounds, depending on timing.

We will be starting with Mr. Cooper.

[Translation]

He will be followed by Ms. Romanado, then Mr. Therrien, if we have the time. We will vote very quickly and continue the meeting, as we did with the first vote.

Go ahead, Mr. Cooper.

[English]

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much, Mr. Johnston.

Mr. Johnston, when you were asked earlier to reconcile the briefing that Erin O'Toole had from CSIS, in which he was informed that he and the Conservative Party were targeted by Beijing and that, among other things, the Beijing regime and Beijing actors, including the United Front Work Department, had amplified and spread disinformation, with your conclusion that you could not trace that disinformation to a state-sponsored source, you said, “The evidence we had before us that permitted us to come to the conclusion you suggested was what was available to us at that time.”

Are you saying you didn't have all of the material evidence and intelligence when you drafted your report?

:

Madam Chair, when we drafted our report, we had the intelligence then available from CSIS and other sources, and that was the basis of our conclusion.

:

You had intelligence, but you said it was based on what was available to you at the time and that there had been “a much greater step in terms of what should have been done”. That's what you said in answer to the question about your effort to try to reconcile what you said with what Mr. O'Toole said based on the information he had received from a CSIS briefing.

Again, I put it to you, how do you explain that?

(1145)

:

Madam Chair, we reported on what was available to us. What transpired in the discussion between the director of CSIS and Mr. O'Toole I don't know. But the issue of—

:

Who selected the CSIS information you relied upon in your report?

:

We had significant information, Madam Chair, from CSIS and we had information, of course, from other agencies, such as the national security adviser and so on, and direct testimony from the heads of the different agencies.

:

I would submit that the only way to reconcile what Mr. O'Toole says with what is in your report is to conclude one of three things: either you omitted material information or you misinterpreted that information or this government withheld that information from you.

I will put it to you more specifically that, at page 25 of your report, in reference to the September 8 Global Times article that contained disinformation—the Global Times being a Beijing-controlled entity—you state, with respect to that disinformation from the Global Times, that “the re-circulation could not be attributed to any state actor.”

How did you come to such a conclusion?

:

Madam Chair, we came to the conclusion set out there based on the information that was available to us at the time—

:

Okay. Thank you for that, because the information that was available to you at that time surely would have included a rapid response mechanism report dated October 18, 2021, which stated, “Chinese Communist Party media accounts on Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok) have published videos that repeat a Global Times headline published on September 8 that suggest the CPC's platform would lead China to break off relations with Canada”. That's from a Communist Party media account, including one Douyin account that had 26 million followers.

You had that information. In the face of that, why did you say there was no evidence the Beijing regime was involved in the recirculation of that disinformation?

:

Madam Chair, the answer to the question is that our conclusion was that we could not find direct attribution to any state actor. There was no question that there were activities, but that they could be traced to a state actor directly was not the conclusion we came to.

:

The rapid response mechanism attributed it to a state actor. It was a Communist Party media account. What part of “state actor” doesn't equal a Communist Party media account?

:

Madam Chair, if I understand the reference, I'm looking at our report, which spoke about WeChat in an article from The Hill Times.

Is that the reference?

:

No, it's the rapid response mechanism report of October 18, 2021, which is one of the very few documents that have been produced for this committee. Surely you had seen it.

:

Madam Chair, with respect to that, the information we had did not permit us to conclude that there was a state-sponsored source. There may be other information that would make that clearer, but that was not clear to us at the time.

:

Well, there were Communist Party media accounts, with one account having 26 million followers, but you made the unequivocal statement that there was nothing to indicate recirculation and amplification by the Beijing regime.

You further cite, on page 25 of your report, in reference to the misinformation directed at then member of Parliament Kenny Chiu, that it, too, “could not be traced to a state-sponsored source”. Mr. Johnston, were you not aware of it? On September 10, an account associated with HuayiNet, which is connected to the United Front Work Department, posted disinformation from another Global Times article, this time targeted at Kenny Chiu, yet you make that unequivocal statement in your report.

How is that possible?

:

Madam Chair, let me refer specifically to what we said on that matter on page 25:

Chinese-Canadian MPs, including Mr. Chiu, were and remain of particular interest to the PRC. There was online misinformation about Mr. Chiu's proposed foreign agent legislation, which he corrected in the media during the campaign. But the misinformation could not be traced to a state-sponsored source. The government does not regulate consumption of social media, during elections or otherwise. However, it has engaged with social media platforms to deal with misinformation, and the threat that it poses to election security. This does not include WeChat, which is based in the PRC.

(1150)

:

Thank you.

Mrs. Romanado, go ahead.

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Through you, I'd like to thank Mr. Johnston for being with us today.

First, Mr. Johnston, I'd like to apologize to you and your team for some of the personal attacks that have been thrown out there with respect to the integrity of yourself, your team and the work that you're doing. I do want to thank you for the task that you have at hand for a very serious issue.

Mr. Johnston, I read the report multiple times. I have to say that the conclusion I come to is that it is very well done. It is very clear to me that you had access to the information that you required to enable you to determine some of the statements and debunk some of the misinformation that was out there. References to the information that led you to come to those conclusions are part of the confidential annex that is included in the report, for those who have the top secret clearance, obviously, to be able to see it.

I have two things. We're hearing that there may be additional information that you did not have access to. You testified earlier that the leader of the official opposition, , was invited four times to provide additional information for your consideration on this issue. He did not provide that and you merely received copies of media reports. We understand that the Cumming report coming out of the last election was not provided to you.

Is there anything else? Gathering intelligence is something that is ongoing. This is not something where you have one piece of a puzzle and it doesn't change. Do you need more information in order to continue and to conclude the work that you are doing?

:

Madam Chair, I have two observations.

One is that, as we've been dealing with an ocean of information in eight short weeks, it's like painting a picture where you have different brush strokes. You need brush stroke after brush stroke until finally a picture emerges. In building a synthesis, that is very key.

Am I confident that we saw every bit of information that we would like to have had or perhaps should have had? Given the ocean of information, the answer is no. I'm not sure how we could absorb any more than we did in the space of eight weeks.

What more needs to be done? I think it comes to the machinery system that we indicated is in need of major reform. It is about having much better clarification of when something moves from intelligence, in this emerging picture, to something that becomes a threat and is passed on. We simply don't deal with information as well as we possibly should.

:

Actually, on that note, something that we heard in earlier testimony, Mr. Johnston, is that intelligence agencies really don't understand politics and political parties, and political parties and politicians don't really understand intelligence gathering and so on. That is something that needs to be improved in terms of making sure there is a two-way dialogue between these two stakeholders in terms of foreign interference.

One other thing I would question is this. Given that PROC is looking at this issue, and we have NSICOP, NSIRA and yourself looking at this, and I believe other committees are, would you recommend that perhaps members of this committee receive the necessary top secret clearance to be able to see the same information that you have in terms of the annex that clearly demonstrates how you came to the conclusions that you have? Would you recommend that, or would that be a duplication of efforts with respect to NSICOP?

:

Madam Chair, with respect to the second of those two questions, I think that is something that should be looked at very carefully, particularly if it permits parliamentarians to perform their proper functions.

Other jurisdictions have had experience with that. They have review committees like NSICOP, but to expand the “cone of silence”, so to speak, and the opportunity to get at this to make intelligence decisions in Parliament makes sense. Whether every parliamentarian should necessarily have that clearance, it may not be, but I think we could expand considerably how we involve parliamentarians more. In particular, when it comes to issues that affect individual parliamentarians, like their safety, it's very clear to me that we have a much better job to do in getting past “This must be kept secret. We can't tell you about it because it will destroy our forces.” I think we have to find ways of bringing those folks into the confidence.

On the first question, you're quite right. We have a culture with intelligence agencies to keep things secret, and for very good reasons. They have sources whose lives are at stake. They have confidence that they have to share with other intelligence agencies. But I think other jurisdictions have made some strong and successful efforts to deal better with that declassification/classification nexus. I think that's a job we have to do here.

(1155)

:

Thank you very much.

I have two last points.

With respect to our intelligence assets, I'm sure you're aware, Mr. Johnston, that my two sons are in the military, and one of them is an intelligence officer, so I understand full well the importance of understanding national security and understanding the difference between a classified “need to know” and putting our assets at risk, as well as our relationship with the Five Eyes.

One thing we did hear is that a lot of parliamentarians and/or their staff won't recognize what is foreign interference. Would you agree that there's some education that needs to happen to make sure that we can be a partner in finding the solution to combat foreign interference?

:

First of all, I salute your two sons and their service, which I admire very much.

Second, how we refine that information and put it into a palatable, understandable form is a major challenge, and we have, as we pointed out, challenges with respect to this that must be addressed and improved.

:

Thank you.

Bells have just ended. What we're going to do is do the six minutes for Mr. Therrien, and then we will take a break to make sure everyone has voted.

[Translation]

Mr. Therrien, the floor is yours.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Johnston has discussed public hearings at length. When I talked about a public inquiry, he often responded by saying that he was going to hold public hearings.

Mr. Johnston, let's suppose I'm a victim of Chinese interference through some police station, for example. Do you think I would then appear at a public hearing?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, certainly some people will not want to appear before a public hearing. That said, we will encourage anyone who wants to make a submission to us, or write to us, or account personal experiences that they've had. They would be very much welcome, and we hope we can give that appropriate attention.

[Translation]

:

Thank you for your quick and specific answer.

Holding public hearings means telling people that they are welcome if they want to come and discuss interference. Cherie Wong very recently said she wouldn't participate in public hearings. She's a member of the Canada Hong Kong Alliance and doesn't want to appear because she's afraid of reprisals.

That's the difference between a public hearing and an inquiry. An inquiry will summon people and be conducted in camera. It can summon people and request that documents be submitted to it. That way, people can safely go and speak with inquiry members and be examined and cross-examined. Information thus gathered would give us a clear idea of the kind of Chinese interference being carried on here.

Mr. Johnston, don't you think that's a promising approach?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, I think it's quite possible, and very appropriate, that in the public hearings, one could have in camera sessions. In fact, since our review will continue with respect to threats to our safety and so on, I expect we will have to go in camera, certainly to hear from officials with classified information.

With regard to any member of the public who does not want to be seen publicly but wants to tell a story that's important to a proper review, I think it would be very appropriate to arrange for those meetings to occur in camera with all the appropriate protection.

(1200)

[Translation]

:

So you're in favour of the idea of inviting people without necessarily putting legitimate pressure on them to provide the desired information and so we're better equipped to deal with foreign interference. That's what I understand.

:

Exactly.

:

Can we shed light on interference merely by inviting people to appear? The answer has already been confirmed: victim members of the diaspora have said they won't attend those hearings.

Won't you then be facing a lack of information that prevents you from shedding any light on the matter in accordance with your mandate?

[English]

:

I don't think one should try to force people to come, either in the open or in an in camera session, to disclose anything if they don't wish to. They're Canadian citizens. They have a right not to do so. That would be fully respected.

[Translation]

:

In camera proceedings are extremely important in an inquiry. Referring back to the Arar inquiry, people were summoned, but they didn't face threats of physical or other violence. That's proof that an inquiry protects people who are victims of this kind of pressure and makes it possible to gather more comprehensive information, compared to what might be gathered at public hearings. These are the reasons why many experts who were opposed to a public inquiry before Mr. Johnston's report changed their minds after reading it.

Now coming back to senior counsel Sheila Block, I won't go on at length about her. She donated $7,500 to the Liberal Party and participated in a fundraising activity in 2021 that the Prime Minister also attended.

Does the fact that you selected her as senior counsel earn you the trust of people expecting solutions to Chinese interference? Is that a good move that will encourage people to trust this special rapporteur?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, Ms. Block's credentials, as a thoughtful and impartial person of great integrity, are known throughout this land to any members of the bar who have been acquainted with her. In my view, we've been extremely fortunate to have her skills, her integrity, and her commitment to improving our way of dealing with foreign interference.

I have every confidence in her, and that's shared widely across the land, regarding her as one of the pre-eminent counsels we have in this country.

[Translation]

:

Thank you.

The Conservatives were very keen to know if he was a friend of the government, of the Prime Minister and so on. I didn't really ask the question, for one simple reason: in his report, he blames the media, CSIS and the public service, but he doesn't blame the government or its ministers. I think this report is proof that he's ultimately a friend of the Prime Minister.

[English]

:

Madam Chair, we don't blame the media, nor do we blame public officials in our report. What we are calling for in this continuation of public hearings is to provide the ways of reforming our system so it functions in the interest of all Canadians and functions very well.

:

Thank you.

I'm going to ask that we pause for not more than a minute, hopefully, to make sure that everyone has voted and that your votes have been registered.

I'm pausing for one minute. Try not to move.

(1200)

(1205)

The Chair: I'm going to continue.

We will continue with Ms. Kwan.

[Translation]

Ms. Kwan, the floor is yours for six minutes.

[English]

:

Mr. Johnston, your report noted that:

Irregularities were observed with Mr. Dong's nomination in 2019, and there is well-grounded suspicion that the irregularities were tied to the PRC Consulate in Toronto, with whom Mr. Dong maintains relationships.

Did you look into what those irregularities were? If yes, what were they?

:

Madam Chair, again, I'm trying to keep the two parts of my brain functioning—the open part and the classified part. We speak about that issue on page 26:

Han Dong Advised the PRC Consulate to Extend the Detention of the “Two Michaels” (Global News, March 22, 2023)

There has been considerable media attention about an alleged transcript of this conversation. I have reviewed the same intelligence report that was provided to the Prime Minister relating to this allegation, which I am advised is the only intelligence that speaks to this issue. I can report the following.

The allegation is false. Mr. Dong discussed the “two Michaels” with a PRC official, but did not suggest to the official that the PRC extend their detention. The allegation that he did make that suggestion has had a very adverse effect on Mr. Dong. He continued to maintain close relationships with PRC consular officials at least through the 2021 Election.

Ministers and the Prime Minister went out of their way to defend Mr. Dong, whom they believe has been badly harmed by the reporting. They did not believe the media reports when they came out—

:

I'm just going to pause.

Ms. Kwan is visiting committee today and we are excited to have her. I think if we can just keep a glimpse on each other, then you can see...because I think it's just an exchange that she's trying to get to. Quoting from the report is appreciated, but she has noted that she has read the report, so she is looking for the answer as to however you feel best....

Ms. Kwan, the floor is yours.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I've read the report several times over, so I don't really need Mr. Johnston to quote the report back to me. What I really need is for him to answer the question, which he didn't.

My next question, then, is this: Did he ask if the knew what those irregularities were?

:

Madam Chair, can we be a little more specific about the irregularities?

:

The irregularities, Mr. Johnston, are what you cited in the report. You say, “Irregularities were observed with Mr. Dong’s nomination in 2019, and there is well-grounded suspicion that the irregularities were tied to the PRC Consulate in Toronto”.

:

The irregularities had to do with nomination meetings and the busing in of people and students and so on, and some questions about whether Mr. Dong had been substituted for another candidate in the nominated process. I think they were that kind.

:

My question was, Mr. Johnston, whether you asked the if he knew what the irregularities were.

:

We did ask the about the nomination of Mr. Dong and the allegations that a previous member had been pushed out. He indicated that he was aware of that and that there were reasons that the previous member stepped out and Mr. Dong received the nomination.

:

I'm sorry, but my question was whether the knew what those irregularities were.

:

I believe the was aware that there was some question about the actual nomination and the busing in of people, etc.

:

Okay.

In the report, Mr. Johnston, you concluded that it was reasonable for the to take no action, even though in your own report you cited that there were irregularities and that there was well-founded suspicion.

From my perspective, I don't know how you can square that circle and how you can come to that conclusion when there was well-founded suspicion, and yet no action was taken. The common refrain from the report seems to be that no recommendations were made, so none were taken and none were ignored. Somehow, the notion is to say “I see no evil, I know no evil, so therefore there is no evil”, but in reality, there is much more and it's much deeper than what is going on.

My question, then, is this: Can Mr. Johnston explain if CSIS looked into nomination processes?

(1210)

:

Madam Chair, with respect to the nomination processes, that is a very difficult area, because they're governed by the rules of the party. It's been a very difficult area to regulate, to oversee, and I think one looks to the parties to develop appropriate rules.

I think CSIS has been conscious of the fact that nomination events have followed procedures that would not be the most attractive, but to date, I don't think CSIS has cast its attention into that area in great depth.

:

I think that explains why CSIS makes no recommendation to the on this, because they don't look into it in great depth, but it doesn't mean to say there are no issues. Even in your own report, Mr. Johnston, you noted that there were irregularities and well-founded suspicion. How could it be that you would come to the conclusion for the Prime Minister to take no action, that it is actually okay? I really have deep troubles with that.

I'd like to ask Mr. Johnston this question: Can you advise the committee on what your concept is of the appearance of conflict of interest? What does that mean to you?

:

The appearance of a conflict of interest would be a reasonable person in possession of all the true facts concluding that a person would not be able to provide unbiased judgment on a particular matter. The key issues would be, one, a reasonable person, and two, all the true facts being in front of that person.

:

Did you check to see if Ms. Block has donated to the Liberal Party or attended a Liberal Party fundraiser event with the before you asked her to join your team on this important work?

:

Madam Chair, I've worked with Ms. Block on an earlier occasion and have complete confidence in her and her colleagues to make any appropriate judgments on conflicts of interest. With respect to her contributions to the Liberal Party, she has made contributions to other parties, and she has served the country with great eminence.

No, I don't believe Ms. Block is a conflict of interest.

:

Thank you.

We will now enter into our usual rounds. There are five minutes to Mr. Cooper, followed by Ms. Sahota.

Mr. Cooper, go ahead.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Johnston, I draw your attention to page 27 of your report, where you write that “CSIS sent an issues management note” to then public safety minister and his chief of staff in May 2021, which warned that MP was being targeted by Beijing,.

Last Thursday at this committee, said something quite different from what you wrote in your report. He said that CSIS did not make him aware of that information. How can one reconcile, on the one hand, what you said in your report versus what Minister Blair testified before this committee last Thursday?

:

Could you give me the paragraph reference on that page? Did you say page 25 or page 27?

:

I hope this is not taking my time, Chair.

It's page 27.

:

Okay. It says, “CSIS sent an issues management note”. Is that the question?

Mr. Michael Cooper: Yes.

The Right Hon. David Johnston: It says, “CSIS conducted the briefing, but we understand from Mr. Chong's statements to the media and PROC that it did not include the detail with respect to his family.”

:

I'm sure you're quite familiar with that. I hope you're familiar with that section of your report. It's a whole section.

:

Madam Chair, I'm attempting to get the context so that I can provide an appropriate answer.

It's clear to us that there was a breakdown in communication in warnings going from CSIS to Mr. Blair, for reasons that I think have to be repaired, including who would receive information and with what kind of equipment, etc. I think that's been clearly indicated.

I think in this case, the Prime Minister has taken action—

Mr. Michael Cooper: You—

The Right Hon. David Johnston: —to ensure that there is a much better protocol—

(1215)

:

I'm sorry, Mr. Johnston. I want to be respectful—

The Chair: I'm going to pause.

Mr. Michael Cooper: —but I have limited time—

:

I'm going to pause.

Right here, on this beautiful sheet in front of me, is exactly how much time everyone gets and exactly how much time you've actually received. You'll notice that when there is a nice exchange of one person speaking at a time and the beep goes off, I let the conversation continue.

I've proven myself to you, Mr. Cooper. In the last round, you had six minutes, and you were given seven minutes and 12 seconds. Do you know why? It was a good exchange and we were getting good information.

Once again, let's just take turns back and forth. You can rest assured—all members can—that any time that should be given to you will be given to you.

Mr. Cooper, the floor is again yours.

:

Mr. Johnston, at page 27 of your report, you say very specifically that “an issues management note” was sent to the minister in May 2021 concerning Michael Chong, but that “Neither the Minister nor his chief of staff received [that]”, because they did not have access to what you refer to as the “Top Secret Network email”. At committee last Thursday, Minister Blair said it wasn't an issue of access. In fact, he said, “First of all, there is no email”.

Is Mr. Blair not being forthright in his testimony, or is there a material fact or facts that you got wrong in your report? I'm trying to understand, on the one hand, what Mr. Blair said, versus what you say, which I can't reconcile.

:

Madam Chair, the question was what Mr. Blair received. Our understanding, from Mr. Blair's testimony to us, is that he did not receive the memo indicating that that warning was there.

:

But a memo had been sent to his attention.

:

My understanding is that it had his name or office on it but he did not receive it.

:

That was sent through an email, a top secret email system. That's what your report says.

:

Madam Chair, the understanding I have is that, very clearly, email or whatever, he did not receive it. That was the testimony he gave to us. That, for us, seemed to be a very substantial flaw in how information is crystallized and finds its way into the hands of recipients who have the accountability to act on it.

:

It's impossible to understand how Mr. Blair could say there just wasn't such an account, but you say there is.

Moving on to the member for Don Valley North, at page 24 of your report, you say, “I did not find evidence that Mr. Dong was aware of the irregularities or the PRC Consulate’s potential involvement in his nomination”. Did you find any evidence or intelligence that Mr. Dong was unaware of the Beijing consulate's involvement in the irregularities that happened at his nomination campaign, at the nomination meeting?

:

Again, I'm trying to be careful in dealing with what's open information and what's classified information.

With respect to the nomination meeting, there clearly were strange practices, unusual practices, going on. We did not conclude from that that it was directly laid in the hands of the People's Republic of China. There clearly was discussion between Mr. Dong and the consulate in Toronto, but that's the extent, to my understanding.

:

Well, I asked you a specific question, and that was whether you had any information that he was unaware.

I want to ask you very simply, why did you not bother to interview Mr. Dong?

:

I think we interviewed the people who had information about this particular matter. Mr. Dong at that time, I think, was proceeding with his own lawsuit. We felt that this was something he should get on with.

:

Thank you.

Ms. Sahota, go ahead.

(1220)

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

When answering a question that was previously asked, at the end, Mr. Johnston, you stated that you had worked with Ms. Block previously. Can you elaborate on what that previous work was?

:

In about 2007-08, Prime Minister Harper invited me to review allegations of the involvement of Mr. Karlheinz Schreiber with former prime minister Mulroney, who had stepped down from office, and to strike the terms of reference for an inquiry into that particular matter. Ms. Block reached out to assist as senior counsel. She and a team from the Torys law firm did so and were eminently helpful and capable in that.

:

I guess her work was good during that interaction, since you decided to retain her services again this time.

:

When I asked her to assist in that respect, she was referred to me as the pre-eminent counsel in the country to do that kind of work, and that proved to be the case.

:

Thank you.

Through this process, Mr. Johnston, you've been given thousands of documents. You said that you had only so many weeks and that you had ample evidence that was provided to you, including intelligence. You interviewed officials, ministers, the , and members of the security and intelligence community. You then looked at unverified allegations that have been either floating around in the media or made by politicians. Then you took a look at the substance, the material that you were provided, to come to conclusions.

I want to walk you through some of the conclusions and ask for a little bit of elaboration, an explanation, as to why you came to those conclusions.

On the allegation that the PRC gave $250,000 to 11 political candidates for the 2019 election—that was the allegation in the Global News report of November 7, 2022—you stated in your report:

No recommendations were made to any Minister or the Prime Minister about this allegation, and therefore no recommendations were ignored.

Can you expand on how you came to this conclusion?

:

We set that out on page 21. We just finish by saying:

NSIA Thomas and the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff both testified to PROC that there was no evidence of money flowing to federal candidates.

I asked the Prime Minister and other Ministers if they or their staff knew anything about money being transferred to federal candidates in the 2019 Election. They indicated that they had not heard anything about this until the media reporting. The Prime Minister pointed out that he is not briefed on matters that are not supported by reliable intelligence. No recommendations were made to any Minister or the Prime Minister about this allegation, and therefore no recommendations were ignored.

:

Then, on the allegations that there was a network of 11 federal election candidates and operatives, at least some of whom were “witting affiliates of the Chinese Communist Party”—this is what Global News reported on November 7, 2022—you stated in your report:

My conclusion is that there was no evidence presented to any Minister or the Prime Minister that any of the 11 candidates or any group of candidates were working together as part of a network. No recommendation about a network of candidates was made as no network was known to exist. No recommendation was ignored.

Can you expand on this conclusion? How did you arrive at this?

:

That was based on both open and classified information, first of all. What we say a little bit earlier on page 22 is this:

The PRC has leveraged proxy agents and has tried to influence numerous Liberal and Conservative candidates in subtle ways. There is no basis to conclude that the 11 candidates were or are working in concert (i.e., as a “network”) or understood the proxies' intentions. Some of the candidates are well-integrated with Chinese Canadian community organizations. There is nothing inherently suspicious about this, as it is common for political candidates to rely on community support.

In a nutshell, I guess, based on what we received, we could not see the evidence of an integrated network working as alleged to have occurred.

:

Thank you.

We've discussed this a bit in some previous questioning, but I want to be clear on the allegation that Han Dong advised the PRC consulate to extend the detention of the two Michaels. Global News was very confident in its reporting on this. You found that to be false. Can you expand as to why you found that to be false?

(1225)

:

The reference, I think, that Global News had was to an early draft of an understanding of what transpired in a conversation between a member of the PRC consulate and Mr. Dong. That was subsequently superseded by another interview, which indicated that the suggestion in the first one that he had suggested the two Michaels be further detained was simply a wrong interpretation. It was just a misinterpretation.

:

Thank you.

We should make sure that the mikes are off so that the floor sound doesn't go back to colleagues.

Thank you, Ms. Sahota.

[Translation]

Mr. Therrien, the floor is yours for two and a half minutes.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Johnston, you said you met with witnesses who had relevant information that you could use to draft the report that you tabled two weeks ago. I have a few questions about that.

First, did you meet with Stéphane Perrault, the Chief Electoral Officer?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, we did not meet with the director, Mr. Perrault, because there were no complaints before him or the commissioner of Canada elections with respect to interference. We anticipate that we would be meeting with him and his colleagues as we look at improving our systems, including any suggestions that can be made to help the commissioner of Canada elections work more effectively.

[Translation]

:

Unless I'm mistaken, the Chinese interference was in a way an attack on Canada's electoral system and perhaps that of Quebec.

You didn't think it was appropriate to meet with the current Chief Electoral Officer. It seems to me you should have met with Mr. Perrault at the outset because he's central to everything that happens within Canada's electoral process. I'm astonished to hear you didn't meet with him, even though I understand your answer.

Did you meet with the commissioner of elections, Caroline Simard?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, with respect to both the commissioner of Canada elections, Ms. Simard, and the Chief Electoral Officer, there were no complaints registered with the commissioner or the Chief Electoral Officer for us to follow up on with the 2019 and 2021 elections. For that reason, we did not meet with them, but we expect we will in our subsequent work.

[Translation]

:

No complaints had been filed, but 11 candidates were apparently victims of some sort of interference during the election. You confirmed that in your report. They were election candidates. As no complaints were filed concerning those two organizations, you thought you didn't have to meet with the commissioner of elections or the Chief Electoral Officer.

Is that correct?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, we expect that we will meet with those two officials in subsequent review. What I was saying is that our understanding was that there were no complaints directed to them that required action with regard to the 2019 and 2021 elections.

[Translation]

:

Madam Chair, I'm truly stunned by what I'm hearing. I'll conclude my remarks with that.

:

We will continue with Mr. Julian.

[English]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'd like to thank Mr. Johnston for being here today.

I want to follow up on the question that Ms. Kwan asked you about the vetting of Sheila Block. It was unclear to me whether it was an honour system where you expected her to step forward with concerns about her donation history, or whether you were aware of all those donations and, to your mind, that didn't represent any problem, given the important work you were assigning to her.

:

Madam Chair, with respect to Ms. Block, I reached out to her because she's an eminent counsel and highly qualified. I'd worked with her in another difficult situation—

:

That's not the question, with respect, Mr. Johnston. It's whether you were aware of her donation history or not.

:

The answer is that I wasn't aware of her donation history, and it wouldn't have occurred to me to inquire into that, because her reputation and integrity are impeccable and continue to be so, in my view.

:

Mr. Johnston, we've heard a lot today. Conservatives have been citing and quoting Liberals praising your decades of public service. Liberals have been quoting Conservatives praising your public service. There's no doubt that you have a long history of public service.

We've spoken to this in the House as well, that a motion was adopted by a majority of parliamentarians in a minority parliament. Parliamentarians read your report and considered that before they cast their vote.

As you mentioned at the outset, you have a deep respect for Parliament, so I find it perplexing. How could you have a deep respect for Parliament and, when there is a clear parliamentary vote, ignore that clear parliamentary vote asking you to step aside so that we could have a public inquiry, which, of course, most Canadians want to see as well?

(1230)

:

Madam Chair, I do have deep respect for Parliament, and I hope I've given good evidence of that through my life, and through my time as Governor General.

The reason I'm continuing in this position, with respect to the motion of Parliament, is that I believe the vote was based on allegations that were false. It would be wrong for me to simply step aside and say, “We'll let those allegations stand. That's fact; that's the truth, so be it.” That would not be the right thing to do.

:

Mr. Johnston, with respect, you can't determine how parliamentarians vote, or why they vote that way. As you mentioned, you have a deep respect for Parliament. You do need to heed a parliamentary vote. As a parliamentarian who cast that vote, I was well aware of your long history of public service but simply profoundly disagreed with your conclusions.

:

Madam Chair, I was asked by the government of the day to undertake an important task, to review foreign interference in our elections. I undertook that task and intend to continue it until my services are simply no longer useful or required.

That's the reason why, with great respect to Parliament, I have—

:

Thank you.

Next, we have Ms. Dancho, followed by Mr. Turnbull.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you for being here, Mr. Johnston. We appreciate your participating in this important democratic process to hold the Liberal government accountable, as is our duty as His Majesty's official opposition, so thank you again for being here today.

I want to ask you a brief question about your report. I'm sure you're aware that there have been multiple Beijing police stations operating at various locations across Canada for the purpose of intimidating Chinese Canadians and students from China studying here, to silence their democratic right to debate and to freely criticize foreign governments.

I was disappointed, however, to see that this was not included in your report. Can you explain why?

:

Madam Chair, the activities of the police stations are nefarious and widespread here in Canada and in other jurisdictions. They are the subject of an RCMP investigation, which is a rather unusual situation. Because of that ongoing investigation and oversight activities, we felt it was appropriate to see that investigation through.

:

Thank you for your answer.

I do feel, however, that it is warranted, and it's certainly encompassed in the foreign interference sphere that has been talked about quite a bit. I see that you're nodding in agreement, so I appreciate that.

I feel that leaving it out does feed into a bit of a perception of bias, which has been a criticism of this report and of you leading the report, in the sense that it has been a failure of the Liberal government to drag its feet on bringing forward a foreign agent registry act. That would be the vital tool needed to hold accountable those operating these illegal Beijing police stations, which are a very clear violation of our sovereignty. They are a slap in the face to all Canadians. That is a tool we need to hold accountable those who are responsible for this, and again, the Liberal government has dragged its feet for a number of years. I do feel, sir, that it would have been a well-placed criticism within this report. There were very few, if any, criticisms of the current Liberal government in the report.

I found it concerning as well that you left out that the Trudeau Foundation, given the leaked report from CSIS, had been given $140,000 through various channels from the Communist Party of China. CSIS said in the leak that, through a wiretap, it was found to have been donated for the express purpose of influencing , who would ultimately become the Prime Minister. Again, not including that leads to a perception of bias, sir. Whether warranted or not, I think that's certainly a valid perception that many people beyond the Conservative Party have pointed out.

Again, I appreciate that you do not see a conflict of interest with or with the Trudeau family. I do have to point out that it is not common, certainly, in Canada that people are friends with prime ministers' sons, and that they have dinner with them and go skiing with them.

I am a McGill graduate, sir, and I appreciate that you were also at McGill. You mentioned several times that you ran into at McGill and that you saw him there. I can tell you, when I was at McGill, I didn't know who the president was, let alone run into him or her on multiple occasions.

I do feel that, because of your long career and your service to Canada, you have very clear connections to a very elite group of what some call “Liberal insiders” that perhaps you don't recognize. That has provided a very clear perception of bias with your appointment, sir. Whether rightly or wrongly, I do feel that those who hold that perception have a good reason in this regard.

Ultimately, sir, while the report is extensive, it does downplay a lot of the concerns and the leaks we have seen from reputable journalists in The Globe and Mail. It denies certain ones. It calls certain other ones false and says that the conclusions were false. You are quite critical, and I do appreciate that you don't see it this way, but this report, sir, is quite critical of the media and their discussion of these leaks in the news to tell the public.

It is also quite critical of the Conservative Party in the way we have held the government accountable upon learning of these leaks. Again, it is not very critical at all of the Liberal Party, despite the fact that they have really not held anyone accountable for the police stations, for the intimidation of MP Chong, , MP Kwan and MP Chiu, and for the targeting of the Conservative Party of Canada. In fact, the one diplomat expelled would not have been expelled if those leaks had not happened, yet there is nothing critical about the lack of action to hold anyone accountable for these things in this report.

Sir, respectfully, I do feel that the perception of bias is warranted, both in the report and given your history with the Trudeau family.

I will just conclude, Madam Chair.

I urge you to respect the will of Parliament, Mr. Johnston, with three votes calling for a public inquiry. Respect the will of Parliament and honourably step down following that.

Thank you, Mr. Johnston.

(1235)

:

Madam Chair, first of all, with respect to having no criticism of the government, the report goes into considerable detail to say that we have a system of dealing with foreign interference that is not working. It points out a number of the areas of defects. I have welcomed the initiatives that have been taken, such as working to now establish a foreign agent registry, which would put that in the public realm. That's been a matter to study, because it has pros and cons, but I think there's action on that. That's very encouraging.

With respect to friendship, acquaintances and so on, you suggested that somehow my realm of friends is with senior Liberal Party people. I've been fortunate in my life to be president of two important universities in this country. I've been involved in somewhere between two and three dozen inquiries, advisory boards and so on. In the course of that kind of work, one is given the opportunity to meet with senior officials, be they Conservative or any other party. That, for me, is simply part of my life, so to suggest that I'm part of a Liberal clique is just wrong.

:

Thank you.

Mr. Turnbull, go ahead.

:

Thanks, Madam Chair.

Mr. Johnston, I was comforted, in a sense, by the fact that you invited scrutiny into the findings of your own report by giving the opportunity for all parties represented on NSICOP and the security and intelligence experts through NSIRA to review your findings. You've also said today multiple times, and I know it's in your report as well, that opposition leaders were invited and you encouraged them to review the facts in the annex of your report.

I take it from Ms. Dancho's comments that she thinks your calling something “false” is a criticism. I think that's just a commitment to the truth.

It seems you must be quite confident—in your findings and the conclusions that you've drawn from the facts, within the context—that other parties and individuals whom you've invited to scrutinize your findings would land on the same conclusions. How confident are you?

:

What I would say, Madam Chair, is that we did the best we possibly could in the two months we had to follow the facts as far as we could and apply the law.

We welcome the scrutiny, the overview of the two committees you referred to, joined by the leaders of the major opposition parties. I think that's appropriate and that's how these things should work. Our work should be held accountable, as it is being here. It will be held accountable by committees that have expertise in this and have been working at it for very long.

With respect to the media, we do say in our report that we're not casting any aspersions at the media. Freedom of press is very important in this country and we would be in chaos if we didn't have it, especially with respect to the rule of law.

(1240)

:

Thank you for that.

I know that you must have had security clearance at the highest level in order to be able to review the intelligence documents within the context in which you formulated your conclusions in your report. Were you impeded in any way in speaking publicly about your opinions about the government taking action or not taking action as a result of having that security clearance?

:

The answer to that question, Madam Chair, is no. We were not impeded. In fact, we worked very carefully to try to write a report that would put as much light as we could on this matter but still respect classified information. There was no impediment to that. We were very pleased to be able to push those boundaries a little bit more than they ordinarily would be in a public report.

:

Thank you.

One of the things that I spent considerable time doing is reviewing all the things that our government has done on foreign interference since 2015. I've heard time and time again people make claims that are false, that the government hasn't done anything.

In your report, you spend a considerable number of pages on that—I think it's roughly page 30 to 49, so almost 20 pages of the report—and you conclude that:

While more can and must be done to strengthen our ability to detect and deter foreign interference, the extent of the government's policy initiatives and regular communications on the topic contradicts suggestions that the government intended to hide the existence of foreign interference, that it has negligently failed to act on it, or that it tolerated foreign interference.

Can you confirm again that it's not true that our government did nothing on foreign interference?

:

Madam Chair, we set out a series of initiatives that had been taken, principally from about 2017 on. Russian influence was the main concern then; Chinese influence became that. There clearly was important activity. The concern is that the activity was not fast enough to catch up with the growing foreign interference, which continues.

What we have done in setting this out is also attempting to create a menu of other initiatives that should take place, some of which we expect to review in our public hearings, to continue this job of being much more aggressive in recognizing the nature of the flip and then taking the prompt steps to counter it, deter it and deal with it in an adequate fashion.

:

If I may just follow up on that, I know that at some point—and I don't remember exactly where it was—you had admitted that your assumption leading into your work as special rapporteur was that you would likely land on a public inquiry, and yet you didn't. You landed on public hearings.

Can you explain why?

:

Madam Chair, a public inquiry would duplicate the work that we attempted to do, especially dealing with classified information. Any public inquiry is going to run into that same problem: How do you deal with classified information in an open fashion and report upon it?

Our view is that you could do that particularly in the area of reforming our systems, looking at them carefully and thoughtfully, drawing the best expertise you can, reinforcing the oversight committees, building on a better system of managing foreign interference and taking lessons from other jurisdictions, especially the Five Eyes, which have had considerable experience in dealing with exactly these challenges.

:

Thank you.

This brings us almost to the end. What we are going to do is give five minutes to Mr. Brock, followed by five minutes to Ms. O'Connell.

[Translation]

Mr. Therrien will have two and a half minutes and Mr. Julien two minutes.

[English]

Mr. Brock, five minutes go to you.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'll be splitting my time with my colleague Mr. Chong.

Mr. Johnston, aside from Navigator, are there any other individuals or entities assisting you currently?

(1245)

:

Madam Chair, I've received informal advice from a number of people, including professionals, but no one has been paid for their services apart from Navigator.

:

Thank you.

Are Don Guy and Brian Topp, or anyone else from GT and Company, involved with assisting you?

:

Yes, those two individuals have provided advice to me, which was quite welcome.

:

Okay. Was it both individuals, Mr. Guy and Mr. Topp?

:

Yes.

:

When did that start?

:

Madam Chair, I think that started about 10 days ago, as I recall.

:

Thank you.

Are you still receiving advice?

:

Yes.

:

Thank you.

Is there anyone else from GT and Company whom you've spoken to about foreign interference?

:

No, I think not, Madam Chair.

:

Okay.

Are you paying Mr. Guy and Mr. Topp for their services and advice?

:

Not at all, Madam Chair, nor are we paying for any of the other informal advice I'm receiving from a number of quarters.

:

Thank you.

At least three times, Mr. Johnston, you've misquoted sections of your report in response to various questions from members of all parties. It begs the question, sir, of who actually wrote this report.

:

Madam Chair, the answer is that I wrote the report, and had considerable advice from a very competent legal team.

:

That includes Sheila Block.

:

It was led by Sheila Block, Madam Chair.

:

Does it include her team?

:

Madam Chair, yes, I've been assisted by a team of legal experts.

:

Did you receive drafting assistance from the PMO?

:

Madam Chair, no, there would be no question of drafting assistance from the PMO. We're completely independent in our work from the PMO.

:

Did you receive advice from the PMO as to what should be contained in the report?

:

Madam Chair, we had continual discussions with PMO officials as we were seeking information and trying to get different—

:

Thank you.

Did you receive drafting assistance from the PCO?

:

Madam Chair, the report is something I wrote, with assistance from my senior legal team, and that was it.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Go ahead, Mr. Chong.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Johnston, thank you for taking the time over the last three hours to appear in front of us.

The core of your mandate is to assess foreign interference in our electoral process. That's the core of your mandate.

In Canada, there is only one federal electoral process, and that is the process whereby Canadians get one vote for their local member of Parliament. Everyone else in our system is appointed. The Senate is appointed. The Prime Minister is appointed—as you know, as a former governor general. The cabinet is appointed. Everyone else is appointed. The only electoral process federally in our system is for the House of Commons. It's the only part of our system that has an electoral process. It's the only part of our system that is democratic. It's the only part of our system where Canadians get a vote, and that is for the House of Commons.

The majority of the people's 338 elected representatives have voted three times in the last three months for an independent public inquiry, yet you and you alone—with respect—have recommended against one. How can you and the government, in this process that you are involved with as an independent rapporteur, restore trust and confidence in our democracy if the government continues to defy the democratic wishes of our only national democratic institution, the House of Commons?

:

Madam Chair, I was asked by the government of the day to undertake a job to review foreign interference, and that included the question of whether a public inquiry would be the best way to do it. After very thoughtful consideration, we concluded that it was not, but that conducting public hearings on the matters that were not classified information would be a very appropriate way to build trust in our institutions.

That work continues to be very important, and I think we need to bring a sense of urgency to get on with that task.

:

I have a very different question, Madam Chair, a very short one.

Mr. O'Toole indicated that the report had been sent to translation on the weekend before he met with you. On what date was the report sent to translation?

(1250)

:

If my memory serves me, Madam Chair, [Technical difficulty—Editor] for translation, but on the basis that we'd get the translation started and that there would be changes and amendments to that report. Within the two days following our meeting with Mr. O'Toole, which I again emphasize was an extremely important and helpful meeting, we made changes to that report and ensured that they were in the translation.

:

Thank you.

Time is so short, and I did let you get one extra one in there, so I'll note that.

Ms. O'Connell, I'll give the same time to you.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I was hopeful. Since my last intervention, we did receive some questions from the Conservatives on foreign interference, but it appears that we came back full circle to a new conspiracy theory questioning whether you actually wrote the report that you wrote. After three hours of desperation, that's what comes our way now.

Let me get back to what we're talking about here. Mr. Johnston, you spoke throughout your testimony today of the great care you took to write and share information that everyday Canadians can easily read and understand. As a former NSICOP member, I can say that this is something that NSICOP looks at very carefully, too: How do you write public reports that can be consumed by people who are not national security experts?

In your report, what I appreciated so much was the comment about how you would be providing all of the information on which you based your recommendations or your findings. You would be compiling that in an annex, and you would make it available for scrutiny. I think I wrote down that you “welcome the scrutiny” based on the information that you made your recommendations on.

Is it reasonable for people to question not only your integrity but whether you've written the report and what information you had or didn't have, when those very parties had the opportunity to read all of the national security confidential information but chose not to? Do you think it's reasonable for someone who chooses not to read the information to then make judgments about what information you had or didn't have?

:

Madam Chair, let me respond to that question in very generalized ways. I think that in dealing with something as important and as growing as foreign interference in our elections and creating mistrust in our institutions—and by the way, those enemies are rubbing their hands with glee as they observe the kind of paroxysms that we're going through—we would have to work very hard at acquainting parliamentarians with foreign interference, but the public really understands very little. In this blessed country of Canada, we'd rather consider ourselves kind of protected and not have to worry about that.

We do have to worry about that. It does create very challenging difficulties for us, and it will continue and get worse.

:

Thank you.

Another criticism that often comes up about why certain party leaders won't receive national security briefings and review the information that you reviewed is that they say they will be silenced. You have now been here for about three hours discussing the very nature of this report, the information. You have the security clearances. You wrote an entire report based on national security secure information. Do you feel that you are silenced from talking about these things, when you wrote an entire report on it and have been here for three hours answering questions from all parties on the very matter, which has national security confidentiality in it?

:

Madam Chair, the first thing I would say is that this is accountability, and that's what Parliament is about and should be about.

Second, I would say that it's very possible for parliamentarians to take top security clearance, as some of you have, without in any way restricting their responsibility to speak publicly and openly about what they know in their head. What they have to guard against is disclosing classified information. That's the difficulty we have with public inquiries that are supposed to shed light on things when you have a problem of classified information that you just can't disclose for reasons we've discussed.

(1255)

:

Absolutely. Thank you for sharing that, because I've raised it in the House, as well.

I'm a former member of NSICOP, and being able to distinguish.... What you said earlier in your testimony reminded me of the red folder and the green folder. Sometimes it's hard to remember what is confidential and what isn't. That is why it's so important to actually have these open conversations. It's not a secret that you're trying to conceal from Canadians; it's about maintaining the sensitive nature of this information in a reasonable and respectful way that is ultimately in the interest of all Canadians.

How do we have these more open conversations with Canadians, so they have a better sense of what national security is all about in this country?

:

I'm a teacher, and I very much believe in seeing the world through the eyes of my children, and now my grandchildren. I think we have to work harder at educating our young people about our civic institutions, the quality of those institutions, and how they're protected.

Democracy is a very thin veneer. It's like the garden cultivated next to the jungle, as Hugh MacLennan wrote in Voices in Time. It must be very carefully cultivated, because if it is not constantly cared for, the weeds and then the jungle will take it over. We need the constant gardeners. You people here, parliamentarians, are the constant gardeners.

I think we have to imbue in our young children a sense of the preciousness of this country, that we have much to protect, and that we must engage ourselves in that to be sure the country is a better place for those who come after us.

:

Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Therrien, go ahead for two and a half minutes.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Democracy is being threatened. We have to ensure that the public has confidence in this democracy. Some 72% of the population are calling for an independent public inquiry. The majority in the House is calling for an independent public inquiry. Many experts are calling for one as well. Some didn't call for it initially, but Mr. Johnston's report convinced them it was necessary. They then joined with the experts who were already calling for an independent public inquiry. This is the only way to obtain the documents needed to understand and limit this interference. It's the only way to meet with interference victims in camera. What Mr. Johnston is proposing is public hearings without obligation to which we only invite people. Victims have already said they won't appear at them.

The benefit of Mr. Johnston's approach is that it's less costly. How much is a healthy democracy worth? We're talking about democracy.

Mr. Johnston says his approach is faster. This is unfortunately a botched job. It's faster, but no light will be shed on the subject. It's so quick that he didn't meet with Stéphane Perrault, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, or Caroline Simard, the commissioner of federal elections. Speed, in this case, has resulted in a botched job.

The only thing to do is to hold an independent public inquiry. Democracy demands it. The House demands it. The public demand it. Mr. Johnston talks about protecting democracy, but he doesn't respect it.

I unfortunately think his appointment was a mistake.

[English]

:

I have no response, Madam Chair.

:

I appreciate that.

Mr. Julian, you have two and a half minutes.

[Translation]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Johnston, earlier you said you hadn't met with the commissioner of federal elections because no complaints had been filed. However, Ms. Simard testified before our committee, and we know that many complaints of foreign interference are under review.

Are you aware that the commissioner is actively reviewing those complaints of foreign interference in our elections?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, we were aware of investigations, but no findings of interference. Our expectation is that we would continue to follow the progress of those investigations and meet with the commissioner of Canada elections to have a good discussion about those.

(1300)

[Translation]

:

Madam Chair, it's very important that that meeting be held before the decision is made whether to proceed with a public inquiry.

Mr. Johnston, I listened closely to your testimony today. You said that an inquiry would cost a little more and that it might take a little longer, but you also acknowledged the weak points of the approach you've adopted. You clearly said at the start of your testimony that foreign interference was real and constituted a threat to our democracy.

I believe the contradictions in your testimony are obvious to Canadians. Aren't you concerned that they will undermine the credibility of your approach, all the more so because parliamentarians don't agree and have voted differently?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, the question is whether I have confidence in the public responding in one way or another. That is for the public to decide. We undertook this task and did the best job we could to build trust in democracy. It will be reviewed by the appropriate review committees. We welcome their suggestions and their conclusions.

[Translation]

:

Madam Chair, I suggest that we extend the meeting by 16 minutes. Mr. Johnston has been very generous, but I know that some members still have questions for him. So I'd like you to allow a four-minute round for each party, for a total of 16 minutes.

[English]

:

Mr. Julian, do you want five more minutes for the Conservatives and five more minutes for the Liberals?

[Translation]

:

No, Madam Chair, I would like you to allow each party four minutes, for a total of 16 minutes.

[English]

:

The current round that we're in would be completed after 10 more minutes. I do believe, with our committee having agreed to work through votes, that if I summarize the amount of time, we're pretty close to three hours with the Right Honourable David Johnston. That's very generous for the amount of time.

We do have resources. I think it's absolutely astonishing that we're doing this. Is that the will of members?

Ms. Sahota, go ahead.

:

Madam Chair, in the last couple of rounds, we saw that members didn't even ask a question. They just used their time to make their comments. If that's how this committee is going to be running, and we've seen ample evidence of that throughout the last three hours, I would say that we release the witness and adjourn for today.

:

I, for one, did know who the president was at my university. I know we didn't get to ski together and hang out together, but I do appreciate the service you've offered.

I come into a situation as a chair where I do need to see the will of committee members. I want to say that I find this very awkward, because I did work with everyone to make sure we could find agreement to find a way forward. I actually thought we were quite credible in the way we did this, so I am concerned about this conversation. It will be noted.

Mr. Johnston, I know the calibre of individual you are, so I know you're not going to say no—unless you want to; you can walk out right now. Otherwise, I'm going to have to go with just another quick round.

I apologize, at least on behalf of myself and some members. This was not the intention.

Who is going for the Conservatives?

Mr. Chong, you have five minutes.

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Johnston, for agreeing to stay a bit longer.

You mentioned in your remarks that there are three advisers for the second part of your mandate. Could you tell us who those three advisers are?

:

No. We have not begun that at all.

:

Okay, thank you.

I want to focus on the second part of your mandate that you outlined in your report. You mentioned, on page 16 of your report, “There is no doubt that these communities are distrustful of security agencies.” That's not entirely accurate. Many diaspora communities have been pleading with security agencies to do more to stop the foreign interference that they are subject to, particularly the Chinese Canadian community.

Chinese Canadians are being targeted by Beijing, and they have rejected your proposals for public hearings. They are frustrated because they have already spoken up and testified many times over the last four years in front of the four parliamentary committees that I've referenced. The government has largely ignored their pleas for help, and they have suffered in silence. They're exhausted. They want more action, not these hearings you are proposing.

Just yesterday evening, I looked at a partial list of members of the Chinese diaspora here who don't want this second phase of hearings, who want an independent public inquiry: Mabel Tung of the Vancouver Society in Support of Democratic Movement; Mehmet Tohti of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project; Chemi Lhamo of the International Tibet Network; Gloria Fung of Canada-Hong Kong Link; Victor Ho, the former editor of Sing Tao Daily, one of the largest Chinese-language newspapers in the country; Cherie Wong of Alliance Canada Hong Kong, and the list really does go on.

All of these civic leaders in the Chinese community, and many more, have expressed a lack of confidence in your first report and in this process, so how can you possibly proceed with the second part of your mandate in light of that lack of confidence from many parts of the Chinese community in Canada?

(1305)

:

Madam Chair, our hope is that we could encourage members of those communities to continue their work in trying to draw to the attention of Parliament and the public generally the dangers we're facing.

We hope that the work we have done and the review by NSICOP and NSIRA, joined by leaders of the opposition, will provide a great deal of impetus to do much more of an active kind in providing the appropriate protection for these communities.

:

These communities, which have been most impacted by PRC interference, have been asking for an independent public inquiry. They put their hope in Parliament, over the last four years, that we would get some real action through Parliament, but unfortunately, because Parliament has been unable to do its job because of a lack of information from the government, a lack of documents, a lack of forthcoming testimony and forthrightness from government witnesses at committee, we've all, in Parliament and within the diaspora community, now put our hopes on an independent public inquiry with the full powers of a public inquiry to subpoena witnesses and to call for the production of documents so that the government can be held accountable as to what happened and so that these long-standing issues can be addressed.

What would you say to those who've said that an independent public inquiry can be held while at the same time protecting national security? Reference was made earlier to the fact that we've had inquiries before like the Maher Arar inquiry, which dealt with highly classified intelligence information. In fact, some of that information was Five Eyes' intelligence. That is the most sensitive intelligence because it comes from our Five Eyes partners and not from domestic intelligence agencies.

We've also had the former head of CSIS, Dick Fadden, say that a public inquiry is possible on this matter. We've had Dan Stanton, a former CSIS officer manager, also say that a public inquiry is possible. We've had the former Chief Electoral Officer of Canada say that a public inquiry is necessary.

In light of all these calls for a public inquiry, how can the second part of your mandate restore confidence?

:

Madam Chair, I would say that there are other experts, including Ward Elcock, for example, who have suggested that public inquiries are not the appropriate way, and Justice O'Connor, following the Arar committee, made the same point. There are differences of opinion on that, and those are reasonable.

What I believe is that the work of our group, the special rapporteur, will, in fact, provide a great deal of pressure and impetus for the government to act with greater acceleration on improving our system of dealing with foreign interference and that the work we will do over the next five months will add very considerable effort to that, so I'm quite hopeful that we will see some very considerable action over the course of the next few months on this very important challenge.

(1310)

:

Thank you.

Mrs. Romanado is next.

:

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I'd like to thank Mr. Johnston for extending his stay with us for another round.

Just in following up on that last line of questioning, on the difference between a public inquiry and the current process that is under way, I think a lot of folks are forgetting the fact that a public inquiry is actually named by an order in council, which is cabinet. Therefore, the same argument that it would not be independent could be said for a public inquiry, because at the end of the day it would be cabinet deciding the terms of reference and so on.

We know, Mr. Johnston, that you've done the work of interviewing various people with respect to foreign interference. You've looked at the documentation. You've written a report. You will be conducting interviews and public hearings, which of course could include going in camera for those who, out of fear, may not want to testify. That would be the same situation in a public inquiry situation. If they're afraid to testify before you in a public hearing, it could be the same thing for a public inquiry. The difference doesn't make sense. You've offered that some meetings could be held in camera for those who would like to testify for any concerns they may have.

Given that the next scheduled election is October 20, 2025, the goal of course should be that we want to make sure the systems we have in place are as strong as they can be to detect, deter and counter any foreign interference in our next election, if we're looking at “forward-facing”. You've already addressed some of the issues we've seen with respect to communications problems. What would you recommend, in addition, that this committee could suggest we do to make sure that, in a forward-facing goal, we protect our democracy? Is there something this committee could be doing to assist, to make sure we are ready for the next election?

:

Madam Chair, thank you for that question.

I would encourage the committee to be very precise and very disciplined and rigorous in accountability to improve our systems with respect to foreign interference. Yes, we have seen some progress and some changes. There is a clear outline of changes that are in process.

In fact, in our next report, what we would like to do is identify the initiatives that are currently under study—like the foreign registry, for example, and many others like that—and to see if there can't be timetables for dealing with these reforms, with amendments to the CSIS Act and so on, so that there's a very disciplined procedure, say, long before the next election of 2025. We can look to our Five Eyes colleagues and look to Canadians in saying that we are really working hard in dealing with foreign interference and we're making real progress on it to restore confidence in Canadians that they can trust our government to protect them.

:

In that regard, would you suggest that NSICOP and NSIRA also provide a list of deliverables with respect to timelines to make sure we're ready and that we check in, perhaps six months from now or a year from now, on where people are at with respect to those recommendations?

:

Madam Chair, I think that's a wonderful suggestion and should be done.

What's important about that, for me, is that we have these overview committees with expertise, with the opportunity to go into deeply classified information, and that we make those bodies as strong as we possibly can in their current existence and with amendments to how they're set up and so on, and ensure that they have the task of working with you and other committees of the House to be sure that we are truly making progress on this in an important way.

:

Last, you touched a bit on the civics necessary. We touched on that a little earlier when I was asking the question. Evidence and intelligence are not the same thing. How can we make sure that Canadians, parliamentarians and everyone who wants to protect our democracy recognize that? What does it look like? What are the tactics used by non-friendly state actors in terms of interference? How can they be part of the solution in terms of identifying and reporting them? This could be a team Canada effort in terms of countering foreign interference. I think this would be a joint effort from all Canadians.

(1315)

:

One of our recommendations, with respect to the public hearings over the next five months, was to deal exactly with that issue. Bring in the best expertise we can to it. Learn from others who have been able to provide more light. Then, help to acquaint the public with this distinction and how we can manage it and put more light on the subject.

:

Thank you.

Monsieur Therrien, go ahead.

[Translation]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Johnston's report outlines problems in transmitting information from CSIS to the Prime Minister and ministers.

Mr. Johnston states in his report that what we heard in the media was more or less true. He also says that the Prime Minister and ministers didn't receive the information. When they said they didn't know, they were right. They were really didn't have the information.

I'm not criticizing that; that's not what I'm mean. However, Mr. Johnston states that information pathways, CSIS and the public service were each partly responsible. However, the remarks of Mr. Stanton, Mr. Wilczynski, Ms. Thomas and Mr. Wark showed that there was a problem with the political offices.

I'd like Mr. Johnston to tell us about that.

[English]

:

Madam Chair, I agree entirely with the member who just raised the question that we have much improvement to do in how we crystalize information, how we move it into responsible hands, how we ensure that appropriate action is taken and have accountability for it. We have much work to do, and that's the task we should get on with, with urgency.

[Translation]

:

I'm going to ask a delicate question, Madam Chair, and I wouldn't want it to be misinterpreted.

There are times when one might prefer not to know certain things.

Could it be that the political offices are reacting to the possibility that ministers and the Prime Minister didn't really want to receive that information?

[English]

:

Madam Chair, I don't think I have many comments to make on what kinds of messages were given at that time. However, we expect from our public servants in this country that they will be non-partisan, that they will be professional, and that they will provide clear information and recommendations to their ministers and to our systems of ministerial accountability. We should expect that they would act appropriately. When they do not, then we should hold them accountable.

[Translation]

:

Thank you.

Go ahead, Mr. Julian.

[English]

:

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Johnston, for your generosity of time in allowing us a few extra questions.

I want to come back to the issue of the contributions of Sheila Block. In questioning, you said that Ms. Block had contributed financially to other parties. Which parties are you aware of that she contributed to?

:

My understanding is that her contributions have been quite widespread. I think she has supported people in political office who bear other than Liberal qualities, but I don't have specific information I can give you.

:

However, she told you that she had contributed to other parties as well.

:

Yes, I think she has been supporting and been prepared to assist other former students and people who have been affiliated with parties other than the Liberal Party.

:

In response to a question from Ms. Kwan, you said that the appearance of a conflict of interest has to be fact-based. Those facts, her frequent contributions to the Liberal Party, are part of the public domain. Do you not understand why some people would question the appearance of a conflict of interest when those facts—we're not talking about speculation—are before us?

:

I don't understand the question. I'm sorry.

:

You said that an appearance of a conflict of interest needs to be fact-based. She has factually given thousands of dollars to the Liberal Party, so do you understand why people see that as an appearance of a conflict of interest?

(1320)

:

Madam Chair, as I said before, I don't see Ms. Block's providing contributions to political parties as a conflict of interest. I think that over a period of 15 years or so it's something like $300 or $400 to the Liberal Party, but my understanding is that she has made contributions in a wide direction: former students and so on.

:

It's been thousands of dollars.

My final question is this: In your report, you said there was no evidence of illegal donations, but we know that the only way to get this information is through the complaint process with Elections Canada or the commissioner of elections. That was certainly the case in the Dean Del Mastro case.

Was that done? Was there any evidence around auditing campaigns? Since you didn't meet with the commissioner or Elections Canada, how did you come to that conclusion?

:

It's based on the fact that our understanding from those officials is that there were no findings of fault and, certainly, no activities leading to charges with respect to the 2019 and 2021 elections.

:

With that, the Right Honourable David Johnston has been very generous with his time today.

On behalf of PROC committee members, I want to thank you for letting us know when you were going to be able to appear and for responding promptly to our communications to you, right away. We wish you and your loved ones well. Thank you for your service.

The Right Hon. David Johnston: Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you to all members of the committee.

The Chair: Thank you.

With that, PROC committee members, we'll see you on Thursday. Keep well and safe.

The meeting is adjourned.

Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE)

Supplementary Messages

Supporting Facts and Figures

Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP)

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Update

An independent evaluation of the Protocol, its implementation and effectiveness in addressing threats, is required after every election. Through document review, interviews and research, a substantial review is completed and a classified report with findings and recommendations is presented to the Prime Minister and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP). An unclassified version is later released publicly.

An independent evaluation of the 2021 federal election is currently underway by Mr. Morris Rosenberg, a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Attorney General of Canada. An unclassified version of this report, including his findings and recommendations, is expected be submitted shortly.

Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)

Supplementary Messages

Supporting Facts and Figures

In May 2022, the G7 RRM published its first annual joint Annual Report. The report publicly named the PRC, Russia, and Iran as countries that leveraged divisive issues and social cleavages to polarize societies, influence political outcomes, and undermine democratic institutions and processes.

Disinformation – China

Supplementary Messages

Update

Disinformation - Russia

Supplementary Messages

Update

Background

Russia’s disinformation and propaganda machine, including in the Ukraine context, employs five main tactics, according to a public report released by the State Department last year. Based on the report, the Kremlin:

  1. Uses official government communications, including statements and social media posts;
  2. Leverages state-funded media, such as RT or Sputnik TV;
  3. Cultivates proxy sources, including Russian-aligned outlets, or grey web sites, that produce content that is then amplified both wittingly and unwittingly;
  4. Weaponises social media by employing fake accounts or amplifying polarising discourses in Western societies to undermine trust and social cohesion; and,
  5. Uses cyber means to acquire or forge information and disrupt communication. Fake video addresses by President Zelensky and recent forged letters by Ukrainian and Polish officials come to mind.

Before drop of the writ, as part of regular practice, GAC notifies all foreign missions in Canada to respect the election period, and withhold views that affect bilateral relations. It is sent via email as a reminder of obligations under the Vienna Convention.

Vienna Conventions – Persona Non Grata Declarations

Supplementary Messages

Background

Overview: the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, ratified by Canada in 1966 and implemented by the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act (the Act), outlines the rules of diplomatic law. It codified the rules for the exchange and treatment of envoys between states, which had been firmly established in customary law for hundreds of years. This convention established, for example, rules for the appointment of foreign representatives; the inviolability of mission premises; the protection of the diplomat and their family from any form of arrest or detention; and the requirement that diplomats must respect the laws of the host state. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, acceded to by Canada in 1974 and also implemented by the Act, codifies the rules with respect to consular posts and consular officers.

Persona non grata: when the receiving State (Canada) is concerned about the behaviour of a foreign representative, it can either 1) request that the sending State voluntarily recall the representative (end the assignment) or 2) expel them. With respect to the latter, both Vienna conventions provide that the receiving State may, at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that any member of its diplomatic or consular staff is persona non grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable.

Notification that a foreign representative is persona non grata triggers an obligation on the sending State to recall that individual “within a reasonable period”, defined in the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act as “a period, not exceeding ten days, commencing on the day on which notice is given”.

Decisions to declare a foreign representative as persona non grata are made in the exercise of the Crown prerogative by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the basis of a recommendation from the geographic branch and legal advice from the Legal Affairs Branch. The Office of Protocol implements the decision by sending the diplomatic note conveying the decision to the foreign mission.

Foreign Interference – General

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Supporting Facts and Figures

Foreign Interference – China

Allegations of Chinese Interference in GE43

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On connections to reports of PRC Police Stations in Canada:

Allegations of Chinese Interference in GE44

Supplementary Messages

On broader foreign interference concerns, including Chinese overseas police stations:

Canada-China Bilateral Relations

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Update

On May 8, 2023, Canada announced that Chinese diplomat Zhao Wei had been declared persona non grata for interfering in Canadian politics. On May 9, 2023, China’s MFA announced that it would expel diplomat Jennifer Lalonde from Canada’s consulate-general in Shanghai in response.

On March 15, 2023, PM Trudeau announced the appointment of former governor-general David Johnston as the Independent Special Rapporteur (ISR) to help protect the integrity of Canada’s democracy. In his first report, released on May 23, the ISR concluded that Canada’s 2019 and 2021 elections had not been jeopardized, but that there is scope for better information (intelligence) sharing across government.

Minister Joly met Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang on the margins of the G20 Foreign Ministers Meeting on March 2, 2023. They discussed bilateral relations, consular cases, the incident of the Chinese spy balloon, the war in Ukraine, and alleged Chinese interference in Canadian elections.

Minister Joly also raised foreign interference in an informal meeting with China’s then-Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the margins of the G20 Summit on November 15, 2022, as well as in a meeting with then-FM Wang on July 8, 2022, on the margins of the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Indonesia.

Allegations of PRC “Police Stations” and Recent Diplomatic Engagement

Supplementary Messages

Background

On October 27, the RCMP announced that police are investigating reports of criminal activity in relation to the so-called Chinese "police stations”.

On November 16, Global News published an article indicating that, Mr. Wei Chengyi, Permanent Honorary Chairman of the Confederation of Toronto Chinese Canadian Organizations, is under investigation for links to several properties in Toronto and Vancouver allegedly used as these PRC “police stations”, and his alleged involvement in PRC interference in Canada’s 2019 General Election.

On November 21, GAC introduced the RCMP’s Strategic Engagement and Awareness Unit to China-focused stakeholders (i.e. leaders from communities and civil society organizations) to enhance dialogue and encourage open lines of communication on issues of foreign interference.

On November 22, the RCMP released a statement indicating that police are investigating reports of possible foreign actor interference at these reported "police service stations".

On December 5, 2022, Safeguard Defenders published a second report that documented the existence of two more “police stations” in Canada, including one in Vancouver, established by other Chinese municipalities.

GAC’s Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) for the Asia-Pacific has made representations to the PRC Ambassador to Canada on this issue on four occasions: October 7, October 28, and November 4, 2022; and February 24, 2023.

IPS - General & Standing Up to China

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Update

Since the launch of its IPS, Canada has made significant progress with early implementation: several ministerial and PM visits to the region, the announcement of the first Indo-Pacific Agriculture and Agri-Food Office (December 2022), the establishment of GAC China Policy Research Center (January 2023); the official launch of Team Canada Trade Missions to the Indo-Pacific (February 2023), and the deployment of the HCMS Montréal to the region as part of the Enhanced Defense Capacity initiative (March 2023). Most recently, Ian McKay was announced as Canada’s Special Envoy for the Indo-Pacific (April 19).

Supporting Facts and Figures

Diplomatic Representation in Canada / in China

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Supporting Facts and Figures

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