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Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-People’s Republic of China Relations (CACN)

June 17, 2024
Published: October 10, 2024

Table of Contents

USS Opening Remarks

Canada-China relations

Canadian resilience

Bilateral trade

Concluding remarks


Drafted: OPB/Adams, OPB/Hudon
Consulted: aOPD/Holton, OPB/Chen, OPC/Robinson, OPB/McPhail, OPB/Steuerman
Approved: OGM/Epp

Appearance before the house of commons special committee on Canada-people's Republic of China Relationship (CACN)

Appearance related to MP Bergeron’s May 6 Motion on your “recent visit to China.”

June 17, 2024

Meeting scenario

Timeline of the study

Your appearance was requested via the following motion, moved by MP Bergeron on Monday, May 6:

That, pursuant to the order of reference of Monday, May 16, 2022, the Committee invite in person and before June 21, 2024, the Minister of Environment and Climate Change; Mr. David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Canadian Ambassador to China, as well as invite the Co-Chairs of the Canada-China Legislative Association to reflect on their recent visit to China.

The motion initially requested you to appear “in light of the government's expressed intention to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China.” This language was revised by the committee before the motion was ultimately adopted in the above form.

Committee membership

Context

Though the committee requested you and Jennifer May to appear on your recent trip to China, the request should be seen as part of broader parliamentary engagement on China, including CACN’s recent and ongoing studies.

Since November 27, 2023, CACN has undertaken a lengthy study on Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, having heard extensive testimony from government officials, academics, NGOs, stakeholders and foreign ambassadors. Questions have been wide ranging, with CPC members focusing on trade issues such as PRC non-tariff barriers on Canadian commodities and the export of natural resources, particularly liquified natural gas (LNG), to the region. NDP MP McPherson has focused on human rights abuses in supply chains and Canada’s lack of involvement in regional minilateral organizations. BQ MP Bergeron has taken an interest in Taiwan issues. Maritime disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN engagement, and the treatment of Uyghurs and Hong Kongers have also been discussed at length.

To note, BQ MP Bergeron is a member of NSICOP. MPs Chong, Kmiec, Bergeron and McPherson have all spoken publicly about being targeted by the PRC.

CACN has also recently completed a study on the Winnipeg Lab leak documents and is expected to table its final report before Parliament is scheduled to rise on June 21.

On June 3, 2024, CPC MP Kmiec introduced a motion at CACN condemning, among other things, the PRC’s treatment of 14 pro-democracy Hong Kong activists of the Hong Kong 47 and the Beijing national security law under which they were charged. The motion was unanimously adopted, with PS Oliphant having proposed that a government response be requested. GAC is leading on the government response.

Prior to its study on the Indo-Pacific Strategy, CACN members travelled to Washington D.C. from November 11 to 13, 2023, to meet with US counterparts on the United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. Members also met with think tanks, academics and WSHDC. Discussions concerned foreign interference, forced labour, Fentanyl, Taiwan, critical minerals, the US CHIPS and Science Act, and opportunities for coordination on our Indo-Pacific strategies. CACN submitted to Parliament a summary of its trip, requesting a government response. GAC is leading on this government response as well.

USS visit to China

Supplementary messages

Update

Background

In her call with Foreign Minister Wang Yi on January 11, 2024, Minister Mélanie Joly identified several areas for cooperation. These include: addressing bilateral trade irritants; the status of direct flights between Canada and China; consular issues; and opportunities to advance shared priorities in the multilateral sphere.

The phone call was their first formal interaction since April 2022.

Minister Joly also met with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the margins of the Munich Security Conference on February 17.

You travelled to China and met with Executive Vice Minister Ma Zhaoxu on April 19, 2024. You discussed avenues for advancing pragmatic cooperation, as well as global issues.

China’s Ambassador to Canada, Cong Peiwu, recently concluded his assignment in Ottawa. His successor, Wang Di, arrived in Ottawa on May 24. 

The May 3 initial report of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference and Canada’s January announcement on research security have drawn criticism from China, but did not derail your visit to China.

Foreign interference by China

Background

Canada has one of the most robust security and intelligence review mechanisms in the world, including NSIRA, established in 2019. Three of eight recommendations issued by NSIRA pertain to GAC: expanding GAC’s membership on the SITE Task Force; increasing intelligence literacy internally; and working with relevant OGDs to develop a common definition of FI. 

NSICOP issued six recommendations addressed to the Government of Canada, two of which implicate GAC:

Overseas police stations

Supplementary messages

Background

On April 27, 2023, Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino told the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) that “the RCMP have taken decisive action to shut down the so-called police stations.”

On June 1, 2023, GAC hosted a workshop with China-focused civil society stakeholders on longstanding concerns about Chinese intimidation and harassment of people of Chinese origin in Canada.  RCMP and Public Safety took part.

On June 13, 2023, RCMP Commissioner Michael Duheme told the Procedure and House Affairs Committee (PROC) that that “the policing activity that was being done” at multiple sites “has been shut down, and investigations are continuing.”

Relevant provisions from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

VCCR art. 3: Consular functions are exercised by consular posts. They are also exercised by diplomatic missions in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention.

VCCR art 4.1: A consular post may be established in the territory of the receiving State only with that State’s consent.

VCCR art. 5: [sets out a list of what constitutes acceptable consular functions]

China consular cases

Supplementary messages

Background

Arrest/Detention Cases in China: Approximately 100 Canadians are detained in China at any given time on a broad range of offences, ranging from basic infractions (e.g. immigration violations) to more serious charges such as drug trafficking and fraud. These figures are subject to change.

Consular case of Huseyincan Celil: Huseyincan Celil, a Chinese-Canadian of Uyghur ethnicity, was arrested in Uzbekistan in March 2006 and extradited to China despite vigorous protests by Canada. China does not recognize Mr. Celil’s Canadian citizenship and refuses to grant consular access.

Canadians sentenced to death in China: Canadians have received death penalty sentences in China. Canada regularly advocates for clemency. The arbitrary sentencing of Robert Schellenberg is of particular concern. PM Trudeau and a number of Ministers of Foreign Affairs have condemned the sentencing as arbitrary. [REDACTED]

Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor: After 1020 days of arbitrary detention Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig were released and returned to Canada on September 25, 2021, the same day as the proceedings against Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer, were withdrawn.

Canada-China Consular Consultations: In May 2024, Canada’s DG for Consular Operations met with her Chinese counterpart for bilaterial consultations in Beijing. Discussion covered a broad range of consular issues, with both sides working toward constructive resolution of concerns. These were the first DG-level consular consultations since 2017.

Hong Kong

Supplementary messages

Background

Since 2024, two international media outlets departed Hong Kong – Wall Street Journal and Radio Free Asia. [REDACTED]

Since 2019, the number of multinational corporations with regional headquarters in Hong Kong has dropped significantly, with many relocating to Singapore. KPMG announced it was closing its law firm due to risks in the city, and many others are reportedly making plans to leave.

On May 13, 2024, the British police arrested three men in London for assisting the Hong Kong intelligence service, including a LES at the London Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO).

On February 8, 2024, Hong Kong police declared self-exiled democracy activist and Canadian resident Agnes Chow a “wanted” person who will be “pursued for the rest of her life,” after she failed to comply with Hong Kong authorities’ order to return in December, 2023.

Tibet

Supplementary messages

Update

Background

Canada recognizes Tibet as a region within China having a distinct cultural identity, but not as an independent political state. Canada calls for substantive and meaningful dialogue without any pre-conditions between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama (or his representatives) to work toward a resolution of issues acceptable to both sides, with a view to ensure the future of Tibetan language, culture, education and human rights. Canada often calls on China to respond to reports and recommendations from various UN bodies regarding the PRC’s human rights violations in Tibet.

As the Dalai Lama is 88 years old, many in the Tibetan diaspora are worried that upon his death and if the PRC will attempt to install its own hand-picked successor. Canada supports the right of Tibetan Buddhists to practice their religion and decide its leadership.   

Xinjiang

Supplementary messages

Background

Taiwan

Supplementary messages

One China Policy

Peace and Stability

CAF Operations in the Taiwan Strait

Multilateral Participation

Trade

South China SEA

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

China and the Arctic

Supplementary messages

Update

Supporting facts and figures

Background

China’s Arctic ambitions: China aims to gain access to Arctic resources and sea routes to bolster its military, economic, and scientific rise. Speeches by President Xi Jinping and senior Chinese officials with responsibility for Arctic policy are clear that China intends to become a “polar great power” by 2030. China remains, however, a relatively newcomer to the Arctic as compared to its presence and activities in Antarctica which are more well established. China is seeking a larger role in polar governance over the long term and to gain access to what some Chinese officials view as an international space to be exploited “for the common heritage of humankind” China has also pushed for greater inclusion of non-Arctic states in Arctic governance.

China in the multilateral system

Supplementary messages

Background

China is focused on growing its influence in the international system to limit checks on its behavior at home and abroad.  It is investing in coalitions of the willing (e.g. BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Council) to counter established international or Western coalitions and to amplify narratives which are seen to be more consistent with PRC values.

China positions itself at the UN as the leader of the “Global South,” critiquing the established multilateral system as a function of the United States and Western countries.  It is increasingly placing its nationals in the UN – a legitimate activity for any Member State – as well as in positions of leadership or political influence in international institutions.

China is putting forward policy approaches designed to codify its ideas, including the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilizations Initiative. Increasingly, it is working to gain endorsement of these initiatives by UN agencies. It uses these initiatives and language associated with them to attempt to weaken the international human rights architecture, which it sees as an obstacle to its non-liberal ambitions at home and abroad.

Recent investments in the GAC’s China capacity are to respond to China’s ambitions in the multilateral system. At the same time, the extent of Chinese activity is putting a strain on Canada’s diplomatic resources at the UN.

Forced labour

Supplementary messages

Update

Budget 2023 and 2024 reaffirmed the federal government’s commitment to introduce legislation in 2024 to eradicate forced labour from Canadian supply chains and strengthen the import ban on goods produced with forced labour. Legislation will be strong, effective, and enforceable.

Background

Forced Labour in Xinjiang: Credible sources have indicated a campaign of repression and human rights violations by the Chinese government against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim communities in Xinjiang. The August 2022 UN report on Xinjiang strengthened this evidence. Violations have a strong commercial dimension and supply chain implications, whether through the importation of goods produced using forced labour, the use of Canadian exports in repression, or business dealings with implicated entities.  Products most at risk include polysilicon and downstream electronic and photovoltaic inputs and products (e.g. solar supply chains); critical mineral inputs and products; tomatoes and downstream processed food products (e.g. fish processing); cotton and downstream fabric and apparel products; automotive sector inputs and products.

Solar supply chains, fish processing, and automotive sector inputs have received recent public attention and scrutiny related to Xinjiang forced labour. Canada is currently assessing existing and new legislative tools that will help address these concerns.

Research security and starc policy

Background

National Security Guidelines

In July 2021, Canada released the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships to help safeguard Canada’s research ecosystem from foreign interference, espionage, and unwanted knowledge transfer.

February 2023 Ministerial Statement on Protecting Canada’s Research

On February 14, 2023, Ministers Champagne, Duclos and Mendicino  announced  that applications to federal research granting councils involving research in sensitive research areas will not be funded if any of the researchers working on the projects in question are affiliated with a university, research institute or laboratory connected to military, national defence or state security entities of foreign state actors that pose a risk to Canada’s national security.

Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern (STRAC)

On January 16, 2024, Canada announced the new STRAC policy, which includes two lists: the Sensitive Technology Research Area (STRA) list and the Named Research Organizations (NRO) list. These targeted measures were developed based on risk and in a country-agnostic manner, recognizing that threats to Canadian research can come from anywhere.

The Named Research Organizations List

The NRO list consists of 103 foreign institutions located in 3 countries: China (85), Iran (12) and Russia (6). The list is non-exhaustive, “made in Canada”, and takes into account similar lists developed by academic organizations and allies. The list will be updated regularly - next update is planned in Summer 2024

Economic security

Supplementary messages

Background

Geopolitical rivalries, economic upheavals, the increased use of non-market policies and practices, and the practice of economic coercion have put supply chain resilience and reliable access to critical goods/inputs at the centre economic policymaking. These goods encompass essential components like semiconductors, graphic processing units, critical minerals, battery components, drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients, and precursor chemicals, which underpin various industries. Many of Canada’s closest partners are developing integrated approaches to economic and national security, through domestic, bilateral, and plurilateral actions, that seek to enhance their prosperity, safety, and sovereignty in a period of heightened geopolitical tension – with varying degrees of attention paid to the rules.

The US, for example, unilaterally implemented the Inflation Reduction Act, which had effects on Canada and other likeminded partners, such as the EU, forcing countries to counterbalance its effects. More recently, the U.S. proposed increases in Section 301 tariffs on imports from China, which if adopted would raise tariffs on solar power products, EVs, batteries, critical minerals, semiconductors, shop-to-shore gantry cranes, steel and aluminum products, and certain medical supplies. The US has also partnered with the EU to provide infrastructure investments to the Lobito Corridor in Africa and with Japan and the Philippines in the Luzon Corridor to secure access to critical goods, such as critical minerals and semiconductors, respectively.

The EU and its members, such as Germany, have released their own China strategies marking efforts to identify derisking strategies to address vulnerabilities, reduce economic exposure, and defend technological competitiveness. European Commission President von der Leyen has nudged member states to embrace the logic of de-risking across ten critical technology areas, including semiconductors, AI, quantum technology, and biotechnology. Another key emerging issue for the EU that will become of more interest to partners, is dealing with China’s exports of goods resulting from massive overcapacity in production.

Globally, the pursuit of economic security has come in the form of identifying vulnerabilities and building new resilient supply chains, whether through domestic capacity/regulations, investments abroad, or various forms of collaboration, including in multilateral fora such as the G7, WTO, OECD, or NATO—where economic security continues to be a central issue.

Trade: outstanding access issues and the canadian commercial corporation representative offices (CCC RO) closure

Supplementary messages

Beef and Pet Food

Air Services

Approved Destination Status

General trade stats and top 5 imports/exports 2023

Supporting facts and figures

All numbers are in CAD, generated from Global Trade Atlas

People’s Republic of China

Hong Kong

Total two-way trade: $5.3B (+38.6% from 2022)

Total Canadian exports: $4.9B (+44.6% from 2022)

Total Canadian imports: $405M (-7.5% from 2022)

Taiwan

Total two-way trade: $10.1B (-16.1% from 2022)

Total Canadian exports: $2.0B (-22.3% from 2022)

Total Canadian imports: $8.1B (-14.5% from 2022)

China and the world

Russia:

Middle East:

Democratic Republic of Korea:

Supplementary messages

Update

Russia-Ukraine: The U.S. has led calls for increased pressure on China over its support to Russia’s military-industrial complex, as it believes that China has grown comfortable in its current position. On June 2, President Zelenskyy accused Russia and China of trying to dissuade other states from attending the June 15-16 peace summit in Switzerland and said that there were “elements of Russia’s weaponry” that come from China.

From May 15 to 16, Vladimir Putin visited China, where he met with Xi Jinping. The two leaders signed a joint statement deepening their “comprehensive strategic partnership.” This followed Xi Jinping’s travel to France (May 6-7), where he met with French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. During trips to China by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken (April 24-26) and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen (April 3-9), China was pressed on its support to Russia. Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, met with FM Wang Yi in Beijing on April 9. The visit by China’s Special Envoy for Ukraine, Li Hui, to Russia, Ukraine, and other European countries that took place in March 2024 mirrored a similar tour in May 2023. China uses these visits to try to cast itself as a neutral party pushing for peace. According to the debrief that we received of Li’s meeting with the European External Action Service in Brussels, however, he largely used this opportunity to convey Russian talking points.

Middle East: The 10th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum took place on May 30 in Beijing. The joint declaration from this meeting “condemned Israel's continued aggression against the Palestinian people” and called on the UN Security Council to “issue a binding resolution to achieve an immediate, comprehensive, and sustained ceasefire.” At a meeting between China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Yemeni counterpart in Beijing on May 28, China called for attacks on civilian ships in the Red Sea to end and for safe navigation. 

North Korea: North Korea criticized the May 27 joint statement of the trilateral summit between China, Japan, and South Korea, calling it a “grave political provocation” after it “reiterated positions on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” From April 11-13, the third-ranked official of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhao Leji, led a delegation to North Korea. China’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sun Weidong, travelled to North Korea on January 25-26 and met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui. The two sides pledged to strengthen strategic communications “at all levels” and reaffirmed an “unswerving stance” on deepening ties, according to the Chinese readout.

The Indo-Pacific strategy and China

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Canada-China Bilateral Relations

Latest developments

Current positions and upcoming milestones

Context

Facing economic headwinds and the uncertainty caused by a series of elections around the globe, China is making a concerted effort to improve its foreign relations with most Western countries, including Australia, France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and USA. This includes Canada as well, though we are not at the top of the priority list. Canada’s relationship with China continues to be marked by multiple friction points, with foreign interference, death penalty cases, visas, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan being the most prominent. Despite these differences, it remains in Canada’s interest to engage China, given its global impact across multiple domains.

Environmental issues illustrate the imperative for pragmatic cooperation between Canada and China. Joint efforts resulted in the adoption of the ambitious Kunming-Montréal Global Biodiversity Framework in December 2022. Minister Guilbeault visited Beijing in August 2023, to further advance cooperation on biodiversity and climate change.

Despite continued issues with market access, such as the ban on Canadian beef and pet food containing poultry, bilateral trade remains strong, with China ranking as our second largest single-country trading partner. In 2023, Canada’s merchandise exports to China exceeded $30 billion to set a new record and bilateral trade was worth almost $120 billion.  

Foreign interference

A report from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), Review of the dissemination of intelligence on People’s Republic of China political foreign interference, 2018-2023, was tabled on May 27 and focussed on the dissemination and the flow of intelligence within the Government of Canada. A redacted version of a report by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions鈥痺as tabled on June 3. The NSICOP report recounted intelligence implicating China in our electoral processes.

On May 6, Canada introduced Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, which proposes to update existing laws to better equip the government to detect, disrupt, and protect against foreign interference threats against all people in Canada. The bill includes the Foreign Interference Transparency and Accountability Act, which creates a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.

The Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference (PIFI) released its initial report on May 3, 2024, following two weeks of public hearings in which China figured prominently. The report described China as the most persistent and sophisticated foreign interference threat to Canada, and found that foreign interference did occur during the 2021 and 2019 elections. While it did not affect the elections’ overall outcomes, it could have affected riding-level results including party nominees, the report concluded.

China reacted to the PIFI report by calling allegations of foreign interference by China a “baseless political fabrication.” China has consistently cautioned Canada that the public inquiry should not be used to “smear” China.

In the second half of 2023, Canada’s G7 Rapid Response Mechanism uncovered two separate disinformation campaigns on social media platforms WeChat, X, Facebook and YouTube targeting Canadian Parliamentarians and attributed them as likely being linked to the Chinese state. 

China continues to deny all claims of foreign interference.

Cyber security

On June 3, the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Safety, and National Defence released a statement identifying China as the source of the most extensive state-sponsored cyber threat activity against Canada and providing guidance from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security on how to protect against threats. Canada expressed public support for the U.K., the U.S., and New Zealand in their March 2024 announcements regarding malicious cyber activity directed at democratic processes and institutions. Canada remains committed to working with partners to prevent and counter future malicious cyber acts.

Research security

On January 16, Canada announced measures that will ban federal granting agencies and the Canada Foundation for Innovation from funding research in sensitive technology areas if any of the researchers are affiliated with, or in receipt of funding or in-kind support, from a university, research institute, or laboratory connected to military, national defence, or state security entities that could pose a risk to Canada’s national security. The list of Named Research Organizations (NRO) of concern includes several Chinese entities.

Human rights

Canada expressed serious concern regarding the passage of Hong Kong’s national security legislation in March, as well as the related verdict on May 30 regarding 47 Hong Kong pro-democracy politicians and activists. Canada and its partners have raised concerns that Hong Kong's national security laws will further prevent people from exercising their rights and freedoms and silence legitimate dissent. Canada remains concerned about human rights in mainland China, including in Tibet and Xinjiang, the treatment of human rights defenders, the state of freedom of religion, LGBTI rights, and media freedoms.

Military interactions

In the context of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, Canada has stepped up its security presence in the region. Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) ships transit the Taiwan Strait in waters where freedom of navigation applies on a regular basis, with the most recent transits taking place in June and November 2023. There have been interactions between PLA Navy ships and Canadian vessels during Canadian transits of the Taiwan Strait. Beginning in 2018 and continuing to the present, the Canadian military has contributed to monitoring UNSC sanctions against North Korea under Operation NEON. During these operations, Canadian aircraft have been regularly intercepted by Chinese People’s Liberation Army aircraft when approaching what the PRC views as its national airspace. Most of these intercepts have been performed in a safe and professional manner but some have been performed unsafely and unprofessionally, putting at risk CAF personnel. The most recent unsafe and unprofessional intercept occurred in October 2023. China closely tracks CAF operations and demarches Canada quickly following actions perceived to be provocative.

Overseas Police Stations

Canada-Taiwan Bilateral Relations

Background

Canada’s One-China policy, is the foundation of Canada’s diplomatic relations with China. Created in 1970, Canada’s One-China policy recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legitimate government of China, noting – but not endorsing nor challenging – the Chinese government’s position on Taiwan. Despite not having official government-to-government relations with Taiwan, Canada has managed to maintain unofficial yet valuable economic, cultural, and people-to-people ties.

Stability in the Taiwan Strait: In line with its Indo-Pacific Strategy, Canada is expanding its defence and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific through an enhanced naval presence; growing and consistent contribution to the ASEAN Regional Forum; and increased engagement with key partners. In 2023, the Royal Canadian Navy conducted three transits in the Taiwan Strait with U.S. vessels. This included the much publicized June transit of the U.S. destroyer USS Chung-Hoon and Canadian frigate Montreal where a PLA Navy ship unsafely cut across the path of the Chung-Hoon. In the context of Operation Neon, Canadian assets will be in the Indo-Pacific this summer, including the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwanese elections: In January 2024, Taiwan elected Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai William Ching-te as its next President. Beijing’s initial reaction to the election results was relatively muted, followed by a continued uptick in intimidation tactics, although a change was noted immediately following the inauguration. These measures fit in broader salami slicing efforts to modify the status quo in the Strait. Example includes a sustained military presence around Taiwan; the switch of relations from Taiwan to the PRC by Nauru (which invoked Resolution UN 2758); a unilateral change of flight path near the sensitive median line in the Taiwan Strait; the withdrawal of Taiwan’s role as host of the 2024 Asian Men’s U20 Volleyball Championship due to China’s objection; a decision to reduce the number of Chinese exchange students allowed to visit Taiwan; and the negation of “prohibited or restricted waters” between Kinmen and China’s Xiamen.

After the election, Lai appointed many cabinet members from his predecessor’s administration to key departments – National Security Council, Defense, Foreign Affairs and the Mainland Affairs Council – suggesting an intention to continue the broad contours of his predecessor approach to cross-strait relations. While his inauguration speech did not overtly depart from core policy directions set by former President Tsai, the overall content was more sovereignty-affirming. Most notably, word choice implying Taiwan and China are separate countries contributed to a confrontational tone that angered the PRC.

In response, the PRC launched two days of military exercises encircling Taiwan, described by Beijing as “strong punishment” for Lai’s inaugural address. Less than a week after those exercises ended, Beijing launched new joint combat readiness patrols around the island and suspended preferential tariffs on 134 items under the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that governs commerce across the Taiwan Strait. The latter measures are largely symbolic, and par for the course in terms of what was expected from Beijing as part of a larger package of measures to signal discontent post-inauguration.

Taiwan’s international participation: Canada supports Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations where there is a practical imperative and where Taiwan’s absence would be detrimental to global interests. Canada and Taiwan cooperate in multilateral organizations where both are represented, including APEC, the WTO, and regional fisheries management organizations. Between 2009 and 2016, Taiwan attended the annual World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer, which marked the first instance of official Taiwanese participation in a UN body since 1971. Taiwan also participated as a guest at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) triennial Assembly in 2013 and, more recently, as an observer at the Kimberley Process (to eradicate conflict diamonds) in 2018. Canada, in its role as Chair of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee, invited Taiwan, under the title “Chinese Taipei”, to participate in the Safer Skies Forum in 2020 and 2022. The Consultative Committee also accepted Taiwan’s application to join as an Observer. Canada continues to look for ways to support Taiwan’s meaningful international participation, including by supporting the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, a platform to build on Taiwan's strengths and expertise to address global issues of mutual concerns.

Additional Background

The Canadian Trade Office in Taipei (CTOT): Canada is represented in Taiwan by the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei, a locally incorporated entity staffed by Government of Canada employees. Also present in Taipei are the Provinces of Alberta and British Columbia. Quebec closed its office within the CTOT in 2014. The CTOT facilitates cooperation with Taiwan on trade and investment; science and technology; foreign and public policy issues; education and youth exchanges; arts and cultural industries; and Indigenous affairs. It also provides consular and citizenship services to the over 50,000 Canadian residents on the island, underscoring the depth of Canada’s engagement with Taiwan. TECO also has locations in Toronto, Vancouver and recently opened an office in Montréal.

Recent High-Level Engagement: Canadian Parliamentary delegations visit Taiwan on a regular basis. In May 2024, 11 members of the House of Commons travelled to Taipei to attend the newly-elected Lai Ching-te and his Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim's inauguration. Three parliamentary delegations visited Taiwan in 2023. In February 2023, Minister Ng and Taiwan’s Chief Trade Representative John Deng agreed to begin formal negotiations on a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Arrangement (FIPPA). The FIPPA aimed to offer grater protection to Canadian investments in Taiwan and better attract Taiwanese foreign investment in Canada. The FIPPA was concluded and signed in December 2023. Canada has been very clear with China that this is an “arrangement” [REDACTED]

Canada-Taiwan Economic Consultations (CTEC): Canada and Taiwan hold annual economic consultations that allow senior officials to proactively engage on bilateral irritants and seek out areas for cooperation. The consultations have effectively guided Canada-Taiwan economic relations, with the most recent consultations in December 2023. They have also led to the signing of Arrangements and Memoranda of Understanding in various sectors, including science and technology research and development.

Indigenous Affairs: With sizeable indigenous populations, Canada and Taiwan share common interests with regard to these issues. On December 10, 2021, Canada endorsed the Indigenous Peoples Economic and Trade Cooperation Arrangement (IPETCA) – a non-binding arrangement with Australia, New Zealand, and Chinese Taipei to identify and remove barriers that indigenous businesses face in international trade.

Immigration and Visas: According to Taiwan’s Overseas Community Affairs Council, there are around 186,000 Canadians of Taiwanese descent (2019) living in Canada. However, Taiwan no longer represents a significant source of immigrants to Canada. In November 2010, Canada lifted the visa requirements for ordinary Taiwanese passport-holders who wish to visit Canada for tourism, to study (up to six months), or to do business.

Culture, Education, and Youth: Canada and Taiwan have a long history of cultural exchanges. CTOT’s latest initiative in cultural diplomacy is the Festival of Canadian Arts and Culture (FESTICA) to promote Canadian arts and artists, and to advance Canadian values of diversity and inclusion. Canada remains one of the most popular destinations for Taiwanese language students, ranking 4th as a study destination after the U.S., Australia, and Japan. Through International Experience Canada (IEC), up to 1,000 young Canadians and up to 1,000 young Taiwanese may live and work in each other’s territory for up to one year.

Foreign Interference

Latest developments

Current positions and upcoming milestones

Context

[REDACTED]A series of Canadian media reports on leaked intelligence documents beginning in February 2023 and the surveillance balloon incident in the same month put increased strain on Canada-China bilateral relations. The intelligence documents dealt with foreign interference efforts by China in Canada. At the same time, the RCMP investigation into unsanctioned Chinese "overseas police stations" was ongoing.

On May 8, 2023, Canada expelled a Chinese diplomat to send a signal that any form of foreign interference in our internal affairs would not be tolerated. China reciprocated by expelling a Canadian diplomat on May 9, 2023. It is anticipated that China will continue to be vocal about their concerns regarding the Canadian inquiry and upcoming legislation on foreign interference.

The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM) is comprised of Focal Points from G7 countries and the EU, and counts Australia, New Zealand, the NATO secretariat, the Netherlands, and Sweden as observers. The mechanism highlights key trends in disinformation and accounts for its activities publicly through Annual Reports.

In August and October 2023, Canada's G7 Rapid Response Mechanism reported two separate disinformation campaigns on social media platforms WeChat, X, Facebook, and YouTube targeting Canadian parliamentarians and attributed them to the Chinese state with a high degree of certainty.

The work of the RRM and our broader efforts on protecting ourselves against Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference and, more broadly, FI, is also reflected in the endorsement, along with the UK, of the US Framework to Counter Foreign Information Manipulation, on the margins of the Munich Security Conference.

On September 7, 2023, Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc announced the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference with a focus on examining and assessing interference by China, Russia, and other foreign states and non-state actors.

China has consistently cautioned Canada that the public inquiry should not be used to "smear" China. The publication of the inquiry’s first report in May 2024 drew public criticism from China, along with renewed denial of any interference in Canada’s internal affairs.

Fentanyl

Latest developments

Current positions and upcoming milestones

Context

Since January 2016, more than 42,494 Canadians have died as a result of opioid-related overdoses. Between January and September 2023, there was an average of 22 overdose-related deaths per day (est. 8,000+ total), 82% of which involved fentanyl.

Since 2015, China has been the largest source country for illegal fentanyl and chemical precursors exported to Canada and North America. Since China scheduled fentanyl and its analogues in May 2019, China-based actors have shifted from manufacturing and exporting finished product to exporting fentanyl precursors. China continues to be listed as the main source country for a variety of precursor chemicals intended for the illegal production of drugs in Canada and some illegal drugs smuggled into Canada. China has a vast chemical manufacturing and pharmaceutical sector that produces large quantities of compounds which are sold globally and intended for legitimate purposes in medicine and industrial processes. CBSA reports increasing import seizures of fentanyl precursor chemicals. These, combined with seizures of clandestine laboratories in Canada, indicate that fentanyl is being produced in Canada. Seizures of Canada-sourced fentanyl in places like the U.S. and Australia suggest that domestic production is likely exceeding domestic demand, and that Canada is now a source (and transit) country for fentanyl to some markets.

Canadian engagement with China: China has signalled receptiveness to counternarcotics engagement, including on chemical precursors used in their production. However, China has framed cooperation as a “bilateral ask” and will likely expect Canadian concessions to which Canada may or not be able to accede. 抖淫视频 and Public Safety Canada are co-chairing a Director-General-level interdepartmental working group to address questions around engaging China on counternarcotics. To date, Canada has not made a request for a formal bilateral working group with China.

During a March 2024 meeting on the margins of the CND in Vienna, China emphasized the importance of “cleaning up one’s own house first” and positioned itself as an expert and mature partner. China nonetheless raised examples of avenues for potential increased cooperation: 1) receiving China-specific information from Canada on the import/diversion of substances; 2) receiving Canada-specific information on domestic challenges and mortality rates; 3) information-sharing with RCMP and CBSA; 4) executing joint operations; 5) conducting RCMP field visits in China; and 6) visiting a drug rehabilitation facility in China. No preconditions for engagement were raised at this meeting, although this is more likely a reflection of China’s representation at the meeting, which was more technical than political.

U.S. engagement with China: The U.S. and China re-established counternarcotics cooperation and announced the launch of a working group, following the meeting between Presidents Biden and Xi on the margins of APEC in San Francisco, on November 15, 2023, and the U.S.’ delisting of the Institute of Forensic Science of China’s MPS. China had called the delisting a precondition for substantive PRC engagement on synthetic drugs. The U.S. had put sanctions on this laboratory in 2020 on violation of human rights grounds, for collecting information on Uyghurs, allegations which China denies. Counternarcotics cooperation between the two countries had been suspended since the visit to Taiwan of the Speaker of the House of Representatives in August 2022.

A full U.S. delegation travelled to Beijing on January 30, 2024, meeting with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the MPS. The U.S.-China bilateral workplan intends to focus on law enforcement action; illicit financing; misuse and distribution of precursor chemicals, pill presses, and equipment; and engagement in multilateral for a.

While China has scheduled four chemical substances, the U.S. reports that discussions have yielded little tangible progress so far. Counter-narcotics cooperation was raised again in a Biden-Xi phone call in April 2024, in their first conversation since November. The next U.S.-China counternarcotics meeting is expected to take place over the summer, in Washington.

Coordination with the U.S. on working with China

The U.S. has pressed for coordination among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico in our respective bilateral dialogues with China on the issue.

Human Rights

Latest developments

Current positions and upcoming milestones

Context

Canada’s position

Canada and likeminded countries continue to press China on human rights. China’s human rights record continues to worsen. It has intensified its systematic persecution of Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other targeted populations. Media freedoms continue to be eroded and the landscape for foreign journalists in China is increasingly fraught. PRC continues its dismantling of civil and political rights in Hong Kong as witnessed by recent passage of the SNS. Canada and other countries are re-evaluating the preferential status afforded to Hong Kong given the apparent end to the “One Country, Two Systems” framework and PRC’s systemic violations of human rights and political rights. Throughout China, the space allowed for political expression continues to shrink. Minister Joly has called for China to action a landmark UN assessment report on Xinjiang, released August 2022. The Minister referred to the report’s finding that human rights violations against Uyghurs may amount to “international crimes, including crimes against humanity”. The Minister has also raised other concerns in public. In October 2023, for example, she called for action on mandatory residential schools that China uses as part of its repression of Tibetans. On January 23, Canada made recommendations on human rights in context of the UN’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of China. Canada called for the PRC to repeal the NSL it imposed on Hong Kong in 2020, which has already been broadly used in a crackdown on advocates for human rights and democracy. Canada also called on China to end coercive measures against Uyghurs and Tibetans, to end enforced disappearances, and to grant UN human rights experts access to China.

Hong Kong - New National Security Law and Trial Updates

On March 20, 2024, Hong Kong passed a new national security legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law. The Hong Kong government publicly noted that this new law will supplement the 2020 National Security Law, which led to the violation of human rights and the suppression of open debate in Hong Kong. The new law’s broad definitions of additional national security offences raise concerns about the potential for enforcement overreach. Hong Kong police since then arrested eight people under this new law.  On January 29, 2024, a new ordinance came into effect that allowed Hong Kong courts to implement Chinese court orders, including those under PRC anti-sanctions legislation.  

The passage of new national security legislation in March, entitled the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNS), accelerates PRC’s dismantling of Hong Kong’s ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and fails to comply with Hong Kong’s international human rights obligations. This SNS law adds new vague national security offences, legitimizes arbitrary detention, and grants the PRC the right to issue orders to Hong Kong public institutions on national security grounds. Both foreign governments and local actors have expressed concern that the legislation will further prevent people from exercising their rights and freedoms and silence legitimate dissent. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and six UN Special Rapporteurs also issued a statement and joint letter respectively to express similar concerns. 

Tibet

In 2022, UN Special Procedures (Human Rights Treaty Bodies) examined various reports on China’s vast system of “colonial boarding schools” inside Tibet and confirmed that up to one million Tibetan school children were separated from their parents and placed into these schools.

Xinjiang (Uyghurs)

In 2017, reports of a rapidly deteriorating human rights situation for Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities began emerging from China’s Western Province of Xinjiang. These reports included disappearances, the use of arbitrary detention, forced labor, torture, forced sterilizations, and the mass incarceration of ethnic and religious minorities in “re-education camps.” As many as 1 million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities were detained in the camps in 2018, according to estimates by the UN.  

UN experts have concluded that modern forms of slavery exist in Xinjiang, and that these human rights violations could amount to crimes against humanity. China’s coercive labour transfer programs have disproportionately affected ethnic minorities, including Uyghur Muslims, and have resulted in children being separated from their parents and placed in residential schools. In 2023, several UN special rapporteurs have expressed grave concern over allegations of a significant expansion of Xinjiang's state-run boarding school system. A system which fails to provide education in the child’s mother tongue and forcibly separates Uyghur and other minority Muslim children from their families and communities, leading to their forced assimilation. Human Rights Watch, in late 2023, produced a report which detailed China’s attempts to consolidate, renovate, and sinicize mosques in China in a “systematic effort to curb the practice of Islam in China.”

Recent events

The next foreseeable events where Canada may wish to make public comment on human rights in China concern Hong Kong. Pro-democracy newspaper publisher Jimmy Lai is currently on trial there for sedition and collusion. A January 23 letter from four UN special rapporteurs called for his release. Other trials of this nature under way in Hong Kong include trials against former independent media (Stand News editors). Verdicts are expected in summer and fall 2024, respectively. Canada is beginning implementation of its new migration pathway to allow Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims who have fled persecution in China to come to Canada. While implementation of this program is meant to be relatively low-profile, China is very sensitive about any measure that implies criticism of its treatment of Uyghurs.

Strategic context

Increasingly, UN bodies and experts have been issuing reports and recommendations regarding China’s human rights violations. This work has flagged serious violations of international treaty obligations involving Tibetans, Uyghurs, and residents of Hong Kong, among others. Canada and likeminded countries leverage these UN reports to call on China to provide meaningful responses on human rights. This approach maintains pressure on China to account for its international obligations and provides support to the rules-based international system. China has responded to pressure on human rights within the multilateral system by ramping up the resources it dedicates to lobbying at the UN and in capitals. Its critique of human rights is consistent with its overarching narrative challenging what it sees as a Western-dominated international order. Similarly, its efforts to redefine international human rights norms is consistent with its attempts to reshape the multilateral system.

China’s position

China consistently says criticism of its human rights record is interference in China’s internal affairs.  China calls public statements on human rights, “microphone diplomacy” and would prefer these issues be raised only in private. China can be expected to raise this objection once again, possibly asking Canada to avoid playing a leading role in the criticism of China’s human rights record. It is not clear whether they expect that Canada will comply given Canada’s stated position on human rights that is a foreign policy priority. The various reports/recommendations from within the UN system on China’s poor human rights record gives coverage for Canada to raise these human rights issues. In the process, Canada is well positioned to request / encourage China to demonstrate responsible international leadership on human rights while being able to help maintain and promote the integrity of this important aspect of the multilateral system.

Canada-China consular cases briefing note

Background

Arrest/Detention cases in China: Approximately 100 Canadians are detained in China at any given time on a broad range of offences, ranging from basic infractions (e.g. immigration violations) to more serious charges such as drug trafficking and fraud. These figures are subject to change.

Consular case of Huseyincan Celil: Huseyincan Celil, a Chinese-Canadian of Uyghur ethnicity, was arrested in Uzbekistan in March 2006 and extradited to China despite vigorous protests by Canada. China does not recognize Mr. Celil’s Canadian citizenship and refuses to grant consular access.

Canadians sentenced to death in China: Canadians have received death penalty sentences in China. Canada regularly advocates for clemency. The arbitrary sentencing of Robert Schellenberg is of particular concern. PM Trudeau and a number of Ministers of Foreign Affairs have condemned the sentencing as arbitrary. [REDACTED]Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor: After 1020 days of arbitrary detention Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig were released and returned to Canada on September 25, 2021, the same day as the proceedings against Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer, were withdrawn.

Canada-China consular consultations: In May 2024, Canada’s DG for Consular Operations met with her Chinese counterpart for bilaterial consultations in Beijing. Discussion covered a broad range of consular issues, with both sides working toward constructive resolution of concerns. These were the first DG-level consular consultations since 2017.

Bilateral Trade Issues: Market Access, Direct Flights, and the Joint Economic and Trade Commission

Latest developments

Current positions and upcoming milestones

Context

China’s ban on imports of Canada’s beef and dry pet food containing poultry ingredients: In December 2021, China banned imports of Canada’s beef and beef products shortly after Canada notified a case of atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). This case did not affect Canada's World Organization for Animal Health negligible risk status for BSE and should not have affected trade. Despite Canada providing all of the technical information requested by China, China has provided neither justification for the prohibition, nor timeframes for restoring trade. Additionally, in February 2022, China imposed an import prohibition on Canadian heat-treated pet food containing poultry ingredients following a confirmation of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Canada. T[REDACTED]

CFIA travelled to Beijing in March 2024 to meet with the GACC to participate in the bilateral DG-level Technical Working Groups, which consists of four thematic tracks: plant health, animal health, food safety, and fish and seafood. No progress was made on the prohibition on beef products and pet food containing poultry ingredients, with China continuing to point out the need to conduct risk assessments, the importance of protecting Chinese consumers, and the lack of internal resources to deal with a large volume of market access requests.

The Joint Economic and Trade Commission: The JETC is an annual DM-led bilateral consultation mechanism for the promotion of trade and investment between Canada and China. It is chaired by DMT and his counterpart at China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). The JETC is supported by the DG-level EPWG, which is chaired by OPD and her MOFCOM counterpart. By focussing on trade policy and the promotion of priority sectors, it allows senior officials on both sides to review the commercial relationship and seek opportunities to advance two-way trade. The last JETC meeting was held in Ottawa in 2017; it was suspended in 2018 following the arrest of Meng Wanzhou. The first EPWG since 2016 was held in a virtual format in March 2024. Discussions centered on broader bilateral issues, multilateral and regional initiatives, and potential new areas of cooperation.[REDACTED] both sides agreed on the importance of the EPWG and the need for progress on key issues before considering holding a JETC. 

Air Services: [REDACTED] Since May 2021, services have been limited to six weekly flights for China [REDACTED]

CPTPP: The CPTPP is a trade agreement between Canada and 11 Indo-Pacific parties: Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United Kingdom and Vietnam. Canada is the 2024 CPTPP Commission Chair.

China and Taiwan both applied for membership in September 2021. Canada has not taken a position on either Taiwan’s or China’s applications, nor have other CPTPP Parties.

CPTPP Parties, including Canada, support the expansion of the Agreement to include economies that meet the ‘Auckland Principles,’ i.e. are willing and able to meet the CPTPP’s high standard rules and ambitious market access commitments, have a demonstrated history of compliance with their existing trade commitments, and can achieve the consensus of CPTPP Parties.

For awareness, aside from China and Taiwan, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ukraine and Uruguay have also formally applied to accede to the CPTPP.

Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Canada’s Critical Mineral Strategy, launched in 2022, takes a full value chain approach to the development of critical minerals, “from exploration to recycling.” It identifies three value chains that have the highest potential for vertical integration in Canada:

Federal initiatives and investments under the Strategy are delivered according to six areas of focus:

  1. Drive research, innovation, and exploration: Supporting public geoscience and exploration to better identify and assess mineral deposits ($79.2 million), as well as critical mineral R&D and the deployment of technologies and materials to support critical mineral development for upstream and midstream segments of the value chain ($144.4 million, led by NRCan and NRC).
  2. Accelerate responsible project development: Advancing critical minerals projects through ISED’s Strategic Innovation Fund (SIF), with prioritization given to advanced manufacturing, processing and recycling applications ($1.5 billion); supporting northern regulatory processes in reviewing and permitting critical minerals projects ($40 million, led by CIRNAC); and, renewing NRCan’s Critical Minerals Centre of Excellence to develop federal policies and programs on critical minerals and to assist project developers in navigating regulatory processes and federal support measures ($21.5 million).
  3. Build sustainable infrastructure: Investing $1.5 billion over 7 years, starting in 2023-24, through the Critical Minerals Infrastructure Fund (CMIF) to support clean energy and transportation infrastructure necessary to develop and expand Canada’s critical mineral resource production. The CMIF program design will coordinate with the Canada Infrastructure Bank support for critical mineral projects, which are Indigenous-led and/or require a capital investment greater than $100M.
  4. Advance reconciliation with Indigenous peoples: Advancing economic reconciliation in the natural resources sector ($103.4 million), including at least $25 million to support Indigenous participation and early engagement in the Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy.
  5. Grow a diverse workforce and prosperous communities: The federal government will continue to leverage a wide range of actions and initiatives to advance this area of focus.
  6. Strengthen global leadership and security: To advance sustainable, transparent and secure global critical mineral supply chains, the Global Partnerships Initiative ($70 million) supports bilateral and multilateral commitments and engagements, while upholding Canada’s responsibilities under the Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act.

Natural Resources Canada is also working across governments to leverage other support measures delivered by various federal departments and agencies to coordinate project reviews and assessments.

Complementing the Strategy, Budget 2022 announced a 30% Critical Minerals Exploration Tax Credit (CMETC) for 15 targeted critical minerals, which was expanded to include lithium-from-brine. Budget 2023 also announced a Clean Technology Manufacturing Investment Tax Credit (CTM-ITC), equal to 30% of the capital cost of investments in machinery and equipment used to manufacture or process key clean technologies and extract, process or recycle key critical minerals. This tax incentive will help spur the expansion of mining and processing of critical minerals, making more raw materials available for clean technologies such as batteries and solar panels.

The Strategy also covers consideration of national and economic security matters related to critical minerals, including as one tool in the toolbox, the Investment Canada Act, led by ISED. In October 2022, ISED announced an ICA policy to clarify investments in Canadian critical mineral sectors by foreign State Owned or State Influenced Enterprises, including with regards to national security and net benefit to Canada. In November 2022, ISED also announced the proactive disclosure of the Government’s order of the divestiture of three investments by foreign (Chinese) SOE investors in Canadian critical mineral companies.

Regional maritime tensions (ECS and SCS)

South China Sea

Latest developments

Current positions

Context

Competing Maritime Claims in the South China Sea

China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan have made competing sovereignty claims over the various maritime features in the South China Sea (SCS), most notably the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands. They also claim sovereign rights over the resources in the waters surrounding these features. Many of these claims overlap, but China's “Ten-Dash Line” is by far the most expansive.  China has conducted land reclamation at an unprecedented scale and constructed military facilities on multiple disputed features and artificial islands. China has constructed at least 27 outposts in the SCS, including multiple significant military installations with mobile air defence and anti-ship ballistic missile systems, airstrips capable of supporting combat aircraft, and substantial radar and communications infrastructure.

Other Chinese actions have included: sending military and paramilitary vessels, as well as large fishing fleets (also known as “maritime militia”) into waters claimed by other states; adopting unsafe navigational practices when intercepting vessels or aircraft of other states (including fishing , most notably those seeking to resupply a  Philippine outpost Second Thomas Shoal); interfering with the freedom of navigation and overflight of other states within the SCS; taking unilateral steps to exploit deep-sea resources; and causing environmental harm, such as damage to fragile coral reefs.

China-Philippines Tensions: Since 2023, Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been carrying out increasingly aggressive actions towards Philippine vessels on numerous occasions including through using military grade lasers, long range acoustic devices and water cannons against Philippine supply and coast guard vessels and conducting unsafe manoeuvres resulting in collision between vessels. Despite a commitment from both parties in January 2024 to improve communication and manage differences, tensions and naval incidents persist. A confrontation on Dec. 9-10, 2023, involving approximately 45 PRC vessels and several assertive tactics generated widespread condemnation, including a departmental statement from GAC and similar statements from the Five Eyes, United Kingdom, European Union, South Korea, and Japan. To strengthen its territorial claims, the Philippines announced in January 2024 that it would develop nine maritime features that it occupies in the SCS to make them more habitable for military personnel. This followed the February 2023 announcement by the U.S. and the Philippines that the U.S. would be given access to four additional Philippine military bases in northern Luzon Island under a bilateral Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, bringing the total number of bases with U.S. access to nine. . The Philippines has sought to increase its international partnerships as a means to garner support in the face of increasing aggression by China. Most recently, the Philippines is working on a cooperative agreement with Japan and the U.S. to maintain the security and freedom of navigation in the SCS as part of the April 2024 summit in Washington, D.C.

The 2016 Arbitral Ruling (Philippines v. China): To date, only the Philippines has taken legal action against China for its activities in the SCS. Using the compulsory dispute settlement procedures established by UNCLOS, the Philippines obtained a decision from an arbitral tribunal in 2016 regarding certain aspects of its dispute with China. The decision undermined important elements of China's legal position. Notably, it found that there was no justification for Chinese claims to historic rights over broad areas of the SCS. While the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine which state has sovereignty over the islands and rocks in the SCS and where the maritime boundary between China and the Philippines is located, it did identify certain waters as falling within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. China refused to participate in the proceedings. It maintains that the tribunal had no authority to hear the case.

Code of Conduct: For over a decade, ASEAN member states and China have been negotiating towards a Code of Conduct (COC) for the SCS to help manage disagreements and avoid conflict, which would replace the non-binding Declaration of Conduct signed in 2002. While a potential COC remains one of the best hopes for maintaining regional peace and stability, there are concerns that an eventual agreement may restrict the rights of third parties by attempting to limit navigation and overflight rights. There are also concerns that a COC could serve to legitimize the land reclamation and militarization already undertaken by several countries as well as support aspects of territorial and maritime claims that may be inconsistent with international law. There are indications that China has a preference for negotiating with ASEAN states on a bilateral basis where it can more easily exert influence to shape outcomes towards its preference. Canada works with like-minded partners to encourage transparency in negotiations and to reiterate the expectation that any agreement must be consistent with international law, including UNCLOS. While negotiations are ongoing, several ASEAN countries, notably the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, have become increasingly outspoken in countering Chinese aggression and in supporting their own maritime and territorial claims. In November 2023, the Philippines hosted talks with Vietnam and Malaysia to discuss the production of a separate code of conduct on the SCS, amid stalling negotiations with China.

East China Sea (ECS) and other maritime tensions

The ECS dispute between Japan and China centres on the Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain which is claimed by both countries but administered by Japan. Since 2012/2013, the Japanese government has reported a dramatic increase in Chinese naval, coast guard and militia vessels entering Japan’s claimed territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The risk of military confrontation between Japan and China over the islands prompted the U.S. to clarify that the islands fall under the scope of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, despite the fact that Washington does not take a position on the sovereignty dispute. The most recent incidents were an encounter between five Japanese ships and China’s coast guard in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain on January 30, 2023, and a similar incident on March 15. Elsewhere in the region, the Republic of Korea exercises authority over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands in the Sea of Japan, which are also claimed by Japan. Although the dispute has largely remained peaceful, entries in the ROK’s self-declared Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) by Russian and Chinese military planes have occasionally enflamed tensions.

Security Cooperation: The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) maintain a near-persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific, including in the SCS, in support of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). The Royal Canadian Navy regularly conducts joint sails and exercises with allies and partners to contribute to regional peace and stability and strengthen regional partnerships. Beijing routinely expresses opposition to the presence of Canadian navy vessels in the region, particularly their sails through the Taiwan Strait, which China labels a “provocation.” In June 2023, the Minister of National Defence announced that the CAF will further support the implementation of the IPS with the launch of Operation HORIZON. The new operation will include an enhanced naval presence, expanded initiatives, more frequent participation in regional exercises and additional opportunities to work alongside allies and partners. DND also signed a defence memorandum of understanding with the Philippines on January 19, 2024, which will support mil-mil cooperation on military education, training exchanges, information sharing, peacekeeping operations, and disaster response.

Dark Vessel Detection: Under the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Canada has expanded the Dark Vessel Detection (DVD) Program to the Philippines. The DVD program provides the Philippines with specialised remote detection services to assist national fisheries agencies and coast guard authorities in locating and tracking fishing vessels that have switched off their location transmitting devices in an attempt to evade monitoring, control, and surveillance.

[REDACTED]

China’s Export Control Measures Related to Critical Minerals

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

 In 2023, China announced export controls on certain gallium, germanium, and graphite products, citing national security concerns. These materials are crucial for green and digital technologies, including the chip-making industry, EV batteries, and solar cells. The measures’ impacts are still uncertain due to a lack of transparency in their application that makes it difficult to gauge their operation in practice.

[REDACTED] Broader discussions on the need for greater diversification of critical minerals supply chains are being prioritized in a variety of bilateral meetings with likemindeds and forums in which Canada is active.

China has been implicated in several WTO dispute settlement actions based on export restrictions for a range of minerals, including rare earth elements.

Canada-China Relations: Forced Labour

Latest developments

Current positions and upcoming milestones

Context

Forced Labour in Xinjiang: Credible sources have indicated a campaign of repression and human rights violations by the Chinese government against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim communities in Xinjiang. The August 2022 UN report on Xinjiang strengthened this evidence. Violations have a strong commercial dimension and supply chain implications, whether through the importation of goods produced using forced labour, the use of Canadian exports in repression, or business dealings with implicated entities.  Products most at risk include polysilicon and downstream electronic and photovoltaic products (e.g. solar supply chains); tomatoes and downstream processed food products (e.g. fish processing); cotton and downstream fabric and apparel products; polysilicon industry and apparel.  Recent news has implicated Canadian supply chains as being linked to the use of Xinjiang forced labour, particularly in fish processing and solar module supply chains.

Measures to address Xinjiang forced labour:  On January 12, 2021, Canada announced a suite of measures to address human rights violations in Xinjiang, including  a Business Advisory cautioning Canadian businesses on the risks of supply chain exposure to Xinjiang-related entities, a backgrounder on the human rights situation in Xinjiang, a specialized Xinjiang Integrity Declaration for Canadian Trade Commissioner Service clients with business ties to the Xinjiang region, enhanced advice to Canadian businesses, increasing awareness for Responsible Business Conduct linked to Xinjiang, and a study on forced labour and supply chain risks (published in April 2022).

Xinjiang Integrity Declaration (XID): Canadian companies must sign the XID prior to receiving support from the TCS if they are: sourcing directly or indirectly from Xinjiang or entities relying on Uyghur labour; established in Xinjiang; or seeking to engage in the Xinjiang market. Companies which meet these conditions face a higher risk of exposure to forced labour. By signing the declaration, companies affirm they are aware of the human rights situation in Xinjiang, are not knowingly sourcing from a supplier implicated in forced labour or other human rights violations, and commit to conducting due diligence on their suppliers in China. There are currently 9 signatories to the XID, with another company in discussions to sign. 

New government-led supply chain due diligence legislation: In Budget 2023 and 2024, the federal government announced its intention to introduce legislation in 2024 to eradicate forced labour from Canadian supply chains. Supply chain legislation is a proactive measure that requires companies to examine and strengthen business practices and operations in their supply chains (not just imports) to improve protections for workers. In the federal budget, the government also committed to strengthen the import prohibition on goods produced using forced labour. CBSA, ESDC-Labour, GAC and other federal departments are working together and with other jurisdictions, to consider means of strengthening the ban further to this commitment. These measures are not specific to the Xinjiang region; they are meant to help eradicate forced labour across global supply chains irrespective of the sector or countries in which Canadian companies are operating. 

Research Security

Latest developments

Current positions and upcoming milestones

Context

National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships

In July 2021, Canada released the country-agnostic National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships to help safeguard Canada’s research ecosystem from foreign interference, espionage, and unwanted knowledge transfer that could contribute to: advancements in military, security, and intelligence capabilities of states or groups that pose a threat to Canada; or to the disruption of Canada’s economy, society, and critical infrastructure. The purpose of the guidelines is to integrate national security considerations into the development, evaluation, and funding of international research partnerships.

Joint-Ministerial Statement on Protecting Canada’s Research

On February 14, 2023, Ministers Champagne, Duclos and Mendicino issued a statement on enhanced research security measures ending federal research grants involving research in sensitive research areas where projects in question are affiliated with a university, research institute or laboratory connected to military, national defence, or state security entities of foreign state actors that pose a risk to Canada’s national security.

The new Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern (STRAC)

On January 16, 2024, Ministers Champagne, Holland and LeBlanc published a follow-up statement announcing the new STRAC policy, developed in close consultation with federal partners as well as federal granting councils and the Canada Foundation for Innovation. The policy includes two lists: 1) the Sensitive Technology Research Area list; and 2) the Names Research Organizations list, which provide guidance so that Canadian researchers can easily determine if these new requirements apply to their research. The lists are intended to work together, with denials of federal research funding occurring for grant applications falling under both lists. These targeted measures are country-agnostic and based on risks. Canada is one of the first countries to publish transparent guidance in that area. The U.S. Department of Defense published a similar policy in June 2023, with an accompanying list of 42 entities.

The Names Research Organizations (NRO) list

The NRO list consists of 103 foreign institutions located in three countries: China (85), Iran (12) and Russia (6). The “made in Canada” list is non-exhaustive and considers similar lists developed by like-

minded partners, including their academic organizations. It will be updated regularly to ensure Canada continues to address the ever-evolving threat landscape.

Research Security Centre

The January 2024 ministerial statement also launched Canada’s new Research Security Centre, which was announced in Budget 2022. Housed at Public Safety Canada, the Centre aims to provide guidance and tools to Canadian post-secondary institutions and eventually to the private sector. Six regional advisors have been placed across the country to ensure that the university and research community are equipped with information related to federal priorities and best practices for the application process.

PRC reaction to the STRAC announcement

The PRC immediately expressed its strong dissatisfaction and objection to Canada’s new policy. Beijing urged Canada to “stop overstretching the concept of national security.” The PRC pointed to the overrepresentation of Chinese institutions on the NRO list, which de facto aims at constraining and suppressing Chinese academic institutions.

PRC’s New Data Security Requirements

The PRC implemented its own set of similar measures over the last few years. In March 2018, the PRC released the Scientific Data Administrative Measures, which impacts all scientific data generated through research within the PRC, whether or not it is funded by the Chinese government. Under these measures, scientific data must not be used for any activities that may endanger national security, the public interest, and rights and interests of others. In September 2021, a new data security law was implemented to enhance the protection of critical data. Measures require domestic and foreign entities operating in China to comply with particular standards for data protection, including requirements on data localization, requiring security assessments for certain data exports. The proliferation of PRC data security regulations has created difficulties for business compliance. Additionally, China’s updated counter-espionage law, which came into effect in July 2023, widened the scope of activities that can be considered as espionage from state secrets, to now covering all “documents, data, materials or articles relating to national security and interests.” The revisions have increased the ambiguity, scope, and potential arbitrary enforcement of the law. These various measures have made it increasingly difficult for foreign researchers to access Chinese data for their research activities in China.

Canada-China Commercial Relations

Background

Commercial Overview

Status of Commercial Relations: While China remains an important market for Canadian businesses, commercial engagement with China carries several risks, including arbitrary application of regulatory and market access barriers; forced technology transfer; intellectual property theft; market-distorting actions of state-owned enterprises; the use of forced labour; economic coercion; and harmful industrial subsidies.

The Canada China Business Council`s 2023 survey revealed that “China continues to remain prominent in the global strategic planning of Canadian firms but plays less of a singular role in their strategies”. It also highlighted the decline of Canadian firms’ profitability in China compared to the pre-COVID era, as well as the main obstacles they face in/with China: 1) bilateral relations, 2) geopolitical risk, 3) domestic firm favoritism and 4) inconsistent application and opacity of Chinese regulations and laws.

Investment: In 2023, China was the 5th largest investing country into Canada (on an Ultimate Investor Country basis) and 20th largest destination (4th largest in Asia/Oceania) for Canadian direct investment abroad (on an Immediate Investing Country basis). In 2023, China’s direct investment in Canada was $37.0B (down from $37.4B in 2022), while Canada’s direct investment in China was $14.9B (up from $14.2B). Chinese investment activity in Canada remains concentrated in the natural resources sector, such as mineral ores and energy fuels, by value, and is largely made through mergers and acquisitions.

Canada’s Strategic Interests

Economic Coercion: Canada continues to cooperate with likeminded partners through for a like the G7, WTO, OECD, and FVEY+ groupings to increase assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response efforts to acts of economic coercion.

Bilateral and Multilateral Engagements

The Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETC) and Economic Partnership Working Group (EPWG): The JETC is an annual DM-led bilateral consultation mechanism for the promotion of trade and investment between Canada and China. The JETC is supported by the DG-level EPWG, which is co-chaired by the Director General, Greater China Division, and her MOFCOM counterpart.

CPTPP Accession Request: See note 16: Outstanding Access Issues and the Canadian Commercial Corporation Representative Offices (CCC RO) Closure 

DEPA: The Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) Parties announced the establishment of China’s Accession Working Group on August 17, 2022, and several meetings have taken place to date. China’s request to join the DEPA is a further signal that this digital trade agreement is capturing the interest of a growing number of countries.

RCEP: The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement, signed on November 15, 2020, creates the world’s largest trading bloc. It includes 15 countries: the 10 ASEAN Member States plus Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. It entered into force on January 1, 2022.

Canada-China FIPA: Effective October 1, 2014, the Canada-China Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Agreement (FIPA) outlines a 31-year legal commitment to promote and protect foreign direct investment in each respective country.

Canada-Taiwan commercial relations

Overview: In lieu of official relations, the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Ottawa manage substantive bilateral engagement. Canada has complementary and growing economic relations with Taiwan, based on robust business ties, shared values, and significant science, tech and innovation collaboration. The annual Canada Taiwan Economic Consultation (CTEC) allows senior officials from both sides to advance economic, people-to-people and cultural cooperation. The most recent CTEC – held in Ottawa on December 6, 2023 – covered a broad range of topics, such as the importance of trade and investment, agricultural market access, cooperation on Indigenous affairs, green economy, supply chain resilience, intellectual property dialogue, export controls, and science, tech and innovation collaboration. The next CTEC is expected to be held in Taiwan in late 2024.

Trade: Canada’s two-way merchandise trade with Taiwan totaled $10.1bn in 2023, down 16.2% from $12.0bn in 2022. Exports to Taiwan in 2023 were $2.0bn, down 22.3% from 2022 ($2.6bn). Imports from Taiwan totaled $8.1bn, down 14.5% from 2022 ($9.5bn). In 2023, Taiwan was Canada’s 15th largest merchandise trading partner (12th in 2022) and sixth-largest in the Indo-Pacific. The top five Canadian exports to Taiwan in 2023 were metallurgical coal, pork, vehicles, fertilizer, and electronics (semiconductors, cellphones, etc.). The top five imports were electronics (computers, telephone sets, etc.), silver products, building hardware, and vehicle parts. Two-way services trade with Taiwan in 2023 was $1.8 bn, unchanged from 2022. In 2023, services exports to Taiwan were $513m and services imports from Taiwan were $1.3bn.

Investment: In 2023, Taiwan had the 44th largest foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in Canada, totaling $483m (or 0.04% of the total in Canada) on an immediate investing country basis (10th largest from the Indo-Pacific). This FDI is concentrated in three sectors: wholesale trade, manufacturing, and finance/insurance. In 2023, several major Taiwanese companies invested in Canada, including E-One Moli Energy (electrical components) and Chan Chung Group (metals). In 2023, Canadian direct investment abroad (CDIA) stock in Taiwan stood at -$870m and was concentrated in two sectors: finance/insurance and manufacturing. Over 30 Canadian companies operate in Taiwan, mainly in the transportation, aerospace/air services, fashion and consumer goods, ICT, clean energy, life sciences and environmental services sectors. There is notable investment in the renewable energy sector by Canadian companies, most prominently in offshore wind projects by Northland Power and Canadian pension funds.

Foreign investment promotion and protection arrangement: On February 7, 2023, Canada and Taiwan confirmed readiness to begin formal negotiations on an Arrangement with the aims of offering protection to Canadian investments in Taiwan and attracting Taiwanese foreign investment in Canada. [REDACTED]As such, Canada and Taiwan completed signatures of a non-legally binding Arrangement on December 22, 2023.[REDACTED] no ratification was required. It came into effect on December 28, 2023 and includes a model binding arbitration agreement that either jurisdiction may enter into with an investor of the other side in the event of a dispute.

CPTPP: In September 2021, Taiwan submitted a formal application to accede to the CPTPP, following a complete analysis of its trade regime compared against CPTPP obligations. All decisions by CPTPP parties regarding accessions are made by consensus; to date, no decisions have been made regarding future accession candidates. The CPTPP is open to accession of economies willing and able to meet the CPTPP standard for rules and market access, and who demonstrate compliance with their existing international trade obligations.

Education: Taiwan is becoming an education market of interest to provinces and Canadian education stakeholders. Collaboration is already underway for dual high school diploma programs. Canadian stakeholders are looking to expand talent partnerships and language training for Taiwanese teachers and enable more research-oriented universities to participate in research internship exchanges. Leveraging Taiwan’s “Bilingual 2030” policy could help achieve the objectives of Canada’s International Education Strategy, while Canada may be well-placed to address Taiwan’s demand for more foreign teachers. At the same time, Canada is welcoming a growing number of Taiwanese students. As of December 31, 2023, there were 4,930 Taiwanese study permit holders in Canada, up from 4,230 in 2022 .GAC provides funding for Taiwanese students to visit Canada on short-term exchanges for study or research. Since 2021, 35 students from Taiwan have received scholarships to study or conduct research in Canada.

Supply chains: Taiwan plays a critical role in global supply chains, serving as a contract manufacturer for major foreign consumer electronic brands. Many of its largest electronics engineering firms are investing to diversify and expand their presence in global supply chains, while also repatriating billions of dollars’ worth of investment from mainland China. Canada’s integration into the North American economy offers them opportunities to find strategic partners or advantageous locations to play a more expansive joint role in global supply chains. On December 6, 2023, Canada and Taiwan endorsed a Collaborative Framework on Supply Chains Resilience covering four areas of interest: critical minerals value chains; clean fuels and renewable energy; green and resilient transportation; and advanced manufacturing, research and development, talent cultivation, and innovation. Both sides are now collaborating on an action plan to implement the instrument. GAC is leading consultations with stakeholders across the GoC to develop the evergreen plan. It will be officially approved in the fall of 2024 and again at the next CTEC in late 2024.

Canada-China bilateral engagement on the environment

Latest developments

Current positions and recent milestones

Context

China’s climate footprint

China is the world’s top emitter of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, emitting more GHGs than the United States (U.S.), India and the European Union (EU) combined, and accounting for 27% of the global total in 2019. China is the world’s largest domestic user of coal, and at the same time the world’s largest producer of renewable energy, hydro, wind, and solar power. Serious concerns remain about human rights and subsidies in solar, however.  In addition to GHG emissions, China is a large contributor to plastics pollution and marine litter, resource consumption, and other environmental issues.

China is a key player in multilateral negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and will hold the presidency of COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) until Colombia assumes the presidency of COP16 in November 2024.

China has committed to peaking its carbon emissions by 2030 and to achieving net-zero emissions by 2060, and has committed to end international coal financing; China continues to build new coal power plants domestically, however. These targets were included in China’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) of 2021. China has announced a number of plans and State level measures to implement these targets, including an overarching guideline on carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, followed by an Action Plan for peaking before 2030. New opportunities are emerging for increased engagement on climate and environment, in light of China’s commitments for 2030 and to carbon neutrality by 2060, and its desire to be a leader in new/advanced technologies. China’s market presents an opportunity for Canadian clean technology and renewable energy companies.

China Council for Environment and Development

The China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) is an international advisory body providing China’s State Council (Cabinet equivalent) with research-based recommendations on policy related to the environment and development. The CCICED is currently comprised of approximately 30 Chinese and 40 international members, who provide independent policy advice on China’s environment and development challenges and needs.

The CCICED, which was established in 1992, is ECCC’s main form of engagement with China on the environment. In 2022, Canada renewed its funding contribution for CCICED Phase VII (2022-26), amounting to $8 million over 5 years (or $1.6 million per year), and equivalent to funding provided for the last five-year Phase. Canada’s financial contribution is managed by the Winnipeg-based International Institute for Sustainable Development. No Canadian funding is provided directly to the Chinese government.

As the largest international donor to CCICED, Canada exerts influence within its organizational structure, notably by serving as the International Executive Vice-Chair (currently Minister Guilbeault) and International Chief Advisor to CCICED (currently Scott Vaughan, former President and CEO of the International Institute for Sustainable Development).

Ministerial on Climate Action (MOCA)

As a partnership between Canada, China and the EU, the Ministerial on Climate Action (MOCA), which launched in 2017, has remained grounded in discussions related to the Paris Agreement and its implementation, particularly during negotiations around the Paris Agreement rulebook. The co-convenors work together to agree on the list of invitees, the meeting agenda, and the co-chair summary that is published following the event for each meeting. Overall, the event convenes major economies and key players to advance the implementation of the Paris Agreement and refine positioning ahead of COP.

In 2024, China will host the MOCA in July. A preliminary agenda shared indicated an interest to discuss mitigation including NDCs, nature-climate linkages, climate resilience and means implementation such as climate finance and capacity building. Canada hosted the first MOCA in Montreal in September 2017 with ministers and senior officials from 35 developed and developing countries

Biodiversity and COP15

China serves as CBD COP President, initiating their presidency with the holding of CBD COP15 Part I in October 2021 (virtual) due to COVID-19 restrictions, and continuing with Part II in December 2022. As China could not host COP15 part II due to internal challenges around pandemic restrictions, Canada volunteered to welcome the world to Montréal for COP15 as the host country of the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Canada worked closely with China, to advance consensus on negotiation and overcome gridlock culminating in the adoption of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Mr. Huang Runqiu the Minister of Ecology and Environment of Government of China was the President of COP15 and head of delegation for China, invited Minister Steven Guilbeault to advance negotiations on key areas alongside the Egyptian Environment Minister, Ms. Yasmine Fouad. Canada and China’s partnership on COP15 was instrumental in securing the adoption of the KMGBF.

Canada-China Ministerial Dialogue

ECCC and the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment had a formal, structured Ministerial Dialogue on the Environment and Climate Change, but this has been on hold due to difficulties in the broader bilateral relationship. The last Dialogue was held in fall 2018.

Canada-China MOUs on Climate Change Cooperation and Environmental Cooperation

ECCC and the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment have two MOUs that remain in force but that have remained dormant since 2019 due to challenges in the broader bilateral relationship. The MOU on Climate Change will expire in 2028, and the MOU on the environment will expire in 2027.

China and the World

Latest developments

Russia-Ukraine

Middle East

North Korea

Current positions and upcoming milestones

Russia-Ukraine

Middle East

North Korea

Context

Russia-Ukraine

China’s Position: Despite China’s profession of neutrality about the war in Ukraine, it is supportive of Russia – quietly providing support on most areas except for lethal assistance; it is trying to calibrate the overall impact of regional instability to its benefit and is not seeking to upend its relations with the U.S. or Europe for Russia’s sake. China has also taken full advantage of the sale of Russian resources at rock-bottom prices, in defiance of Western sanctions policy. While China and Russia boast a “no limits partnership,” the limit to China’s support for Russia appears to be around the use of nuclear weapons.

China does not seek to upend its relations with the United States or Europe for Russia’s sake. China may be concerned that North Korea’s provision of weapons systems to Russia will bring those two countries closer. China is closely watching developments in the war in Ukraine to inform its own calculus vis-à-vis Taiwan.  

Publicly, China continues to express concern with the situation in Ukraine, stating that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all parties must be respected, and that they must pursue dialogue and negotiation. It was a year after the war began before President Xi spoke with President Zelenskyy, however. As with other global crises, China has been critical of the West’s response, particularly regarding how it perceives democracy and human rights rhetoric being politicized, and has shared its concerns about the regional security implications of NATO’s eastward expansion. China may be concerned that the DPRK’s provision of weapons systems to Russia will bring those two countries closer, which would not in line with Chinese interests. The limit to China’s support for Russia appears to be around the use of nuclear weapons.

From May 15 to 16, Vladimir Putin visited China, where he met with Xi Jinping. Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, met with FM Wang Yi in Beijing on April 9.

International Coalition for the Return Ukrainian Children (the Coalition): Canada and Ukraine launched the Coalition at a hybrid event in Kyiv on February 2, 2024, during Minister Joly’s visit to Ukraine. Canada’s goal as co-chair is to support and complement Ukrainian and global efforts on the safe return of children. Canada will focus on convening key partners to support Ukraine in returning the children, raising awareness, and advocating for their return through diplomatic engagement and communication activities. There are currently 34 member states of the Coalition, who will combine their efforts to reunite Ukrainian children with their families and communities. Countries that are interested in taking on a role as mediators in returning children from Russia but who are reluctant to engage in public-facing or leadership roles have joined the Coalition as observers (e.g. Qatar and the Vatican). Active discussions with others in a position to take on a mediation role, particularly with Brazil and South Africa are ongoing. China was invited to all three key meeting of the Coalition to date, but did not attend any of the events. Canada and Ukraine would welcome China joining the Coalition publicly or taking on a more private role as a mediator.

Ukraine 10 Point Peace Formula (10PPF): Under the 10PPF, the sixth meeting of National Security Advisors took place in Kyiv on March 20, 2024. The meeting was the latest held within the ‘core group’ NSA format (G7, EU and key Global South). China did not attend, despite efforts; to date it has only attended the Jeddah meeting in August 2023. NSIA/Nathalie Drouin led Canada’s delegation. Qatar is expected to host the next meeting in late April. The first leader-level summit under the 10PPF is set to take place at Lake Lucerne, Switzerland, likely between June 15-17, although ministerial attendance will be accepted. Swiss Foreign Minister Casis has confirmed that Russia will not participate in the June conference but said there was an “expectation,” based on his interactions with FM Lavrov, that Russia would participate down the road. Minister Casis said that the presence of Russia-friendly countries would add to that expectation. China has signalled that it will not participate, given Russia’s absence.

China’s Peace Paper: On February 24, 2023, China released a 12-point position paper on how to end the conflict in Ukraine, which highlights a variety of positions and ideas around the conditions necessary for peace. The points include the need to respect the sovereignty of all countries and the need to cease hostilities—two potentially contradictory terms. China’s position is positive in a few important areas: the importance of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, exchanging prisoners of war, condemning nuclear threats, and supporting the IAEA, and UN humanitarian access. The document tries to position China as a neutral player, particularly in the eyes of the Global South. China states that it will “continue to play a constructive role” toward the resumption of peace talks.

The paper was initially rejected by Ukraine and the West for not beginning from the premise of Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory but could be revived in the future. Western leaders have been particularly skeptical of China’s calls for a ceasefire, which they fear would entrench Russia’s gains. In May 2023, Li Hui, China’s Special Envoy for Ukraine, visited Kyiv for two days where he met with FM Kuleba, who firmly stated that Ukraine would not accept any proposals to end the war with Russia that involved it losing territory. In March 2024, Li conducted a follow up ‘peace mission’ with six relevant countries, including Ukraine and Russia, where he stressed China’s hopes that all sides will make efforts to deescalate and achieve ceasefire. China uses these visits to try to cast itself as a neutral party pushing for peace. According to a recent debrief of Li’s March meeting with the European External Action Service in Brussels, however, he largely used this opportunity to convey Russian talking points. In April 2024, Russia’s Foreign Minister claimed that the China’s 12-point peace plan is the most reasonable proposal to date.

Middle East

China recognized Palestinian statehood in 1988. China has not directly condemned Hamas for the October 2023 attack, but has called for an immediate ceasefire on humanitarian grounds. FM Wang has denounced Israel for “going beyond self-defence,” and has called for an end to the “collective punishment of the Gazan people.” U.S. Secretary of State Blinken has indicated a willingness to work with FM Wang to address the tensions in the Middle East. Meanwhile, China’s domestic and national spin on these events amplifies Western support for Israel and China’s alignment with the Global South, while avoiding addressing China’s relatively modest role beyond its constant call for peace in the Middle East. 

China may see this as an opportunity to exploit wedges between the West and the Global South. China could try to leverage more of its influence on issues that more directly affect its interests, for example constructive pressure on the Iran and the Houthis to cease attacking shipping lanes. 

President Xi has also held in-depth discussions with the leaders of Saudia Arabia and Iran. Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Cairo and Tunisia in January and met with the Secretary General of the Arab League. 

North Korea

Russia’s Panel of Experts Veto: The March 28 veto comes after recent reports from the Panel that investigated evidence of Russian evasion of the sanctions regime, including the purchasing of weapons. China abstained on the vote, citing the need to link the sanctions to a political process and calling on others to consider Russia’s proposal of sunsetting the sanctions regime. Statements from likeminded members of the Council were straightforward in their anger at Russia for this result, with clear accusations of procurement of weapons from DPRK for its war of aggression in Ukraine. Potential middle-ground countries all voted in support of the resolution. Under the Veto Initiative, the matter will now go to the UNGA where all Member States will be able to share their views. While the Panel of Experts has not been renewed, the underlying sanctions regime remain fully in force, and, unlike other UN sanctions measures, do not require Council renewal. PRMNY HOM delivered a statement at the UNGA on April 11 in response to Russia’s veto terminating the mandate of the DPRK Panel of Experts and its broader implications.

DPRK-China: While the two countries maintain active diplomatic and commercial ties, China is concerned by North Korea’s nuclear program and has supported UN resolutions condemning nuclear tests in the past. Over the past year, however, China has prevented any kind of condemnation of the DPRK at the UNSC despite the multitude of escalations. The full effect of UNSC sanctions on North Korea cannot be realized absent China’s co-operation, as China accounts for the vast majority of North Korea’s foreign trade, which rebounded significantly in 2023. Officially, China’s exports of refined petroleum to North Korea remain under the UNSC-mandated threshold. However, illicit ship-to-ship transfers of oil continue to occur within China’s territorial waters.

Although relations between Moscow and Pyongyang have recently strengthened, China-North Korea relations remain tepid. China regards North Korean escapees as illegal migrants, and routinely repatriates / refoules them to North Korea despite international criticism. In October 2023, China forcibly repatriated / refouled a “large number” of North Koreans (estimated to be 500-600), a move publicly criticized by the U.S., ROK, and UN experts, as it exposed the escapees to human rights violations at home and contravened Beijing’s international legal obligations. In 2024, Pyongyang has conducted multiple missile test launches. In February, Kim Jong-un announced that North Korea was abandoning the cause of peaceful unification and now regarded the South as its “primary foe.” The Chinese blame the recent increase in tensions on Seoul and the United States, pointing to President Yoon Suk Yeol’s hardline policy toward North Korea and greater military co-operation with Japan and the U.S.

Despite its general calls for stability on the Korean Peninsula, China usually blames the current situation on the U.S. or insists that the "legitimate security concerns" of the DPRK should be taken into consideration. When pressed in private to do more to try to prevent further DPRK missile or nuclear tests, China often claims that it has little influence over the DPRK.

Canada and other G7+ states recently unveiled a series of sanctions designations for Russian individuals and entities involved in arms transfers from North Korea to Russia. 

On May 31 2024, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from G7+ nations issued a joint statement affirming that the recent sanctions designations by our governments represents a coordinated effort to hold North Korea and Russia to account and to impose costs on actors and entities involved in the unlawful transfer of arms from North Korea to Russia for use in attacking Ukraine.

In 2024, China and North Korea will mark 75 years of diplomatic ties, which were established shortly after the PRC was founded in October 1949.

CACN member biographies

Ken Hardie

Ken Hardie – Chair
LPC – Fleetwood North Kells (BC)

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Notable committee membership

Recent points of interest

CACN Chair

NSICOP Report

Canada-China Relations

Tom Kmiec

Tom Kmiec – Vice Chair
CPC- Calgary Shepard (AB)

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Notable committee membership

Recent points of interest

Taiwan Independence

Chinese Coercive Campaigns

Uyghurs

Foreign Interference /Cyber attacks

Stephane Bergeron

Stephane Bergeron, Vice-Chair
BQ-Saint-Hyancithe – Bagot (QC)

Election to house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Notable committee membership

Recent points of interest

In committee

Taiwan

Winnipeg Lab

Heather Mcpherson

Heather Mcpherson – Vice Chair
NDP- Edmonton Strathcona (AB)

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Notable committee membership

Recent points of interest

IPAC Hacks

Human Rights

 China’s Global Influence

Micheal D. Chong

Micheal D. Chong
CPC- Wellington – Halton Hills (ON)

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Notable committee membership

Recent points of interest

Foreign interference

Trade

Human Rights

Damien C. Kurek

Damien C. Kurek
CPC – Battle river-Crowfoot (AB)

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Notable committee membership

Recent points of interest

Energy exports:

Trade challenges:

Agriculture industry:

Melissa Lantsman

Melissa Lantsman
CPC – Thornhill (ON)

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Deputy Opposition leader (2022-Present)

Former Shadow Minister for Transport (2021-2022)

Member: Canada-Israel Interparliamentary Group (2022-Present); Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association (2023-Present); Canada-Japan Inter-Parliamentary Group (2023-Present); Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2023-Present); Canada-United States Inter-Parliamentary Group (2023-Present); Canada-United Kingdom Inter-Parliamentary Association (2023-Present); Canadian Delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2023-Present)

Notable committee membership

Member: Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship (2023-Present)

Former Member: Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (2021-2022)

Recent points of interest

Foreign Interference:

Nathaniel Erskine-Smith

Nathaniel Erskine-Smith
LPC – Beaches- East York (ON)

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Member: Canadian Branch of the Assemblée parlementaire de la Francophonie (2024-present); Canadian Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2024-present)

Notable committee membership

Member: Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship (2024 – Present); Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations (2024 – Present)

Recent points of interest

Climate action and sustainability:

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP):

Human Rights:

Peter Fragiskatos

Peter Fragiskatos
LPC – London North Centre (ON) 

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Notable committee membership

Recent points of interest

Taiwan:

AI and security:

Winnipeg Lab Data breach:

Marie-France Lalonde

Marie-France Lalonde
LPC—Orléans (ON)

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests 

Parliamentary roles 

Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defense (2023 - Present)

Parliamentary Associations Chair: Canada-France Inter-Parliamentary Association (2020 - Present) 

Parliamentary Associations Member: Canadian Branch of the Assemblée parlementaire de la Francophonie (2019 - Present); Canada-Africa Parliamentary Association (2020 - Present); Canada-Germany Interparliamentary Group (2019 - Present); Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association (2019 - Present); Canada-Ireland Interparliamentary Group (2019 - Present); Canada-Israel Interparliamentary Group (2020 - Present); Canada-Italy Interparliamentary Group (2020- Present); Canada-Japan Inter-Parliamentary Group (2019 - Present); Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2020- Present); Canadian Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (2019 - Present); Canada-United States Inter-Parliamentary Group (2019 - Present); Canadian Section of ParlAmericas (2019 - Present); Canadian Delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly(2019 - Present); Canadian Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2020 - Present) 

Notable committee membership 

Member: NDDN Standing Committee on National Defense (2023-Present); CACN Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship (2020 – 2021/2022 – Present)

Former Member: CIMM Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (2023 - Present); OLLO Standing Committee on Official Languages (2020 - 2021); ACVA Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs (2020 - 2021) 

Recent points of interest

Deconfliction of space

Foreign Interference

Robert Oliphant

Robert Oliphant
LPC – Don Valley West (ON)

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Notable committee membership

Recent points of interest

Foreign Interference

Taiwan

Indo-Pacific

Africa

Jean Yip

Jean Yip
LPC – Scarborough-Agincourt (ON) 

Election to the house of commons

Professional background

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Notable committee membership

Recent points of interest

Canada-China Relations

Taiwan

Foreign Investment

Chinese sanctions on Canadian parliamentarians 

  1. Member of Parliament of Canada, Michael Chong
  2. The Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of the House of Commons of Canada

Background

Annex A: PRC statement

Foreign Ministry spokesperson announces sanctions on relevant US and canadian individuals and entity

2021-03-27 20:51

The United States (US) and Canada imposed unilateral sanctions on relevant individuals and entity in Xinjiang on March 22 based on rumors and disinformation. In response, the Chinese side decides to sanction Chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) Gayle Manchin, Vice Chair of the USCIRF Tony Perkins, Member of Parliament of Canada Michael Chong, and the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of the House of Commons of Canada. The individuals concerned are prohibited from entering the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of China, and Chinese citizens and institutions are prohibited from doing business with the relevant individuals and having exchanges with the relevant entity. In the meantime, China's previous sanctions on US individuals who have seriously undermined China's sovereignty and interests on Xinjiang-related issues remain effective.

The Chinese government is firmly determined to safeguard its national sovereignty, security and development interests, and urges the relevant parties to clearly understand the situation and redress their mistakes. They must stop political manipulation on Xinjiang-related issues, stop interfering in China's internal affairs in any form and refrain from going further down the wrong path. Otherwise, they will get their fingers burnt.

Statement by Foreign Affairs Minister on 35th anniversary of Tiananmen Square

From: 抖淫视频

Statement

June 4, 2024 - Ottawa, Ontario - 抖淫视频

The Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement:

“Today, Canada marks the 35th anniversary of the violent crackdown in and around Beijing’s Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, against unarmed and peaceful citizens, many of whom were students.

“Thirty-five years have passed but many of the victims’ families still do not know the truth of what happened that day.

“The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China says that Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, of demonstration, and of religion or belief. Motivated by love of their country, the protestors of 1989 believed passionately in these principles.

“The spirit of those lost in 1989 lives on, in the voices of those calling for accountability and human rights today.

“Canada calls on China to uphold its human rights obligations under international law and we will continue to speak for those who cannot speak freely and stand with those who stand for human dignity.”

Government of Canada releases statement on malicious cyber activity

From: Public Safety Canada

Statement

Ottawa – June 3, 2024 – Today, the Honourable Dominic LeBlanc, Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, the Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, issued the following statement:

“The Government of Canada takes any attempts to undermine our national security seriously. We continue to take action to protect the Canadian public from malicious cyber activity and foreign interference.

This statement is being issued to raise awareness of the threat to Canada and the Canadian public posed by malicious cyber activity by foreign states and their affiliates.

Over the past year, Canada has attributed malicious cyber activity by calling out certain states, and supported our allies in condemning these activities. We do this because Canada works with allies and partners to promote a stable cyberspace that is built on respect for international law and the UN norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

Certain foreign states – including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iran, and North Korea – are conducting wide-ranging and long-term campaigns to compromise government and private sector computer systems. These states obtain information that can be used to interfere with our political systems and our critical infrastructure, and can be used to threaten or harm people in Canada.

Foreign interference, enabled by sophisticated cyber tools, poses one of the most serious threats to Canada’s national security, economic prosperity and sovereignty, as well as our way of life. State-sponsored actors have demonstrated their desire to target all aspects of our society, including each level of government, the private sector, and even individuals.

The most extensive state-sponsored cyber threat activity against Canada stems from the PRC. The Government of Canada urges the Canadian cyber security community, particularly critical infrastructure network defenders, to bolster their awareness of, and protection against, the PRC’s sophisticated cyber threat activity. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, a part of the Communications Security Establishment, has published additional information on this threat as well as guidance for network operators to protect their systems: .

The Canadian public needs to be vigilant as these activities can affect personal information, finances, as well as our public institutions, such as the health, water and education sectors. Furthermore, many of these campaigns seek to directly undermine Canada’s democracy.

Canada will continue to call out malicious activities by foreign states and work closely with allies and partners on cyber security. Cyber threats against our critical infrastructure and democratic institutions will not be tolerated.

Should you be the target of malicious cyber activity, you are encouraged to report via the  or by e-mail at contact@cyber.gc.ca.

Any individual in Canada who is concerned they are the target of foreign interference should contact the RCMP’s National Security Information Network at 1-800-420-5805, or by e-mail at rcmp.nsin-risn.grc@rcmp-grc.gc.ca.

Information related to foreign interference may also be reported to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service by  web form."

Statement on verdict of Hong Kong pro-democracy politicians and activists

From: 抖淫视频

Statement

May 30, 2024 - Ottawa, Ontario - 抖淫视频

抖淫视频 today issued the following statement on the verdict on the “Hong Kong 47” trial:

“Canada is deeply concerned at the guilty verdicts handed down in the National Security Law (NSL) mass trial of 47 pro-democracy politicians and advocates known as the "Hong Kong 47” or “NSL 47.

“The 47 defendants in this case were arrested and prosecuted for peaceful political activity, including organizing an unofficial primary election. Among them, many were denied bail and held in pre-trial detention for almost two years.

“The trial’s result demonstrates that Hong Kong's national security laws, including the recently enacted Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law, are being used to silence dissent not only in Hong Kong but also overseas.

“The Hong Kong government’s decision to appeal the acquittal of two defendants is deeply troubling.

“Canada recognizes Hong Kong’s need to address legitimate national security considerations. Hong Kong’s national security laws, however, fail to safeguard the human rights and freedoms enshrined in the Basic Law and in international instruments to which Hong Kong is a party.

“Canada reiterates its recommendation to China at the UN's Universal Periodic Review of its human rights record to repeal the NSL and for Hong Kong authorities to end the prosecution of all individuals charged under it.”

Statement regarding Hong Kong’s adoption of a new national security law

From: 抖淫视频

Statement

March 20, 2024 - Ottawa, Canada - 抖淫视频

抖淫视频 today issued the following statement on Hong Kong’s rapid passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance and expressing deep concern regarding the impact the new law could have on human rights in Hong Kong:

“Canada is concerned that the new national security law adopted by Hong Kong could deviate further from internationally accepted standards of proportionality, transparency and accountability.

“The law’s broad definitions of national security offences and national security threats raise concerns about the potential for enforcement overreach. There is no clear provision for an independent review mechanism to ensure proportionality, transparency, and accountability in the law’s application.

“Canada recognizes Hong Kong’s right to enact legislation to address legitimate national security considerations. This new legislation, however, fails to safeguard the human rights and freedoms enshrined in the Basic Law and in international instruments to which Hong Kong is a party.

“The National Security Law imposed in 2020 led to the violation of human rights and the suppression of open debate in Hong Kong. The new law risks compounding the chilling effect created by the National Security Law at a moment when the city is trying to maintain its status as an open and free international hub.”

Joint statement by Canada, United States and United Kingdom on foreign information manipulation

From: 抖淫视频

Statement

February 16, 2024 - Ottawa, Ontario - 抖淫视频

The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada remain deeply concerned about foreign information manipulation and other actions designed to undermine our democracies and human rights globally.

Foreign information manipulation is a national security threat that undermines democratic values, human rights, governmental processes and political stability. Given the borderless nature of information manipulation, we call on all like-minded countries committed to the rules-based order to work together to identify and counter this threat. Securing the integrity of the global information ecosystem is central to popular confidence in governance institutions and processes, trust in elected leaders and the preservation of democracy.

The present international system, based on international law and respect for territorial boundaries, is competing with an alternate vision defined by autocratic impunity. This alternate vision deploys foreign malign influence aimed at undermining our safety and security with disregard for universal human rights and the rule of law.

The time is now for a collective approach to the foreign information manipulation threat that builds a coalition of like-minded countries committed to strengthening resilience and response to information manipulation. We can do this through coordinated, whole-of-society solutions that work with experts, independent media and multilateral organizations to address these transnational security threats.

That is why, today, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada jointly endorse the Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation, which affirms our shared understanding of the threat and offers a holistic view of how to address the foreign information manipulation challenge. It aims to standardize our approach to this problem and build interoperable and complementary systems to resist this threat as technologies continue to emerge and adapt. The framework complements the high-level international commitments from the Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online and reinforces our joint efforts and commitment to protect and promote information integrity.

The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada intend to collaborate on building partner countries’ resilience to foreign information manipulation by advancing the framework’s key action areas: National Strategies and Policies; Governance Structures and Institutions; Capacity; Civil Society, Independent Media and Academia; and Multilateral Engagement.

The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada intend to jointly work on operationalizing relevant key action areas through new and existing multilateral mechanisms, such as the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and in coordination with other like-minded partners and multilateral organizations.

Public readouts (Canada and China) of MINA’s engagements (Jan 2024 and Munich Security Forum) with Chinese FM Wang Yi

Canada

Minister Joly speaks with China’s Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi

From: 抖淫视频

Readout

January 11, 2024 - Ottawa, Ontario - 抖淫视频

The Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today spoke with China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi.

The Ministers exchanged views on a wide range of critical global and regional issues, including the Israel-Hamas conflict, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and ongoing challenges and opportunities in the Indo-Pacific region.

Minister Joly raised concrete priorities for forward collaboration, including fighting climate change and deepening our economic and people-to-people ties, for the benefit of citizens and businesses in both countries, and both ministers tasked their respective officials to advance next steps. 

Minister Joly highlighted that amidst an international security crisis, Canada will pursue pragmatic diplomacy. She reiterated that Canada will continue to uphold its interests and values, as described in Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, and defend the international rules-based order.

Both Ministers highlighted that despite recent challenges in the bilateral relationship, it is important to keep communication channels open.

China

Wang Yi Has a Phone Call with Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly

2024-01-11 23:39

On January 11, 2024, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly at the latter's request.

Wang Yi said that both China and Canada are countries with important influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The two countries have neither historical rows nor realistic conflicts of interest, and share many common interests and enjoy complementary advantages. The current challenging China-Canada relationship is not what China desires, nor is caused by China, while China is open to maintaining contact and dialogue with Canada.

Wang Yi put forward three points on improving and developing China-Canada relations:

First, correct cognition. The root cause of the downturn of China-Canada relations in recent years is the serious deviation of the Canadian side's perception of China. China hopes that the Canadian side can objectively, rationally and correctly interpret China's domestic and foreign policies. China neither exports ideology nor challenges the international order, but has consistently upheld the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the international system with the UN at its core and the international order based on international law. At the same time, China must firmly safeguard its own sovereignty, security and development interests and never allow the Chinese people to be deprived of their legitimate rights to development.

Second, mutual respect. The differences in social systems and ideologies between China and Canada stem from their respective histories, cultures, national conditions and people's choices. The two sides should respect each other, engage in dialogue on an equal footing, increase trust, dispel misgivings and strengthen communication responsibly and constructively, so as not to let differences dominate bilateral relations. The Canadian side should earnestly implement its commitment to the one-China policy, preserve the political foundation of China-Canada relations, and not send any wrong signal to the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces.

Third, win-win cooperation. China will continue to expand high-standard opening-up, and Chinese modernization will surely bring important development opportunities to Canada and other countries in the world. As promoters and beneficiaries of free trade, China and Canada should jointly oppose the politicization and pan-security of economic issues and create a fair, just and non-discriminatory environment for business development.

Mélanie Joly said, sound and stable Canada-China relations serve the fundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples. Despite the difficulties in bilateral relations, Canada is willing to bring bilateral relations back to the right track with a more open, practical and constructive attitude, and is willing to strengthen communication and dialogue with China, promote personnel exchanges, deepen economic and trade cooperation, and maintain close coordination and cooperation on environmental protection, biodiversity and international and regional issues.

Canada

Minister Joly meets with China’s Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi

From: 抖淫视频

Readout

February 17, 2024 – Munich, Germany - 抖淫视频

The Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today met with China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, on the margins of the Munich Security Conference.

The Ministers discussed Canada-China relations and issues critical to global security, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the crisis in the Middle East.

Both Ministers agreed that bilateral issues should continue to be discussed pragmatically and constructively, in a spirit of mutual respect, with regular communication between the two sides.

China

Wang Yi Meets with Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly at the Latter's Request

2024-02-18 23:17

On February 17, 2024 local time, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly at the latter's request on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.

Wang Yi said that China-Canada relations have long been at the forefront of China's relations with Western countries, and the current difficult situation is not what China wants to see. It is in the fundamental interests of both countries to promote the stabilization of China-Canada relations from further deterioration and achieve the improvement and development of bilateral relations. The economies of China and Canada are highly complementary and there is no conflict of fundamental interests between the two sides. The two sides are not rivals, let alone enemies, and should be partners of cooperation. As China and Canada differ in system, history and culture, the two sides should respect and learn from each other to expand consensus and rebuild trust to achieve win-win cooperation.

Wang Yi clarified China's position on bringing China-Canada relations back to a sound and stable track, expressing the hope that Canada could establish a correct understanding of China, take a long-term view of bilateral relations, and provide positive anticipation for practical cooperation; stop hyping up the "China threat" theory, stop spreading false information about the so-called "Chinese interference in Canada's internal affairs", and stop overstretching the concept of national security regarding exchanges in economy and trade as well as science and technology. The two sides should earnestly respect each other's core interests, and take concrete actions to safeguard the political foundation of bilateral relations.

Joly extended to the Chinese side her greetings for the Chinese New Year of the Dragon, noting that Canada pursues pragmatic diplomacy and is committed to improving its relations with China. Canada is ready to make joint efforts with China to overcome difficulties, build trust, carry out cooperation in climate change, biodiversity, public health and other fields, and strengthen people-to-people and cultural exchanges. Canada will continue to pursue the one-China policy.

The two sides also had an exchange of views on Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, among others.

IPS overview and excerpt on China

Figuer 1
Text description - Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

IPS Overview: The rising influence of the Indo-Pacific region is a once-in-a-generation global shift requiring a generational Canadian response.

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

  • New funding: $2.3 billion over 5 years
  • Seeks to advance 5 strategic objectives
    • Promoting Peace, Resilience, and Security
    • Expanding Trade, Investment, and Supply Chain Resilience
    • Investing in and Connecting People
    • Building a Sustainable and Green Future
    • Canada as an Active and Engaged Partner to the Indo-Pacific
  • 24 initiatives across 17 departments and agencies, as well as the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, FinDev
  • Increases Canada’s regional engagement to advance national interests: stability, security, prosperity
  • Reflects Canada’s values and builds on long-standing partnerships

IPS implementation highlights

  • ASEAN-Canada Strategic Partnership established
  • Augmented naval presence: three RCN ships in the region
  • Indo-Pacific Agriculture and Agri-Food Office opened in Manila
  • First IUU high seas mission by DFO
  • New Canada-ROK 2+2 Dialogues on economic security and foreign and defence policy
  • Completed Team Canada Trade Missions in Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam and South Korea
  • Enhance cooperation in ST&I with Japan, Taiwan and Singapore 

Indo-Pacific Strategy – Excerpt on China

The People’s Republic of China

Canada’s evolving approach to China is a critical part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

China is an increasingly disruptive global power. Key regional actors have complex and deeply intertwined relationships with China. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is informed by its clear-eyed understanding of this global China, and Canada’s approach is aligned with those of our partners in the region and around the world.

China’s rise, enabled by the same international rules and norms that it now increasingly disregards, has had an enormous impact on the Indo-Pacific, and it has ambitions to become the leading power in the region. China is making large-scale investments to establish its economic influence, diplomatic impact, offensive military capabilities and advanced technologies. China is looking to shape the international order into a more permissive environment for interests and values that increasingly depart from ours.

This can be seen in China’s disregard for UN rulings on disputes in the South China Sea, and its actions to further militarize that region and challenge navigation and overflight rights. Canada has experienced, like others, the impact of coercive diplomacy and non-market trade practices, such as forced labour. The global community continues to see the effects of lending practices that diverge from international standards and create risks for developing economies and their governance. We see China’s increasing reluctance to comply with the mandates of UN institutions, such as its efforts to block the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on the situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China, from consideration by the UN Human Rights Council. Canada has been compelled to adjust warnings to Canadians travelling to China, as well as to the business community, to account for the growing risk of arbitrary application of Chinese laws. In short, behaviours and policies that erode the existing rules-based international order undermine Canadian interests, whether they come from countries that are big or small—but they are especially challenging when pursued by rising powers with divergent national values.

At the same time, China’s sheer size and influence makes cooperation necessary to address some of the world’s existential pressures, such as climate change and biodiversity loss, global health and nuclear proliferation. And China’s economy offers significant opportunities for Canadian exporters.

Canada will, at all times, unapologetically defend our national interest, be it with regard to the global rules that govern global trade, international human rights or navigation and overflight rights. Our approach to China is shaped by a realistic and clear-eyed assessment of today’s China.

In areas of profound disagreement, we will challenge China, including when it engages in coercive behaviour—economic or otherwise—ignores human rights obligations or undermines our national security interests and those of partners in the region. We must all abide by international rules. We will work together with regional partners. We will cooperate with China to find solutions to global issues such as climate change, biodiversity loss, global health and nuclear proliferation.

Our approach to China, which is inseparable from our broader Indo-Pacific Strategy, operates across domestic, bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres:

At the domestic level, Canada will continue to strengthen the defence of our Canadian infrastructure, democracy and Canadian citizens against foreign interference. This includes reviewing, modernizing and adding new provisions to the Investment Canada Act that protect our national interests, as well as acting decisively when investments from state-owned enterprises and other foreign entities threaten our national security, including our critical minerals supply chains; further protecting Canadian intellectual property and research; pushing back against any form of foreign interference on Canadian soil; and strengthening our cyber security systems. At the same time, we are committing significant resources to enhance Canadian competencies on China across and beyond government to ensure that we are better able to understand, assess and respond to the growing impact of China in the region and beyond.

At the bilateral level, Canada will pursue dialogue with China to advance Canada’s national interests while remaining true to our values, all the while focusing relentlessly on Canadian priorities. Canada is reviewing all mechanisms and structures, such as Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and Dialogues, across all federal departments to ensure they advance Canada’s national interests in the 21st century. Canada is also improving Trade Commissioner Service for Canadian exporters to provide services that ensure commercial opportunities are consistent with national security. Canada will continue to protect Canadian market access in China while working with clients to diversify within, and beyond, that market. Canada will continue to speak up for universal human rights, including those of Uyghurs, Tibetans and other religious and ethnic minorities. Canada will continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the people of Hong Kong, who are faced with China’s imposition of the National Security Law and, more broadly, the deterioration of individual and collective freedoms.

At the regional level, Canada will balance its approach to China with diversified investments in regional relationships and institutions and a strong vision for the country in the Indo-Pacific region. Canada will work to deepen a variety of partnerships, influence best practices, advance institution building and support a rules-based approach to a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable Indo-Pacific region. Canada will also continue to work with partners to push back against any unilateral actions that threaten the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, as well as the East and South China Seas.

At the multilateral level, Canada will work closely with its partners to face the complex realities of China’s global impact and continue to invest in international governance and institutions. Canada will pursue new solutions to push back against behaviours that undermine international norms, such as arbitrary detention and economic coercion. Where our interests overlap, Canada will partner with China multilaterally, as Canada is doing by co-hosting the 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity in Montreal.

We are investing in deepening our understanding of how China thinks, operates and plans, and how it exerts influence in the region and around the world. In this context, Canada will increase our presence, supporting analysis, consultation, and diplomacy related to China at Canada’s multilateral missions to the United Nations, the European Union and NATO to anticipate and respond to political, economic, and security risks, complementing previous capacity increases to Canada’s China network.

As we forge ahead with a strong, broad-based approach to China, we must always remember to differentiate between the actions of the current Chinese government, with whom we have differences, and the Chinese people. The bedrock of our relations remains the people of Canada and China. The long-standing connections we share and the extraordinary contributions of Canadians of Chinese heritage to Canada will continue to bring diversity and depth to our relationship for decades to come.

While remaining consistent with our One China Policy, Canada will continue our multifaceted engagement with Taiwan, which includes collaborating on trade, technology, health, democratic governance and countering disinformation. Canada will oppose unilateral actions that threaten the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

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