抖淫视频

Fourth Informal meeting of the 77th General Assembly plenary on the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council

Monday, 03 April 2023

Co-chairs,

Thank you very much co-chairs, I appreciate very much the chance to speak with you and colleagues. As with previous IGN rounds, I would like to congratulate Ambassador Massari for his statement on behalf of the group which Canada is a member. Canada aligns itself with his statement.

Categories of membership

Co-chairs, the current structure of the Council is, as some others have stated, is far from democratic. I would argue that it’s also it is not representative of the world or of all its peoples. And there is a fundamental problem that the five permanent members have no particular accountability. And in particular I have to draw attention of the conduct of one of the permanent members, with respect to the aggression carried out by his country, ironically at the very time that this country was the chair of the security council, and now we find ourselves in a similar situation this month.

To be blunt, improving these faults can only come through the addition of new, non-permanent, that is to say -- elected -- members. We do not believe that extending or adding to the numbers of permanent members makes any sense, and we do not support it.

Elected members must demonstrate their willingness to contribute to the mandate of the Council. They are assessed by their peers, academics and civil society. They come from regional groups to which they turn for advice and guidance, and to which they report out on closed meetings.

Over the past several years, as a group, the ten elected members -- the ’E10’ -- have created new roles for themselves within the Council’s structures. They coordinate to such an extent that Council decisions -- requiring 9 yes votes -- depend on at least partial buy-in from the E10.

These developments have mitigated some of the worst features of having permanent members comprise one third of the Council. So five countries make up one third of the Council, doesn’t work, hasn’t worked for a long time and doesn’t work now. However, for us to add more members from the permanent category would undercut these recent gains that we have recently made.

Co-chairs, by the 21st century we understand well both human nature and group dynamics. New permanent members would join the existing P5 in their exclusive, separate negotiations and coordination. They would further exacerbate the class system that exists on the Council today. I have to say, when someone asks me if something surprised you about the UN, it’s the hierarchical nature of the UN, not a great situation when permanent members holding the ‘pens’ on almost every Council agenda item and product, deciding which subsidiary bodies the elected members can (and have to) chair, and generally deciding which country-specific and regional issues make it to the Council’s agenda.

This is why Canada and the UfC support the addition of new elected members only. Expansion of the Council by balancing the power of the P5. Power -- and status -- that the P5 cannot realistically give up. And they won’t give it up.

We all know that elected members face significant challenges in serving on the Council. Two years go by quickly when reacting to international crises; when addressing some issues only periodically; and while learning about processes, methods and subsidiary bodies that are not at all transparent to non-members of the Council.

We also understand the desire and capacity of Member States to contribute to the Council’s mandate over a longer term. This is why the UFC proposal to increase the size of the Council leans heavily toward new, longer-term elected seats. This is an elegant, pragmatic and practical bridging solution that would address certain national interests on one hand, and enhance the effectiveness of a reformed Council on the other.

Views on how to rectify the historic injustice done to Africa, views on GRULAC representation, views on Asia-Pacific representation

Co-chairs, we appreciate your openness to requests from regional groups to discuss their particular interests and concerns. Canada supports your initiative to expand today’s discussion to include these themes.

We spoke earlier this session about regional representation on the Council, the size of a reformed and expanded Council, and its composition. In those meetings, Canada explained its position. And in the cases of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia-Pacific, we believe each group should receive expanded and enhanced representation on the Council.

Quantitatively, this would come through structural reform and the addition of new elected seats for each group, including 3 more for Africa, 3 more for Asia-Pacific, and 2 more for GRULAC. Additionally, we support the addition of a new rotating seat for SIDS and small states.
Qualitatively, enhanced representation and participation in the work of the Council should also come through working methods reform. And this is something that needs to be paid attention to, leadership roles, including penholderships, should be held by elected Council members from regions affected by conflict. These members should also lead relevant subsidiary bodies, and engage active stakeholders at the intergovernmental level. For example, this could include PBC country configuration chairs, ECOSOC subsidiary body chairs, the chairs of groups of friends, or the relevant organs or operations of regional organizations.

Status of documentation

Co-chairs, you have also asked us to express ourselves on IGN documentation. I would preface my comments by saying I do not regard this issue as a theological issue, we should be looking for practical solutions to find our way through our differences on this matter. Ideally, our goal should continue to be, to achieve the widest possible political acceptance by Member States, as it was initially laid out in GA decision 62/557. But we must be clear-eyed about the significant and persistent efforts required to achieve constitutional reform. It involves give-and-take, with acceptance and support from all sides. And to help parties get to that point, Canada feels that documentation should focus on areas of consensus or outright agreement, and we would need to document that obviously, to see whether this is in fact an area of very substantive agreement, as well as, and this again is an area where I think as co-chairs you can assist us, to point out the positions that have been set out by different countries or groups of countries. In language that can then be discussed very specifically with respect to its meaning.

Co-chairs, in this regard, here is my delegation’s contribution to your effort to document our work in this year’s session. We are focussing on the positive. There are many substantive issues on which Member States largely agree with each other, and I’ll set out seven areas where I believe there is substantial agreement:

1. all Member States, first of all, agree on the need to reform the Security Council. To make it more effective, more representative and to better reflect the modern era; I’ve not heard anyone, in my now third year listening to this discussion, I’ve not heard anyone say things are just great as they are and there is no need to change a thing a body of 193 Member States should only have a security council of 15 and we should just leave it as it is, don’t make a change, I’ve not heard anyone say that.
2. all Member States agree to expand the number of elected Security Council seats; a profound area of consensus;
3. all Member States agree that such an expansion should favour the underrepresented regions of the world; the process of decolonization which has taken place since 1945 is one of the most dramatic geopolitical events of the last several hundred years, it’s been an astonishing transformation of the globe, it should be reflected in the membership on the Security Council but in our view it should be in the elected members, with some elected for longer than others;
4. a very significant number of Member States agree that the size of a reformed, expanded Council should be in the mid-20s;
5. Canada, along with all Member States, we agree with the need to address the historical injustice that African Member States continue to suffer in terms of Security Council membership; that’s why we’ve argued that their numbers should increase more than that of any other region;
6. a very significant and growing number of Member States want veto limitation, in particular in the cases of genocide and atrocity crimes; and
7. all Member States agree on the need to strengthen the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, and to improve the Council’s working methods.

Co-chairs, in closing I encourage you to do two things. The first is to focus on these areas of convergence. And to stress the fact that there is in fact agreement in the United Nations on these significant reforms. Second I would encourage you to identify as clearly and as much as possible with consensual language, worked out if you like with the Member States, on what are the continuing areas of disagreement.

Focus on identifying the ties that bind us, while working to move Member States closer together on those other issues within the clusters. So with that I wish you the very best of luck and know that Canada will be there to support you in a positive and constructive way. Thank you.