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Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade appearance before the Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT) on Main Estimates and Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

2021-04-26

Table of contents

Appearance before the standing committee on international trade (CIIT) on main estimates and ISDS, April 26, 2021

Meeting scenario

¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ

Committee context

First Round

Second Round

Motion inviting you to appear

The committee did not pass a motion to invite Minister Ng. Parliamentary Secretary Bendayan informed the committee that Minister Ng would appear on the estimates, as is custom.

Of note, the Estimates referred to the committee are on the Invest in Canada hub.

Committee membership & interests

Committee work

Recent meetings at CIIT

Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT)

43rd Parliament – Second Session

September 23, 2020 to Present

Chair

Hon. Judy Sgro (Liberal – Ontario)

Vice-Chair

Tracy Gray (Conservative – British Columbia)

Vice-Chair

Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay (Bloc Québécois – Québec)

Members

Daniel Blaikie (NDP – Manitoba)

Randy Hoback (Conservative – Saskatchewan)

Ben Lobb (Conservative – Ontario)

Sukh Dhaliwal (Liberal – British Columbia)

Ziad Aboultaif (Conservative –Alberta)

Randeep Sarai (Liberal – British Columbia)

Rachel Bendayan (Liberal – Québec) Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade

Chandra Arya (Liberal – Ontario)

Terry Sheehan (Liberal – Ontario) Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Economic Development and Official Languages (fednor)

Order for Questioning:

The time allotted for the questioning of witnesses in the first round be as follows: Conservative Party – six (6) minutes, Liberal Party – six (6) minutes, Bloc Quebecois – six (6) minutes, New Democratic Party – six (6) minutes; that the order and time allotted for the questioning of witnesses in the second round be as follows: Conservative Party – five (5) minutes, Liberal Party – five (5) minutes, Bloc Quebecois – two and a half (2.5) minutes, New Democratic Party – two and a half (2.5) minutes, Conservative Party five (5) minutes, Liberal Party five (5) minutes. If time permits, further rounds shall repeat the pattern of the first two at the discretion of the Chair.

Witnesses typically have 10 minutes each for their opening remarks, but the Chair will often request witnesses to keep opening remarks to 5 minutes if appearing alongside other witnesses providing opening remarks.

Mandate:

The House of Commons Standing Committee on International Trade studies and reports on matters referred to it by the House of Commons. The Committee can also initiate studies of subjects falling within its mandate. As a permanent committee established by the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, the Committee may be asked to comment on legislation, departmental activities and spending, and other matters under its jurisdiction. The Compendium of the House of Commons Procedure contains additional information on the mandate and powers of standing committees.

The general subject area of the Committee includes the following:

The federal departments and agencies under the Committee’s direct scrutiny are:

Hon. Judy Sgro Chair (LPC — Humber River-Black Creek, ON)

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Sgro has served as a Member of Parliament since 1999. She served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services in 2003, and as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from 2003 to 2005. She has served as Critic of many portfolios, including Industry, Status of Women, Veterans Affairs and National Revenue. In the previous parliament, Sgro served as Chair of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities.

Notable committee memberships

Background

Prior to entering federal politics, Sgro served in municipal politics as part of the North York City Council and the Toronto City Council, starting in 1987. At the municipal level, Sgro focused on poverty and crime reduction.

Tracy Gray  Vice-Chair (CPC — Kelowna-Lake Country , BC) Critic for export promotion and international trade  

Key interests

Parliamentary Roles 

Gray was named the Conservative Critic for Export Promotion and International Trade by Leader Erin O’Toole on September 8,  2020. She had previously served as the Critic for Interprovincial Trade.   

Notable committee membership 

Background

Gray defeated the Liberal incumbent in the 2019 General Election, where she had been a Kelowna city councillor 2014-2018. Prior to entering politics, Gray had extensive experience in the BC Liquor industry. In 2003 she introduced a chain VQA wine stores to the BC interior and she has experience managing several wineries and breweries in the Okanagan Valley.  

Questions ask at CIIT

March 8, 2021

March 12, 2021

March 22, 2021

March 26, 2021

Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay Vice-Chair (BQ — Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot, QC) Critic for international trade

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Savard-Tremblay currently serves as the Bloc Quebecois critic for International Trade and Industry.

Notable committee membership

Background

Prior to entering politics, Savard-Tremblay worked as an academic, author and columnist. He has a bachelors degree in political science from the University of Montreal, a Masters in Sociology from the University of Quebec at Montreal, and a doctorate in the social economy of development from the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris. He was heavily involved in the youth forum of the BQ and has been a frequent commentator in Quebec on economic and sovereignty-related issues. In his academic work, he is critical of neoliberalism and globalization.

Questions ask at CIIT

March 8, 2021

March 12, 2021

March 22, 2021

March 26, 2021

Daniel Blaikie (NDP — Elmwood-Transcona, MB) Critic for international trade

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Blaikie was first elected in 2015. Blaikie is currently the NDP Critic for Democratic Reform, Employment, Workforce Development and Disability Inclusion, Export Promotion and International Trade and Western Economic Diversification, as well as the deputy critic for Finance. He has previously served as the Critic for Public Services and Procurement, Deputy Critic for Ethics, and as NDP Caucus Chair.

Notable committee membership

Background

Prior to entering politics, Blaikie worked as an electrician and acted as an advisor to the Minister of Health in the Government of Alberta. He has served on the Manitoba Apprenticeship and Certification Board and the Winnipeg Labour Council.

Questions ask at CIIT

March 8, 2021

Not present. Questions asked by MP macgregor.

March 12, 2021

Not present for first half, questions asked by MP Lindsay Mathyssen:

MP Blaikie was present for the second half:

March 22, 2021

Not present. Questions asked by MP Johns.

March 26, 2021

Randy Hoback (CPC — Prince Albert , SK) Critic for international trade

Key interests

Parliamentary Roles

Hoback currently chairs the Conservative Saskatchewan Caucus. He has served previously as the critic for International Trade and the critic for Canada-US Relations. He also served as President of the Canadian Section of parlamericas starting in 2010, and as President of parlamericas at the hemispheric level from 2011 to 2014. 

Notable committee membership

Background

Hoback was first elected in 2008, and has been re-elected in his Prince Albert riding in each of the 2011, 2015 and 2019 elections. Prior to entering politics, Hoback worked in the farm equipment manufacturing industry before taking over his family farm. He has a business administration certificate from the University of Saskatchewan and a Chartered Director’s designation from mcmaster University.

Questions ask at CIIT

March 8, 2021

March 12, 2021

March 22, 2021

March 26, 2021

Ben Lobb (CPC — Huron-Bruce, Ontario) 

Key Interests

Parliamentary roles

Lobb was a member of multiple Parliamentary Associations and Interparliamentary Groups between 2009 and 2016. Some of these groups included the Canada-China Legislative Association (CACN), the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (CANA), the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group (CEUS), and the Canadian Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CCOM).

Notable committee memberships

Background

Lobb was first elected to the House of Commons in 2008. He was re-elected in 2011, 2015, and 2019. Lobb attended Lee University in Cleveland, Tennessee where he earned a bsc in Business Administration.

Recent Questions asked at CIIT

March 8, 2021

March 12, 2021

March 22, 2021

March 26, 2021

Ziad Aboultaif  (CPC — Edmonton Manning, Alberta) 

Key Interests

Parliamentary Roles

MP Aboultaif was the Conservative Critic for digital government from November 2019 to September 2020.  He had previously served as the Critic for International Development and the Critic for National Revenue.

Notable committee membership

Background

Aboultaif was first elected in 2015 and campaigned on a pledge to support small businesses and to support pipeline development.  Prior to entering politics, Ziad was a self-employed business owner working in logistics and distribution.

Recent Questions asked at CIIT

March 8, 2021

March 12, 2021

March 22, 2021

March 26, 2021

Rachel Bendayan (LPC — Outremont, QC) Parliamentary secretary to the minister of small business, export promotion and international trade 

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Bendayan was first elected in a by-election in February 2019. She is currently the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade.

Notable committee membership

Background

Before entering politics, Bendayan was a lawyer with Norton Rose Canada in Montreal. She ran for the Liberal Party in Montreal in 2015, losing to Thomas Mulcair. After the election, she was hired as the chief of staff to the former Minister of Small Business and Tourism Bardish Chagger.

Recent Questions asked at CIIT

March 12, 2021

March 22, 2021

March 26, 2021

Sukh Dhaliwal (LPC — Surrey – Newton,  BC) 

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Dhaliwal has served in Parliament twice, first representing the riding of Newton-North Delta from 2006-2011, then for the riding of Surrey-Newton from 2015 to present. During his previous tenure as a Member of Parliament, he served as critic for the Asia Pacific Gateway, Sport and Western Economic Diversification Canada.

Notable committee membership 

Background

Dhaliwal was born in India, coming to Canada in 1984. Prior to entering politics, Dhaliwal founded a successful land-survey company in Surrey. He has been very involved in the business community and in municipal affairs in Surrey, serving on many local boards and fundraising campaigns.

Recent Questions asked at CIIT

March 8, 2021

March 22, 2021

March 26, 2021

Chandra Arya(LPC — Nepean, ON) 

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Arya was first elected in 2015. He is a member of virtually all of the interparliamentary associations.

Notable committee membership

Background

Arya spent his career prior to entering politics as an executive in the high-technology sector. He has a Bachelor degree in Engineering and a Masters in Business Administration. Arya was active in the Ottawa business community, serving on the board of Invest Ottawa and as Chair of the Indo-Canada Ottawa Business Chamber. He was also active in social causes, serving on the board of the Unity Non-Profit Housing Corporation Ottawa and as Vice President of the Ottawa Community Immigrants Services Organization.

Recent Questions asked at CIIT

March 12, 2021

March 22, 2021

March 26, 2021

Randeep Sarai (LPC — Surrey Centre, BC) 

Key interests

·Labour mobility

Parliamentary roles

Sarai was first elected in 2015. In the previous parliament, he served as the chair of the Liberal Pacific and Northern Caucus. He has also been a member of many interparliamentary associations.

Notable committee membership

Background

 Sarai is a lawyer by training, with experience in real estate development and urban planning. He has a Bachelors degree from the University of British Columbia, majoring in political science, and a Bachelor of Laws degree from Queen’s University. He has served on the boards of a number of community organizations dedicated to combatting youth violence in Surrey.

Recent Questions asked at CIIT

March 8, 2021

March 22, 2021

March 26, 2021

Terry Sheehan (LPC — Sault Ste. Marie, ON) Parliamentary secretary to the minister of economic development

Key interests

Parliamentary roles

Sheehan was first elected in 2015. He was elected co-chair of the All Party Steel Caucus in the previous Parliament. He has been the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Economic Development since November 2019.

Notable committee membership

Background

Prior to entering politics, Sheehan had a career in the private and public sectors in business, community and economic development. His last position prior to being elected as a Member of Parliament was as an employment and training consultant for the Ontario Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities. His riding is home to Algoma Steel and Tenaris

Private Members’ Motion

In the 42nd Parliament Sheehan submitted a concerning the importance of the Canadian steel industry and the creation of a National Steel Procurement Strategy.

Recent Questions asked at CIIT

March 12, 2021

March 22, 2021

March 26, 2021

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)

Supplementary messages

Right to Regulate/Regulatory chill

FIPA Model Review

CUSMA

Keystone XL/Enbridge Line 5; other potential claims by CAD investors

CETA

COVID-19

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Investment agreements ensure fair treatment for foreign investors and equal chance for them to compete for business. The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism provides foreign investors an impartial and timely process for the resolution of private disputes.

Canada includes an ISDS mechanism in Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (fipas) and in investment chapters of Free Trade Agreements (ftas). CUSMA is the first such treaty in which Canada has not included an ISDS mechanism. Under CUSMA, apart from the three-year transition period (i.e., until June 30, 2023), investment disputes can only be brought under the State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism.

Canada’s model FIPA review is nearly complete and a public announcement is expected to be made soon. The model FIPA includes an ISDS mechanism, reproduces innovations from CETA and CPTPP, and is in line with the Government’s inclusive trade agenda. It also addresses criticisms of the ISDS mechanism and will be more accessible to smes.

Canada’s International Investment Agreements

Background

Rules-based Investment Environment

Canada’s international investment agreements create certainty and predictability for Canadian investors abroad by depoliticizing investment disputes and establishing transparent and enforceable rules surrounding foreign investment. The rules governing the administration of Investor-State dispute settlement were established through transparent, multilateral processes, including at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), part of the World Bank.

Right to Regulate

Canada’s international investment agreements are carefully drafted to protect governments’ rights to regulate in the public interest, including with respect to health and the environment. Canada’s agreements include provisions, which ensure that governments do not relax or fail to enforce such measures as an incentive for investment. Canada’s agreements also include many important exceptions, such as for measures in the cultural industries or for the Investment Canada Act. Canada’s investment agreements always include reservations, exempting sensitive areas from certain obligations, including social services as well as rights and preferences provided to Indigenous peoples and disadvantaged minorities.

Treatment of State-Owned-Enterprises in Canada’s International Investment Agreements

Canada’s international investment agreements treat state-owned enterprises and private investors equally. Nonetheless, Canada is mindful that the presence of foreign state-owned enterprises in Canada may have adverse effects on the competitiveness of Canadian companies. The Investment Canada Act (the Act) provides for the assessment of whether significant foreign investments above a certain threshold are of economic benefit to Canada. The Act specifies a lower threshold for state-owned enterprises than for other investors. Separately, the Act also provides that any foreign investment can be subject to a national security review. All of Canada’s international investment agreements guarantee Canada’s discretion to screen foreign investment, and decisions following such a review are not subject to challenge under the agreements. Finally, there is no known case of a state-owned enterprise using a Canadian treaty to launch an Investor-State claim.

Canada’s Mining Sector and ISDS

Supplementary messages

Responsible Business Conduct

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Mining companies often operate in a complex and risky environments and their investments require significant capital outlay. Canada’s investment agreements help mitigate the risk for these companies by establishing standards of protection for their investments (e.g. Non-discrimination, expropriation, etc.). When a dispute arises with the host state, investor-State dispute settlement is a helpful avenue for these companies, particularly where the independence of the domestic courts is not guaranteed. Moreover, obligations found in investment agreements may not always have equivalents in the host state domestic law. Therefore, breaches of the treaty protections cannot always be addressed in domestic courts.

There are important limitations to the issues that companies can resolve through investor-State dispute settlement under Canada’s investment agreements. The mechanism can only be used to challenge an alleged breach of obligations found in an investment agreement. Absent such a breach, the mechanism cannot be used to resolve a private commercial dispute or other challenges, such as labour and community-relations issues.

Key innovations in Canada’s approach to investor-State dispute settlement

Supplementary messages

Canada’s Approach:

Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA):

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP):

Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA):

Background

Comparison Table: ISDS in Canadian ftas
CETACPTPPNAFTACUSMA
Traditional ISDS mechanism🗸🗸ISDS is not applicable to Canada in CUSMA. (Potential disputes concerning Mexico measures or by Mexican investors would be addressed by CPTPP.)
Permanent Investment Tribunal🗸
Appellate Tribunal🗸
Binding Code of Conduct for Arbitrators/Members of Tribunal🗸🗸
Flexibilities for smes to reduce cost of proceedings🗸
Public Access to Hearings and Documents🗸🗸🗸
Third Party Submissions 🗸🗸🗸
Mandatory Consultations🗸🗸
Specialised Mediation Rules 🗸
Suspension of Timelines for Mediation🗸
Express provision on early dismissal of frivolous claims🗸🗸
Disclosure of Third Party Funding🗸
Stay of proceedings for overlapping claims🗸
Exclusion from ISDS for decisions under Investment Canada Act🗸🗸🗸

Stakeholder Interactions on ISDS

In the summer of 2018, the Department launched a review of Canada’s model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA). A variety of approaches were used to consult stakeholders over the course of the FIPA review process. This included:

This consultations process was governed by the Department’s privacy policy and the Privacy Act. As such, any personal identifying information cannot be disclosed for individuals and/or groups that provided a submission or participated in this process.

WTO reform

Supporting facts and figures

Background

As a strong proponent of the multilateral trading system, Canada is exercising global leadership on WTO reform. This includes ongoing leadership of the Ottawa Group – a group of 14 likeminded WTO members created in 2018 with the objective of supporting WTO reform efforts, such as to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the WTO; safeguarding and strengthening the dispute settlement system; and reinvigorating the WTO’s negotiating function.

Canada is actively engaged in work to preserve the WTO dispute settlement system – which is key to Canadian interests – in the face of the United States blocking appointments to the Appellate Body, which has rendered the appeal mechanism for WTO dispute resolution inoperable since December 2019.  On July 31, 2020, Canada and a group of WTO Members established a Multi-Party Interim Appeal-Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) to hear disputes between its 25 participants.

Canada is also committed to concluding fisheries subsidies negotiations by December 2020 and progressing work in other areas in the lead up to the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference in late 2021, including on services domestic regulation; e-commerce; Micro, Small and Medium-sized enterprises; investment facilitation; and agriculture.

On November 23, 2020, Ottawa Group Ministers endorsed a Communication calling on WTO Members to avoid further disruptions in the supply chains of essential goods and proposing a WTO Trade and Health Initiative. This stems from the June 15 Ottawa Group Joint Statement Focussing Action on COVID-19, where members committed to a work plan to address the trade-related impacts of COVID-19, foster global economic recovery, and be prepared to respond to similar crises in the future.

WTO trips Agreement Waiver Proposal

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures / background

Canada commercial consular service

Supplementary messages

Update

TCS has informed O/MINT that the website can be live after mid-April and is awaiting feedback.

Background

Through its approximately 1,500 employees worldwide, the TCS provides a range of services to support the international business activities of its clients:

As a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, demand from clients for problem-solving support services by the TCS increased by 40% between April 2020 and February 2021 compared with the same period in 2019-20. During that period, support provided by the TCS centered around business travel restrictions, shipping delays, and inspection assistance.

While the TCS is actively helping Canadian businesses faced with export challenges, the CCCS mandate letter commitment will provide a new tool to ensure exporters are aware of and have quick and easy access to an array of resources.

A dedicated website operated by the TCS will provide Canadian companies – both existing clients of the TCS and other Canadian companies – with information to avoid problems, and access to personalized support within one business day to help resolve those that emerge.

It will also maintain a "no wrong door" approach to the federal and provincial services Canadian businesses may require, referring them quickly to the right place to get the right help.

This enhanced TCS service will help firms to manage risk, save time and reduce costs, maintain relationships with clients, and continue to export.

Export diversification strategy

Supplementary messages

Update

Canadian businesses are likely to experience continued uncertainty and disruption in international markets in coming months. At the same time, exporters will face renewed opportunity as foreign economies reopen and global demand rebounds. Investments made under the Export Diversification Strategy mean that exporters will be able to draw on enhanced trade development services and resources to help them re-engage with global markets.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

The 2018 Fall Economic Statement established the target of increasing by 50% Canada’s overseas exports by 2025 and announced Canada’s Export Diversification Strategy, which included transformative investments to enhance services and programs available to Canadian businesses from the Trade Commissioner Service. Enhancements have included:

The Trade Commissioner Service has leveraged these resources to adapt and maintain robust services for Canadian businesses throughout the pandemic. They will remain a source of support for exporters as Canadians look to return to growth through trade. 

The Office of the Chief Economist at GAC regularly produces a report, “Growing Canada’s exports to overseas markets by 50 percent which is publically available on the Department’s website, that tracks progress towards achieving that goal.

Recovery in exports

FTA utilization rates

Trade commissioner service COVID-19 response

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Facts about the TCS

Support to Women-owned smes

Virtual Trade Missions:

Investment in Canada

Supplementary messages

Update

Since March 2020, COVID-19 has halted the steady growth of FDI into Canada, and globally. Ongoing interactions with existing and potential investors, however, confirm that Canada continues to be a premier investment destination. The TCS and IIC effectively pivoted their service-delivery methods to reach foreign investors by moving to virtual events where possible, organizing sector-specific webinars, organizing virtual site visits or meetings with investors and working with partners to identify innovative ideas on how to promote Canada.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ and IIC share the mandate to increase FDI into Canada and work closely together to exchange information, support investors and coordinate with other partners to attract FDI. The TCS manages a network of 44 investment officers abroad, which identifies and advances FDI opportunities in key markets and sectors and is often the first point of contact for potential investors.

2021-22 Main Estimates for Invest in Canada

IIC’s Main Estimates for 2021-22 reflect a budget of $34,271,556.  This remains consistent with 2020-21 with only a slight decrease of $20,000 comparatively. 

The majority of IIC’s expenditures (80%) are related to achieving its core responsibility which is to lead the Government of Canada’s FDI attraction efforts by making Canada top-of-mind for foreign investors and providing services in support of investor decisions to expand in Canada.

The remaining 20% is related to internal services (Financial Management Services, Human Resource Management Services, Information Technology Services etc.).

IIC is at full capacity in terms of staffing (67 ftes) which makes up 25% of its total budget - including all employee benefits and pension contributions.

Fdi success stories

Sanofi

HCL Technologies

Invest in canada succession planning

Export development Canada (EDC) current issues

Supplementary messages

Update

The Canada Emergency Business Account (CEBA) has delivered over $45.15 billion in emergency credit to over 852,000 Canadian businesses since April 2020. The Government has expanded the level of credit available to individual businesses from $40,000 to $60,000, of which $20,000 is forgivable upon timely repayment. CEBA will continue to ensure Canadian businesses receive the support they need to endure the pandemic and be well positioned for a dynamic recovery.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

EDC is Canada's export credit agency with a mandate to support and develop, directly or indirectly, Canada's export trade. In 2019, EDC facilitated over $102 billion in Canadian business through serving over 9,000 financial clients. The day-to-day operations of EDC are at arm's length from the Government. In order to meet the needs of the Canadian economy resulting from the impacts of COVID-19, the Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade provided EDC with an increased capital limit, expanded domestic authorities, and increased the Canada Account statutory limit. With this additional financial flexibility, EDC has implemented the BCAP program, temporarily broadened its risk profile, and administered CEBA. EDC is working to ensure that Canadian businesses impacted by COVID-19 continue to receive the support they need across the economic spectrum.

EDC dividend payments

If Pressed:

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

As outlined in the Financial Administration Act, the Minister of Finance is responsible for the Capital Adequacy and Dividend Policy of all financial Crown corporations. Consistent with this responsibility, the Minister of Finance, in consultation with the President of the Treasury Board and the responsible Minister of the Crown corporation, provides the Crown corporation with the policy framework that governs its capital management and ensures adequate capitalization to deliver on its mandate.  The Government’s Capital Adequacy and Dividend Policy does not require that a financial Crown corporation return a dividend annually unless it retains capital in excess of its requirements.

As a financial Crown corporation, EDC is subject to this policy and has returned an annual dividend in eight of the past ten years based on this policy, totalling $6.684 billion. EDC manages its capital through a Board of Directors-approved Capital Management and Dividend Policy, which is consulted with Finance Canada and ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ as required.

Export development Canada (EDC) support for carbon intensive industries

Supplementary messages

Update

In 2020, EDC facilitated $8.1 billion in oil and gas sector business via 544 transactions.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Export Development Canada (EDC) is a Crown corporation and Canada’s export credit agency. The Export Development Act provides EDC with the mandate to support and develop, directly or indirectly, Canada’s export trade, and Canadian capacity to engage in that trade, and to respond to international business opportunities. EDC provides a range of trade finance and risk management services, including short-term credit insurance, direct loans, loan guarantees, bonding support, and political risk insurance. The day-to-day operations of EDC are at arm’s length from the Government. EDC is governed by a Chair and Board of Directors responsible for implementing the direction provided by the Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade.

Canada commercial corporation (CCC) current issues

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

CCC is Canada’s government-to-government contracting agency. The Corporation acts as the prime contractor for foreign governments to supply Canadian goods and services, and sub-contracts with a Canadian exporter, passing on all contractual obligations.

Among CCC’s primary functions is the administered Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) on behalf of the Government of Canada. The DPSA is a bilateral defence trade agreement with the U.S., first signed in 1956, that allows Canadian companies to compete for U.S. Department of Defense (dod) contracts on the same terms as domestic suppliers, as part of the integrated North American Defence Industrial Base. CCC’s role as prime contractor helps maintain this bilateral framework, and ensure that Canadian exporters continue to enjoy a level playing field with U.S. companies.

In September 2020, Senator Don Plett drew attention to delays in filling Governor in Council appointments at CCC through a Senate written question. The 2019 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the Board of Directors of the Canadian Commercial Corporation—Special Examination noted that in January 2018, the terms of all nine directors had expired. However, by November 2018, five directors had been appointed, including three who were reappointed to their positions. Three more directors were appointed in July 2018, and an additional director was appointed in December 2021.

Robert Kwon, who had served as a member of the Board of Directors since 2018, was appointed as President and CEO effective March 8, 2021, for a five-year term.

CanExport funding program

Supplementary messages

Update

COVID-19 and the resulting travel restrictions have had a significant impact on the ability of CanExport clients to explore new markets. In response to these challenges, on November 3, 2020, the program updated its guidelines to provide more flexible funding, particularly for virtual activities. Main changes include:

Supporting facts and figures (since program inception in January 2016)

CanExport - SMES

CanExport - Innovation

CanExport - Associations

CanExport - Community Investments

Background

Established in 2016, the Trade Commissioner Service’s CanExport Program is composed of four sub-programs: CanExport smes, CanExport Associations, CanExport Innovation, and CanExport Community Investments. Funding for the program was increased by $100 million over six years in June 2018, as a response to US tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum. The 2018 Fall Economic Statement provided an additional $26 million on an ongoing basis.

Responsible business conduct

Supplementary messages

Update

Ms. Sheri Meyerhoffer was appointed as the CORE in April 2019.  The office of the CORE opened on March 15, 2021 to accept cases. In January 2019, MINT - Minister Carr at the time - instructed the Department to provide funding for a total of six positions and approximately $1 million per year. This was in addition to the funding provided for CORE through Budget 2018.

Supporting facts and figures

The below chart outlines the funding of the total amount received through the budget for the office of the CORE.

Y1: 2019-20Y2: 2020-21Y3: 2021-22Y4: 2022 – 23 & ongoing
CSR TB SubCSR TB Sub - Salary (4ftes)381,119476,466476,466476,466
CSR TB Sub - Operating165,000165,000165,000165,000
CSR TB Sub - subtotal546,119641,466641,466641,466
Department-FundedSalary (2ftes)227,119231,907231,907231,907
Operating135,000135,000135,000135,000
Office Fit-up500,000000
Department Funded - subtotal862,119366,907366,907366,907
Additional FundingFY2019-20 Surplus Carry-over to FY2020-210650,00000
In-Year Allocation (MINT Approved) - Salary0490,00000
In-Year Allocation (MINT Approved) - Operating0280,00000
Additional Funding – subtotal*3,722*1,437,013*17,013*17,249
Total1,411,9602,445,3861,025,3861,025,622

*Total amounts adjusted to reflect collective bargaining funding

Background

Canada is committed to RBC and we expect Canadian companies active abroad to operate at the highest of standards: respecting human rights, operating lawfully and conducting activities in a manner consistent with international standards and Canadian values.  Canada’s balanced approach to RBC includes both preventive measures and access to dispute resolution mechanisms through the CORE and the National Contact Point (NCP) for RBC. A company that chooses not to engage meaningfully with either the CORE or NCP could face the withdrawal of enhanced trade advocacy support and future Export Development Canada financial support.

COVID-19 supply chains

Supplementary messages

Background

The global pandemic has placed a new spotlight on global supply chains. From the outset, there were concerns about the continued functioning of supply chains and the ability of Canadians to get essential foods and medicines. Shortages of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) were mistakenly attributed to supply chain issues rather than the large and globally coordinated demand shock that it was. Although there were some tense moments that required intervention by Ministers and senior officials; as well as quick policy adaptations, by and large international supply chains held up rather well during the global pandemic.

There has been talk of re-shoring of supply chains to increase the resilience of the domestic economy. Supply chains allow countries, regions within countries, and companies to specialize in what they do best, while gaining inputs from and selling to global markets. Because of this, supply chains have been found to raise competitiveness and productivity, improve wages and lower prices for consumers. Given these benefits of supply chains, companies will only take action to reconfigure supply chains if there is sufficient incentive to do so.

There is also doubt about the added resiliency of reshoring supply chains. While reshoring supply chains would shorten the chains and remove some foreign policy, transport and border risks, there is no guarantee of increased resiliency. The geographical dispersion of supply chains itself provides a form of resiliency. It is notable that some of the most important supply chain disruptions during the global pandemic were in meat packing which is largely domestic.

If there is questionable benefit from reshoring supply chains but likely significant cost, alternative approaches to increasing supply chain resilience may be more effective. For an open economy like Canada, this means increasing the resiliency of the international environment and diversification. Updating trade infrastructure, not only physical but also trade facilitation infrastructure, and supporting the digitization of companies - including those that facilitate trade would also promote resiliency.

Increasing visibility into supply chains is also an important contributor to resiliency. Many companies are also not aware of the risks in their supply chains and even sophisticated multinationals may not know their second or third tier suppliers.

CPTPP implementation

Supplementary messages

Responsive: Taiwan CPTPP accession

Responsive: China’s interest in CPTPP accession

Update

The U.K. submitted its formal accession application on February 1, kicking off the first CPTPP accession process. Parties are completing domestic procedures to decide whether to establish an Accessions Working Group (AWG) to oversee accession negotiations. For Canada, this includes public consultations and a GBA+ analysis.

Public consultations on future negotiations with the U.K., both on the anticipated bilateral FTA and possible CPTPP accession, will wrap up on April 27. The results will inform Canada’s position on the creation of the AWG. All decisions on CPTPP accessions require the consensus of CPTPP Parties.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Ratification: The COVID-19 pandemic has further delayed ratification of CPTPP by Chile, Peru, Brunei and Malaysia. Chile’s Senate returned from summer break at the start of March, but it is unknown if or when CPTPP legislation will be voted upon. Peru has faced ongoing political challenges, the timeline for ratification is unknown. Brunei continues to advance its domestic work on technical issues necessary for ratification. Malaysia’s timeline for ratification remains unknown.

Canada-Asean FTA negotiations

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Canada and ASEAN have been discussing a possible FTA since 2017. At the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM)-Canada Consultations in August 2020, Ministers agreed to a timeline in support of a launch in 2021, which includes developing a reference paper to outline the scope of a possible agreement. Canadian officials are working with ASEAN on this paper, which is expected to be finalized in advance of the next AEM-Canada Consultations, scheduled for September 2021.

According to the Canada-ASEAN Joint Feasibility Study on a possible Canada-ASEAN FTA, a comprehensive FTA would deliver significant trade and economic benefits for all ASEAN member states and Canada. As part of this Study, Canadian modelling predicted a possible comprehensive agreement would increase Canada’s GDP by $3.37 billion and ASEAN’s GDP by $7.97 billion. Canada’s exports to ASEAN could increase by 13.3% ($3.54 billion) and ASEAN’s exports to Canada could increase by 15.5% ($6.38 billion).

In 2018, the Government conducted public consultations to seek the views of Canadians on a possible FTA with ASEAN. Overall, stakeholders expressed support for a Canada-ASEAN FTA and highlighted significant opportunities to Canadians in the ASEAN market, notably with non-CPTPP economies (Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand), across a broad range of sectors, including agriculture, manufacturing and services. A small number of stakeholders, especially from the supply-managed agriculture sectors, were skeptical of the benefits of a possible Canada-ASEAN FTA.

Possible Canada-Indonesia comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA)

Supplementary messages

Update

From January 9 to February 23, 2021, the Government conducted public consultations to seek the views of Canadians on a possible Canada-Indonesia CEPA. To date, the Government has received 79 written submissions. Overall, stakeholders and partners expressed broad support for a CEPA with Canada, citing the significant market potential that could be facilitated by reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers (e.g. Those related to transparency and regulatory predictability). A What We Heard report summarizing the views of Canadians will be published on ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s website later this spring.

In parallel with public consultations, Canada and Indonesia held technical discussions to assess the potential for negotiating a comprehensive trade agreement, which took place in February and March 2021. These technical discussions revealed that there is scope to negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement that would result in meaningful market access for Canadians.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Indonesia is Canada’s 24th largest merchandise trading partner and a key market for Canadian exports of agricultural, machinery products, and natural resources. Recently, Canada and Indonesia have begun to explore the possibility of negotiating a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement which is being considered in parallel with a possible Canada-ASEAN FTA.

China – trade relations and market access issues

Supplementary messages

China/Xinjiang

China/Hong Kong

China/Canola

China/COVID-19 import measures on food products

Responsive: U.S.-China trade dispute and Phase One agreement

Update

In response to China’s use of coercive diplomacy, including economic coercion, Canada is advising companies to take on a strong suite of policy and operational measures to support diversification and mitigation of vulnerabilities. The Trade Commissioner Service is proactively providing clients and stakeholders information on the risks of doing business in China, including the importance of Responsible Business Conduct and international best practices for Canadian companies operating abroad, as well as new risks related to human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong’s NSL.

To safeguard Canadian supply chains and prevent Canadian businesses from becoming unknowingly complicit, on January 12, 2021 Canada announced a suite of measures to address extensive human rights violations against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China. On March 22, Canada announced sanctions on four Chinese officials and one entity involved in human rights violations in Xinjiang.

Canada has been working with like-minded countries in calling upon trading partners to ensure that trade measures are transparent, rules-based and non-trade disruptive to global supply chains. It will require a critical mass of like-minded countries to agree to mechanisms to deter such coercive actions, share business risks, and hold China to account. In this regard, officials are currently developing options.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

India – market access and investment

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Pulses: India is the world’s largest pulse import market and, until September 2017, had been Canada’s largest pulse export market. However, responding to domestic pressures, India made commitments to self-sufficiency and increased domestic production. India continues to apply a number of measures on imported pulses including mandatory fumigation requirements, increases in import tariffs, quantitative restrictions on dry peas (de-facto banning imports of yellow peas) and, most recently, increased scrutiny for the presence of weed seeds, including a number of previously untested pests. Pulse exports to India from Canada have decreased significantly as a result of India’s restrictive measures, from $930 million in 2017 to $158 million in 2018 (an 83% decrease). Exports in 2020 rose to $708 million but are still well below 2017 levels. In the case of peas, additional trade restrictions (quota) has made the impact more significant: exports have fallen from $526 million in 2017 to $21 million in 2020 (a 96% decrease). On March 11, 2021, you raised the issue with India’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, who indicated that pulse market access may not be resolved independently from other issues of interest to India.

Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement: Canada and India launched negotiations toward a FIPA in 2004. The most recent round of negotiations took place in 2017. Ministers and officials have been in regular contact over the last year with a view to reengaging discussions.

Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement: CEPA negotiations launched in November 2010. The tenth round of negotiations took place in 2017. Several meetings have taken place between Chief Negotiators since then, including most recently on November 19, 2020. The next meetings are planned for April.

Canadian Investment in India: Priority sectors for investment attraction from India include ICT, automotive, aerospace, infrastructure, financial services, and the oil & gas and extractive sectors. Canadian portfolio investments in India have grown substantially over the past five years and are estimated to exceed $60 billion. Canadian investors are active in India’s real estate, infrastructure, logistics, information technology, private equity, renewable energy sectors, and credit financing.

CETA implementation and trade irritants

Supplementary messages

Update

CETA’s implementation continues with many Committee meetings and dialogues taking place each year. These meetings allow the Parties to raise: concerns relevant to stakeholders; to work for a resolution of such issues; and in some cases to develop decisions or recommendations to implement or address new issues under the Agreement. For example, in January 2021, four decisions related to CETA’s Investment Chapter were adopted by the CETA Joint Committee, marking an important step toward ensuring the full functioning of CETA once it is ratified by all EU Member States. The decisions established clear and rigorous ethical rules and transparency in the resolution of investment disputes. The EU also recently implemented their Protocol on Conformity Assessment obligations under CETA after a three-year delay.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

CETA is one of the most comprehensive and ambitious free-trade agreements that Canada and the EU have ever implemented. The EU is Canada’s second largest trading partner after the U.S., offering tremendous opportunities for Canadian businesses. A few irritants persist in the Canada-EU trade relationship, such as the EU’s delay in publishing Temporary Entry information, the difference of opinion vis à vis “effective enforceability” of CETA’s Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters and [REDACTED]. In addition, Canadian agricultural stakeholders have raised complaints with the EU’s non-tariff barriers (e.g. Italy’s COOL law, access for Canadian beef and pork, hazard based approach towards pesticides, long approval process for biotech products).

Canada – U.K. trade continuity agreement

Supplementary messages

Update

After making its way through the House of Commons without amendments, Bill C-18, An Act to Implement the Agreement on Trade Continuity between Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, passed quickly through the Senate and received Royal Assent on March 17, 2021. Following approval of the necessary regulatory changes and an exchange of diplomatic notes with the U.K., the TCA entered into force on April 1, 2021. Public consultations on future trade negotiations with the U.K. were launched on March 12 and will run through April 27, 2021.

Background

The Canada-U.K. Trade Continuity Agreement (TCA) entered into force on April 1, 2021. The agreement ensures a seamless transition of our trade relations with the United Kingdom following its departure from the EU at the end of 2020. The TCA replicates the outcomes of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which ceased to apply to the U.K. as of January 1, 2021 (while remaining otherwise unchanged and still governing trade between Canada and the EU). Modifications were required in areas where it was not appropriate to transpose the CETA outcome directly, such as tariff-rate quotas (trqs), TRQ administration, rules of origin, and investment.

The TCA addresses the unique situation brought about by the U.K. leaving the EU in the medium term. For the longer term, however, Canada is interested in negotiating an agreement that can best reflect the nature of Canada-U.K. trade relations going forward and take into account any post-Brexit developments. Canada and the U.K. have committed to enter into subsequent negotiations within one year of the TCA’s entry into force, and to make best efforts to reach a new agreement within three years. Public consultations were launched on March 12, 2021, to seek the views of Canadian stakeholders and interested parties on future bilateral trade negotiations with the U.K., as well as the prospect of the U.K. acceding to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement (CUFTA) modernization

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Update

On March 20, 2021 ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ launched public consultations in the Canada Gazette towards an Initial Environmental Assessment (IEA), and Gender Based Analysis+ (GBA+) of the modernization of CUFTA for a 45-day period.

Background

The CUFTA is a comprehensive FTA, but does not include chapters on services and investment. The CUFTA contains a review clause (Article 19.2) that commits the Parties to review the Agreement within two years of its entry into force with a view to expanding the agreement to include trade in services and investment, as well as other areas as agreed by the Parties. In July 2019, PM Trudeau and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy announced a mutual commitment to expand and modernize the 2017 CUFTA. Public consultations to seek the views of Canadians were held in winter 2020 through a Canada Gazette notice, and an official report of the consultations was published on GAC’s website in May 2020. The majority of submissions were positive or neutral. At this time, Canada is ready to proceed and is waiting for Ukraine to finalize its preparations, anticipated in spring 2021, prior to launching negotiations. Modernization of CUFTA would demonstrate the Government of Canada’s commitment to increasing and diversifying rules-based international trade, and would support Canada’s overall commitment to Ukraine and its domestic reform efforts. CUFTA modernization would help improve the business environment in Ukraine by strengthening trade rules and increasing transparency and certainty for Canadian stakeholders, including building on the existing obligations of the 1995 FIPA.

Canada-Pacific alliance FTA negotiations

Supplementary messages

Update

Eight rounds of negotiations have taken place to date, with the most recent held Nov. 21-23, 2019 in Lima, Peru. Good progress has been made in the negotiations. Following a pause in negotiations, discussions are ongoing regarding next steps towards Canada achieving Associated State status.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

In June 2017, the PA invited Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore to become Associated States. Canada launched FTA negotiations with the PA in October 2017. Canada already benefits from a high level of market access from its existing ftas. Achieving Associate State status would allow Canada to strengthen its commercial and political linkages with like-minded countries in Latin America, and to continue to promote Canada’s inclusive approach to trade.

Domestic consultations to seek the views of Canadians on a potential Canada-PA FTA were held in 2017. The CIIT also undertook a study on the potential FTA in 2018-19; a government response was presented to the House in July 2019.

Canada-Mercosur FTA negotiations

Update

Since launching FTA negotiations with Mercosur in March 2018, seven rounds of negotiations have been held. Round 8, which was originally targeted for mid-September 2019 and then subsequently March 2020, was postponed on two occasions: first due to general elections in Canada, Uruguay and Argentina in late 2019 and second, due to concerns related to COVID-19 in mid-March 2020. Given the international travel restrictions in place, no new rounds are scheduled. Leads are engaging virtually to advance technical discussions.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

These negotiations provide an opportunity for Canada to promote an inclusive approach to trade and to advance broader social, labour and environmental priorities both at home and abroad while reinforcing the importance of a rules-based trading system at a time of growing protectionism. Environmental concerns stemming from the forest fires in Brazil’s Amazon region, coupled with human rights concerns related to Brazil’s treatment of Indigenous peoples and potential links to increased agricultural trade, have triggered greater public scrutiny of trade liberalization efforts with Brazil. Several EU member states have also expressed concern about these issues in the context of the ongoing ratification process for the EU-Mercosur FTA, and these concerns have been echoed by Canadian stakeholders, led by Greenpeace, as well as Indigenous groups.

Buy american and buy America

Supplementary messages

Background

Buy American requirements were first established during the U.S. Great Depression and are set out in the Buy American Act of 1933, which mandates that all federal government departments purchase only U.S. goods. Canada is exempt from Buy American requirements as a result of our respective obligations under the revised WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).

However, Canada is not exempt from Buy America requirements. Since 1982, Buy America requirements have applied to the purchase of iron, steel and manufactured goods used in state/local infrastructure projects funded – in whole or in part – by certain U.S. federal departments and agencies (mainly the Department of Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency). In addition, procurement of rolling stock (e.g. Buses, subway cars, vehicles) requires 70% U.S. domestic content and final assembly in the U.S. to be considered Buy America compliant. As federal transfers or grants to lower levels of government are not covered by the U.S. under the GPA, imposing Buy America requirements is consistent with U.S. trade obligations. 

There is broad bipartisan support for Buy America policies in the U.S. and President Biden has pledged to attach existing, or potentially expanded, Buy America requirements to the upcoming U.S. infrastructure package, which is expected to be in the range of US$1-2 trillion. This initiative, which would be the subject of new legislation, could particularly impact Canadian companies supplying products for:

The federal government is engaging the U.S. Administration, members of Congress, allies at the sub-national level and in the U.S. business and labour communities, to advocate for a Canada-U.S. approach to the U.S. infrastructure package. A strong Team Canada approach will be required to advance Canada’s interests.

Canada-U.S. relations

Supplementary messages

Trade

Climate and energy

Border and pandemic

Arctic

International security and foreign policy

Inclusion and respect for diversity

Supporting facts and figures

Background

On February 26, Secretary Blinken undertook a virtual visit to Canada during which he had a bilateral meeting with MINA and a courtesy call with PM Trudeau. MINA and Sec. Blinken discussed issues in the Americas (Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti), China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, as well as multilateralism, democracy and migration.

Political context: Joe Biden was inaugurated U.S. President on January 20, 2021. He has nominated all Cabinet members, and their Senate confirmation processes are almost completed. Biden’s cabinet is the most diverse in U.S. history with almost as many women as men, a non-white majority, and multiple historic nominations, including Deb Haaland, the first Native American in a president's Cabinet.

The new administration inherited significant domestic challenges – including tense partisan and racial relations, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, immigration pressures and a fragile economic recovery – which are expected to focus the Biden administration and Congress on domestic matters rather than foreign affairs. Nevertheless, President Biden has consistently expressed an intention to rebuild alliances with foreign partners and renew U.S. leadership internationally.

Canada-U.S. Roadmap: PM Trudeau and President Biden had their first virtual meeting on February 23. The two leaders committed to a Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, which is intended to be the cornerstone of a whole-of-government approach to Canada-U.S. relations. It includes the creation of a High-Level Ministerial Dialogue on Climate, the revival of the North American Leaders’ Summit, and expansion of the U.S.-Canada Arctic Dialogue, among other initiatives. In particular, the Roadmap prioritizes:

PM Trudeau and President Biden also discussed a wide range of bilateral issues, including an inclusive and sustainable economic recovery, fighting against all form of discrimination, and protecting energy infrastructure. The leaders also considered ways to address key global challenges, such as climate change, NATO, China, digital economy and cybersecurity, and priorities in multilateral forums.

The U.S. administration signalled its interest in hosting the North American Leaders’ Summit (NALS) around April 22, 2021.

Trade: Canada and the U.S. enjoy the largest trading relationship in the world. Canada’s efforts are focused on ensuring the effective implementation of the CUSMA and defending Canadian trade interests in the U.S., and collaborating closely to address global trade challenges, including with respect to China and the WTO.

The CUSMA entered into force on July 1, 2020, reinforcing the strong economic ties between the three parties and enhancing North American competitiveness. More recently, the parties have focused on the implementation of the rules of origin for automotive trade and standing-up CUSMA committees, including those on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and North American Competitiveness.

While implementation is proceeding well overall, certain bilateral irritants exist. For example, the U.S. has pursued dispute settlement consultations with Canada regarding tariff rate quota administration policies for dairy, and Canada has requested consultations with the U.S. regarding its continued illegal global safeguards on imports of Canadian solar products. U.S. trade policy continues to be closely linked to domestic priorities and a tendency towards protectionism will remain.

President Biden is moving forward on his campaign promise to expand Buy America and Buy American requirements. On January 25, President Biden signed an Executive Order (EO) on ‘Ensuring the Future Is Made in All of America by All of America’s Workers’, which is largely focused on streamlining process, increasing transparency and oversight, and re-enforcing existing commitments for Buy American requirements. As such, it will have limited impact for Canada.

Climate and energy: New U.S. policies and overall approach on climate change and environmental protection are aligned with Canada’s views. As part of the Roadmap, PM Trudeau and President Biden pledged to explore opportunities to align policies and approaches to create jobs, while tackling climate change and inequality, and enhancing adaptation and resilience to climate impacts. They also agreed to protect businesses, workers and communities in both countries from unfair trade by countries failing to take strong climate action, and to reduce oil and gas methane emissions to protect public health and the environment.

There is also local and national opposition in the U.S., including court actions, against Enbridge Line 5 and Line 3 pipelines. The Biden administration has not pronounced on these two projects yet. The renegotiation of the 1964 Columbia River Treaty, a bilateral flood control and hydropower Canada-U.S. agreement, is currently underway and remain a priority.

Border management: On March 17, the temporary border arrangement between Canada and the U.S. was extended through April 21, 2021. In the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, Prime Minister Trudeau and President Biden recognized that coordinated border policies remain central to controlling COVID-19 and new variants while promoting economic growth and recovery. Both leaders agreed to take a coordinated approach based on science and public health criteria when considering measures to ease Canada-U.S. border restrictions in the future.

International security and foreign policy: As part of the U.S.-Canada Roadmap, PM Trudeau and President Biden reaffirmed the importance of investment in modern, ready, and capable forces in line with their commitments to NATO, and agreed to expand cooperation with respect to the promotion of democracy, human rights, and media freedom in our hemisphere and around the world. President Biden also condemned the arbitrary detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor and his commitment to work for their release.

The Biden administration has expressed its commitment to a rules-based international system and multilateral co-operation, notably by cancelling plans to withdraw from the World Health Organization and rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement. There is a recognition from the Biden administration that the U.S. will have more of a lasting and consequential impact on regional and global challenges when it works in concert with partners. The foreign policy challenges identified by the U.S. include building back from COVID, global migration, democracy vs. Authoritarianism, China, Russia and Iran.

COVID-19: As of March 18, there have been more than 29.4 million cases and over 530,000 deaths in the United States. About 113 million people have received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, including about 40 million people who have been fully vaccinated. On March 11, President Biden signed a new COVID economic relief package totaling US $1.9 trillion into law.

Representation: Canadian Ambassador to the U.S., Kirsten Hillman. U.S. Chargé d’affaires to Canada, Katherine Brucker.

Canada-U.S. Trade Promotion

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Approximately 80% of new exporters are smes that export to a single market and almost 70% of new exporters choose the U.S. as their first export destination. The U.S. is a proven testing ground both for new exporters, and for established ones piloting a new product or service.  Canada is the United States’ largest customer and buys more goods from the United States than do China, Japan and the United Kingdom combined.

Solar tariffs and other trade remedy issues

Solar Tariffs

Fact-Finding Investigations on Seasonal Produce

Supplementary messages

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Solar Tariffs

In 2018, the Trump administration purposely ignored NAFTA global safeguard rules and imposed a 30% safeguard tariff on solar modules from Canada.  The U.S. also blocked Canada’s attempt to launch NAFTA dispute settlement proceedings. Despite a high level of engagement with the Trump Administration since the tariff was illegally imposed in 2018, the tariff has remained in place. On December 22, 2020, Canada launched CUSMA dispute settlement proceedings and held consultations on January 28, 2021, with the goal of convincing the Biden Administration to respect NAFTA and CUSMA rules and exempt Canada from the solar tariff.

Fact-Finding Investigations on Seasonal Produce

The Trump Administration also launched various investigations on seasonal produce. Although Canada was successful in preventing the imposition of a safeguard duty on blueberries, the threat of new safeguard investigations on bell peppers and strawberries remain, and any resulting tariffs could disrupt Canadian exports of these products (fact-finding investigations can lead to safeguard investigations). It will be important to ensure that the Biden Administration adheres to CUSMA safeguard rules, which require the United States to exempt Canada from the application of these tariffs, subject to certain conditions.

Section 232 Investigations on Transformers and Vanadium

The U.S. 232 National Security investigations on Vanadium and Transformers and parts that were launched by the Department of Commerce in 2020 remain without final decision or closure by the President. In both cases, there is no indication that the Commerce Secretary submitted a final report to the President. Although the tariff threat appears to have diminished greatly with the new Administration, the Embassy in Washington continues to seek clarity on the status of these investigations.

Canada-U.S. border

Supplementary messages

Update

Discussions continue within the Government of Canada as to options to move forward  on the future of the temporary border arrangement, and an eventual border reopening. Canadian officials have developed productive working relationships with incoming members of the Biden Administration. 

Stakeholder interest in the future of the temporary border arrangement and options for re-opening the border to normal flows is expected to continue to rise. Next month, the Wilson Center Task Force on Public Health and the U.S.-Canadian Border, co-chaired by Anne mclellan, Jean Charest, as well as U.S. co-chairs Christine Gregoire and James Douglas, former governors of Washington State and Vermont, respectively, plans to release a report with recommendations as to next steps to re-open the border.

Supporting facts and figures

Background

The one-year anniversary of the Canada-U.S. temporary border arrangement recently passed; on March 18, 2020, Prime Minister Trudeau announced that the two countries had agreed to temporarily restrict all non-essential travel across the Canada-U.S. border, taking effect on March 21, 2020, and ending on April 21, 2020. The arrangement has since been extended 12 times.

Canada-U.S. cooperation on china

Supporting facts and figures

Background

Whereas in the past the U.S. has seen China as a developing country (with nuclear weapons), its unprecedented economic growth over the last 20 years, technological advances, large military expenditures, and more assertive foreign policy under President Xi have led to the realization that American pre-eminence cannot be guaranteed. Also, the hope that U.S. support for economic liberalization, especially following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, would lead to greater democratization has been unrealized.

In light of these conclusions, a new narrative has emerged in Washington, partly reflected in and influenced by President Trump’s “America First” agenda, that China will not engage as a constructive, cooperative partner with the U.S. and that a new era of great power competition has begun. As stated in his January 2021 Senate confirmation hearing, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken believes that China poses the most significant challenge of any state to the U.S. Supported by a bipartisan consensus in Congress, counter-balancing China’s growing global influence and safeguarding U.S. national and economic security is a high priority for the U.S. administration, which is expected to adopt a whole-of-government approach to China. That said, President Biden and his top national security officials have also stated that the U.S. must find ways to coexist with China, noting that competition and cooperation are not mutually exclusive. Canada also recognizes that we need to work with China to address global issues such as climate change, health, non-proliferation, and finance.

In these circumstances, the Biden administration is seeking to act in concert with like-minded democratic partners to address shared concerns about Chinese domestic issues such as repression of human rights (including in Xinjiang and Hong Kong), media freedom, rule of law, growing military expenditures, conditions for foreign investors, market access, and technological competition. The U.S. is also seeking to work with allies to counter other Chinese activities it sees as problematic, such as assertions of its maritime/territorial claims in the South China Sea, foreign direct investment/financial assistance under the Belt and Road Initiative, coercive diplomacy, state-sponsored cyber program (including 5G network concerns) and foreign interference. Long-standing concerns about Taiwan and growing Chinese interest in the Arctic, Latin America, and elsewhere will also preoccupy the United States.

Canada shares many of the U.S. concerns with respect to China’s assertive behaviour both internationally and domestically, notably with respect to trade, intellectual property, human rights, rule of law, security issues and industrial policies. For example, as part of the CUSMA Canada and the U.S. jointly signed on to new obligations that prohibit each country from importing goods made in whole or in part by forced labour. Canada has made use of this provision in order to bring attention to and minimize risk exposure for Canadian companies to the on-going human rights situation in Xinjiang as part of its measures announced on January 12. On March 22, in coordination with the U.S. and U.K., and in solidarity with the E.U., Canada announced new sanctions against 4 officials and 1 entity under the Special Economic Measures (Peoples Republic of China) Regulations, based on their participation in gross and systematic human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Secretary Blinken and the U.S. administration have also commended Canada’s leadership on the Arbitrary Detention Initiative, supported Canada in advocacy around the world, and joined Canada and 60 other parties in endorsing the Declaration against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations. The U.S. has also pledged to raise the arbitrary detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor systematically with China at every level and treating it as though they were American citizen.

Some specific policies of the Biden administration are already apparent. Domestically, Trump-era restrictions, such as the requirement for China-based media to register as foreign missions in the U.S., limits on the network of Chinese-language Confucius Institutes, and attempts to ban Chinese technology companies from critical sectors (e.g. Semiconductors, 5G) will likely remain in place. Plans to strengthen domestic U.S. manufacturing and increase supply-chain resiliency, particularly for medical supplies, are partly intended to reduce dependence on Chinese sources. The Biden campaign pledge to increase government spending on green technology explicitly refers to the advantage that state subsidies and industrial strategies have given China’s own industry. Canada is also moving forward on investment in green technologies and is considering options with respect to supply chains resiliency in critical sectors, particularly telecommunication technologies (i.e. 5G), critical minerals, and medical supplies.

To counter China’s aggressive foreign policies, the Biden administration has argued that the U.S. should focus on ad hoc coalitions or issue-specific groups to increase pressure on China such as a “D-10 coalition” (G7 + Australia, South Korea and India) proposed by the UK to address issues related to trade, technology, supply chains, and standards. Increased U.S. engagement in multilateral organizations such as the U.N. as well as regional groupings such as Quads, ASEAN and APEC are also expected to be instrumental in a Biden strategy to counter-balance China. Secretary of State Blinken has stressed the importance of taking a lead role in international institutions instead of, through disengagement or absence, effectively ceding leadership to China. Biden has advocated greater consideration at NATO of the risks stemming from China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness (e.g. Taiwan, South China Sea) and in favour of increased military capacity to address potential Chinese security threats in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. As a member of the G7, NATO, ASEAN, and other multilateral organizations, Canada will be a key partner for the United States. A number of bilateral priorities will also feature prominently in the U.S. strategy to counter China, such as modernizing NORAD, the Arctic, cybersecurity, and strengthening democracy.

On trade and economic issues, President Biden made campaign promises to address structural issues such as steel overcapacity, industrial subsidies, and support for state-owned enterprises, as well as forced technology transfer, cyber threats, intellectual property theft faced by U.S. companies in China. Canada is already well aligned with the U.S. on these issues.

While Canada did work with the Trump Administration on some China-related issues, it’s clear that the Biden administration policies toward China will provide many opportunities for collaboration and cooperation, including a much greater focus on some of Canada’s top priorities, including human rights. Early signs from Washington are encouraging and there is a clear recognition from the U.S. that working in tandem with like-minded partners, including Canada, will be likely to achieve results when it comes to China.

CUSMA implementation and reinforcing the Canada-U.S. economic partnership

Supplementary messages

Responsive – Mexico Labour Reform

Responsive – U.S. Concerns on Canada’s Dairy Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQS)

Supporting facts and figures (Statistics in canadian dollars unless otherwise noted)

Background

CUSMA Implementation: Following entry into force on July 1, 2020, the Parties have focused on the implementation of the autos rules of origin and standing-up CUSMA committees, including those on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and North American Competitiveness. More recently, work is underway to support a Free Trade Commission meeting, which could take place as early as mid-April. While implementation is proceeding well overall, certain bilateral irritants exist including with respect to U.S. concerns on Canada’s dairy tariff rate quota practices and Canada’s concerns with continued U.S. safeguard tariffs on Canadian solar products.

Mexico Labour Reform Support: Canada has devoted $27.5 million over 4 years, starting in April 2021, to support Mexican labour reform programming and establish a  monitoring and compliance regime. The U.S. has appropriated US$180 million for programming to support similar efforts in Mexico. Canadian and U.S. officials are engaged in regular discussions to coordinate efforts.

Dairy Tariff Rate Quota Administration: On December 9, 2020, the U.S. requested consultations under CUSMA regarding the administration of Canada’s dairy tariff rate quotas (trqs), specifically Canada’s practice of allocating a high proportion of its trqs to processors. Consultations took place on December 21, 2020, between officials from Canada and the U.S. At the end of the meeting, the U.S. indicated that it remained dissatisfied with Canada’s administration of its CUSMA dairy trqs. The U.S. has been in a position to request the establishment of a panel since January 8, 2021.

Canada-U.S. Cooperation on Global Trade Issues: Early engagement with the U.S. on global trade issues is crucial to demonstrate the role that Canada can play in advancing shared objectives. In particular, there is an opportunity to collaborate to support resilient supply chains and North American competitiveness; advance the global response to climate change; and, demonstrate the benefits of our essential security relationship and make progress on global trade issues (e.g. China and the Indo-Pacific, WTO reform, forced labour).

Softwood lumber

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Currently, most Canadian companies are subject to a combined 8.99% duty rate when exporting certain softwood lumber products to the United States.

Softwood lumber continues to be a priority for the Government of Canada, and it is being raised at all levels with the new U.S. Administration. In addition, Canada continues to work with long-time allies in the United States, such as homebuilder associations, to stress that U.S. duties are not only causing undue harm to Canadian producers, but also to U.S. homebuilders and consumers. The current record-high lumber prices are hampering the role that the U.S. housing sector may play in the economic recovery. U.S. homebuilders have been vocal about the need to find solutions to the high prices and to ensure stability of supply. Canada’s position remains that a new softwood lumber agreement is in the best interests of both countries, and Canada is prepared to re-engage in negotiations when the United States is ready to discuss realistic proposals that would be acceptable to Canadian industry. In the meantime, Canada is continuing to vigorously pursue legal challenges against U.S. duties at the WTO and through NAFTA/CUSMA dispute settlement panels.

Under NAFTA Chapter 19, Canada is challenging the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) initial countervailing (CVD) and anti-dumping (AD) determinations. Canada and the United States continue to be engaged in protracted discussions regarding panel composition for these cases. Canada is also challenging Commerce’s determinations before the WTO. While the WTO AD panel found that the U.S. improperly calculated dumping margins, Canada appealed in June 2019 certain findings from the Panel that were unfavorable. The Panel’s report on Canada’s CVD challenge was released in August 2020. The WTO CVD Panel found overwhelmingly in Canada’s favour and that U.S. CVD duties on Canadian softwood lumber are inconsistent with the United States’ WTO obligations. However, the United States appealed the Panel’s report in September 2020. Timelines for both appeal proceedings are unclear due to the WTO Appellate Body’s current lack of quorum.

Finally, Canada is pursuing challenges of the final results of Commerce’s first Administrative Reviews under Chapter 10 of CUSMA. Administrative reviews are annual reviews Commerce conducts of its AD and CVD orders. The Administrative Review process establishes duty assessment rates for shipments entered during the period of review, as well as the new duty deposit rates going forward until the next annual Administrative Review is completed. On November 23, 2020, Commerce issued the final results for its first AD and CVD Administrative Reviews. The final duty rates are, for most companies, significantly lower than those from the initial investigation (8.99% compared to 20.23% “all-others” rate). The second and third Administrative Reviews are underway and final results are, respectively, expected in November 2021 and August 2022.

Canada-U.S. oil and gas pipelines

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Keystone XL (KXL)

For more than a decade, successive Canadian governments, including the present one, have strongly and consistently supported the KXL project through engagement with the U.S. federal and state governments, and other American stakeholders.

Canada was disappointed with President Biden’s decision to cancel KXL’s Presidential permit, but acknowledges this decision to fulfil his election campaign promise made in public in May 2020.  We believed there was a strong case to be made for KXL. To that end, following the U.S. elections last November, Canada made every effort, and reached out to make the strongest possible case for KXL with the incoming Biden team, the transition team and their advisors. In his first telephone call with then President-elect Biden, the Prime Minister raised KXL.

Enbridge Line 3

Enbridge’s Line 3 replacement project has been completed in Canada, and is also complete for the portions in North Dakota and Wisconsin. For the incomplete section in Minnesota, Canada has strongly supported the project through formal, detailed, written submissions to U.S. federal and state regulatory and environmental assessments. Construction is now underway in Minnesota, with approximately 25% of that leg of the project complete. As the project is still subject to some litigation, we are continuing to monitor the situation closely.

Enbridge Line 5

Line 5 is a 645-mile pipeline, running from the terminal hub of Superior, Wisconsin, to Sarnia, Ontario. It has operated safely since 1953, and carries light crude oil and natural gas liquids (ngls) from Alberta and Saskatchewan to Michigan and Ontario. Connecting pipelines transport these resources further to Quebec, Ohio and Pennsylvania. A shutdown of the pipeline would cause significant economic disruption.

On November 13, 2020, Michigan announced that the it was revoking Enbridge’s 1953 authorization (‘easement’) to operate its Line 5 pipeline through the Straits of Mackinac, which connects Lakes Michigan and Huron. The State is citing alleged violations of the easement agreement by Enbridge, which Michigan sees as an unacceptable oil spill risk, and has given the company until May 12, 2021, to cease operations. In making this announcement, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer also filed a legal claim seeking a state court decision to validate her proposed action. Enbridge filed a suit against Michigan in federal U.S. District Court, seeking to remove the case from Michigan state to U.S. federal jurisdiction. The state court case is held in abeyance, waiting for a decision from the federal court. The federal court has set aside all consideration and motions, with the exception of a motion from Michigan to remand the case back to state court.

On February 17, the judge in the federal court set down a briefing schedule on only one procedural motion, whether to remand the case to state court, where all action is suspended until the federal court determines jurisdiction. Filings of pleadings may run until June 2, 2021, i.e. After Michigan’s stipulated shutdown date of May 12, 2021. The federal court judge ordered Enbridge and Michigan to enter into mediation to see if, in the meantime, they might reach a settlement that would render the court proceedings unnecessary. On March 16, a mediator was announced, with the first meeting scheduled to take place on April 16 after which they will report out a meeting schedule to the judge. The mediation outcome would be non-binding.

Line 5

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Line 5 is a pipeline operating safely since 1953, carrying light crude oil and natural gas liquids (ngls) from Alberta and Saskatchewan to Michigan and Ontario. Connecting pipelines transport these resources further to Quebec, Ohio and Pennsylvania. A shutdown of the Line 5 would cause significant economic disruption.

On November 13, 2020, Michigan announced that it was revoking Enbridge’s 1953 authorization (‘easement’) to operate its Line 5 pipeline through the Straits of Mackinac, which connect Lakes Michigan and Huron. Citing alleged violations of the easement agreement by Enbridge, which Michigan sees as an unacceptable oil spill risk, the company was given until May 12 to cease operations. The Governor has filed a legal claim seeking a state court decision to validate the action. Enbridge has filed a suit against Michigan in federal U.S. District Court, seeking to remove the case from state to federal jurisdiction. The state court case is in abeyance, waiting for a decision from federal court.

The federal court has set aside all consideration and motions, with the exception of deciding on Michigan’s procedural motion to remand the case to state court.

On February 17, the federal court judge set down a briefing schedule on the procedural motion Filings of pleadings may run until June 2, 2021, after Michigan’s stipulated shutdown date of May 12. The federal court judge ordered Enbridge and Michigan to enter into mediation to see if they might reach a settlement, rendering court proceedings unnecessary. The first meeting with mediator took place on April 16. They will report out a meeting schedule to the judge on April 23. The mediation outcome will not be binding.

Canada’s advocacy in support of Line 5 has been ongoing for several years, led by our Embassy in Washington, and our consulates general in Detroit and New York.

Commitment to a green economic recovery

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Canada and the U.S. are increasing public climate-resilient and green infrastructure spending as a means to spur economic recovery after COVID-19. Climate change is a “cornerstone” of the Government’s plan to create one million jobs and is included in one of the four pillars of the Speech from the Throne. The Government of Canada committed to making investments in clean energy and helping sectors transition to a net-zero future. Canada’s Task Force for a Resilient Recovery recognized green recovery as essential for Canada’s competitiveness in climate action – through buildings, zero-emission vehicles, clean energy, nature, and clean competitiveness.

President Biden’s US$2 trillion green infrastructure and clean energy plan calls for investments in clean energy technologies and infrastructure, new electric vehicle charging stations, battery manufacturing incentives, and foreign investment. Part of that plan has been incorporated into draft legislation that is currently before Congress. The Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, announced by the PM and the U.S. President on February 23, 2020, embraces the opportunity for clean growth by strengthening the Canada-U.S. Critical Minerals Action Plan for a net-zero industrial transformation, essential to zero-emissions vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage. These technologies require specific mineral and metal inputs, the demand for which is projected to grow exponentially in some cases. Under the Joint Action Plan, the United States and Canada are working collaboratively in building a resilient global critical mineral supply chains that will benefit both nations.

Increased demand for clean growth products and services equally leverages Canadian technological strengths – energy storage, renewables, electrification and power distribution via smart grids, and global Canadian infrastructure company expertise in services – project management, engineering, and consulting. Efforts to facilitate recovery after COVID-19 present a transformative opportunity to stimulate economic growth through climate resilient and green infrastructure investments. Canadian firms have significant experience building and operating some of the largest renewable energy plants in the world, through developers, engineering firms, equipment manufacturers and suppliers.

Climate change and border carbon adjustment

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Canada’s approach to carbon pricing

Canada has had a carbon pricing system in place since 2019, known as Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon Pollution. The Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon Pollution gives provinces and territories the flexibility to develop their own carbon pricing system so long as the system meets the established criteria designed to ensure all systems are stringent, fair and efficient (known as the federal benchmark).

On December 11, 2020, Canada introduced A Healthy Environment and a Healthy Economy – Canada’s strengthened climate plan. The plan includes $15 billion in investments to build a stronger, cleaner, more resilient and inclusive economy. As part of Canada’s strengthened climate plan, the Government of Canada proposes to continue putting a price on carbon pollution post 2022, by $15 per year to 2030. The Government will engage with provinces and territories, as well as with Indigenous organizations, on the proposal to increase carbon pricing from $50/tonne in 2022 (the current policy target) in $15/tonne annual increments to $170/tonne in 2030. 

Current status of U.S. initiatives to tackle climate

President Biden has identified action on climate change as a key priority of its build back better agenda. In addition to commitments to rejoin the Paris Agreement and achieve net zero emissions by 2050, the Biden Administration’s trade policy agenda for 2021 prioritizes using trade to advance environmental sustainability. This includes inter alia: negotiating and implementing strong environmental standards; exploring and developing market and regulatory approaches to address greenhouse gas emissions in the global trading system, including considering border carbon adjustments (bcas); working with trading partners as they develop their own approaches; taking action against trading partners who fail to meet their environmental obligations; and promoting resilient renewable energy supply chains. President Biden has also committed to condition future trade agreements on partners’ commitments to meet their enhanced Paris climate targets. Early engagement with the U.S. is essential to protect Canadian interests and to position Canada to be part of these discussions on bcas.

Clean energy (hydro) exports

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At the PM/President meeting on February 23, the leaders: …agreed to take a coordinated approach to accelerating progress towards sustainable, resilient, and clean energy infrastructure, including encouraging the development of cross-border clean electricity transmission. 

On February 24, 2021, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) issued a report examining the economic effects of increased renewable energy commitments in New England and Massachusetts, and the role of renewable electricity imports. Canada and some of the provinces testified at the ITC’s hearings. The main finding is that Massachusetts can meet its increased renewable and clean energy commitments with a relatively small increase in retail electricity rates. Positive for Canada, the report states that increased imports of hydroelectric energy from Canada will likely support Massachusetts’s carbon emissions reduction goals.

Over 30 cross-border transmission lines move electricity back and forth across the Canada-U.S. border. These operate both under long-term contracts (e.g. Hydro Quebec supplies Vermont with 25% of its electricity) and on the spot market as supply, demand and price dictate.

From this existing electricity trade, Canada’s hydro exports are expanding with the Hydro Quebec New England Clean Energy Connect (NECEC) supplying Massachusetts and the New England grid under a 20-year contract, running through Maine. The project has obtained all federal and state permits, and pre-construction work has started. Local opposition to the project remains, and litigation is ongoing, but there is no expectation of federal intervention. Hydro Quebec’s Champlain-Hudson Power Express (CHPE) would provide clean power to the New York City government. The project is fully permitted at U.S. state and federal level, so construction could begin if a supply agreement is reached that includes financing the project. Manitoba Hydro, on July 1, 2020, brought into service a new export/import project the Great Northern Transmission Line (GNTL) between the province and Minnesota.

Vaccines (defence production act / executive orders, canada-u.s. Vaccine cooperation)

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On January 21, 2021, President Biden signed an Executive Order titled “Sustainable Public Health Supply Chain” to direct authorities to secure supplies necessary to respond to domestic needs related to COVID-19, including through the authorities of the Defense Production Act (DPA).

Since the issuance of this Order, the Biden Administration has invoked the DPA to increase production of vaccines by U.S. manufacturers. U.S. Government priority-rated orders do not explicitly prohibit exports. However, once a U.S. company has been issued a DPA-rated order from the U.S. government, it is legally bound to comply in fulfilling that order on a priority basis. A supplier can continue to fill other orders while working on a priority-rated order, if its supplies are sufficient, in accordance with the details of the order.

Canada has an exemption to export restrictions of certain related medical products under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA“), valid until June 30, 2021. These restrictions do not cover COVID vaccines.

The White House announced on March 19, 2021, that the U.S. will allow exports of 1.5 million astrazeneca-Oxford vaccine doses to Canada. This will count as part of Canada’s 20 million doses secured through a bilateral agreement with astrazeneca. Canada will receive 1.5 million doses in late March and, in return, an equal number of doses will be provided to the U.S. at a later date by astrazeneca.

Mexico new electricial utility law

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Approximately US$4.1B of Canadian investment in Mexico is at risk, including from companies such as ATCO, JCM, Northland Power, Canadian Solar.  On March 3, Mexico’s Senate passed into law a bill that aims to undo many elements of Mexico’s energy reform that opened the country to international investment, including from Canada.  President López Obrador had submitted the bill to Congress on February 1 with priority status.

The law essentially codifies many of the regulatory changes that have been attempted and been subject to injunctions over the past year. This includes providing clear preference to the national utility, CFE, to dispatch onto the grid, relegating clean energy producers (who are largely foreign owned) to a lower position limiting guarantees to sell onto the grid; centralizing permitting processes in the Energy Secretary; as well as disbanding the wholesale energy market.

The implementation of the law has been suspended by the Mexican courts following numerous injunctions. The Supreme Court will likely rule on the constitutionality of the law in Fall 2021.

Year-Over-Year Changes – Explanation of Items

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The 2021-22 Main Estimates include:

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 By Core Responsibility

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Allocation by Core Responsibility:

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Trade and investment

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Briefing note on departmental plan 2021-22

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Briefing note on departmental results report 2019-20

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¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s results highlights include:

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Explanation of Variances

Canada’s network abroad

*Does not include Taiwan or the West Bank/ *Ne comprend pas Taiwan ni la Cisjordanie.

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Overview of 2020-21 Main Estimates (Previous Year)

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Public accounts 2019-20 – Travel and conferences

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