¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ

Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA) on study on the Canadian Foreign Service and elements of the foreign policy machinery within ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ

June 8th, 2023
Published: January 16th, 2024

Scenario note

• Your in-person, one-hour appearance begins at 11:30 a.m.
• The following officials will support you:

Accompanying In-Person Panelist:

• David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Alexandre Lévêque, Assistant Deputy Minister, Strategic Policy
• Vera Alexander, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, Human Resources

Accompanying in Audience:

• Stéphane Cousineau, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, People and International Platform, and;
• Anick Ouellette, Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Planning, Finance and Information Technology and Chief Financial Officer.

Committee Logistics

• After your opening remarks of five minutes, the committee will move to rounds of questions.
• Unlike House of Commons Committee practice, questions will be asked on a first come, first served basis. Senators catch the eye of the Clerk by raising their hand indicating they wish to be added to the list. Senators will typically be afforded up to 4 minutes per round of questions unless otherwise indicated by the Chair.
• Any Senator can attend a Senate committee meeting and pose questions, even if they are not a member of that committee.

Committee Membership & Context

• For the full list of committee members, please see the committee biographies included in the briefing binder.
• Your appearance before the Committee follows Deputy Minister Morrison’s May 10^th appearance on the role that Canadian culture and arts could pay in Canada’s international relations.

As regards the latest in the Committee’s study of the Canadian Foreign Service:

• On April 19, GAC’s Diversity Networks’ Champions appeared before the Committee, during which they discussed recruitment, training and retention, as well as Champions’ perspectives and concerns related to the communities they represent;
• You were scheduled to appear on November 23, 2022, but had to postpone due to scheduling conflicts.
• Minister Sajjan and Minister Ng appeared before the Committee on this study on November 3 and December 15, 2022, respectively.
• The Committee plans to travel to London, Oslo and Berlin in late September and their deadline to submit a final report on the study to the Senate is December 29, 2023.
• Since the committee began its work in April 2022, Committee members’ questions have focused on the following issues:

Human Resources:

Staffing and talent management; mobility, rotationally and pool management; under-staffing, recruitment and the need to develop surge capacity; disproportionate balance of staff at HQ vs. missions; and amalgamation.

Skills Development and Maintenance: maintaining development expertise; developing and maintaining diplomatic skills, and geographic and specific functional expertise; bilingualism; foreign language competencies; and mentorship.

Diversity and Inclusion: importance of diversity; under representation of black and Indigenous Canadians in the Foreign Service.

Decision-making: Organizational structure; hierarchy; strategic policy planning and coherence; innovation; risk-aversion in senior management and duty of care.

Mission-related issues : Geographic distribution, underrepresentation in some countries/geographic areas; nomination of heads of missions; role of non-foreign-service staff at mission; recruitment, retention and treatment of LES; and use of consulates.

The Engagement of Provinces and Canadians in Canadian foreign policy: interdepartmental partnerships and co-operation; provincial representation overseas, engagement with Canadians.

Thematic/Geographic: Ukraine response; Havana syndrome; Multilateral organizations and partnerships; digitalization of work; GAC Internal Review; and security policy.

Other Areas of Interest to the Committee:

• Aside from the Canadian Foreign Service, during this 44^th Parliament the Committee has studied:
  • ,
  • The Frozen Assets Repurposing Act,
  • A comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of the Sergei Magnitsky Law, and the Special Economic Measures Act, and;
  • S-225, An Act to amend the Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act (investments)
  • Cultural diplomacy and Canadian Studies.

Opening remarks

• Thank you Mr. Chair.
• Over the past year, I have been following this committee’s study closely. I know that my colleagues Ministers Sajjan and Ng as well as many of my predecessors have had the opportunity to speak with you, and I am grateful to be able to be here today.
• ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ stands at the forefront of Canadian international engagement. Its staff in Canada and at missions abroad work around the clock and across time zones to advance and protect Canadian interests and to deliver world-class services to Canadians.
• In recent years, the international environment has become infinitely more complex, and we are navigating unprecedented levels of uncertainty and volatility, which have demonstrated to Canadians that the security and prosperity they have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War cannot be taken for granted anymore.
• Canada is facing a shift in economic and political power away from its traditional allies and partners; a return of great power competition; increasing vulnerability to transnational threats like climate change, and cyber activity; and adapting to rapid technological change.
• At the same time, the fabric of Canada has evolved: Canadians are much more connected to the world than in the past, and they have higher expectations for how their government will promote and protect their interests abroad.
• We have been already taking action to adapt to these drivers of change through new initiatives and investments:
  • Last fall we launched our Indo-Pacific Strategy to better position Canada within this critical region and set a clear framework for our engagement with China. We will expand the scope of Canada’s engagement in the region and our contribution to regional security, prosperity and sustainable development. We also aim to improve our trade competitiveness and our regional connectivity, including by increasing immigration processing capacity.  
  • The department has invested $110 million, by the end of 2023; to establish a fully dedicated mission and permanent observer to the African Union in Addis Ababa; convert Canadian offices in Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Rwanda into full embassies and high commissions with resident heads of mission; open new missions in Armenia, Fiji and Milan. The department will also further strengthen its presence at its embassy in Latvia in 2024.
  • In addition, we have been strengthening security and preparedness at missions abroad and increasing our consular capacity.
  • And we’re also working to build a healthier, more diverse workplace to deliver on all of our foreign policy, trade, international assistance and consular priorities.
• I could highlight many more achievements, but one of the projects I am most excited about relates the Future of Diplomacy: Transforming ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ initiative I launched with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in May of last year. At that time, I said we would be taking an honest look in the mirror, and asking ourselves important questions about the way forward. I also committed to receiving ideas from all Global Affairs Staff, and from partners across government and across the country.
• Well, we did just that. I am pleased to report that after extensive internal and external consultations we received more than 9,000 individual ideas and submissions. And there was a remarkable degree of convergence in what stakeholders were saying.
• What we heard is that Canada needs a Global Affairs department that is strategic and influential, and that can effectively articulate, coordinate and deliver a full global agenda.
• We also need to be open and connected to the people we serve – all Canadians – and to the world.
• The pace and complexity of change means we have to be agile and responsive as issues emerge, while continuously learning and prioritizing what matters.
• Our department also needs to lead the whole-of-government international engagement effort. Other departments and level of governments are looking to us, and we must step up.
• Not least, we need to have a workforce that reflects the diverse population we serve, and one that is highly-skilled, healthy and dedicated to excellence.
• We’ve broken this down into what we’re calling four key “action areas”:
  • Building new expertise in ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ on international issues of importance to Canada’s future, and increase capacity to anticipate and manage prolonged crises;
  • Enhancing Canada’s capacity to exert influence where it matters most, by increasing presence abroad;
  • Ensuring ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s workforce, both Canada-based staff and locally-engaged staff, is highly skilled, including in targeted thematic and geographic areas; bilingual; supported through training and career development; diverse, healthy, and capable of delivering world class results for Canadians; and
  • Ensuring ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ has the tools, processes, and culture to thrive into the future.
• Successful implementation will require sustained commitment. We know that a transformation of this scope and ambition is a collective and incremental process which cannot be completed overnight. That is why Deputy Minister Morrison is establishing a mutli-disciplinary Transformation Team to drive the modernization agenda for a period of three years.
• Building on a proud legacy of Canadian diplomacy, I envision a modern ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ able to anticipate and respond to the threats and seize opportunities of today but also of tomorrow.
• I see empowered Canadian representatives at more tables, with louder voices and better tools and equipment to meet the moment and to serve Canadians.
• I am committed, as I know you all are, to the transformation and modernisation of Canadian diplomacy to a model fit to respond to the ever evolving challenges we face. I look forward to incorporating the outcomes of your study into our ongoing work.

AEFA members’ biographies

Peter M. Boehm (Chair)
Independent Senators Group – Ontario 

Appointment to the senate

• October 3, 2018

Professional background

• Studies: Ph.D in History from the University of Edinburgh, a Master's degree in International Affairs from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, and a Bachelor's degree in English and History from Wilfrid Laurier University.
• Public Servant: Various positions at Global Affairs from 1983 – 2018, including: Deputy Minister for the G7 Summit, Deputy Minister of International Development, Senior Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Ambassador to Germany, and Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Organization of the American States.

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate group: Independent Senators Group (November 3, 2018 – Present)
• Member: Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2018 – Present)

Committee membership

• Chair: Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2020 – Present)
• Member: Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (2018 – Present); Standing Senate Committee on National Finance (2018 – Present); Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2018 – Present)
• Former Member: Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples (2018 – 2019); Standing Senate Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration (2019 – 2020); Committee of Selection (2019 – 2020)

Recent points of interest

Ukraine: 

• During that same meeting in June 2022, Senator Boehm asked if Canada has a plan to look at the long-term assistance that Canada could provide to Ukraine from a post-hostility perspective. 
• At a Senate Standing Committee on National Finance meeting in June 2022, Senator Boehm asked for details regarding the distribution of the $500 million in terms of stocks, new acquisitions and direct transfers to Ukraine.

Peacekeeping: 

• During Senate debate, Question Period, and Committees, Senator Boehm frequently highlights the importance of United Nations peacekeeping missions. From his perspective, the UN's role is to maintain international peace and security, by working to prevent conflicts, and by working proactively to lay the foundations for peace.

GAC ‘Fit For Purpose’:

• During the March 2023 visit to 125 Sussex, Senator Boehm underlined that the committee has heard a lot of emphasis on human resources and the need for consistent recruitment. He also suggested that parliamentary diplomacy could be better leveraged.
• In November 2022, Senator Boehm asked Minister Sajjan whether the Government finds time to have comparative discussions with counterpart organizations like USAID and FCDO around what is working and what isn’t for their respective organizations.
• During this study, he has repeatedly questioned other government departments on whether they are using GAC’s training center for their personnel working abroad.

Other interests

Indigenous Relations

• During a Senate debate on Bill C-15 (An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) in 2021, Senator Boehm expressed his support for Indigenous Peoples, and the importance of ensuring their meaningful inclusion in Canadian society.

Peter Harder (Vice-Chair)
Progressive Senate Group – Ontario

Appointment to the senate

• March 23, 2016

Professional background

• Studies: Bachelor’s degree in Political Science
• Public Service: 30 years of experience in the Federal Public Service, including in the departments of immigration, public safety, industry, the treasury board and foreign affairs.
• Immigration: Senator Harder served as the founding Executive Director of the Immigration and Refugee Board.
• Foreign Services/GAC: He joined the Foreign Service in 1977; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2003 – 2007)

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate groups: Independent (2016 – 2020); Progressive Senate Group (2020‑ Present)
• Leader of the Government in the Senate (2016 – 2020)

Committee membership

• Deputy Chair: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2020 – Present)
• Member: Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency (2022 ‑Present); Standing Committee on Ethics and Conflictof Interest for Senators (2020 – Present); Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (2020-‑ Present)
• Former Member: Standing Committee on National Finance (2019 – 2020); Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (2019 – 2020); Standing Committee on Transport and Communications (2020 – 2022); Standing Committee on Human Rights (2021 – 2022); Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology (2021-‑ 2022)

Recent points of interest

Humanitarian Aid:

• Senator Harder closely follows humanitarian operations, and regularly asks questions about the logistics, resources and results of these operations.

Ukraine:

• In March 2022, Senator Harder asked the Government Representative in the Senate what means Canada is considering support to military efforts and combatants in Ukraine other than a no-fly zone.

COVAX: 

• In December 2021, Senator Harder criticized the fact that while Canada promised 51 million doses to COVAX out of its own surplus of stock and through bilateral donations, only about 10 million of those vaccines had been delivered.

GAC ‘Fit For Purpose’:

• In October 2022, Senator Harder stated that locally engaged staff are an important element of our international footprint and inquired about their recruitment, role, security issues, and how they are managed. 
• In November 2022, he asked about the inter-pollination of human resources between GAC and DND, and whether there have been recent lessons from a kinetic and policy perspective. 

Gwen Boniface
Independent Senators Group – Ontario

Appointment to the senate

• November 10, 2016

Professional background

• Police/Security: Served internationally for 10 years, including as Deputy Chief Inspector of Ireland’s Garda Síochána Inspectorate tasked with reforming Ireland’s national Police Service, as a Transnational Organized Crime Expert with the United Nations Police Division and as Deputy Executive Director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
• Commissioner: Served with Law Commission of Canada for 5 years as a Commissioner.
• Indigenous: Initiated a truth and reconciliation project in her home community of Orillia in 2019 with Indigenous and non-indigenous members.

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate group: Independent Senators Group (2016 – Present)
• Member: Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association (2017 – Present); Canadian Delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2017 – Present) 

Committee membership

• Co-Chair: Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency (2022 – Present)
• Member: Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2020 – Present); Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency (2022 – Present); Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (2017 – Present); Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (2017 – Present); Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament (2021 – Present)
• Former Chair: Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (2020 – 2021)

Recent points of interest

GAC ‘Fit For Purpose’:

• During the March 2023 visit to 125 Sussex, Senator Boniface asked whether, in consultations with other countries, GAC has found they are facing the same issues and hurdles related to human resources.
• In June 2022, the Senator stated that the Foreign Service has a risk-averse culture and she asked how to rebuild an organization in a way that actually values contrary views. 
• Duringthis study, she has demonstrated an interest in the Government of Canada’s footprint abroad.
• Sanctions Against Russia:
• In June 2022, Senator Boniface asked if sanctions that Canada and its allies have put on Russia are affecting the Russian economy and the Russian people and if there is evidence that suggests international sanctions are producing a behavioural change in the Russian regime. 

 Unfair Trade Practice:

• At an AEFA meeting in May 2022, Senator Boniface wanted to know how the CBSA and the CITT investigate instances in which imports are being dumped or subsidized and if these practices have caused injury to Canadian producers. 

Other interests

Defence & Security:

• With a background in law enforcement, Senator Boniface has a special interest in security issues, particularly those related to human trafficking and CBSA-related work.

Mary Coyle
Independent Senators Group – Nova Scotia (Antigonish) 

Appointment to the senate

• December 4, 2017

Professional background

• Studies: Bachelor’s degree in in languages and literature with a major in French and a minor in Spanish and a Master’s degree in rural planning and development.
• Rural Development: She subsequently worked as a Rural Development Advisor in Indonesia and later to support two State Islamic Universities develop their community engagement strategies.
• Involvement: Vice President and Director of the school’s Coady International Institute (1997 – 2014); Executive Director of the Frank McKenna Centre for Leadership (2014 – 2017)

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate group: Independent Senators Group (2018 – Present)

Committee membership

• Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2019 -‑ Present); Standing Committee on Indigenous Peoples (2017 – Present); 
• Former Member: Standing Committee on Transport and Communications (2020 – 2022)

Recent points of interest

GAC ‘Fit For Purpose’:

• During the March 2023 visit to 125 Sussex, Senator Coyle asked for more information around the Department’s Future of Diplomacy work and how much of the input into it is coming from internal vs external.
• On March 9, 2023, she noted that Canada has had 15 foreign ministers in the past 22 years, and expressed the view that some Ministers did not have the time or the power to provide Canadian diplomats with real leadership; she asked John Baird, who was appearing as a witness, to share his views on how these multiple changes affect the Foreign Service.
• In June 2022, the Senator showed interest in GAC's recruitment process and asked if there was a strategy on the part of the department to attract senior or mid-career professionals.
• In April 2022, Senator Coyle described the loss of many development assistance experts following CIDA’s amalgamation with DFAIT, and asked whether the role of Global Affairs as a link to development assistance expertise has been weakened.
• Ukraine
• In June 2022, Senator Coyle wanted to know the role of Canada or any other country or international organization in supporting diplomatic channels of negotiation between Russia and Ukraine and asked if there was still a possibility of de-escalation through diplomacy.

Seized Russian Assets:

• In May 2022, Senator Coyle wanted to know how the Russian assets seized by the government will be used.

Atrocities in Ukraine

• In April 2022, Senator Coyle, noted that “rape is a brutal weapon of war” and that atrocities and human rights violations throughout Ukraine have already been documented. She asked what Canada is doing to support the Ukrainian government, or other organizations on the ground, to protect women and children from further sexual violence and what Canada is doing to support the preparation of the evidence required to support the eventual prosecution of war crimes.

Other interests

• Senator Coyle is an advocate for gender equality in the in Canadian public institutions and in Canadian society.

Marty Deacon
Independent Senators Group – Ontario (Waterloo Region)

Appointment to the senate

• February 28, 2018

Professional background

• Commonwealth Games Canada: Executive Board Member & Chef de Mission (2012- ‑Present)
• Canadian Olympic Committee: Director, Executive Board (2009 – Present)
• Independent Consultant: Education consultation at the elementary and secondary school level (2016 – 2018)
• Waterloo Region District School Board: Superintendent & Executive Officer (2010 -‑ 2016); Principal (2000 – 2010)

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate group: Independent Senators Group (2018 – Present)

Committee membership

• Member: Standing Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (2020 – Present); Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2020 – Present); Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament (2022 – Present)
• Former Member: Standing Committee on Official Languages (2022 – 2022)

Recent points of interest

Russia: 

• In June 2022, Senator Deacon expressed concern about the risk that Russia uses chemical weapons in Ukraine and asked what options are available to Canada and other signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention if it does so.
• During the same meeting, she also expressed concern regarding physical violence on women and children by Russia in Ukraine and asked how Canada can help hold perpetrators accountable for sexual violence in Ukraine. 

GAC ‘Fit for Purpose’:

• During the March 2023 visit to 125 Sussex, Senator Deacon asked what the Government learned from the pandemic with respect to emergency management, and what the connection is between the work at NORAD and similar sites and GAC’s Emergency Watch & Response Centre.
• In June 2022, the Senator stated based on the comments of previous witnesses that “there are too many supervisors and not enough leash to allow Canadian foreign affairs officers to operate independently and with autonomy in their postings.”
• She also asked what direction Canada should take as a middle power in its diplomacy given major changes on the international scene.
• Senator Deacon considers that the development aspect in diplomacy is very important for a rich, medium sized‑country like Canada. She regularly asks questions about Canada's development assistance efforts and resources.

Seized Russian Assets:

• In March 2022, Senator Deacon wanted to know how the Russian assets seized by the government will be used and if unfreezing of Russian assets could be a condition of any peace agreement.

Other interests

Afghanistan:

• In 2021, Senator Deacon was contacted by several athletes, coaches, sports leaders and leaders in the LGBTQ2+ community to help them get out of Afghanistan. 
• In a Senate question period in February 2022, she also reiterated the importance of the work involved in getting Afghans out of Afghanistan.

Mohamed-Iqbal Ravalia
Independent Senators Group – Newfoundland and Labrador 

Appointment to the senate

• June 1, 2018

Professional background

• Studies: Medical degree (MB.ChB.) and a Certification in Family Medicine (CCFP)
• Medicine: Practiced family medicine in Twillingate, NL (1984 – 2018)
• Community Engagement: Involvement with local minor hockey, community outreach initiatives, and fundraising for the Lions Club and support of the Anglican Church Sunday school program.

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate group: Independent Senators Group (2018 – Present)
• Member: Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association (2019 – Present)

Committee membership

• Member:Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2020 – Present); Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans (2018 – Present); Standing Joint Committee on the Library of Parliament (2019 – Present)
• Former Member: Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (2022 – 2022)

Recent points of interest

GAC ‘Fit for Purpose’:

• During the March 2023 visit to 125 Sussex, Senator Ravalia asked what GAC is doing to attract “hyphenated-Canadians” so that we can reap the benefits of their language skills, cultural knowledge, etc.
• In November 2022, the Senator asked DND about their involvement with GAC in the development of the Indo-Pacific Strategy given the potential threats in that region of the world.
• In June 2022, he recognized the importance of modernizing Canada's diplomacy as well as modernizing its digital technologies to revitalize the foreign service. He asked if Canada has an infrastructure capable of addressing potential cybersecurity threats and whether it is working with its Fives Eyes allies on this issue.
• In April 2022, Senator Ravalia suggested that in the context of evolving global challenges, Canada appears to be under-represented in some jurisdictions, such as on the African continent.

Humanitarian aid to Ukraine:

• In June 2022, Senator Ravalia asked what Canada can do to help maintain an adequate supply of equipment and medicines to organizations assisting Ukrainians on the ground.

Space Industry and Cooperation: 

• In May 2022, Senator Ravalia asked for more details about the memorandum of understanding signed by Canada and the United States concerning the cooperation on the civil Lunar Gateway. He also asked if there will be competition between private industry and this program in the long term. 

Vaccine Equity:

• Senator Ravalia has been a strong advocate for the redistribution of COVID-19 vaccines to disadvantaged countries and has repeatedly called for Canada's involvement in vaccine distribution in needy and underdeveloped countries.

Yuen Pau Woo
Independent Senators Group – British Columbia 

Appointment to the senate

• November 10, 2016

Professional background

• Research: Senior Fellow in Public Policy, Asian Institute of Research at The University of British Columbia (2014 – 2021); Senior Fellow, Asia Pacific Business Studies, Simon Fraser University (2014 – Present)
• Asia Pacific: President and CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2005 – 2014); Distinguished East Asia Fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2014 – 2021); President of China Global: The Vancouver Society for Promotion of Chinese Art and Culture (2014 – 2020)

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate group: Independent Senators Group (2016 – Present)
• ISG Facilitator (2017-2021)

Committee membership

• Member:Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2017 – Present); Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce (2021 – Present); Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament (2021 – Present); Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations (2017 – Present); Standing Committee on Transport and Communications (2022-Present)
• Former Member: Committee of Selection (2019 – 2020); Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration (2021 – 2022)

Recent points of interest

GAC ‘Fit for Purpose’:

• In June 2022, Senator Woo showed significant interest in the recruitment process for the foreign service and how to optimize it. 
• Senator Woo has said he is in favour of greater recruitment into the Foreign Service of officials from other departments.
• During Minister Sajjan’s November 2022 appearance before the committee, the Senator suggested that GAC shouldrank the intrinsic global savvy and skills that some Canadians have‑ higher than we currently do, and place less emphasis on knowledge of French. As examples, he suggested foreign language ability, having lived abroad, and understanding cultures around the world.

 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties:

• In May 2022, Senator Woo underscored the importance of addressing anti-dumping and countervailing duties to protect producers and their workers and asked how the interests of consumers and importers of intermediate goods are addressed in these protectionist measures.

Russia Invasion of Ukraine:

• In April 2022, Senator Woo expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the government seems to want the conflict in Ukraine to continue over the long term and asked what Canada is doing to try to negotiate a quick end to the war to reduce human suffering.

Russia Sanctions:

• In March 2022, Senator Woo noted his agreement with using the Magnitsky act to punish Russian leaders. However, he expressed some reluctance regarding SEMA and FACFOA, which he believes may not achieve the goal of changing the behavior of these Russian actors.

Amina Gerba
Progressive Senate Group – Quebec (Rigaud) 

Appointment to the senate

• July 29, 2021

Professional background

• Studies: Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration and a Master’s degree in Business Administration
• Business: Co-founded two companies manufacturing hair and body care products: KarilissLaboratories Inc. and Kariderm
• Consulting: Founder (2003) of non-profit Afrique Expansion Inc., in order tobuild bridges between Canada and Africa, and encourage business opportunities

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate group: Progressive Senate Group (2021 – Present)
• Member: Canada-Africa Parliamentary Association (2021 – Present); Canada-France Inter‑Parliamentary Association

Committee membership

• Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2021 – Present); Standing Committee on Human Rights (2021 – Present); 
• Former Member: Standing Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources (2021 – 2022); Standing Committee on National Finance (2021 – 2022); Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology (2021 – 2022); Standing Committee on Transport and Communications (2021 – 2022)

Recent points of interest

GAC ‘Fit For Purpose’:

• During the March 2023 visit to 125 Sussex, Senator Gerba sought details on Canada’s Africa Strategy, and what we know about how other countries are positioning themselves in Africa.
• In November 2022, the Senator criticized DND witnesses on their footprint in Africa, having been surprised to learn that one Defense Officer was covering 13 countries.
• In October 2022, she asked whether Canada’s whole diplomatic machinery should turn to economic foreign policy to avoid missing opportunities.
• In June 2022, Senator Gerba congratulated Canada for its membership in the African Development Bank. She went on however to deplore the reduction over the years of the Canadian diplomatic network on the continent and asked why a country like Canada, as one of Africa’s main donors, has such a small diplomatic network there.
• In April 2022, the Senator asked if there have been any significant changes as a result ofGAC's announced plan to increase its number of Black and Indigenous executives.

Global Food Crisis: 

• In June 2022, Senator Gerba noted the global food issues related to the conflict in Ukraine and asked what role Canada can play in limiting this crisis particularly in the most affected African countries.

Trade Remedy System: SME

• In May 2022, Senator Gerba underscored the need to improve access to the trade remedy system for small and medium-sized enterprises and asked what actions have been taken by the government simplify access to the system for small and medium-sized businesses.

Bill S-217 (An Act respecting the repurposing of certain seized, frozen or sequestrated assets):

• In April 2022, Senator Gerba acknowledged the importance of this legislation, but expressed concern about the effects of such legislation on investment by foreign nationals in Canada. 

Stephen Greene
Canadian Senators Group – Nova Scotia (Halifax – The Citadel) 

Appointment to the senate

• December 22, 2008

Professional background

• Politics: Candidate for the Reform Party in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections; served as Chief of Staff to Preston Manning of the Reform Party of Canada (1993-‑ 1996)
• Insurance: He worked in the insurance industry and became engaged in national and international insurance issues (1996 – 2009) 
• Foreign Service: Early in this career, he worked at the Canadian embassy in Washington D.C., and at the Canadian Consulate in Boston.

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate groups: Conservative Party of Canada (2009 – 2017); Independent Senators Group (2017 ‑2019); Canadian Senators Group (2009 – Present)
• Deputy Liaison (2022 – Present)
• Deputy Government Whip in the Senate (2010 – 2015)
• Deputy Opposition Whip in the Senate (2016 – 2017)

Committee membership

• Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2019 – Present); Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament (2020 – Present); Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations (2019 – Present)
• Former Member: Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce (2015 – 2017); Special Senate Committee on Senate Modernization (2017 – 2019); Standing Committee on Transport and Communications (2011 – 2013)

Recent points of interest

GAC ‘Fit For Purpose’:

• In June 2022, Senator Greene noted that the conflict in Ukraine will significantly change Canada's international policy and asked if GAC will be seeking the assistance of academics and experts to help adapt.

UN Update:

• In April 2022, Senator Greene mentioned the lack of relevance that the UN has in the conflict in Ukraine and whether Canada should have as an objective to initiate discussions and work on the creation of the “United Nations, Part II”. 

Ukraine:

• Since the beginning of the conflict, Senator Greene has advocated for more aid to Ukraine as well as the imposition of a no-fly zone.

Free Trade Agreements:

• In May 2019, Senator Greene stated that he was in favour of free trade agreements because they benefit Canada, our trading partners, and the global economy in general.

David Richards
Canadian Senators Group – New Brunswick 

Appointment to the senate

• August 30, 2017

Professional background

• Novelist, essayist, screenwriter and poet.
• Recognition: In 2007, he was awarded the regional Commonwealth Writers’ Prize award. He is also a member of the Order of New Brunswick and the Order of Canada. 

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate groups: Independent Senators Group (2017 – 2018); Non-affiliated (2018-‑ 2019); Canadian Senators Group (2019 – Present)
• Member: Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association(2019 – Present)

Committee membership

• Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2021 – Present); Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (2017 – Present); Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (2021 – Present); 
• Former Member: Standing Committee on Indigenous Peoples (2013 – 2015); Standing Committee on National Finance (2019 – 2022); Standing Committee on Transport and Communications (2020 – 2021)

Recent points of interest

Afghanistan: 

• In June 2022, Senator Richards showed a strong interest in Canada's relationship with Afghanistan, particularly with respect to immigration issues and Afghan employees working at the Canadian embassy.

Russia:

• In June 2022, Senator Richards wanted to know if a diplomatic approach was still possible with Russia and if there are discussions behind the scenes to calm the situation.

Ukraine:

• Senator Richards has been in favour of imposing a no-fly zone in Ukraine and providing more military aid from Western countries.

GAC ‘Fit for Purpose’:

• In April 2022, Senator Richards deplored the state of Canada’s military, suggesting that greater collaboration between GAC and DND would improve the situation from a defence and security perspective.

Leo Housakos
Conservative Party of Canada – Quebec (Wellington) 

Appointment to the senate

• December 22, 2008

Professional background

• Studies: Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration
• Business: Had a career in business, served two terms as Vice-President of the Hellenic Congress of Quebec and as a founding member of the Hellenic Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senator Group: Conservative Party of Canada (2009 – Present)
• Deputy Whip of the Opposition(2020 – Present)
• Speaker of the Senate(2015)
• Speaker Pro Tempore(2014 – 2015)

Committee membership

• Chair: Standing Committee on Transport and Communications (2021 – Present)
• Member:Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2009 – 2021/2022 – Present); Standing Committee on Transport and Communications (2009 – 2016/2021 – Present); Committee of Selection (2021- Present)
• Former Member: Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration (2013 – 2016); Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament (2017 – 2019);Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament (2009 – 2022); Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency (2022 – 2022)

Recent points of interest

GAC ‘Fit For Purpose’:

• During the March 2023 visit to 125 Sussex, Senator Housakos asked what the Department needs to do to address perceived gaps in intelligence gathering, defense against cyber-attacks and theft of intellectual property at a level equivalent to our allies in the US, UK and France.

Sanction Regime:

• In May 2022, Senator Housakos introduced Bill S-247 An Act to amend the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law).
• During a debate on Bill S-217, An Act respecting the repurposing of certain seized, frozen or sequestrated assets, in June 2022, Senator Housakos spoke in favor of the bill by mentioning that “it will further strengthen the Magnitsky Act and strengthen our ability as a country to properly deal with corruption and human rights abuses around the world”.

Foreign Interference:

• In October 2022, Senator Housakos spoke to an increase of foreign interference in Canada and asked witnesses what kind of legislation would identify and protect Canada in this regard.

Afghanistan: 

• In October 2022, Senator Housakos deplored what he described as Canada having let down our friends and supporters in Afghanistan, asking if the failure was because of a lack of intelligence or because of an error from GAC or IRCC. 

Michael L. MacDonald
Conservative Party of Canada – Nova Scotia (Cape Breton) 

Appointment to the senate

• January 2, 2009

Professional background

• Studies: Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and History 
• Provincial Politics: He ran twice provincially for the Nova Scotia Progressive Conservative Party in 1993 and 1998 
• Business: President and owner of the Fortress Inn Louisbourg (1988 – Present)

Political and parliamentary roles

• Senate Group: Conservative Party of Canada (2013 – Present)
• Co-chair:Canada-US Inter-Parliamentary Group (2019 – Present)
• Treasurer:Canada-Korea Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group (2020 – Present)

Committee membership

• Chair: Committee of Selection (2021 – Present)
• Member: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2009 – Present);
• Former Member:  Standing Committee on Transport and Communications (2015 – 2017 | 2020 – 2021); Standing Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources (2017 – 2019)

Recent points of interest

GAC ‘Fit for Purpose’:

• In June 2022, Senator MacDonald asked about the impact of selecting non-career diplomats as ambassadors. 

UN – Ukraine:

• Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Senator MacDonald has on several occasions raised concerns about the impact of the conflict on the functioning of the UN.

China: 

• Senator MacDonald has shown particular concern about China's intentions. In April 2022, he posited that China is currently learning from the conflict in Ukraine about tactical and operational matters.

Agriculture Producers:

• In March 2020, Senator MacDonald expressed his concern about the impact of the Carbon Tax, which he said would make it difficult for Canadian agriculture to compete with American producers in a free trade environment.

Ministerial Q and A - future of diplomacy

Anticipated questions & suggested responses for topics not included in other briefing materials.

1. Future of Diplomacy

1.1  Which areas of the department do you think will be most affected by the Future of Diplomacy exercise? What kind of an impact will the modernization have on our foreign policy, trade and international assistance?

• This initiative was focussed on 4 core action areas essential to ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s capacity to engage internationally:
  • Building new expertise on international issues key to Canada’s future, and increase capacity to anticipate and manage prolonged crises;
  • Enhancing Canada’s capacity to exert influence where it matters most, by increasing presence abroad;
  • Ensuring ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s workforce is highly skilled, diverse, bilingual, healthy, and capable of delivering world class results for Canadians; and
  • Ensuring ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ has the tools, processes, and culture to thrive into the future.
• If collectively adopted and implemented, these action areas have the potential to positively and constructively transform the organization to ensure it is fit for purpose for the decades to come.
• This has been a department-wide initiative that has involved every portfolio, which is why I worked closely with my fellow GAC Ministers and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1.2  What are some of the early findings of the exercise in terms of the biggest challenges or issues currently facing GAC?

• The environment in which ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ operates is increasingly complex, volatile and challenging: there are new actors and technologies, a rules-based international system at an inflection point and global issues increasingly linked to domestic issues.
• We are increasingly being asked to respond to situations and events that are without precedent using tools, structures and processes designed for a different time.
• As an organization, we are constantly looking at how best we can improve what and how we do things so that we can continue to effectively deliver on our core mandates and foreign policy priorities, while remaining adaptive and flexible to address emergent challenges.
• Our conclusion is that Canada needs a department that is:
  • Strategic and influential where and when it matters;
  • Open and connected to Canadians and the world;
  • Agile and responsive to emerging challenges and opportunities;
  • FThe leading player in a whole of government international policy effort; and
  • Has a workforce that is diverse, highly skilled, bilingual, healthy and dedicated to excellence
• Through extensive consultations, we have identified action areas that will equip GAC to advance Canadian interests and values in an increasingly complex global reality.

1.3  Will you be seeking incremental funds from the fiscal framework in order to implement the outcomes of this exercise?

• Successful implementation will require aggressive reallocation of existing financial resources.
• Many of the lines of action will be implementable at the department level and will require no additional resources.
• However, there will be larger and more transformational pieces that may require additional funds.
• Work is already underway to assess what may be needed and to ensure that we are doing the most we can with what we have before requesting more funds – but transforming ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ is a significant undertaking.
• Now is the time to act so that we can equip ourselves to meet the challenges we know are on the horizon.

1.4  Given that similar initiatives have taken place in the past – what makes this process different? How will you ensure that there are meaningful results? What will be the implementation strategy?

• We are facing a unique historical moment, with unique challenges and opportunities calling for transformation.
• The future of the department is something that all employees should feel ownership over and work collectively to build.
• Most plans for institutional transformation fail not because recommendations are wrong; they fail because of inadequate or incomplete implementation.
• This is why, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has already appointed a senior executive, Chief Transformation Officer Antoine Chevrier, to drive the change process over an initial period of 3 years. The Chief Transformation Officer will report directly to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, with matrixed reporting responsibilities to the Deputy Ministers of International Trade and International Development. The Deputy Minister will report results to me every 6 months.
• A multi-disciplinary transformation team with relevant expertise and deep knowledge of the department across business lines will drive the transformation process and will develop a full implementation plan, including milestones and performance metrics, all by early September 2023
• The implementation of this transformation agenda will be closely monitored and course corrections will be undertaken as necessary.
• Progress will be communicated regularly to partners and stakeholders including staff, other government departments and the Canadian public.
• United in our commitment to this effort, we will deliver meaningful results.

1.5  What is the anticipated timeline for implementation?

• There are short-term and longer-term line of action. Many of the new initiatives are easily-implementable at the departmental level but others are larger in scope and ambition and will require long-term commitment and sustained action to operationalize.
• A transformation of this scope is a collective and incremental progress, one which is already well underway with a large number of ongoing internal reform exercises which have complemented and contributed to the Future of Diplomacy: Transforming GAC review such as our digital and data strategies, equity, diversity and inclusion strategy, talent management modernization and the future of work.
• A Chief Transformation Officer, Antoine Chevrier, has been appointed and will drive the change process over an initial period of 3 years.
• A full implementation plan, including milestones and performance metrics, will be developed by early September 2023.

2. Action Area 1: Building new expertise in ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ on international issues key to Canada’s future, and increase capacity to anticipate and manage crises

2.1  In which policy areas will GAC build new capacities?

• Canada faces a wider range of complex and layered issues than ever before. ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ should increase its ability to anticipate and analyze issues such as climate change, energy, critical minerals, cyber and digital issues.
• The department’s immediate priority should be to increase its policy capacity on climate change, including in relation to the energy security and critical mineral nexus.
• This is needed given the significance of these issues to Canada’s future, their growing importance to Canada’s bilateral and multilateral engagements, and for Canada’s leadership in global climate financing.
• This includes how geopolitical competition intersects with Canada’s economic security, supply-chain resilience and emerging industrial policies, and how the interplay between climate change, the green transition and Canada’s critical minerals will be key to the country’s future positioning internationally.
• The department will work closely with partner departments, including Environment and Climate Change Canada, Natural Resources Canada and Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, and further leveraging the role of Canada’s Climate Change Ambassador.
• Priority should also be given to expanding capacities and mandates for cyber and digital issues, both at headquarters and at select missions abroad, with a particular focus on science and technology, artificial intelligence and big data, and the relevance of these issues for Canada’s foreign policy, including to influence norm-setting internationally.
• The enhanced policy capacity should build on existing departmental expertise and deepen cross-fertilization with other federal and provincial departments where technical and scientific knowledge resides.
• This would require engaging new experts from outside the department (or bringing them in via Interchange or similar agreements), drawing from academia, industry and civil society.

2.2  Climate change is a crosscutting issue affecting every stream of ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ, how will this issue grow in importance in the future and how do you plan to address it?

• Biodiversity loss, climate change, and pollution/waste are the three planetary crises for which the need for urgent, ambitious and coordinated action will only grow exponentially in the near future.
• In fact, this triple crisis is already upending the world order. It is redefining how we live and work, and disrupting the systems of production, trade, economics, and finance, with impacts felt in all of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development streams of GAC’s mandate.
• To achieve a nature-positive, carbon-neutral, sustainable and healthy near future, public support and international assistance will not be sufficient. Twenty first century diplomacy will have to shape the transformative systems change needed, and rethink the actual modes of multilateral collaboration, and international trade.
• We have already applied this approach with success to the development of Canada’s renewed approach to Indo-Pacific, to GAC’s implementation of the Triple Nexus Approach to Development Assistance, and to Canada’s revised approach to Science, Technology and Innovation negotiations with the G7.
• Canada’s recent increased commitment to climate finance also constitutes urgent action to address these interconnected crises of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution/waste, which disproportionally affect the poorest and most vulnerable. Canada will allocate at least 20% of its $5.3 billion climate finance commitment to projects that leverage nature-based solutions and projects that contribute biodiversity co-benefits in developing economies. This represents more than $1 billion. Canada will also ensure that all of its climate finance investments are nature-positive.
• Given the growing importance of this issue, the department will increase its policy capacity on climate change, including in relation to the energy security and critical mineral nexus.
• We plan to build on existing departmental expertise and deepen cross-fertilization with other federal and provincial departments where technical and scientific knowledge resides. This will require engaging new experts from outside the department (or bringing them in via Interchange or similar agreements), drawing from academia, industry and civil society.

2.3  Are our diplomatic and consular capacities fit to respond to crises like what we are seeing in Sudan and Haiti?

• Through more than 260 points of service in our network of diplomatic missions abroad, GAC provides timely, effective and efficient consular services to Canadians, including the management of almost 162,000 new consular and routine cases in 2022-23. The consular network abroad is resourced to meet this demand.
• The consular footprint at missions can be bolstered in the event of a crisis with surge capacity from Headquarters or neighbouring missions.
• The department delivered consular assistance to thousands of Canadians, Permanent Residents and their families in the course of Canada’s responses to recent events such as the downing of flight PS752 (2020), the COVID-19 global repatriations (2020), the crisis in Afghanistan (2021), the response to the conflict in Ukraine (2022), and most recently in Sudan (2023).
• GAC leads the strategic coordination of the whole-of-government preparations and responses to international emergencies affecting Canadians or Canadian interests through its Emergency Watch and Response Centre (EWRC), a 24/7 operations and communications hub. The EWRC is designed to serve as a high-readiness first-response unit, trained and resourced to take initial actions in time of crisis such as convening departmental and interdepartmental task force meetings, establishing an Emergency Response Team at HQ, provide support to missions abroad, and call-up surge resources both at HQ and mission (including a Standing Rapid Deployment Team). As an example, the EWRC responded to more than 4000 inquiries on the crisis in Sudan from April 17th to May 15. It is also responsible for answering queries from Canadians abroad outside of mission’s business hours.
• GAC recently received new funding to increase capacity to respond to emergencies involving Canadian interests via the creation of a standing Emergency Response Team at headquarters.
• While the existing departmental structures effectively serve short-term consular and humanitarian crisis coordination requirements, there is a need for more dedicated resources to respond effectively to broader international security crises, which are becoming more frequent, complex and protracted, often requiring simultaneous humanitarian, geo-political, security, and consular interventions that last for months and sometimes longer.
• For example, the most recent political/security crisis that escalated in Haiti last fall has required extensive Canadian engagement and leadership via GAC, with whole-of-government coordination on planning and operationalizing of Canada’s response from a peace and security lens. A crisis of this duration places significant strain on GAC’s (limited) specialized expertise for peace & security crisis management.

2.4  How is GAC adapting to address increasing cyber threats and foreign interference?

• To counter cyber threats, GAC leads Canada’s multilateral diplomacy to support the UN Framework of Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace. These efforts aim to limit threats before they affect Canada. Along with likeminded countries, Canada is working to establish a UN cyber Program of Action, which would be a permanent mechanism to increase global resilience against cyber threats and advance implementation of the UN Framework. Canada is also actively engaged in negotiating a UN Convention on cyber crime.
• A year ago, GAC published Canada’s statement explaining how international law applies to cyberspace. This directly contributes to the growing global jurisprudence on cyber security.
• GAC is also working with MFAs from likeminded & allied countries allies to deter threats. Canada will be hosting a meeting of cyber officials from some 25 countries, in June, to advance this cooperation. We can have more impact against cyber adversaries by working together. Domestically, GAC works closely with the federal cyber community to respond to cyber threats affecting Canada or its allies.
• Pursuant to Canada’s 2018 National Cyber Security Strategy, GAC is preparing an International Cyber Security Strategy that will clearly articulate our positions on international cyber security and identify these and other practical steps we are taking to defend Canadian interests.
• GAC undertakes numerous activities related to countering foreign interference, ranging from diplomatic responses – such as official complaints, sanctions, and the declaration of persona non grata – to proactive bilateral and multilateral collaborations – such as the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism.
• An outcome of the work on the Future of Diplomacy will be to expand capacities and mandates within existing units responsible for cyber and digital issues, both at headquarters and at select missions abroad, with a particular focus on science and technology, artificial intelligence and big data, and the relevance of these issues for Canada’s foreign policy.

2.5  What is the status of Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy?

• The development and implementation of the feminist foreign policy is a key priority stated in my mandate letter.
• The feminist foreign policy, implemented for the past 7 years, is cross-cutting and informs all our international engagement, including advocacy and diplomacy, peace and security, trade and economic relations, international assistance, and consular services.
• Proud of the strong collaboration between our department, civil society, and Indigenous partners in developing a public statement on Canada’s feminist foreign policy.
• The launch of the paper will be an important milestone in Canada’s evolving feminist approach. It will provide Canadians and partners at home and abroad with a clear and concise statement of our objectives and core principles guiding our feminist international agenda.

3. Action Area 2: Enhancing Canada’s capacity to exert influence where it matters most, by increasing presence abroad

3.1 Should we have a greater presence abroad? If so where and why?</h3

• Canada is in a better position to defend and support its strategic interests when it is present on the ground. Our international mission footprint is made up of 178 missions abroad and is aligned to respond to strategic priorities, and deliver on ministerial commitments.
• The department will have invested $110 million by the end of 2023, to: establish a fully dedicated mission and permanent observer to the African Union in Addis Ababa; convert Canadian offices in Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Rwanda into full embassies and high commissions with resident heads of mission; and open new missions in Armenia, Fiji and Milan. The department will also further strengthen its presence at its embassy in Latvia in 2024.
• We need to have a more targeted presence abroad, including more boots on the ground in the right places working with local partners and civil society to meet development objectives.

3.2  How can you explain why our diplomatic representation in Africa is so small? Why isn’t bigger? Are there plans to expand our mission network in Africa?

• When allocating resources abroad, the Government of Canada considers Canada’s political, security, economic and commercial interests and priorities, making strategic choices about the locations of our missions.
• In Sub-Saharan Africa, Canada’s diplomatic representation includes 16 embassies or high commissions as well as five diplomatic offices.
• As part of a PM commitment to deepen engagement with the continent, we announced that we will increase representation in Kigali and with the African Union as marks of Canada’s steadfast commitment to its engagement in Africa.
• In Rwanda, the Canadian office will be upgraded to a high commission, increasing Canada’s capacity to promote its diverse partnerships with Rwanda and the broad range of our shared interests and cooperation.

In addition, Canada is establishing a dedicated mission and permanent observer to the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that will enable Canada to bring a renewed focus to its relationship with the African Union and strengthen ongoing efforts on shared priorities. A Permanent Observer/Head of Mission is expected to be in place in the coming months. 

3.3  The US is our closest and most consequential ally, what has been done to strengthen Canada-US relations?

• Canada’s relationship to the U.S. is unique and particularly strong.
• Since the Biden administration took office in January 2021, our direct, personal engagement with the administration, congressional lawmakers, and state leaders has continued to expand and deepen.
• Strategic engagement has enabled us to stay at the forefront of U.S. domestic policy changes, to defend the interests of Canadian workers, and to partner where there is alignment.
• President Biden’s visit to Canada in March 2023 – the first stand-alone visit by a sitting U.S. President since 2009 – showcased the strength of our relationship, our shared democratic values, and our global leadership in Ukraine and Haiti.
• The visit also highlighted the many ways that Canada and the U.S. are collaborating on “century-defining” issues confronting all countries – namely, energy and environment.
• The Prime Minister and President announced a new series of bilateral commitments that build on the 2021 Roadmap for a Renewed Canada-U.S. Partnership. This includes commitments – on semiconductor and critical mineral supply chains, energy security and climate action, and fostering trade and innovation – that set our nations and workers on a path of mutual prosperity, security, and growth.
• In parallel to the work that will be undertaken by our governments at all levels, the Deputy Prime Minister is leading the Energy Transformation Task Force to accelerate cooperation on clean energy and supply chains to achieve the promise of the new green economy.

3.4  How can we use digital diplomacy and new technology to better deliver on international priorities? Can digital diplomacy ever replace person-to-person interactions?

• I can’t stress enough the importance of face-to-face interactions for consensus building, cultivating innovation and creativity, fostering trust and networks, finding pathways for informal knowledge sharing, specifically around sensitive topics, for monitoring projects and providing services to Canadians abroad.
• With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada’s missions abroad and regional offices acted swiftly to adapt their activities in a way that prioritized the health, safety and well-being of our workforce while ensuring excellence in delivering services to Canadians.
• A number of good practices were put in place during the pandemic when in-person engagement was not possible, such as virtual ministerial visits and virtual capital-to-capital engagement or bilateral consultations.
• Many of Canada’s diplomatic missions abroad resumed in-person operations in 2021 with the realization that although the virtual world can offer opportunities and benefits for modern diplomatic practice, it is unable to fully replace in-person interactions. And this is furthermore true in regions where remote work and virtual options are not an option for local stakeholders.
• Although the pandemic made some aspects of diplomacy more accessible, it also highlighted gaps in digital access, technology and systems as not all stakeholders are equally equipped to participate in virtual settings.

4. Action Area 3: Ensuring ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s workforce is highly skilled, diverse, healthy, and capable of delivering world class results for Canadians

4.1  What is the breakdown of employees abroad versus at HQ (as of March 31, 2023)?

• GAC has 13,906 employees:
  • 8,339 CBS
  • 5,567 LES
• 7,078 or 51% (including LES) are abroad versus 6,828 or 49% are in Canada;
• Number of rotational employees: 2,059 employees, of whom 52% are abroad vs 46% at HQ and 2% in regional offices.

4.2  What is the ratio of Canada Based Staff at HQ and abroad (as of March 31, 2023)?

• CBS abroad: 18%
• CBS at HQ: 80%
• CBS in regional offices: 2%

4.3  How many FS are there? How many FS have been hired in the last few years?

• Rotational employees (“the foreign service”): 2129 employees (26% of total workforce, including EX)
• Rotational positions: 2713 (only 81% filled by rotational employees)
• Recruitment and promotion: expecting 200 new FS recruits this year; over 1000 candidates recruited or promoted since 2018.

4.4  What are the planned recruitment timelines for the next five years?

• The plan is to hold promotion processes for each rotational group and level every second year;
• There are 6 rotational recruitment processes underway and additional processes are expected in the coming months.

4.5  How does GAC build diplomatic and issue-specific expertise?

• Diplomacy is a vocation and a métier that requires training and the honing of skills throughout a career.
• One of the conclusions of the Future of Diplomacy review is that the department must improve recruitment and staffing to ensure the department has the right expertise to deliver on its mandates. The department will look into reforming its approach to post-secondary recruitment in this regard.
• The department’s “Onboarding” for new FS recruits includes a 2-year mandatory program of training, cross-Canada engagement and mentorship to build core competencies; mandatory pre-posting training precedes all postings.
• Training & skills development continues throughout a diplomat’s career, in fact, there are now 200 different learning activities offered through the Canadian Foreign Service Institute (CFSI) covering wide range of topics ranging from negotiation skills to international development and trade topics. This is further complemented by the rich syllabus of the Canada School of Public Service.
• FS recruits who are not already bilingual receive “ab initio” 1-year official language training.
• Informal learning is just as important as formal training, and career-development experiences, such as temporary duties are encouraged in addition to mentoring and coaching by seasoned diplomats which is facilitated by the mentoring program.
• In addition to management skills developed for all EXs, outgoing HOMs receive extensive HOM training, and have access to mentors they can call on for advice.
• We are now hiring to fill the pools at 104% to allow for surge capacities, training, secondments outside de department, and different types of leave.

4.6 How important are foreign languages to GAC’s talent management approach in the FS stream?

• Language proficiency is an important competency for diplomats. It is essential to speak to people in their own language to understand a society - language opens a window to a country’s mentality and culture.
• The Future of Diplomacy initiative recommends ways to increase foreign language capacity including through:
  • enhancing the compliance rate for foreign language-designated posts;
  • incentivizing the learning and retention of foreign languages;
  • putting more emphasis on language skills that meet organizational needs, at headquarters and missions, in the consideration of candidates during the hiring process, at all levels and for all employees;
  • providing foreign language training for new foreign service recruits as part of their on-boarding, when necessary, combined with career-length continuous learning and multiple assignments to missions where their foreign-language skills are required,
• The department is committed to deepening and sustaining critical foreign-language capacities in the long-term, and this will be a key element of the Future of Diplomacy’s implementation plan.

4.7 How does GAC compare with other departments in terms of bilingualism?

• I am dedicated to ensuring a fully bilingual work environment.
• GAC reflects linguistic duality in its workforce, which is 41% Francophone, as compared to 30,2% of the Public Service as a whole.
• Among GAC Executives, 27% are Francophone, as compared to 22.8% of the Canadian population.
• GAC compares well with other departments in respect for official languages.
• 89% of GAC positions are bilingual, this is about twice the rate of the public service as a whole.
• This said, more efforts are necessary to ensure that the department does everything it can to take greater advantage of bilingualism as an undeniable asset of Canada’s international engagement.
• The Future of Diplomacy internal review notes that senior executives across the department should be held accountable for ensuring an equal use of French and a functionally bilingual environment as well as promoting francophone diplomacy, at headquarters and in the mission network abroad.
  • As a key measure to promote bilingualism within ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ, consistent with the proposed Bill C-13, Act for the Substantive Equality of Canada’s Official Languages, the department should centralize and expand access to official-language training for all employees, independent of their professional group, and must increase the linguistic profile of supervisory positions in line with the Treasury Board Secretariat’s directive scheduled to come into force in April 2024.

4.8 How is Global Affairs demonstrating its commitment to diversity and inclusion in the workforce, including linguistic and geographic diversity?

• ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ has a diverse workforce that represents Canada at home and abroad.
• It is a government priority to commit to an inclusive workplace where all employees feel welcome and comfortable.
• I know the Department is genuinely committed to reach compliance with the Employment Equity legislation and has developed the relevant governance structure to support these initiatives namely the Anti-Racism Advisory Committee and a Diversity & Inclusion Council.
  • It reached and often exceeded targets for underrepresented populations (ex. Indigenous people (6.3% CBS), visible minorities (26.2% CBS) and Black Canadians (4.8% CBS)
  • Currently, 47% of HOMs are women and 12% are visible minorities; women represent 50% of our Executives and visible minorities represent 16%.
  • Francophones are well represented at GAC, with about 40% of employees who have French as their first Official Language.
• Through the department’s Anti-Racism Strategy, we are placing a particular focus on improving diversity in the senior ranks of the organization, including through a new Sponsorship Program that provides opportunity for racialized groups and Persons with Disabilities to be sponsored by senior management in their career development.
• We are making important strides and over time, we are closing remaining gaps.

4.9 Are we doing enough to recognize and support our Locally Engaged Staff?

• Locally Engaged Staff are essential to the Department, they are an integral part of our international engagement and without them, we would not be able to deliver on our mandates.
• They help bring continuity, as well as local knowledge, language and networks that CBS don’t have.
• Jobs in Canadian missions are highly sought after, because we’re seen as a good employer. Though our missions continue to attract and retain talented candidates for their LES positions, more can be done.
• The department launched, in 2021, a new directive on LES employment and staffing in addition to the launch of the LES Benefits Modernization initiative to improve management and benefits for LES.

4.10 What is our standard of care when it comes to LES? What are the distinctive implications and accountabilities in dealing with the LES vs the CBS workforce when crises take place?

• LES are subject to the labour jurisdiction of host governments. In addition to labour law, LES are wholly subject to the criminal, civil and administrative jurisdictions of the receiving state in which they work because, unlike CBS, they do not have any diplomatic privileges and immunities.
• The Government of Canada has an obligation to take reasonable steps to protect the health and safety of the LES in relation to the workplace. In recent crises such as in Ukraine, Afghanistan and Sudan, we have led whole-of-government responses to ensure the safety of our staff.
• One of the lines of action of the Future of Diplomacy initiative is for the department to launch a review of the employment package of locally engaged staff, to ensure optimum working conditions, competitive compensation, fair treatment, and the right level of protection and care, especially in times of crisis.
• The recent events in Afghanistan, Ukraine and Sudan will help inform the range of support options for LES in times of crisis.
• In practice, there are extensive protocols and mechanisms in place to support LES in crisis situations, be it in a civil war context, as a result of natural disasters or civil disturbances.
• For instance, during crises, LES are provided with:
  • Timely information on evolving political and security situations and input to operational decisions, such as mission closures that factor such risks as employee commutes);
  • Safe work arrangements such as remote work while in country and where the operational requirements, security of information and IT environment permits;
  • Safeguard of income and/or job security as well as emergency compensation measures during crisis situation – including a reduction or suspension of operations (Ukraine, COVID19 pandemic).

4.11 In your opinion, should GAC seek to become its own autonomous employer? What would be the added benefits of this and what would be the challenges?

• Studying the possibility of ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ having “separate employer” status is a recommendation of the Future of Diplomacy initiative.
• Service abroad within Canada’s global network of missions arguably brings challenges that are unique and moving to “separate employer” status may help ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ respond more effectively.
• If “separate employer” status is not advisable or cannot be achieved, the department will work within existing frameworks to ensure ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ can optimally manage its workforce.

4.12 What is the status of amalgamation? Is this a success? What have been the achievements and what are the areas that are still outstanding?

• Following the decision to amalgamate the Department of Foreign Affairs and the International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 2013, the two departments were integrated into a single organizational structure.
• Very few countries in the world have the chance to benefit from an integrated department to address the increasingly complex issues that we face in the world. Thanks to the amalgamation, we have a broader view and assessment of the issues at play and multifaceted programs through the nexus of foreign policy, trade and development.
• Since amalgamation, coherence across the different portfolios has been an issue of ongoing importance, and a constant work in progress to look into innovative solutions that will help adjust our culture to be more collaborative.
• Coordinating with my fellow GAC Ministers is an essential part of working on global issues that transcend portfolios and impact all streams of our work and we continue to make strides in leveraging these connections.
• The implementation of our Future of Diplomacy transformation agenda will also drive forward the continued integration and coherence of the department, begun ten years ago with amalgamation.

5. Action Area 4: Ensuring ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ has the tools, processes, and culture to thrive into the future

5.1 How much per year does GAC spend on the following tools and programs to advance Canada’s priority international commitments? – 2022-23 Planned Spending (budget allocation)

• Diplomacy and Advocacy:
  • Scholarship Programs for Youth Mobility and in Aid of Academic Relations - $ 10.8M
  • Mission Cultural Fund - $2.5M/yr
  • North American Platform Program (NAPP) - $3.7M/yr
  • Post Initiative Fund (PIF) - $1.6M/yr
  • Technical Assistance Partnership (TAP) - up to $15m/yr
  • Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLIs) - $26.8M annually
• International Assistance (GAC and OGDs): $12.9B budget allocations for 2022-23, noting that GAC is approximately $7.0B
  • Strategic Priorities Fund - $200M/yr annually, however increased in 2022-23 to $303M
  • Crisis Pool - $200M/yr
  • Peace and Security - $460M 2022-23; including:
    • Peace and Stabilization Operations Program - $156M
    • Inclusion, Diversity, and Human Rights Envelope $7.5M/yr
    • Protecting and Promoting Democracy Fund - $8.9 M/yr
    • Weapons Threat Reduction Program - $71.0M
    • Canadian Police Arrangement - $11.4M GAC and $35M RCMP
    • Civilian Deployment Platform - $2.8M
    • Anti-Crime/Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program - $48M
  • International Financial Institutions - $6,158.8M of which OGD portion is planned at $5.673M for 2022-23
  • Core Development - $4,868M 2022-23
  • Humanitarian Assistance - $975.7M 2022-23

5.2 What are some of the planned tools and processes that could result from the Future of Diplomacy implementation phase?

• Some new or updated tools and processes envisaged are:
  • Creating an Open Policy Hub for high-quality, evidence-based policy analysis, warning and foresight;
  • Increasing capacity to anticipate and manage a whole-of-government response to geopolitical and security crises
  • Developing and implementing a mechanism to regularly review and rebalance presence abroad;
  • Improving recruitment, training and career development, including through strengthened role of the human resources branch; enhanced career planning and talent management; dedicated and aligned training resources; reform of post-secondary recruitment and interchange/lateral entry processes;
  • Modernizing ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s IM/IT and digital services, infrastructure and tools, including modern, cloud-based architectures and networks
  • Modernizing the tools and process that underpin the $4.3 billion in annual grants and contributions programmed by ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ
  • Establishing a Data Centre of Expertise to drive data and evidence-based insights across all business lines
  • Enhancing knowledge management throughout the organization so that ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ can learn more from its own people and experiences
  • Developing a culture and practice of resource reallocation to be able to respond to new challenges and opportunities on an ongoing basis
  • Simplifying bureaucratic processes by conducting an immediate red tape review, incentivizing innovation and smart risk taking, and exploring the potential of new technologies to help staff “work smarter”.

Global Trends & Drivers of Diplomacy

• Our diplomacy today is affected by changes both to global geopolitics, and to our operational environment.
• These include the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the rise of the Indo-Pacific region, challenges to global governance, the transformation of work, new tools and technologies, and changing demographics.
• To respond to these changes, we must increase and adapt our diplomatic capacity. Diplomats today need to be experts, innovators, entrepreneurs, and facilitators; they must be technology- and data-savvy, scientifically literate, agile and adaptable.

Supplementary Messages

• Fundamentally, diplomacy is still about persuasion and the ability to influence the decisions and conduct of foreign governments and actors in a variety of contexts to advance national interests.
• The changing strategic and operational environments require thought about how we train our diplomats in terms of skills and competencies; and how we manage and integrate complex data, information and knowledge using new tools and technologies to improve results and outcomes.
• We also need to think about how and where we deploy our diplomats to promote our interests and provide efficient services to Canadians.
• At the same time, Canada`s diplomats must also embody the values of our society, which is evolving rapidly thanks to changes in demographics, migration flows, and cultural diversity.

Supporting Facts and Figures

• Changing global economic dynamics: Global value chains account for over 76% of international trade and China plays a central role in these supply chains, responsible for nearly 29% of global manufacturing output (USG International Trade Administration, 2021).
• By 2030, the world economic center of gravity could be located around the confluence of China and India. In comparison, it was located in the Atlantic Ocean until 2007 (Allianz Trade 2021).
• Canada’s place in the world: As of 2022 exports to the U.S. still accounted for 77% of Canada’s total exports (Statistics Canada, 2022), 48% of Canadian foreign direct investment (FDI) was in the U.S., and the U.S. represented 46% of FDI in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2022).
• Technology: The number of connected devices globally is set to grow exponentially with projections of extending from 30 billion in 2020 to 200 billion in 2030 and possibly reaching to the trillions by 2040 (US National Intelligence Council, 2022).
• Global governance: Less than half of the world’s population now live in a democracy of some sort. 2022 marks the 17^th consecutive year of decline in global freedom. (Freedom House, 2023).
• Inequality: The poorest half of the global population owns just 2% of the global total, while the richest 10% own 76% of all wealth (World Inequality Report 2022).

Background

Key trends at the strategic and operational levels are prompting questions about how fit for purpose Canadian diplomacy is today.

On the strategic side, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened security concerns and increased the tension of already fraught geopolitical dynamics, notably the increasing geopolitical competition between China and most developed democracies. The world’s centre of geopolitical and economic gravity is shifting away from Europe and decidedly toward the Indo-Pacific, and the rules-based international system is under serious strain.  At the same time, increasing numbers of emerging and developing states are voicing concerns around the perceived double standards sometimes employed by Western countries, seeking to avoid taking sides when it comes to major geopolitical rivalries on key issues.

At the operational level, the transformation of work has posed questions about the relative importance of close-proximity (i.e. on the ground) diplomacy and how other methods can also be effective at influencing key interlocutors in some circumstances.

Rapid changes in technology are having a profound impact on geopolitics, while at the same time also requiring diplomats to access and process big data analytics, learn how to use new tools such as generative AI, and as to effectively use new and more immediate forms of communication, both with other diplomats and with external stakeholders.

The rightful importance being accorded to diversity and inclusion are driving expectations about a ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ workforce that better represents the linguistic, gender, ethnic and racial diversity of Canada.

Different channels of diplomacy and an increase in the number of non-state actors having an influence on global events are forcing a reappraisal of the most effective ways through which Canada can promote its interests abroad.

Feminist Foreign Policy

• Advancing a feminist foreign policy for the last 7 years because all people, regardless of their background, gender or identities, should benefit from equal participation in economic, political, social and cultural life.
• Promoting rights-based, open, and inclusive societies leads to a safer, more sustainable and prosperous world, which supports Canada’s own stability, security and prosperity.
• Proud of strong collaboration with civil society and Indigenous partners in developing a public statement on Canada’s feminist foreign policy. The paper, in process of finalization, will be an important milestone in Canada’s evolving feminist approach.

Supplementary Messages

• Our feminist foreign policy is the expression of ongoing, coordinated and whole-of-government efforts to advance human rights, diversity and inclusion, and gender equality across all of our international actions, including diplomacy, trade, security, development, and consular services. It is not only about what we do, but also how we do things differently.
• In implementing our Feminist International Assistance Policy, we have prioritized support for feminist movements and women’s rights organisations through our Women's Voice and Leadership Program and the Equality Fund, and contributed to improving women’s economic empowerment, and health and wellbeing, including sexual and reproductive rights.
• We are developing our third National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security and taking a whole-of-government approach to ensuring meaningful participation of diverse women in peace, security and humanitarian efforts.
• As part of our Trade Diversification Strategy, we are pursuing an inclusive approach to trade that aims to share benefits more widely and equitably, and helping women-led, Indigenous, visible minority, youth and 2SLGBTQI+-owned businesses expand into global markets.

Update

Discussions continue to take place with other countries that have avowed feminist foreign policies, and a coalition of likeminded partners, including civil society, is expanding. A public-facing policy paper articulating Canada’s feminist foreign policy approach is pending finalization and launch. ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ applied a feminist approach to the Future of Diplomacy: Transforming GAC initiative, through a GBA Plus approach at all stages, and ensuring the integration of a diversity of views and perspectives into both the analysis and outcomes of the process.  In March 2023, the Auditor General tabled a report critical of ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s ability demonstrate international assistance results in support of gender equality.

Supporting Facts and Figures

Canada’s feminist foreign policy is being implemented through a suite of complementary international policies including the Feminist International Assistance Policy; National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security; and Trade Diversification Strategy, with its Inclusive Approach to Trade. The department has achieved near-gender parity in its Heads of Mission abroad.

Duty of care (CBS and LES)

• As a responsible employer, Canada is committed to ensuring the health and safety of both its diplomatic Canada-Based Staff (CBS) and Locally-Engaged Staff (LES).
• While the duty of care towards LES typically applies to employees and work related risks controlled by the employer, the duty of care for CBS posted abroad extends to their dependants and the overall environment.
• This said, Global Affairs has established protocols to safeguard the well-being of all mission employees in times of crisis, including LES.

Supplementary Messages 

• In times of crisis, Missions factor LES safety in operational decision-making and adopt alternate work arrangements to limit exposure or movement while ensuring the continuity of operations. 

• To address the potential hardships faced by locally engaged employees, Global Affairs implements special emergency compensation measures (i.e. granting pay advances, payment in cash/hard currencies, etc..). These measures are designed to alleviate financial burdens and provide support to LES during periods of reduced operations or temporary suspension of operations.

• In addition to these compensation measures, GAC also ensures that LES have access to continued leave with pay, allowing them to take time off when necessary without compromising their income or employment status. This provision enables LES to attend to personal matters or deal with unforeseen circumstances while still receiving the necessary support from GAC.

• In addition, GAC takes into consideration the safety and well-being of LES in situation where operations are disrupted or security concerns arise.

• During crises in Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Sudan, GAC provided support to LES through compensation alleviation measures as well as safe work arrangements to ensure their wellbeing and safety. In coordination with Immigration, Refugee Citizenship Canada, some LES were relocated to a safe location.

Supporting Facts and Figures 

• Canada employs more than 5567 LES across more than 112 jurisdictions. 

• On average, they represent 40% of the overall workforce, and about 80% of a mission’s workforce.

• LES are subject to the labour, criminal and civil jurisdiction of host governments and may have to comply with national service requirements and border exit controls.

• Unlike CBS, LES do not have any diplomatic privileges and immunities. 

• While the duty of care towards LES typically applies to the employee and work-related risks controlled by the employer, the duty of care for CBS posted abroad extends to the dependants and the overall environment.

• Under ministerial direction, the department has at times provided evacuation support to LES in times of crisis, including more recently in Sudan.

Background 

• In August 2021, due to real threat to the life and safety of LES as a result of their employment with the Government of Canada, the Special Immigration Measures (SIM) program was established by IRCC to evacuate Afghan LES.  

• In other crisis such as Ethiopia, Ukraine and Haiti, LES have been provided with compensation alleviation measures as well as safe work arrangements to ensure their wellbeing and safety. These posts remain open with CBS presence.

• During the most recent crisis in Sudan, LES received compensation alleviation measures and were offered the option to be evacuated to a third safe country. This evacuation of the LES and their family members was carried out as a humanitarian gesture and was possible given a number of factors, such as the permission by the government of Kenya to allow them in the country, the fact that Canada organized its own flights and was able to include the relatively small number of LES working for the mission and their families, and the fact that Canada has a large embassy in Nairobi that could support them. (Note this information is confidential and cannot be disclosed publicly).

• The Government of Canada does not have a formal evacuation policy. It is currently developing one to establish clear parameters and eligibility criteria for potential evacuation, as well as seek relevant authorities, in consultation with other departments.

Locally engaged staff (LES)

• The Locally Engaged Staff (LES) are hired to work outside Canada in support of the delivery of the programs and services of the Government of Canada, provinces and partners abroad.
• The 5567 (March 31, 2023) strong workforce performs a wide variety of tasks and are employed by ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ according to local law, local market practice and operational requirements. Their knowledge of local languages, context and business networks contribute to the delivery of GoC’s programs and services abroad.

Supplementary Messages

• The LES are not governed by the same human resources legislative and policy framework as Canadian public servants. As such, a comprehensive review was initiated in late 2019 to update the various HR policy instruments that govern the management of this workforce, following the transfer of this responsibility to GAC. [REDACTED] Despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, all of the priorities identified in 2019 has either been successfully implemented (LES Classification Conversion, LES Employment and Staffing, LES Consultation, Global Review) or initiated (Benefits Modernization).
• GAC continues to support the GoC in its role as the employer of the LES by steadily refining the program’s framework and evolving requirements, as funding permits.

Supporting Facts and Figures (as at March 31, 2023)

• The 5567 LES represents approx. 80 % of our employees in Canada’s mission network.
• In accordance with the TBS Locally Engaged Staff Policy (1996), LES are employed by GAC as the delegated authority; however, only 75% of the LES workforce is involved in GAC led programs. Of the remaining 25% that are funded by other partners, IRCC holds the majority share (75%), followed by DND (4.5%) and CBSA (3.7%).
• In terms of individual program positions, common services have the largest share (35.5%), followed by IRCC (20.7), trade (11.8%), FPDS (7.4%), HOM supports (6.7%), Consular (6.6%), international assistance (3.2%), Common Service Delivery Points (2. 7%), and Locally Engaged Information Technology Program (1.4%) and Emergency Readiness (1.6%).

Background

The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has been delegated broad authority to manage all aspects of the Government of Canada’s LES program (classification, staffing, labour relations, compensation and benefits, etc.). The LES community represents about approximately 41.4% of GAC’s total workforce and approximately 80% of its staff in the 182 missions across 112 jurisdictions around the world.

Although LES are excluded from the Public Service Employment Act (PSEA), they constitute a vital building block of Canada’s presence abroad and their role has been evolving. The trend of increasing level of responsibility for the LES working in Canadian missions is reflected in the practice of most foreign ministries. The principles set by Treasury Board on the LES program, namely those of local law, local labour market and operational needs, mean that LES conditions of employment around the world are pegged to local labour market analysis.

In recognition of the need to provide good working conditions and an environment which promotes inclusion as well as competencies, GAC undertakes, on a regular basis, a review of key parameters governing the LES program. The 2019 LES HR Management Framework Reform began as an effort to update the 50-year-old framework to include alignment with broader Canadian public service principles, as well as to ensure coherence with Canada’s foreign policy priorities.

In spite of challenges introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of additional reference level increase, such priorities as those identified in the 2019 first Global LES Symposium (classification, governance and engagement) have been implemented. The key Employment and Staffing Directive as well as the Work Outside of Mission Premise Guidelines have been introduced in response to evolving workplace reality.

This, combined with a series of recent geopolitical crisis affecting mission operations, will continue to guide GAC’s ongoing efforts to develop the management framework, tools and strategies for the LES program.

Foreign Language Requirements

• Foreign language requirements of diplomatic positions at missions are rigorously assessed every 3 years.
• Arabic, Chinese, Japanese and Spanish skills are considered critical for the department.
• Foreign language requirements are integrated into the department’s HR framework.
• The FoD initiative recognized the need to enhance foreign language capacity of our staff.

Supplementary Messages

• The department determines foreign language requirements of positions abroad by assessing the impact of foreign language skills on the ability of officers to fulfil their functions effectively.
• Considering mission priorities, operations and functions, heads of mission determine the level of foreign language skills (intermediate or advanced) for each position and identify key positions where foreign language skills are indispensable.
• Foreign language requirements have remained stable across time and changes in requirements are aligned with changes in the priorities and operations of department.
• Foreign service officers receive foreign language training for durations ranging from a few months to 2 years before an assignment abroad, when necessary.

Supporting Facts and Figures

• Approximately a third of positions abroad (434) are currently designated as requiring an intermediate or advanced foreign language skills.
• Out of the positions requiring foreign language skills, 73% (315) require advanced skills and 27% (119) require intermediate skills.
• Out of the positions requiring foreign language skills, 21% (89) are senior foreign service officer positions (EX).
• 28% of foreign service officers meet the foreign language requirements of their position.
• 76% of foreign service officers in positions requiring foreign languages have proficiency in the foreign language to varying degrees.
• Out of the officers that require foreign language skills,
  • 45 (10%) are heads of mission;
  • 137 (32%) are political officers;
  • 116 (27%) are trade officers;
  • 93 (21%) are management and consular officers;
  • 24 (6%) are international assistance officers; and,
  • 19 (4%) are foreign service executive assistants.
• Out of the positions requiring foreign languages,
  • 33% (142) require Spanish
  • 16% (68) require Chinese
  • 9% (37) require Portuguese
  • 9% (37) require Arabic
  • 6% (27) require German
  • 5% (23) require Japanese
  • 4% (15) require Russian

Background

The Canadian Foreign Service Institute supports the development and maintenance of employees’ foreign language competency to allow them to fully demonstrate their international competencies abroad, including judgement in a global context, resilience and adaptability, influencing and alliance building, and intercultural proficiency.

Overall, an average of 575 employees benefit annually from all the programs of the Centre, including full-time acquisition, part-time acquisition and maintenance. The Centre also administers proficiency testing based on an internationally recognized scale and system, as well as Modern Language Aptitude Test (MLAT) testing, designed to predict the likelihood of success in learning a foreign language.

An average of 140 employees are assigned to full-time foreign language training of various durations in a given year, from a few months (e.g. Spanish) to a few years (e.g. Chinese).

The FoD initiative recognizes the need to increase foreign language capacity. This includes enhancing compliance rate for foreign language designated posts; incentivising the learning and retention of foreign languages; foreign language training for new foreign service recruits as part of their on-boarding, and placing more emphasis on language skills that meet organizational needs at HQ and at missions. 

Status of Amalgamation of DFAIT and CIDA

• As a result of the amalgamation of the former Canadian International Development Agency and the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, there is increased coherence and efficiency across development, diplomacy and trade streams.
• Joint initiatives across development, diplomacy and trade streams have led to results that could otherwise not have been achieved without cross-stream collaboration. For example, advancing the connections between humanitarian, development, and peace actions, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, strengthens collaboration and positive results across all three streams.
• Taking a feminist approach across business lines has positively impacted policy alignment and increased coherence in international programming and initiatives by ensuring that all voices are part of the conversation, reducing silos minimizing the potential for blind spots and facilitating decision-making by outlining key priorities areas.

Supplementary Messages

• Diplomacy plays a pivotal role in enabling coherence and offers the highest level of flexibility in terms of ability to collaborate with, support and create connections across other streams. Advocacy and bilateral relationships are central to delivering international strategies across all streams, making diplomacy critical to advancing Canadian priorities.

Supporting Facts and Figures

• As a result of amalgamation, there are improved bilateral and multilateral relationships, expanded and strengthened networks of influence, and an enhanced ability to understand and address complex issues that require a diversity of expertise.
• For example, we have seen increased efficiency and greater impact through cross-stream collaboration on the Canada-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement where streams leveraged each other’s expertise and networks in joint initiatives to further negotiation efforts through technical assistance, aid programming, diplomacy, bilateral relationship building and advocacy campaigns. Other examples include, Canada`s Response to the Rohingya Crisis, the COVID response, the Scholarships and Educational Exchanges for Development (SEED), and the development of an Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Background

In 2013, Canadian International Development Agency and the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade amalgamated to become ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ. Since amalgamation, the department has seen increased levels of coherence across the diplomacy, trade and development streams, which has facilitated Canada’s ability to adapt to global, complex and multifaceted challenges. Some examples include:

• Canada’s response to the war in Ukraine has involved constant collaboration and coordination between all streams and particularly between diplomacy and development.
• Canada’s participation in the global COVID response was facilitated by collaborative work done by the streams to address an export ban on pharmaceutical and personal protective equipment (PPE) imposed by India at the beginning of the COVID pandemic. The work performed by trade and diplomacy helped remove major barriers that would have had an impact on Canada’s response to the pandemic.

In order to further increase efficiency and effectiveness of Canada’s international engagement, ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ is conducting a series of four geographical coherence evaluations to assess the extent to which each geographical branch cooperates across trade, development and diplomacy. To date, the department has completed the evaluations of the Africa (WGM), Americas (NGM), and Asia Pacific (OGM) branches, and has recently begun the evaluation of the Europe, Arctic, Middle East & Maghreb (EGM) branch. A meta-analysis of coherence across the entire department is planned for 2024. Five key factors have been identified by the evaluations as enabling or impeding coherence; these include: Branch Leadership; Capacity & Expertise; Organizational Structure; Policy and Priority Alignment; and Corporate Systems.

Means and Measures to Diversify the Workforce at GAC

• Anti-racism, Reconciliation, Equity, Accessibility, Diversity and Inclusion are top priorities of GAC’s senior leaders to make the department a truly equitable, inclusive and diverse organization and workplace, at home and abroad, that reflects Canada’s culturally diverse society.
• GAC is developing and implementing additional strategies to attract, recruit, develop and retain a workforce at all levels that is representative of the Canadian population.
• GAC has made consistent progress in terms of representation and diversifying its workforce. There is still work to be done to address persistent gaps at all levels for specific groups such as Persons with Disabilities and at the executive level for Women, Black and Indigenous employees.

Supplementary Messages

• Women, Indigenous Peoples and Visible Minorities are three of the four equity groups under the Employment Equity Act. They are represented overall, but not equitably at all levels, at GAC. Persons with Disabilities are under-represented.
  • When disaggregated by group and level there is still underrepresentation for Indigenous, Black at the executive levels and Persons with Disabilities at all levels.
• Employment Equity Data (March 31, 2022) among Canada-Based Staff at ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ:
  • Women: 56.7% (Workforce availability: 56.2%)
  • Indigenous Peoples: 6.2% (Workforce availability: 3.5%)
  • Persons with Disabilities: 3.7% (Workforce availability: 9.1%)
  • Visible Minorities: 26.2% (Workforce availability: 15.8%)
    • Black employees: 4.8% (Labour Market Availability: 3.18%)
  • Increase in representation of all groups over the past 5 years, except for Indigenous Peoples (-0.3% in 21-22).
  • Since 2019, broader definition of Persons with Disabilities in the Census, hence the larger gap.
• To achieve better representation at all levels, GAC has taken concrete actions:
• In recruitment and hiring practices, GAC encourages Canadians across the country to join the department and solicits candidates from employment equity groups through targeted outreach activities.
• Employment equity (EE) and official languages (OL) organizational needs are also taken into account in hiring, promotions, and opportunities for career development.
• Human resources policies and practices are reviewed and evaluated regularly to identify potential systemic barriers.
  • For example, in collective exercises we engage in blind-screening, and we ensure diversity on hiring and promotion boards. A diverse selection board list has been created to ensure hiring managers can diversify the composition of selection committees.
  • At each gate of a recruitment or promotion process, we analyse EE and OL data to ensure that we can quickly remedy potential barriers in the process.
  • HSI will engage HFP in adding self-declaration to the FS selection process.
• GAC also participates in interdepartmental initiatives and programs to further develop leadership skills, such as: Mosaic Leadership Development Program and Sponsorship Programs.
• An Equity, Diversity and Inclusion action plan is being developed by Human Resources to address EE matters and equity-seeking groups’ needs, as well as a departmental Accessibility Action Plan. Both will be completed in Summer 2023.

• In September 2020, GAC established an Anti-Racism Secretariat (ARS) to lead the work on addressing systemic racism and racial discrimination within the department. The ARS was made a permanent unit in September 2022 and integrated into the Human Resources branch to build on synergies and efforts on employment equity and diversity, which is led within the branch.

• In October 2021, the department launched its Anti-Racism Strategy and Action Plan 2021-2026. The Strategy contains over 22 initiatives under three pillars of Representation at all levels, Career Development, and Anti-racism Training and Engagement. The strategy’s Performance Measurement Framework ensures that GAC is on track to deliver on Anti-Racism commitments and initiatives.

• GAC is implementing the Deputy Ministers Pilot Sponsorship program which aims to provide equitable career advancement opportunities for Indigenous peoples, Black and other racialized people, and persons with disabilities at the executive level. A total of ten protégés were selected as part of the pilot underway until summer 2023.

Rates of current vacancies at GAC

• As of March 31, 2023, the number of funded Canada-Based staff (CBS) positions is 8,646 (rotational and non-rotational positions).
• Of these 8,646 funded positions, 2,555 are rotational and 6,091 are non-rotational.
• 14% of the 2,555 rotational positions were vacant
• 20% of the 6,091 non-rotational positions were vacant

Supplementary Messages

• ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ is actively engaged in seeking new talent for the department in order to address vacancies. This includes recruitment into the Foreign Service but also traditional Public Service positions.
• Funded/budgeted position: A position for which funds are available in the branch reference levels.
• A vacant position means that there is no employee attached to the position.
  • A funded position that is empty and can be staffed indeterminately – does not belong to anybody and/or
  • A funded position vacant at the moment but belonging to an employee. The position is vacant because the person who owns this position is elsewhere currently. It can be staffed for the duration of the absence of the owner only. If not staffed temporarily, it is deemed “vacant with substantive attached”.
• Vacancy rate: Total number of funded vacant positions divided by the total number of funded positions (calculated at a certain point in time).
  • There is a number of employees, such as casuals, students, secondment in, Interchange Canada and any other employees, who are without a position in the Human Resources Management System (HRMS). Even if performing duties against a funded position, these employees are not accounted for in the vacancy rate calculation.

Canada’s Sanctions Regime

• The government remains committed to playing a leadership role in the preservation and strengthening of international rules – sanctions are a component of this approach.
• The government is judicious when it chooses to deploy sanctions and is committed to their effective and coordinated use, and implementation.

Supplementary Messages

• Autonomous sanctions are an important complement to our foreign policy tools, which include dialogue, capacity building, advocacy, multilateral engagement, and other diplomatic actions.
• Canada’s sanctions regime includes tools to mitigate risks associated with imposing sanctions. In addition to being targeted in their scope, they include exceptions and a permit process to reduce unintended consequences.
• Last June, Canada was the first G7 country to adopt new sanctions authorities to seize and forfeit assets in Canada belonging to sanctioned individuals and entities to demonstrate Canada’s leadership and commitment to maintaining pressure on the Russian regime and those who enable it. A first restraint of US$26 million believed to belong to Russian Oligarch Roman Abramovich was announced in December 2022.
• The Government commends the committee for its work in reviewing Canada’s autonomous sanctions legislation and looks forward to closely considering the report’s recommendations.

Responsive Points

• The Government of Canada is currently considering next steps to effect the forfeiture of this asset and is actively engaged in identifying potential assets that could be pursued under this new regime.

Update

Recent listings under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) include:

• In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, since February 24, 2022, we have imposed sanctions on: 1230 Russian individuals and 336 Russian entities; 85 Belarussian individuals and 52 Belarussian entities; and 257 Ukrainian individuals and 1 Ukrainian entity.
• In response to the multidimensional crisis in Haiti, since November 3, 2022, we have imposed sanctions on 19 individuals.
• In response to Iran's gross and systematic human rights violations, since October 3, 2022, Canada has imposed sanctions on 115 individuals and 31 entities. In total, since 2010, Canada has imposed sanctions on 156 individuals and 192 entities.

In December 2022, the Government announced the first restraint of an asset (worth
US$26 million) under SEMA’s new asset seizure and forfeiture authorities. The Government is carefully considering next steps, given the complexity and uniqueness of this regime in the international sanctions context. Work continues to identify other potential assets of sanctioned persons that could be pursued.  

Amendments are currently before Parliament (Bill C-47, Budget Implementation Act 2023) to further bolster our autonomous sanctions regimes to support more effective and efficient sanctions implementation. For example, proposed amendments provide more clarity on ownership and control of subsidiaries, affiliates and related companies of listed persons, improve Canada’s ability to list persons in third countries and strengthen information sharing between government departments implicated in sanctions enforcement. 

Supporting Facts and Figures

• Since the beginning of 2022, the government has imposed 77 rounds of SEMA sanctions (Belarus x6, Haiti x7, Iran x11, Myanmar x4, Russia x41, Sri Lanka x2, and Ukraine x6). Many were undertaken in coordination with likeminded countries, including Australia, EU, U.K. & U.S. The government has also implemented the UN Security Council Sanctions Resolution on Haiti in November 2022.

Background

SEMA allows Canada to impose sanctions on a foreign state, its individuals and entities in four situations: a grave breach of international peace and security; when an international organization calls on members to impose sanctions; human rights violations; or corruption. They can include a dealings ban on individuals/entities and restrictions on trade or financial transactions. Individuals listed in response to gross and systematic violations of human rights or acts of significant corruption are also rendered inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. To maximize effectiveness, Canada coordinates with other countries. There are SEMA sanctions on 15 countries.

The Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA) allows Canada to sanction foreign nationals responsible for or complicit in violations of human rights and acts of corruption. There are 70 individuals listed under the JVCFOA (see annex). Canadians are prohibited from dealing with these individuals, effectively freezing their Canadian assets. They are also inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

In June 2022, amendments were made to the SEMA and JVCFOA to allow for the seizure, forfeiture, disposal and redistribution of sanctioned assets. Proceeds generated from the sale of assets may be used for reconstruction of affected states, restoration of international peace and security, and compensation to victims.

In accordance with Section 16 of the JVCFOA, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA) published their five-year legislative review report on the SEMA and JVCFOA on May 16, 2023. ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ is currently reviewing this report, including its 19 recommendations.

Canada is legally required to implement sanctions imposed by the UNSC. These sanctions are implemented in Canada through regulations under the United Nations Act. Thirteen countries are subject to UN sanctions: Central African Republic, Mali, DRC, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, DPRK, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen.

Through targeted sanctions measures, the Government of Canada strives to minimize adverse consequences for civilians and for legitimate humanitarian businesses and activities. It also mitigates unintended humanitarian consequences of sanctions through legislated exceptions for certain activities, as well as through the permit and certificate processes.

Annex: Canadian autonomous sanctions listings

Special Economics Measures Act (SEMA)

• There are currently 3567 listings under SEMA:
  • Belarus - 245 individuals/entities
  • China - 5 individuals/entities
  • Haiti – 19 individuals
  • Iran - 348 individuals/entities
  • Myanmar – 158 individuals/entities
  • Nicaragua – 35 individuals/entities
  • Russia –1765 individuals/entities
  • South Sudan – 2 individuals
  • Sri Lanka – 4 individuals
  • Syria – 281 individuals/entities
  • Ukraine (Russian Invasion) – 502 individuals/entities
  • Venezuela – 96 individuals/entities
  • Zimbabwe – 81 individuals/entities
• Note: Canada also imposes broader SEMA sanctions on the DPRK and Libya.

Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA)

• There are currently 70 individuals listed under the JVCFOA:
  • 1 from Myanmar
  • 3 from South Sudan
  • 19 from Venezuela
  • 30 linked to murder of journalist Sergei Magnitsky
  • 17 linked to murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi

Indo-Pacific Strategy

• Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) signals Canada's intention to assume a more dynamic and engaged role in upholding a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.
• We announced an initial investment of nearly $2.3bn for new program initiatives and a reinforcement of our presence in the Indo-Pacific.
• GAC is working with 16 departments and agencies across the Government of Canada toward implementation of the 24 initiatives under the Strategy.

Supplementary Messages

• Canada’s IPS reflects a recognition that the future trajectory of the Indo-Pacific will have critical implications for Canada’s prosperity, security, public health and capacity to address climate change
• We are taking action to become a responsive partner of choice in the region - the recent appointment of Canada’s first Special Envoy for the region is one more step in this direction.
• ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ's transformation agenda- the outcome of the Future of Diplomacy initiative- aligns with the objectives of the IPS and will strengthen its implementation.

Update

Canada is in the process of securing funding for the various initiatives of its Indo-Pacific Strategy, launched in November 2022.  Early progress in implementation since the launch include several ministerial visits to the region (incl. your most recent visit in South Korea and the Philippines), strategic dialogues with Indo-Pacific partners (India, South Korea, the U.S.), the announcement of the first Indo-Pacific Agriculture and Agri-Food Office (December 2022), the official launch of Canada Trade Team missions to the Indo-Pacific (in Singapore in February 2023), and the deployment of the HCMS Montréal to the region as part of the “Enhanced Defense Capacity” initiative (March 2023). The announcement of Ian Mackay as Canada’s first Special Envoy for the Indo-Pacific is one step further in that direction (April 2023).

Supporting Facts and Figures

• The Indo-Pacific region is home to nearly 60% of the world’s population,
• It represents more 1/3 of global economic activity, which is expected to grow to 50% by 2040.
• A number of flashpoints threaten regional security and stability, including tensions in the East and South China Seas, on the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and along the India-China border.
• It is the world’s most disaster-prone region and is greatly impacted by climate change. It accounts for 53% of global CO₂
• The IPS funds 24 initiatives, involving 16 ministry and agencies across the GoC, as well as FinDev Canada and the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
• 16 countries and organizations have already adopted regional frameworks for the Indo-Pacific: Australia (2013), Japan (updated in 2023), U.S. (updated in 2022), India (2018), France (updated in 2022), ASEAN (2019), Germany (2020), Netherlands (2020), the UK (updated in 2023), New Zealand (2021); the EU (2021), Italy (2022), the Czech Republic (2022), the IORA (2022), Canada (November 2022), South Korea (December 2022).

Foreign Interference

• We take any threats to our democracy very seriously.
• We respond to foreign interference through various measures—including diplomatic responses, proactive engagement with our partners, and preventative efforts—to protect our institutions and uphold Canadians’ confidence in our elections.
• My team will continue to take coordinated action with other departments and international partners to protect and strengthen democracy, human rights, and the rule of law at home and abroad.

Supplementary Messages

• Canada is taking a whole-of-government approach to assess and address foreign interference, which represents a significant danger to Canada’s sovereignty and social fabric. GAC is working with Public Safety Canada and the S&I community to ensure counter-FI efforts are aligned with Canadian foreign policy.
• Allegations of foreign interference by foreign agents are taken very seriously, and any targeting of Canadians by foreign actors will not be tolerated.
• GAC’s authorities enable the department to respond to foreign interference notably by carefully managing Canada’s diplomatic and consular relations with foreign states, implementing Canada’s sanctions and import/export regime, and working in collaboration with national security agencies.
• Overall, GAC’s work to counter foreign interference is proactive and multifaceted. It includes: monitoring disinformation and countering threats to democracy under the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), RRM Canada’s participation in the SITE taskforce (where it acts as an early warning system for potential incidents during General Elections), and conducting international engagement on cyber threats.
• GAC also regularly works with likeminded partners to share best practices and lessons learned and addresses foreign interference and other hostile activities directed at Canada by our adversaries through diplomatic channels.
• Independent investigations on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol found the ‘19 and ‘21 elections were free and fair.
• The government will address recommendations made by the two external review bodies and the Independent Special Rapporteur to further protect Canada’s democratic institutions from foreign interference, once available.

Supporting Facts and Figures

• During the 2019 and 2021 elections, the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol did not observe any activity threatening a free and fair election that passed the threshold to alert the public.
• Since its establishment in 2018, Canada has led the G7 RRM to better understand and address foreign threats to democracy. Budget 2022 announced permanent funding of $13.4M for the RRM and $2.8M ongoing.
• During the 2019 and 2021 elections, GAC officials from RRM Canada provided open-source assessments of potential foreign interference in the Canadian information environment to national security agencies through the Security and Intelligence Threats to Election (SITE) Task Force.

• On 6 March 2023, the Prime Minister announced three separate probes to investigate alleged foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections. The three assessments are expected to be completed in the fall of 2023.
• On 23 May 2023, the Independent Special Rapporteur released his first report, concluding that although “a further public process is required to address issues relating to foreign interference… there should not and need not be a separate Public Inquiry.”

Advancing Human Rights and Democracy

• In the face of growing global threats to human rights and fundamental freedoms that form the cornerstone of Canada’s democracy, we have reinforced and sought out leadership opportunities to promote and protect these rights and values both at home and abroad.
• As a multicultural, multi-faith and inclusive society, Canada is well-positioned to champion the values of inclusive and accountable governance, peaceful pluralism and respect for diversity and human rights.
• We are regarded as innovative in the sphere of democracy protection, for example through the creation of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM). We need to continue to seek out ways to engage with a greater diversity of countries and communities to harness ideas and contribute to global efforts to advance our democracy and human rights agenda to meet the current threat environment and foster a more resilient democracy.
• In a digital era, this means continuing to enhance our approaches so that we also have the capacity to advocate for the protection and promotion of human rights and democratic values both offline and online, including by establishing norms to safeguard information integrity online.

Supplementary Messages

• Through leadership in emerging thematic global coalitions, Canada is advancing important international discussions that have been traditionally difficult to address in bilateral or multilateral settings.
• For example, to protect and promote democracy, Canada chaired International IDEA and the Freedom Online Coalition in 2022, will continue as co-Chair of the Media Freedom Coalition until July 2023, and is the current Chair of the Community of Democracies for 2023. Areas of focus for our chairships have included disinformation and the resilience of democracy, including the resilience of democratic institutions, of civil society, and of women engaged in political participation.
• Canada also leads the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism on an ongoing basis to enhance collaboration and responses to foreign threats to democracy.
• The promotion and protection of human rights is an integral part of Canada’s engagement multilaterally. Within UN bodies, Canada has taken a leadership role on a wide range of human rights issues, including as the lead on resolutions with cross-regional support, such as the situation of human rights in Iran; the elimination of violence against women; child, early and forced marriage, which we co-lead with Zambia; and freedom of expression, which we co-lead with the Netherlands.
• Canada also recognizes and applauds the key role human rights defenders play in advancing human rights, often at great risk to themselves and their loved ones. Voices at Risk: Canada’s Guidelines on Supporting Human Rights Defenders offer practical advice, tools and resources to Canadian diplomats at home and abroad on support for human rights defenders.
• On May 9th, the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced Canada’s candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council, for the 2028-2030 term. As a Member of the Council, Canada aims to support the vital and courageous work of human rights defenders; strive for a more inclusive future for all; advance reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples; prioritize gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in all their diversity; reduce harm online; and work with others to address the adverse impacts of climate change.

Supporting Facts and Figures

• GAC’s Pro-Dem Fund provides over $16M per year in agile and flexible programming dedicated to promoting and protecting democracy in ODA and non-ODA countries. This funding addresses challenges to democratic values, threats to human rights defenders and at-risk actors, exclusion of marginalized and vulnerable minorities, including women and girls, and digital risks to human rights.
• GAC’s spending on inclusive governance projects totaled $300.4M or 5% of total international assistance in FY 2021/22. This is similar to previous years but continues a downward trend since 2010. For comparison, spending in FY08/09 was $474 million (or 15% of total international assistance).
• In calendar year 2021, Canada ranked 12^th after the US, Germany, the EU, France, Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, Norway, and Denmark in ODA democratic governance spending.
• Additional resources and action are needed to address growing challenges to democracy and to be a more effective partner alongside our allies. Canada requires a renewed democracy approach with investments to modernize and strengthen our toolkit to protect and promote democracy internationally.
• In Budget 2022 GAC received $13.4M over five years and $2.8M ongoing to continue leading the G7RRM.

Background

Canada is confronting growing global challenges to democratic governance and pushback against accepted human rights principles. Anti-democratic regimes are undermining human rights norms and challenging UN institutions. Meanwhile emerging global pressures – migration, COVID-19, climate change, emerging tech, and counter-terrorism – have human rights dimensions that risk undermining democratic institutions. In this context, allies and civil society look to Canada for leadership, especially on gender equality. In response, Canada is placing the promotion of democracy and human rights at the core of our feminist foreign policy.

Championing human rights is a shared endeavour. Canada meaningfully engages with other countries and civil society, and actively participates in the rules-based international system, to advance human rights worldwide and call on all states to adhere to their human rights obligations. Within UN bodies, Canada has taken a leadership role on a wide range of human rights issues, including as the lead on resolutions with cross-regional support, such as the situation of human rights in Iran; the elimination of violence against women; child, early and forced marriage, which we co-lead with Zambia; and freedom of expression, which we co-lead with the Netherlands.

Our multilateral and bilateral initiatives on human rights engagement functions in lockstep with engagement on democracy and digital policy. Canada is at the international forefront of actively protecting democracy through its leadership of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, the Media Freedom Coalition, and the Community of Democracies, and ongoing engagement in the Freedom Online Coalition, International IDEA, and various capacity-building projects.

The governance of digital technologies has also become a critical area of foreign policy, with significant implications for the future of democracy, the international rules based system and the development agenda. Currently, Canada and the Netherlands are working to develop and launch a Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online that will be a concrete step towards the development of international norms for addressing information integrity online, that is rooted in respect for human rights.  Canada’s 2022 Chairship of the Freedom Online Coalition contributed to advancing our vision of democracy in the digital age, which begins with digital inclusion. In this role, we issued a on Russian state-sponsored disinformation in Ukraine,a to address Internet shutdowns in Iran, and   launched the social media campaign, with an audience of 13 million in over 50 countries. Canada also supports civil society partners, including a $2 million project to the World Benchmarking Alliance. GAC continues to work with ISED to create a Digital Policy Task Force and position Canada as a global leader in the digital domain.  

Canada has led the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism on an ongoing basis since its establishment in 2018 out of the G7 Charlevoix Summit. Through the G7 RRM, we work with our G7 partners to strengthen our collective understanding of foreign threats to democracy and our respective capacities to counter these threats.

Export Controls - General

• Canada has one of the strongest export controls systems in the world, and respect for human rights is enshrined in our legislation.
• All export permit applications are reviewed against a robust risk assessment framework, including the criteria of the Arms Trade Treaty.
• As Minister of Foreign Affairs, I must deny export permit applications for military items if I determine there is a substantial risk that the export would result in a serious violation of human rights, amongst other criteria.

Supplementary Messages

• Export permit applications are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine the intended end use and end-user, among other factors.
• Permits will also be denied if there is a substantial risk the item could be used in serious acts of gender-based violence or related to terrorism.
• Canada will take appropriate action in response to the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology, regardless of destination.

Update

On May 31, 2023, Canada’s 2022 Report on the Export of Military Goods was tabled in Parliament. Notably, the report indicates that the top ten non-U.S. destinations by value for military exports were Saudi Arabia, Germany, United Kingdom, Poland, India, Qatar, Ukraine, South Korea, Australia, and France. Since 2019, export controls have received sustained public, media and parliamentary attention. In February 2022, export controls restrictions were amongst the first measures announced by the Prime Minister following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Supporting Facts and Figures (2022 data)

• The department assesses approximately 5,000 export permit applications annually, of which half were destined for Europe in 2022.
• Canada’s exports of military goods to non-U.S. destinations amounted to $2.122 billion, compared to $2.731 and $1.966 billion in 2021 and 2020.
• Saudi Arabia was the largest non-U.S. export destination by value (approximately 54% of the total value of the non-U.S. military exports, compared to 64% in 2021), largely on account of the GDLS-C LAV contract with Saudi Arabia.
• The report also includes information on the value of military goods and technology exported to:
• China - $0 (compared to $1,000.00 in 2021) – 4 permit applications were also denied;
• Peru - $560,517.38 (compared to $2,700.00 in 2021);
• Israel - $21,329,783.93 (compared to $26,092,288.99 in 2021).
• Canada issued 24 permits to Ukraine and 19 permits were utilized. Separately, the Government of Canada made a number of equipment donations to Ukraine, some of which were not subject to export controls.

Background

Export and brokering controls are meant to ensure that exports of controlled items are conducted in a manner that is consistent with Canada’s foreign and defence policies and national security, and are not meant to unnecessarily hinder international trade. Most items are controlled for export further to Canada’s commitments in the four main multilateral export control regimes.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

• Canada is strongly committed to working with partners to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. We are not a signatory to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which is incompatible with our NATO commitments.
• That said, we share common ground with Treaty supporters in our efforts to accelerate the very slow pace of global nuclear disarmament.
• Through concrete initiatives with a variety of states, Canada is taking meaningful steps towards the goal of achieving global nuclear disarmament.

Supplementary Messages

• Canada’s policy is rooted in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the cornerstone of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We are committed to advancing full implementation of the Treaty.
• To this end, Canada has focused its efforts on: banning nuclear testing, building disarmament verification capabilities, ending production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and strengthening accountability, transparency, and inclusion in Treaty implementation.
• In May 2023, G7 Leaders issued the Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament reaffirming our commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, with undiminished security for all.

Background

The lack of meaningful progress on nuclear disarmament led a number of states to negotiate, at the United Nations, a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). None of the nuclear weapon possessing states, nor any NATO ally, took part in the negotiations (except the Netherlands, under a parliamentary mandate). Likewise, none of these states have signed the Treaty.

The TPNW entered into force in 2021. It prohibits the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, use or threat to use nuclear weapons. The Treaty also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory and the provision of assistance to any state in the conduct of prohibited activities.

The first TPNW Meeting of States Parties was held in June 2022 under Austrian chairpersonship (unlike some other NATO allies, Canada did not attend as an observer). As of May 2023, the Treaty has 68 states parties while a further 27 states have signed but not yet ratified.

The TPNW is inconsistent with Canada’s membership in NATO, which relies on nuclear deterrence as a core aspect of its collective security. Civil society actively advocates for Canada to join the Treaty. Opposition parties (notably the NDP) have also pressed the Government on the issue. While Canada does not support the Treaty, it shares the underlying concerns about the very slow progress of disarmament.

A steadfast supporter of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), Canada has long supported a step-by-step approach to disarmament – one that would halt the spread of nuclear weapons, reduce existing stockpiles, and irreversibly eliminate these weapons. Such measures include the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, building capacity for disarmament verification, expanding arms control to states like China, and commencing long-overdue negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

To uphold the NPT’s credibility and advance its implementation, Canada has also long championed more transparency, accountability of nuclear weapons states, and inclusion of civil society and underrepresented groups.

Recent Diplomatic Engagement with China

• The Indo-Pacific Strategy provides a clear framework for how we will engage China over the long-term.
• Canada will continue to seek frank and open dialogue with China, and maintain open channels of communication at all levels, to ensure clarity about our respective positions.
• Canada will challenge China when we ought to, and co-operate with China when we are able to.

Supplementary Messages

• Foreign interference: Diplomats in Canada have been warned that if they engage in foreign interference, they will be sent home. After careful consideration, Canada decided to declare persona non grata Mr. Zhao Wei, who held the position of Consul at the Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in Toronto.
• Taiwan: We continue to oppose unilateral actions that threaten the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
• Russia-Ukraine: We continue to impress upon China the necessity of playing a more constructive role to end Russia’s brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine.
• Human rights: Canada continues to engage the Chinese government at the highest levels regarding the human rights situation in Xinjiang, where credible accounts of human rights abuse and crimes against humanity are well documented.
• Nova Scotia Lobster Exports: Canadian fresh and chilled seafood exporters rely on air cargo to ship their products to market, and Canada is currently assessing how additional commercial Canada-China flights could be added to the market in a manner that offers an equitable and competitive operating environment for both countries’ airlines. Canada has been firm that an increase in the level of air services must be done in a fair and balanced manner. Canada will always work hard to defend our interests and to deliver outcomes that benefit Canadians.

Update

On May 8, 2023, Canada announced that Chinese diplomat Zhao Wei had been declared persona non grata for interfering in Canadian politics. On May 9, 2023, China’s MFA announced that it would expel diplomat Jennifer Lalonde from Canada’s consulate-general in Shanghai in response.

On March 15, 2023, PM Trudeau announced the appointment of former governor-general David Johnston as the Independent Special Rapporteur to help protect the integrity of Canada’s democracy. In his first report, released on May 23, the ISR concluded that Canada’s 2019 and 2021 elections had not been jeopardized, but that there is scope for better information (intelligence) sharing across government.

The all-party National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) will also investigate foreign interference in federal elections, while the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) will examine how investigations into Chinese election meddling have been handled by national-security agencies. The ISR will also oversee the investigations of these two bodies.

Public Safety Canada concluded consultations on a foreign agent registry on May 9, 2023.

Budget 2023 also established a National Counter-Foreign Interference Coordinator and Office within Public Safety Canada, and allocated increased funding to the RCMP to help protect Canadians against harassment and intimidation from authoritarian regimes.

Minister Joly held an informal meeting with PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang on the margins of the G20 Foreign Ministers Meeting on March 2, 2023. This was Minister Joly’s first interaction with Foreign Minister Qin following his appointment on December 30, 2022. They discussed bilateral relations, consular issues, the incident of the Chinese surveillance balloon over North American airspace, the war in Ukraine, and alleged Chinese interference in Canadian elections. Minister Joly told Minister Qin that Canada would never tolerate any form of foreign interference in our democracy and internal affairs.

Before that, her last interaction with former PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi took place on the margins of the G20 Summit on November 15, 2022, during which she raised the war in Ukraine, North Korea, COP15, and alleged Chinese foreign interference.

Supporting Facts and Figures

• Budget 2023 allocated $13.5 million over five years to establish a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office at Public Safety, with oversight for economic security as well as what is viewed as more traditional foreign interference, such as harassment and intimidation. $48.9 million was allocated to the RCMP over three years to help protect Canadians against harassment and intimidation from authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, and Iran.
• First Catch, a Chinese export company, spent $9 million on its own lobster handling facilities at Halifax airport's new Air Cargo Logistics Park, where it is an anchor tenant with a 25-year lease. First Catch’s facilities are generally not available for use by other shippers and freight forwarders. Some lobster exporters have complained that they have limited options to ship live lobster from Halifax, and have to carry cargo over ground to ship it from airports in Moncton or New York.
• Nearly 16,000 tonnes of lobster — valued at $293 million — moved through Halifax Stanfield in 2022, according to the airport. First Catch represented about 14% of the exports.
• PRC Ministry of Commerce Vice Minister Wang Shouwen visited Canada on February 16-17. He held a bilateral meeting with DMT/Rob Stewart, and had a brief pull-aside with USS/David Morrison. This was the first bilateral visit to Canada by a senior PRC official since the release of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor.
• China is Canada’s third largest merchandise export market (*second largest bilateral), with 4.3% of total exports in 2022, well behind the U.S. (90.3%) and just behind the EU-27 (5.4%). In 2022, Canada’s exports to China totaled $28.7 billion, 2% higher than 2021. Imports from China totaled $100.0 billion in 2022, 16.4% higher than 2021. Canada’s trade deficit with China ($71.4 billion) in 2022 was 23.3% higher than 2021.
• According to a December 2021 poll by the Angus Reid Institute, only one-in-six (16%) Canadians say they hold favourable views of China. Three-quarters of Canadians want Canada to prioritize human rights and the rule of law in dealings with China. A November 2022 poll from Nanos Research found that more than 84 percent of Canadians believe that China has a negative influence on world affairs.

Canada’s Engagement with Africa

• Canada’s engagement in and with Africa is robust but we can do better to ensure we are fit for purpose in a rapidly changing African context.
• On the diplomatic engagement front, progress is being made, including several unprecedented high-level meetings between Canada and the African Union Commission, more ministerial-level visits to the continent – including my recent trip to Kenya – and an expanding diplomatic footprint.
• I have asked my Parliamentary Secretary Rob Oliphant to explore how to bolster Canada’s foreign policy engagement in Africa.

Supplementary Messages

• Engagement with Africa is multi-faceted. As we work to strengthen our foreign policy engagement in Africa, strides are being made with the development of a Canada-Africa Economic Cooperation Strategy, which is part of Minister Ng’s portfolio, and mandated by the Prime Minister. And the Feminist International Assistance Policy commits 50% of our bilateral funding to Sub-Saharan Africa.
• We are also establishing a dedicated mission and Permanent Observer to the AU in Addis Ababa (nomination pending).

Update

On May 16, MINA received official correspondence from Senator Amina Gerba about the implications of pursuing an engagement “framework” rather than “strategy”. On May 17, a Canadian Press article titled “Liberals downgrade Africa strategy to framework, but insist continent is a priority” was published by multiple Canadian news outlets. The article echoed similar questions posed to Minister Sajjan at the House Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (May 2).

Supporting Facts and Figures

• In Canada, almost 1.4 million people are of African origin, with approximately 66% first generation (2021 census).
• 60% of Africa’s population is under the age of 25, making Africa the youngest continent in the world.
• Africa is set to outperform rest of the world in economic growth in 2023 and 2024.
• Nine of Africa’s 35 Low-Income Countries are in or at high risk of debt distress.
• The African continent represents 54 UN votes.
• Canada has 21 embassies and high commissions in Africa.
• There are 14 Canadian Senior Trade Commissioners (STCs) in Africa and 40+ locally engaged TCs, serving 54 markets.
• Canadian international assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has risen by 54% in four years to $3.58B (2021-22).
• In 2021-22, Canada’s international assistance to Africa totalled $3.6 billion or 43.4% of Canada’s total international assistance spending.
• On Africa Day (May 25, 2023) the Prime Minister announced Canada’s support for the AU’s membership in the G20.
• Canada provides financial support to five UN peace missions and has deployed personnel to three of them.

Background

In spring 2022, Minister Joly mandated Parliamentary Secretary Oliphant (PSA) to develop a strategy to strengthen Canada’s engagement with Africa and to improve the delivery of Canada’s foreign policy towards Africa. PSA has consulted various stakeholders, which garnered interest from the media, diaspora, academia and others.

Under the leadership of Minister Ng, public consultations for the development of a Canada-Africa Economic Cooperation Strategy (CA-ECS) were launched in May 2023 to identify the priorities of Canadian companies and investors, as well as those of African partners. The CA-ECS will examine support for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), trade and investment, and partnerships in research and innovation.

ATIP Protected Background

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Sudan

• Canada continues to call for an end to violence, and urges all parties to engage in mediation efforts supported by regional partners that promote dialogue and a lasting peace.
• It is vital that the voices of Sudanese civilians and civil society are taken into account, including political groups, peacebuilders, women and the press.
• We stand with the people of Sudan in their demand for a peaceful and democratic future.

Supplementary Messages

• Canada continues to respond to critical needs through experienced humanitarian partners both inside Sudan and in neighbouring countries.
• On May 3, Canada announced over $71M in humanitarian assistance funding to UN, Red Cross and other NGO partners in Sudan ($30.7M), South Sudan ($31.1M) and the Central African Republic ($10M) to help address life-saving needs of crisis-affected populations. We are exploring options for providing additional assistance, as appropriateUpdate

The U.S. and Saudi-Arabia are leading talks in Jeddah between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), brokering several ceasefire agreements which have not held. The latest seven-day ceasefire was announced on May 20, and entered into force May 22. Unlike its predecessors, this agreement includes provision for a monitoring committee composed of representatives of the U.S. and Saudi-Arabia, and of each of the belligerent forces. On May 26, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia issued a joint statement indicating that while there had been clashes earlier in the week, the fighting has lessened and humanitarian actors were able to begin delivering urgent medical supplies. 

Supporting Facts and Figures

• Through the Government of Canada’s evacuation flights, nearly 540 people have been evacuated out of Sudan, including approximately 175 Canadians and permanent residents.
• In 2022, Canada’s humanitarian assistance funding supported partners in reaching over 6.9 million people with food assistance, helped deliver essential health services to 6.3 million people, assisted in the provision of critical water, sanitation and hygiene interventions for more than 4.3 million people, and facilitated the delivery of protection services to 2 million vulnerable people.
• At the onset of 2023, an estimated 3.7 million people in Sudan were internally displaced, and the country hosted close to 1 million refugees from neighbouring countries.
• In 2021-2022, Canada’s bilateral international assistance to Sudan delivered through trusted partners totalled $60.5 million.

Background

On April 15, a military confrontation began between the SAF led by Lt. General al-Burhan who is concurrently Head of State, and the RSF, led by General Hemedti. More than 800 people have been killed. The conflict is exacerbating existing needs both within Sudan and in neighbouring countries already experiencing their own humanitarian crises, as close to 300,000 people have been displaced across borders. There are multiple players in the mediation space. Canada supports the inclusion of civil society in efforts to end the current violence and to reach durable and sustainable peace and a civilian-led transition. 

Ukraine - International Security, Humanitarian and Development Programming

• Canada’s security, humanitarian and development assistance to Ukraine is an investment in a more stable, democratic and accountable world.
• Canada’s support aims for the greatest impact in response to Ukraine’s evolving needs.
• Russia’s invasion has weaponized sectors like food, energy, and information. Canada’s programming mitigates impacts on the most vulnerable populations, in Ukraine and worldwide.

Supplementary Messages

• Canada’s support is part of our commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.
• Canada’s development support is true to our core principles of inclusive governance, growth that works for everyone, and gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.
• Canada closely coordinates our security, humanitarian, and development support with G7 and other partners.
• Canada’s assistance supports international and Ukrainian institutions to pursue justice for war crimes and other violations of international law.

Supporting Facts and Figures

From January 2022 to March 2023, including through Budget 2023, GAC has committed $352.5 million in humanitarian assistance, $127 million in development assistance, and over $102 million in security and stabilization assistance to support Ukraine. 

Canada’s humanitarian assistance is aligned with the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan and includes support for emergency health interventions, protection services, and essentials such as shelter, water, sanitation, and food. Canada has also committed $127 million in development assistance funding, including $52 million for grain storage and $35 million to support Ukraine’s government and civil society.

Canada’s over $102 million in security and stabilization programming supports civil society and human rights organizations, the security sector, mine action, accountability for human rights violations, including conflict-related and sexual violence, and countering Russian disinformation.

Current Situation in Israel / West Bank / Gaza

• Canada is strongly committed to the goal of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, including the creation of a Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel. 
• Our position remains that this can only be achieved through direct negotiations between the parties. 
• Canada will continue to raise concerns about unilateral actions, which are unhelpful to the cause of peace.

Supplementary Messages

• Canada is concerned by the rise in violence in Israel and the West Bank and welcomes all efforts that can help bring the parties back to the negotiating table.
• Our longstanding position is to support a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Update

Canada has expressed concerns with the rise in violence and inflammatory rhetoric in Israel and the West Bank, as well as unilateral actions taken by both parties that have exacerbated tensions. In May, Canada welcomed the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire which ended five days of conflict between Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Israel. In February, Canada condemned the Israeli government’s announcement of its intention to authorize illegal outposts and expand housing in existing settlements. In January, Canada expressed concern following the Israeli government’s levying of financial sanctions against the Palestinian Authority. Canada supports efforts to create space for direct dialogue between the parties.

Supporting Facts and Figures

• You spoke with Israeli Foreign Minister Cohen and Palestinian Foreign Minister Malki in March 2023 to express concern about the rise in violence and reiterate Canada’s support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
• Canada has a substantial program of assistance to help meet the development and humanitarian needs of vulnerable Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinian refugees in the region. This support contributes to advance the peace process, promote security and the rule of law, and stimulate economic growth.
• Canada has contributed over $90 million towards UNRWA over the last three years (2020 to 2022). This support allows UNRWA to deliver education, social services, health care, and emergency assistance to meet the needs of Palestinian refugees.

Background

Prospects for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have diminished over the past several years, with no formal negotiations taking place since 2014. Mutual distrust and competition on all sides has limited the ability and willingness of the parties to return to direct negotiations.

The current Israeli coalition government under Benjamin Netanyahu was sworn in on December 29, 2022. There have been no elections for the Palestinian Authority (PA) since 2006; the administration run by President Abbas suffers from low popular support. Relations between the new Israeli government and the PA have deteriorated in light of some statements made by Netanyahu’s coalition members and recent actions taken by the new government against the PA.

In Gaza, recurrent violence, severe restrictions on the movement of people and goods, limited economic growth, poor governance, damaged infrastructure, and poverty continue to erode the population’s resilience. Hamas, the de-facto authority in Gaza since 2006, has increased its rhetoric and conducted rocket attacks on Israel, as has the PIJ. The situation remains volatile, with a constant risk of a return to violence.

Actions Taken Against Iran / IRGC

• Canada works closely with its allies to hold the Iranian regime responsible for its systematic human rights violations and support for terrorism.
• Since October 2022, Canada has imposed 11 rounds of new sanctions targeting all levels of Iran’s security, intelligence and economic apparatus under the Special Economic Measures Act.
• On November 14, Canada designated Iran under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), as a regime that has engaged in terrorism and systematic human rights violations. This designation means that thousands of members of the regime, including many members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), are now inadmissible to Canada.

Supplementary Messages

• Canada continues to be a leader in imposing costs on the Iranian regime for its gross and systematic human rights violations.
• Since October 2022, Canada has implemented eleven rounds of sanctions against 115 Iranian individuals and 31 entities who have participated in gross and systematic human rights violations, including the persecution of women, spreading disinformation, threats against international peace and security and supplying lethal drones to Russia for use in its illegal war against Ukraine.
• Since 2012, Iran has been designated as a state supporter of terrorism under Canada’s State Immunity Act (SIA), which allows civil actions to be taken against Iran under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.
• Canada lists the IRGC-Qods Force, which is Iran’s primary mechanism for supporting terrorist groups abroad, as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code.
• Canada also lists a number of proxies that have benefited from the Qods Force’s and the Iranian state’s patronage, including Hizballah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, and three Iran-backed regional militias.
• Furthermore, at the United Nations General Assembly, in December 2022, for the 20^th consecutive year, Canada led the successful adoption of the resolution on the situation of human rights in Iran, keeping the global spotlight on the Iranian regime’s human rights abuses.
• Canada is also deeply concerned about Iran’s continued enrichment of uranium to near weapons-grade and its lack of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on important nuclear issues.
• We have joined with many in the international community that have called on Iran to stop its nuclear violations and restore its nuclear commitments and obligations. Canada supports diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s escalation of nuclear activities, including efforts to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) if that remains possible. In support of this important mandate of the IAEA, Canada has been a leading voluntary contributor to the IAEA’s monitoring and verification efforts of Iran’s nuclear program ($21M since 2014).

Saudi Arabia

• Agreement to fully restore bilateral relations represents a welcome development and illustrates our two countries’ willingness to engage in open diplomatic lines of communication.
• Having an ambassador in place in Riyadh will further facilitate the promotion of core Canadian interests, such as human rights, regional and international security, trade opportunities, energy and food security and climate action.

Supplementary Messages

• (Responsive - if asked about human rights): We remain concerned about the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia. Normalizing the relationship allows us to engage with Saudi Arabia on issues related to human rights in a more comprehensive and sustained manner.

Supporting Facts and Figures

• Canada has nominated Jean-Philippe Linteau as ambassador to Saudi Arabia.
• Saudi Arabia achieved a significant 8.7% growth in its gross domestic product in 2022, the highest growth rate among all G20 countries. Saudi Arabia was Canada’s most important two-way trading partner in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for 2022, and 23rd globally.
• Merchandise trade between Canada and Saudi Arabia in 2022 was approximately $5.1 billion, with $1.3 billion exports and $3.8 billion imports.
• Key sectors of interest include health and life sciences, education, defence and security, energy (including renewables), mining, infrastructure and finance.

Background

Bilateral Dispute: Bilateral relations were fractured after the downgrading of relations by Saudi Arabia on August 5, 2018, in reaction to a series of tweets by then-Foreign Minister Freeland and Global Affairs calling for the immediate release of detained human rights activists. PM Trudeau and Saudi PM and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit on November 18, 2022, and expressed a mutual desire to restore diplomatic relations. On May 24, 2023, it was publicly announced that Canada and Saudi Arabia agreed to fully restore diplomatic relations, starting with the exchange of ambassadors. This includes an end to all punitive measures instituted by Saudi Arabia, including the Saudi Royal Proclamation of August 6, 2018, which prohibited new business with Canada and cancelled all existing business transactions.  Canada had taken no punitive measures against Saudi Arabia in response to the downgrading of relations.

Geopolitical context: Saudi Arabia has increased its engagement and diplomatic efforts to work towards greater regional stability and security. This has been reflected in the recent Chinese-brokered agreement with Iran to restore relations and the push to readmit Syria in the Arab League, and to mediate prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and Russia. KSA has also been involved in peace talks in Yemen and has played a significant role to try to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Sudan. These ventures have also highlighted a hedging strategy from KSA, partly response to a perceived U.S. pullback from the region, but also as a reaction to a growing political, economic and military involvement from other powers like Russia and China.

Arms sales/export controls: In 2020, officials from ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ completed a review of arms exports to Saudi Arabia in order to carefully assess whether military goods exported to Saudi Arabia would be used in a manner consistent with the Arms Trade Treaty and Canada’s domestic legislation. This review concluded that exports authorized to date, and exports proposed under permit applications received and assessed to date, were not at substantial risk of being used in contravention of Canadian law or ATT criteria.

Human Rights: While modernization efforts and reforms are unfolding and have improved the human rights situation, notably in regards to women’s economic empowerment, the KSA remains an absolute monarchy with significant restrictions, especially in relation to political freedom and tolerance of dissent.

Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict

• Canada supports a comprehensive, negotiated political solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the continuation of dialogue between the parties.
• Canada continues to urge Azerbaijan to reopen the Lachin Corridor and ensure freedom of movement.
• Canada supports measures to stabilize the situation and encourages continued progress in the dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
• Canada welcomes the efforts of the European Union and the United States in bringing the parties together and assisting them to build mutual confidence.

Supplementary Messages

• Canada promotes the principles of the non-use of force, territorial integrity and self-determination in resolving the conflict.
• We welcome the EU’s Mission in Armenia.
• Canada looks forward to opening its new embassy in Yerevan; preparations progressing well.

Update

On May 25, Russian President Putin hosted a trilateral meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev in Moscow. Prior to that meeting, Pashinyan and Aliyev disputed each other’s positions over the Lachin Corridor blockage, in front of the Eurasian Economic Union meeting participants. The meeting took place days after the Armenian PM announced his government’s readiness to formally recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan if the security and rights of the Armenian population are ensured. The EU continues to facilitate the bilateral negotiation process. The President of the European Council Charles Michel most recently met with the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders on May 14 in Brussels, with another meeting scheduled on the margins of the European Political Community on June 1 and then again in Brussels in July. 

Supporting Facts and Figures

Canada enjoys positive bilateral relations with both countries. Thousands of Canadians trace their heritage to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and serve as important links between our societies.

Canada allocated $800,000 in funding through the Peace and Security Operation Program toward demining activities on both sides of the dividing line in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Project activities were completed in December 2022.

In October 2022, Canada provided $40,000 through the Canadian Red Cross Society for an emergency relief operation supporting the Armenian Red Cross Society in providing immediate assistance  for 4 months.

Background

Armenia-Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh/Lachin Corridor: The protests in the Lachin Corridor, which began on December 12, 2022, continue to impede the normal movement of people and goods in or out between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku argues that the protesters are environmentalists against illegal mining operations by Armenian companies causing environmental damage, although outside observers doubt that these protests can be sustained without the support of Azerbaijani authorities. Canada continues to call on Azerbaijan to ensure access through the Lachin Corridor. On April 23, 2023, Azerbaijan built a checkpoint at the entrance of the Lachin Corridor, which has sparked international condemnation. On April 25, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a statement expressing concerns over the establishment of the checkpoint, calling on Armenia and Azerbaijan to resume talks and refrain from any further hostile actions along the border.

The European Union Mission in Armenia was officially launched on February 20, 2023. It is mandated to support the EU’s efforts to promote peace and contribute to stability in the border areas of Armenia. The mission is tasked with observing and reporting on the situation on the ground; contributing to human security in conflict-affected areas, and contributing to build confidence. Personnel will be deployed in several locations within Armenia’s territory, in border regions with Azerbaijan.

Opening of Embassy in Yerevan/Follow-up on SE Dion Recommendations: Work is ongoing towards the opening of an Embassy in Armenia. Canadian officials are continuing engagement to explore next steps in the implementation of Ambassador Dion’s recommendations and other opportunities for engagement. Canada supports projects in both Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fields of democratic development, women economic empowerment and human rights through Canada Fund for Local Initiatives programming.

Haiti

• We remain deeply concerned by the steady deterioration of the security situation in Haiti, with the escalation of violence being a worrying trend.
• Strengthening the security sector in Haiti is a top priority for Canada. We are actively working on building the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP), with an additional investment of $100M announced on March 24. Planning is well underway.
• Canada is also committed to play a coordination role of international efforts to strengthen the security sector in Haiti, along with the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and the HNP. This includes establishing a Canada-led joint civilian-military-police coordination mechanism with initial operating capacity planned for the Summer.
• Canada is also working to put pressure on those who - through corruption, economic and political influence - support gangs, foment violence and perpetrate unspeakable cruelty on the population. The implementation of autonomous sanctions and other measures is at the centre of this effort.
  Supplementary Messages
• The JSCC will play critical role under Canadian leadership in improving the effectiveness of international security assistance, leveraging the engagement and contributions of our partners and amplify the impact of Canada's own investments in Haiti by channelling in a coherent way international efforts.
• Canada’s response to the crisis in Haiti is structured around four integrated pillars: 1) supporting political dialogue; 2) imposing sanctions on those who support violence; 3) responding to the humanitarian and development needs; and 4) strengthening the security sector.
• We believe that the best course of action is to focus on supporting the HNP while helping to disrupt key drivers for instability, particularly armed gangs and those who finance them.
• A much broader political consensus is necessary, with a view to holding elections as soon as security conditions permit. Essential that we continue to press all parties to show a spirit of compromise and to be open to sharing power during a transition period.

Supporting Facts and Figures

• In 2022-2023, Canada’s annual assistance budget to Haiti is $95M with 10M$ to the UNDP Security Basket fund out of a total budget sought of US$28M. Canada also approved $22.5M over 5 years in development assistance to strengthen the HNP and the National Police Academy.
• PMJT recently announced $100M (March 2023; during POTUS visit) to enhance the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP), which will be used to provide lethal and non-lethal equipment. Planning is well underway to implement.
• Over the last few months, Canada has undertaken military supported actions to quickly bolster the HNP, including facilitating the delivery of equipment purchased by the HNP in Canada (e.g. 12 Mines-Resistant Ambush Protected and 5 light armoured vehicles), and providing tactical information through deploying in Haiti an aircraft patrol and two navy vessels.
• We’ve also undertaken planning missions to Haiti recently to validate with the HNP and partners immediate needs for which international support is necessary, including specialised training, lethal and non-lethal equipment, financial support, force protection, mobility, infrastructure, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). We are working on options aimed at increasing the number of police officers and providing training in and outside Haiti.
• We are also consolidating the information on contributions from international partners and identifying gaps for international support. This information will be shared with partners to inform funding decisions and ensure that our collective response is complementary.
• In June, Canada will convene an international virtual ministerial meeting to mobilize international partners in response to the security crisis in Haiti and the political impasse.
• To date, Canada has sanctioned 19 individuals of the Haitian political and economic elite, individuals Canada believes are providing illicit financial or operational support to armed gangs in Haiti.
• Canada continues to explore additional related measures and we are urging international partners to join our efforts and apply autonomous sanctions and other measures, including visa restrictions or travel bans on individuals already sanctioned by Canada.

Venezuela/migrants

• Deeply concerned by the ongoing crisis in Venezuela and its impacts on the region.
• Canada is meeting its international commitments with additional international assistance to respond to the Venezuela crisis, including the socio-economic integration needs of Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the region.
• Canada continues to work with key international partners to seek a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the multi-dimensional crisis in Venezuela.

Supplementary Messages 

• Since 2019, Canada has contributed over CAD$180 million in humanitarian, development and stabilization assistance to support those affected by the Venezuela crisis. In March 2023, Canada announced an additional CAD$58.55 million in international assistance funding at the International Conference in Solidarity with Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants and their Host Countries and Communities, co-hosted by Canada and the EU. 
• Canada’s development programming addresses longer-term needs related to the Venezuela crisis in education, health, nutrition, inclusive governance, protection and livelihoods, particularly for women and girls.
• Canada is at the forefront of international efforts to advance human rights and played a crucial role in securing the renewal of the mandates of the Fact Finding Mission and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. We remain concerned by the human rights situation, notably by the persecution of dissent, including human rights defenders, pro-democracy forces and independent media.

Update 

On November 26, 2022, after a yearlong hiatus, the Maduro regime and the Unitary Platform representing Venezuelan democratic forces resumed the negotiation process in Mexico. A partial social agreement was signed to invest in the areas of electricity, healthcare, food security, education and natural disaster prevention. The agreement includes the creation of a Trust of about $3 billion in frozen overseas funds to be administered by the UN to address the country’s urgent humanitarian needs. Subsequent talks are expected to address democratic issues, including steps needed to ensure free and fair elections in 2024 (presidential) and 2025 (parliamentarian). In December 2022, the democratically elected Venezuelan National Assembly of 2015 voted in favor of effectively dissolving the Interim Government. Moving forward, the Democratic Forces plan to use primaries to choose a candidate to run against the Chavismo candidate – likely to be Maduro – in the 2024 elections.  

In accordance with Canada’s commitment to maintain the international visibility of the Venezuelan refugee and migrant crisis, in March 2023 Canada and the EU co-hosted the International Solidarity Conference for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants and their Host Countries and Communities. The event successfully raised CAD$1.2 billion in pledges (including CAD$744 in grants), plus an additional US$800 million in investment loans expected to be leveraged by the Inter-American Development Bank. Within this amount, Canada pledged CAD$58.55 million in international assistance.  This was a follow-up event to the 2021 Donors’ Conference, hosted by Canada.   

Supporting Facts and Figures 

• In September 2022, Canada along with Latin American partners led the renewal of the mandates of the Fact Finding Mission on Venezuela and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
• As per the 2023 UN Global Humanitarian Overview, 7.7 million people inside Venezuela require humanitarian assistance. 
• Over 7.2 million Venezuelans have left or fled their country since 2015. Colombia (2.5M), Peru (1.5M), Ecuador (>500K) and Chile (>440K) host the largest populations, stretching response capacities.
• In 2023, the UN appealed for US$720 million to respond to the needs of 5.2 million people inside Venezuela, and US$1.72 billion to respond the regional Venezuelan refugees and migrant crisis (3.4 million people targeted). 
• Inside Venezuela, Canada is providing $10 million/year in development programming in health, nutrition, inclusive governance, education, and livelihoods.
• To respond to the displacement crisis, [REDACTED] in new funding over two fiscal years (2021-23).  Seventeen new projects were launched in 2022, largely in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.  Areas of support include access to employment, education, health (SRHR), regularization, protection, as well as human trafficking and institutional strengthening

BILL S-8

An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, to make consequential amendments to other Acts and to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations

• The amendments proposed in Bill S-8 will close the current gaps in our sanctions regime by harmonizing the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA).
• The proposed amendments will ensure that all foreign nationals subject to any sanctions under SEMA and the United Nations Act will also be inadmissible to Canada pursuant to IRPA.
• The new authorization will ensure sanctions imposed by the Government of Canada will have direct consequences in identifying and prohibiting sanctioned foreign nationals who try to enter Canada.

Supplementary Messages

• Through these legislative amendments, the Government of Canada will ensure Canada’s sanctions framework remains cohesive, enforceable and responsive in providing the authority to deny sanctioned individuals entry into Canada while sending a strong message that sanctions have meaningful consequences from an immigration perspective as well.
• Notably, the passage of Bill S-8 will extend inadmissibility to 1266 Russian individuals currently sanctioned by Canada. At present, only 90 (6%) sanctioned Russian individuals fall within the IRPA’s inadmissibility criteria for sanctions.

Update

Status of Bill S-8: Senate Government Bill S-8 was adopted by the Senate on June 16, 2022, and introduced in the House on October 4, 2022. On May 9, 2023, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE) heard from the Minister of Public Safety on the legislation, alongside CBSA, IRCC and GAC officials. FAAE met again on May 11 to continue studying the bill, hearing from Senate sponsor PSG Senator Peter Harder as well as individual witnesses including the Ukrainian Canadian Congress and the Canadian Bar Association before meeting for clause-by-clause consideration on May 16. FAAE adopted the bill with amendments on May 16 and it is expected to be reported back to the House by the end of May 2023. While reactions to Bill S-8 have been mostly supportive, opposition members have been critical of the perceived delays in moving Bill S-8 through the legislative process and have criticized Canada’s sanctions regime for its lack of transparency and enforcement. At FAAE, opposition members criticized the lack of clarity regarding language in the bill as well as the unintended consequences for individuals who feel sanctions have been unfairly applied for refugees. The Canadian Bar Association has expressed concern with broadening the scope of inadmissibility and emphasized the need to clearly define terms in the bill. The Ukrainian Congress has supported the bill and called on members to pass the legislation expeditiously.

Background

Overview of Bill S-8: On May 17, 2022, the Government Representative in the Senate Senator Marc Gold, introduced Government Bill S-8 in the Senate, which seeks to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) to ensure that foreign nationals subject to sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) are inadmissible to Canada. The proposed amendments would allow CBSA to deny entry to, and remove, individuals subjected to sanctions, and would allow IRCC officials to deny temporary resident and permanent resident visas overseas, and to refuse various type of immigration applications made in Canada. The bill would also expand the scope of inadmissibility based on sanctions to include not only sanctions imposed on a foreign state but also those imposed on an entity or a person as well as all orders and regulations made under section 4 of the Special Economic Measures Act. It is worth noting that FAAE had previously released a report during the 42nd Parliament in April 2017 entitled: A Coherent and Effective Approach to Canada’s Sanctions Regimes: Sergei Magnitsky and Beyond. In the report, the committee issued13 recommendations, one of them being that “the Government of Canada should amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to designate all individuals listed by regulations under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) as inadmissible to Canada.” This recommendation is reflected in the proposals contained in Bill S-8.

BILL S-9

An Act to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA)

• Canada is proud to be a leader in the fight against weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons, and is committed to fighting the scourge of chemical weapons.
• Bill S-9 would amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act by clarifying the list of chemical substances and removing areas of confusion.
• Bill S-9 is a matter of good governance, strengthening Canada’s commitment against chemical weapons, which is particularly relevant in the wake of recent conflicts.

Supplementary Messages

• Bill S-9 will not impact how the Chemical Weapons Convention applies to Canadians. It in no way changes Canada’s obligations or commitments under the CWC.
• The legislation is a symbolic act that reiterates Canada’s strong support for the Chemical Weapons Convention, which remains a crucial part of the rules‑based international system, the set of norms, laws, institutions, and treaties that has provided clear rules for managing competing national interests and facilitating international cooperation.

Background

Status of Bill S-9: The CWCIA legislation was first introduced during the first session of the 43^rd Parliament by then Minister of Foreign Affairs François-Philippe Champagne in March 2020 as Bill C-9. The bill did not reach second reading and was reintroduced as Bill S-2 on October 27, 2020, by Government Representative in the Senate Marc Gold during the second session of the previous Parliament. Bill S-2 completed third reading in the Senate on December 17, 2020, and was subsequently introduced in the House of Commons on February 25, 2021, however, the bill died on the order paper when the 2021 federal election was called.

The bill was reintroduced in the Senate on June 2, 2022, as Bill S-9 and was debated at second reading on June 14. The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA) held one meeting on the bill with GAC officials, during which time the committee proceeded to clause-by-clause consideration of the bill. The bill was reported back to the Senate without any amendments on June 20. Bill S-9 was subsequently introduced in the House of Commons on October 4, 2022, by the President of the Treasury Board and MP Mona Fortier on the behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The bill currently remains at second reading in the House with discussions ongoing amongst the parties on next steps.

Overview of Bill S-9: Bill S-9 seeks to amend the CWCIA, removing an out-of-date list of chemical substances from the legislation, and clarifying that the current list is contained in the amended Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This amendment does not increase, decrease, or in any way change the existing obligations that Canada or Canadians have under the CWC. It merely removes a potential area of confusion.

Some text of the original CWC, including the Annex on Chemicals, is copied verbatim in the CWCIA. However, another provision in the CWCIA notes that if there are any discrepancies between the text of the Convention found in the Act and the Convention itself, the Convention always takes precedence. This means that Canadians were automatically bound by the amended CWC, even if the text of the CWCIA is out of date. This out-of-date list contained in the CWCIA creates the potential for confusion. The government has decided that the best way to make the CWC Implementation Act current and to keep it up to date in case of future amendments to the Annex on Chemicals is to remove the now-out-of-date schedule from the Act itself. Bill S-9 seeks to repeal this schedule in its entirety. It also amends the definition of "Convention" under subsection 2(1) and deletes subsection 2(3) entirely. These last two amendments remove references to the now-repealed schedule.

Repealing this schedule from the Act will not impact how the Act applies to Canadians. It in no way changes Canada’s obligations or commitments under the CWC. It imposes no new burdens upon Canada, Canadian citizens, nor Canadian industry. It merely prevents possible confusion among Canadians that would otherwise see one list of chemicals in their domestic legislation and another list on the website of the OPCW. There has been no opposition in the Senate nor in the House of Commons on Bill S-9.

Bill C-41

• The proposed amendment to the Criminal Code will facilitate Canada’s engagement to address humanitarian crises and advance human rights globally, including in Afghanistan.
• Where needed, new authorization(s) will provide certainty for Canadians that they will be shielded from the risk of criminal liability for the activities covered by the authorization.
• As currently amended, a humanitarian exemption will remove certain lifesaving and immediate assistance from the scope of 83.03 of the Criminal Code, removing the risk of criminal liability for these activities.
• Work is underway to support the timely and streamlined provision of authorisations as quickly as possible once the regime becomes law.

Supplementary Messages

• Through these legislative amendments, the Government of Canada is responding to the crisis in Afghanistan by facilitating the provision of international assistance and the safe passage of vulnerable individuals destined for Canada, while balancing the need to maintain strong anti-terrorist financing provisions.

Update

Status of Bill C-41: On March 9, 2023, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-41 to create an authorization regime to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, health services, education, human rights programming, support to livelihoods, resettlement, immigration processing, safe passage activities, and other government operations. The Bill was debated at second reading on Monday, March 27 after which, it was referred to the House of Commons Committee on Justice and Human Rights (JUST). On April 24, certain amendments were accepted by JUST which introduce a humanitarian exemption into the regime, in addition to the original authorization mechanism. The exemption extends beyond the original policy cover for C-41 and will require high-level approval to expand the scope of the bill. The clause by clause analysis is expected to resume in early June. 

Budget 2023 includes a reference to new resources to support GAC, PS, RCMP and CSE for this authorization regime, with some of these resources sourced from internal departmental resources.

Initial reactions to Bill C-41 have been mixed. A coalition of 18 Canadian charitable organizations, including GAC implementing partners, initially expressed support. At the same time, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have called for a humanitarian exemption instead of an authorization regime, and questions have been raised about the time required to issue authorizations, and the administrative capacity of smaller NGOs to apply for authorizations. There also have been concerns expressed by some Afghan-Canadian diaspora groups regarding the need to deliver aid in a manner that does not benefit the Taliban, and to ensure that any unavoidable benefit to the Taliban is minimized. During second reading, criticisms raised by opposition MPs reflected those raised by MSF and the ICRC.

Background

Overview of Bill C-41: Under the proposed authorization regime, the Minister of Public Safety (PS) or a delegate would have the authority to issue authorizations to shield from criminal liability activities for the above purposes that would otherwise be at risk of violating provision 83.03 of the Criminal Code due to the unavoidable benefit to a terrorist group. In deciding whether to issue an authorization, the Minister of PS would consider referrals by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and IRCC on specific assessment criteria, including the need for the activity, whether the area is controlled by a terrorist group, and the capacity of the applicant to manage and report on funds. The Minister would balance this information against the results of a national security review in a risk-benefit analysis and make a decision on the request, including associated terms and conditions of any authorization. The proposed regime, while responsive to the current situation in Afghanistan, would also be applicable in other contexts and would enable Canada to better respond to future crises in any area where terrorist groups exert control and legal concerns are raised about the risk of violating Canada’s Criminal Code due to a possible benefit to a terrorist group from a proposed activity.

Criminal Code:  With the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban, a listed terrorist entity in Canada, is likely to receive revenue from any payment made to the de facto authorities in Afghanistan, including taxes, import tariffs, and the payment of administrative fees. Any Canadian authorizing such payments risks contravening the provision 83.03 of the Criminal Code. As a result, it has been difficult for Canadian NGOs and the Government of Canada officials to support activities in Afghanistan. There is no Crown immunity for government activities.  Canadian government-funded humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan has been continuing through partnership with a limited number of international institutions that have been able to implement measures to ensure that funding does not indirectly benefit the Taliban (e.g. by funding non-taxable expat salaries or acquiring out-of-country goods), but the organizations have indicated that implementation of these measures is not sustainable. 

Bill C-281

International Human Rights Act

• As part of Canada’s commitment to uphold human rights, we consistently look for opportunities to bolster our robust foreign policy toolkit to better address emerging human rights crises, protect those in vulnerable and marginalized situations, and, ultimately, advance respect for human rights globally.
• As Bill C-281 aims to uphold Canada’s commitment to human rights in a strong and meaningful way, the government has welcomed the opportunity to work with colleagues from all political affiliations on this important piece of legislation.
• While parliamentarians in the House of Commons have worked together to strengthen Bill C-281, concerns remain and further work is needed to ensure the objective of the legislation is respected.

Supplementary Messages

• We particularly welcome the inclusion of an annual human rights report, as this will help to demonstrate Canada’s robust engagement on human rights and create space for greater transparency and accountability in our actions.
• While amendments proposed have strengthened the bill and addressed issues with the original drafting, we remain concerned with the obligation to publicize a list detailing the names and circumstances of prisoners of conscience in cases where the government is actively engaged, as well has the exclusion of “intent” in the prohibition of investments in cluster munitions.

Background

Status of Bill C-281: Private Members’ Bill C-281, was introduced in the House of Commons by Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) Member of Parliament (MP) Philip Lawrence on June 13, 2022. The bill was debated at Second Reading on October 7 and November 14, and was reported to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE). FAAE held two meetings with departmental officials and witnesses, before proceeding to clause-by-clause. The bill was adopted with amendments and reported back to the House of Commons on May 18. Votes on report stage motions are scheduled for Wednesday, May 31. It is expected that the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA) will study the bill.

Overview of Bill C-281: Bill C-281 seeks to advance human rights by amending four acts as follows:

• Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act – would impose a new requirement on the Minister of Foreign Affairs to publish, at least once in every calendar year, a report that includes: a) an outline of the measures that the government has taken to advance human rights internationally as part of Canada’s foreign policy; and b) a list that sets out specific information relating to prisoners of conscience for whose release the Government of Canada is actively seeking. Exemptions to the list were introduced during clause-by-clause, with the intention to ensure the personal safety and security of prisoners of conscience, allow for Canada’s effective engagement on cases, and maintain Canada’s ability to advance human rights.
• Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA)– would require the Minister of Foreign Affairs to respond to a report submitted by a parliamentary committee that recommends that sanctions be imposed under that Act against a foreign national. Amendments during clause-by-clause aligned the Minister’s response to standard parliamentary practices regarding Government responses to committee reports including the timelines specified in the Standing Order or rules of the Senate for responses to committee reports.
• Broadcasting Act– would prohibit the issue, amendment or renewal of a licence in relation to a broadcasting undertaking that is vulnerable to being significantly influenced by a foreign national or entity that has committed acts or omissions that the Senate or House of Commons has recognized as genocide or that is subject to sanctions under the JVCFOA or Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA).‍
• Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act– would prohibit a person from investing in an entity that has contravened certain provisions of the Act. These provisions are identical to those contained in Senate Public Bill S-225. In addition to prohibitions on investments, Bill C-281 also includes references to two of Canada’s obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Article 5, Victim assistance; Article 6, international cooperation and assistance).

Members from all three House of Commons opposition parties have expressed their support for Bill C-281. It is expected that senators from all political affiliations will also support the bill once introduced in the Senate. The government has agreed on the importance of continued efforts to strengthen its commitment to human rights, including through Bill C-281.

Main concerns with Bill C-281: Amendments proposed during clause-by-clause have strengthened the bill and addressed various issues with its original drafting. However, the government remains particularly concerned with two areas: a) the obligation to publicize information related to prisoners of conscience whose case the government is actively engaged on, which could have serious consequences including undue harm to the individual detained and hinder  Canada’s effective engagement on cases; and b) the absence of the element of intent – this should be incorporated into the amendment to ensure that the PCMA section of the bill is targeted and enforceable, and not criminalize innocent investors (notably indirect investors) such as pension or mutual fund holders who may be unaware of what investments they hold.

Bill S-225

Cluster Munitions Investment Prohibition Act

• Canada is steadfast in its commitment to end the suffering caused by cluster munitions, by addressing both the immediate and long-lasting impacts of these weapons.
• Bill S-225 seeks to strengthen prohibitions on investments in cluster munitions - an important objective that the Government supports.
• We are supportive of including language that would explicitly prohibit investments in cluster munitions with an element of intent to ensure that innocent investors are not held criminally liable.

Supplementary Messages

• The policy intent of the bill is a noble one – to ensure that no Canadian invests in cluster munitions weapons that have such devastating impacts – and it is one the government supports. However, we need to ensure that this Bill is targeted and enforceable, including the element of intent.

Background

Status of Bill S-225: Senate Public Bill S-225 was first introduced by Conservative Senator Salma Ataullahjan in December 2016 as Bill S-235. Bill S-235 completed first and second reading, and was referred to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA). However, the bill died on the Order Paper when Parliament was dissolved for the 2019 federal election. On November 24, 2021, Senator Ataullahjan reintroduced the bill, as S-225. The bill was adopted at second reading on October 26, 2022, and referred to AEFA for consideration. AEFA held one meeting on the bill, including with GAC officials on March 30, 2023. It is expected that the bill will remain dormant at AEFA and will not be reported back to the Senate in the short run.

Separately, on June 13, 2022, CPC MP Philip Lawrence introduced Private Members’ Bill C-281, the International Human Rights Act. The provisions of Bill C-281 related to cluster munitions are identical to those in Bill S-225. Bill C-281 is currently at report stage in the House of Commons. It is anticipated that Bill C-281 could be before AEFA in the fall of 2023.

Overview of Bill S-225: Bill S-225, seeks to prohibit investments “in an entity that has breached a prohibition relating to cluster munitions, explosive sub-munitions and explosive bomblets.” The prohibitions would apply to both direct and indirect investments. During debates in the Senate and committee study, senators expressed general support for the intent of the bill. However, senators noted important enforcement challenges at AEFA, particularly related to prohibitions to indirect investments.

Main concerns with Bill S-225: As with Bill C-281, Bill S-225’s proposed prohibitions to indirect investments pose challenges to enforce, as they would potentially criminalize indirect investors, such as mutual fund holders, who may be unaware of what investments they hold. Furthermore, the bill’s proposed prohibition on “possessing a pecuniary interest” is broad and challenging to enforce. Possession of a pecuniary interest is even broader than “investment.” It can be difficult to determine what actions would constitute a “possession of a pecuniary interest” and what degree of linkage to cluster munitions would be sufficient to result in criminal liability. The government is of the view that the bill would be stronger if it incorporated an element of intent – this would ensure that innocent investors, such as pension and mutual fund holders, are not held criminally liable as they are often unaware of what investments they hold.

Corporate support function placemats

Overview of Corporate Services: Finance and Contracting

Key Priorities

• Provide corporate leadership and vision for the development of departmental short-term, medium term and long-term financial strategies.
• Modernize financial management planning to improve client service and support decision making.
• Support grants and contributions (Gs&Cs) Program Branches to achieve departmental priorities and objectives through timely investment planning, financial management
  and financial instruments support services.
• Advance Grants and Contributions Transformation, encompassing process streamlining, new approaches to risk management, and an expanded relationship with external partners.
• Support the Auditor General’s review of the ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s accounting treatment of unconditionally repayable contributions, which will inform Canada’s proposed strategic use of these funding instruments in
  the Memorandum to Cabinet on the Way Forward for the International Assistance Innovation Program.
• Increase the proportion of women-owned and Black, Indigenous and People of Colour procurement.

Departmental budget

$7.58B, fiscal year 2023-24 budget

As per Main Estimates *Pending royal assent*

$1.96B   Vote 1 – Operating expenditures

$0.20B   Vote 5 – Capital expenditures

$4.95B   Vote 10 – Grants and contributions

$0.10B   Vote 15 – Locally Engaged Staff pensions and benefits

$0.37B   Statutory expenses

Business Environment

• Ongoing crises around the world require timely departmental action that has an impact on financial operations, spending and budget forecasting.
• A payment authorization process has been put in place for all payments in Afghanistan to mitigate the risk of non-compliance to Canada’s legislative framework covering terrorism by the Department and its funding recipients and to protect public servants who may be subject to personal liability under Canada’s Anti-terrorism Act for authorizing payments meant to support projects in Afghanistan.
• Gs&Cs programming partners continue to rely on streamlined financial instrument measures enacted at the beginning of COVID-19 and to adapt to shifting global economy.
• Global inflation puts increasing pressure on the purchasing power of departmental budgets.

Departmental Capacities

• Robust financial management accountability principles underpin a sound approach to ensuring value for money, oversight and management
  of public resources.
• The Department uses and is building automated data-entry and artificial intelligence capacities for the tracking and reporting of Gs&Cs funding. This improves the policy process, data-driven decision-making, and tracking of financial commitments.
• Innovative Finance requires increased technical resources for financial analysis and agreement negotiation commensurate with an important and emerging programming area.
• Regional Contract Review Boards established in 2018-19 currently cover 100% of missions

Key departmental authorities

Treasury Board has delegated limited authorities for construction, goods, services and emergency contracts.

The Department may enter into non-competitive contracts of up to $15M in response to pressing emergency or national security related threats to missions abroad.

The Department may enter into International Development Assistance (IDA) funding agreements of up to $50M, or up to $100M with multilateral organizations, and emergency humanitarian assistance agreements of up to $100M.

The Department may enter into contracts of up to $30M for services or construction in support of IDA.

• The Department participates on the interdepartmental Greening Govern-ment ADM Steering Committee focusing on green procurement.

Grants and contributions programs

776 / $4.77B, number and total value of new financial instruments last fiscal year

Fiscal year 2022-23

2,160 / $23.42B, number and total value of  operational transfer payment financial instruments

As of October 1, 2022. Does not include Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, academic relations, or project monitoring and audit agreements. Development agreements can span from 3 to 5 years or more.

Challenges

• The complex budgeting environment, with overlapping financial and political commitments, encumbers the majority of the Gs&Cs budget (over 90%), leaving little room for new priorities.
• The structural deficit in the Departmental management reserve limits the capacity to absorb unexpected incoming pressures. It also limits the ability to pursue opportunities for modernization and innovation.
• The Department has reduced travel budgets in response to the Budget 2023 announcement, in the form of reductions in budget reference levels for the current fiscal year.

Opportunities

• Implementation of the Financial Sustainability Strategy (FSS) to identify funding flexibility for internal reallocations and to prepare for future budget constraints.
• Implementing a Risk Appetite Framework and complementary risk appetite statements for fiduciary and financial risk areas.
• Leveraging data to support Gs&Cs financial and fiduciary decision-making, including the development of a project cost database.
• Expanding transparency and engagement with external partners to improve interactions on financial and fiduciary matters.
• Supporting and informing the Treasury Board Secretariat/Office of the Controller General review and renewal of the transfer payments policy framework.

Treasury board submissions

26 anticipated number of submissions to Treasury Board in fiscal year 2023-24

$2.572B estimated amount of funding sought via Treasury Board submissions in 2023-24

Overview of Corporate Services: People

Key Priorities

• Support government-wide human resources priorities while strengthening the Department’s People pillar in accordance with the work being undertaken on the future of diplomacy by:
  • Increasing our workforce capacity and talent management.
  • Supporting the Department for a safe and healthy workplace in Head-quarters, in regional offices and abroad.
  • Strengthening equity, diversity, and inclusion in the workplace.
  • Ensuring sound and sustainable management of pay and benefits.
  • Enhancing our locally-engaged staff (LES) framework.

Canada-based Staff = CBS

Locally engaged Staff = LES

Employment equity

Women 56.2%

Visible Minorities 26.2%

Indigenous People 6.2%

Persons with Disabilities 3.7%

Canada-based staff only
GAC representation as of March 31, 2022

Business Environment

• The COVID-19 pandemic, the shortage of labour market availability, and economic uncertainties, including inflation, continue to directly impact our operations and affect both salaries and costs for Headquarters and our international network.

Departmental Capacities

• The Department has 13,906 employees, of which 60% are CBS and 40% are LES. Some LES support Other Government Departments.
• The workforce abroad consists of 1,511 CBS (1,014 rotational) and 5,567 LES. As of March 31, 2023, 48% of the total workforce works abroad, represented at a rate of 79% by our LES.
• 178 missions, located in 110 countries and territories, are served by seven Common Service Hubs abroad that provide missions with services for LES staffing, contracting, procurement, and financial transactions.
• The workforce is relatively well-diversified. There are no workforce availability (WFA) gaps for most employment equity groups with the exception of Persons with Disabilities. Improvement is also needed at the executive levels for Indigenous and Black employees.
• The Department has an enviable official languages capacity compared to other organizations in the public service with double the number of bilingual positions compared to the average of the public service. However, the language of work and senior level representation within the department has been raised as an issue.

Challenges

• Global pressures and the geopolitical context have implications for GAC’s footprint abroad, including new demands in the area of human resources. 
• Irregular recruitment initiatives have created certain gaps in both the workforce complement and have affected specific business lines.
• Residual gaps exist in certain areas of diversity and inclusion, foreign service representation, as well as consistency in the provision of official language services.
• GAC is reviewing proposals to stabilize the funding for the LES benefits program, including minimum standards for LES maternity and parental leave, insurance, etc. This is part of a longer term LES framework reform project.
• The current health service framework shared between GAC and Health Canada is no longer conducive to ensure our Duty of Care responsibilities to staff abroad.

HR authorities and responsibilities

Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) has delegated the authorities for the management of all Locally Engaged Staff to the Department.

GAC has Duty of Care responsibilities for Canada-based Staff and their dependents abroad, as well as for LES.

Although TBS negotiates the Foreign Service Directives, the Department is accountable for administering them for  many other departments.

• The combination of residual COVID-19 implications coupled with the largest assignment rotation abroad in recent history, has directly impacted all aspects of our foreign presence abroad. This includes impacts on our staff, their dependents, their movement, etc..

Opportunities 

• Building capacity for a skilled, agile, diverse workforce to meet departmental needs. Ensuring effective recruitment and retention practices are in place to achieve long-term sustainability and high performance.
• Preventing workplace harassment and violence, injuries and incidents, and ensuring the safety and the physical and mental well-being of all employees in Canada and abroad.
• Building a safe, equitable, diverse and inclusive workplace, reflective of Canada’s diversity where everyone can bring their whole self to work.
• Paying our employees on time and accurately for the duties performed as well as reducing the potential impact on pay and benefits for staff working abroad.
• Developing management frameworks and systems to effectively and competitively manage the LES workforce in local labour markets, including in terms of employment benefits.

Overview of Corporate Services: Technology and Digital Capacity

Key Priorities

• Support the Future of Diplomacy initiative and GC Digital Ambition by seeking sustainable funding and resources to invest in modern infrastructure and tools.
• Support Future of Work efforts by ensuring the performance of GAC’s digital network, developing applications that enable the hybrid model, and increasing IM/IT resources to support the hybrid workforce.
• Enable GAC programs to better serve Canadians and partners through modern client relationship manage-ment solutions and case management systems combined with data and analytics for Foreign Diplomacy, Trade and Consular services.
• Engage with partners to support emergency preparedness efforts, such as Ukraine, through agile solution delivery and effective support.
• Empower the workforce with modern collaboration, analytics and information management tool, optimize processes through automation and digital solutions, and strengthen digital and data literacy.
• ModernizeGAC’s network infra-structure to enable new cloud solutions, enhance performance, reduce technical debt and improve security. 
• Decrease business risk by investing in secure classified communications and cyber security capabilities to protect our information, and by retiring aging applications.

Network utilization

15,629 Microsoft 365 users (2022-23)

13,300 Microsoft Teams users (2022-23)

Business Environment

• Global events such as the pandemic, socio-economic shifts, and geopolitical changes require more responsive, adaptive and resilient digital solutions.
• Technology advances shape how Canadian industry and global partners conduct business and drive expecta-tions. Attracting and retaining skilled workers requires modern solutions.
• Cyber security landscape is evolving rapidly. GAC is accelerating security improvements to counter increasingly sophisticated threat actors.

Network capacity

+33% Increase in virtual private network users since the pandemic – 15,900 total users

+375% Increase in Department-wide bandwidth since the pandemic – now 3 Gb/sec.

Departmental Capacities

• GAC’s digital capabilities, including its cadre of Foreign Service IT Professionals (FSITP), supports all employees at Headquarters and abroad, including co-locators in missions, by ensuring that all employees have the tools needed to work, thus allowing GAC to deliver on its mandate.
• Modern enterprise solutions, such as the Microsoft 365 collaboration and productivity tools, case management solutions and analytics capabilities, and a modern IT service delivery model ensure that employees and co-locators are well-supported, and operations can continue during crises. Rapid implementation of infrastructure enhancements internationally have kept the client community productive.
• The Department has a track record of enhancing its global support model to transform the way employees work and deliver services at home and abroad. This is achieved by investing in staff training and upskilling.
• GAC can build cloud capabilities with advanced and secure platforms and can support the rapid deployment of solutions for responding to urgent needs. It has the capacity to support the modernization of business processes.

Cyber security

18, number of sophisticated cyber threats (suspected to be sponsored by a nation-state) detected over 6 months

October 2022 to March 2023

282, number of cyber events detected over
6 months

October 2022 to March 2023

Challenges

• Ensuring Shared Services Canada’s focus on the Department’s key priority projects and to address expected network performance issues in a hybrid work context, requires ongoing engagement.
• There is a lack of adequate funding for the technical backbone required to digitize international service delivery and reduce technical debt (i.e. legacy infrastructure and apps). While the pandemic highlighted digital solutions opportunities, it also identified gaps in the digital infra-structure and the need to re-support service and programs delivery. 
• The digital network requires sufficient human resources, with the skills and experienceto carry out digital transformation plans. Staffing highly-skilled, full-time IT staff has been challenging, with current resource levels insufficient to fulfil the Department’s digital transformation.

Opportunities

• Seek sustainable funding to accelerate digital transformation and modernize GAC service delivery to Canadians at home and abroad.
• Focus efforts on talent management and recruitment to attract and retain skills in areas such as cloud and cyber security that are in high demand.
• Increase digital and data literacy across the Department.
• Transform the IM/IT Operating Model to build stronger partnerships and shared accountabilities between IM/IT and GAC programs.
• Deliver key business projects to support the Trade Commissioner Service, the Ukraine crisis, and Grants and Contributions Transformation.
• Accelerate work to improve GAC’s cyber security posture to enable international business, while protecting against increasing state actor cyber threats.
• Modernize the international network infrastructure by deploying cloud capabilities (Virtual Mission Model) to ensure the performance of digital solutions that support the hybrid model.

Network modernization

30 for FY 2022-23

+50 planned by March 2024

+60 planned by 2024-2026

Number of sites where Phase 1 of the Virtual Mission Model is deployed

128, umber of Wi-Fi enabled sites

Overview of Corporate Services: Global Presence (Physical Network)

Key Priorities

• Continue to work with central agencies and internal stakeholders to modernize the domestic and international real property portfolio.
• Enable Canada’s presence abroad through sound management and delivery of resources, infrastructure and services.
• Ensure that personnel is safe, missions are more secure, and government and partner assets and information are protected.
• Continue implementing $1.18B of infrastructure projects of varying categories under the “Duty of Care” initiative, which is part of $1.87B allotted by Treasury Board over 10 years (and $126M ongoing) to implement security measures across missions and HQ.
• Align all current and future Treasury Board submissions to the Government of Canada Greening Government Strategy requirements of net-zero emissions and climate resilience.
• Continue working on the renovation of the 125 Sussex office complex, which began in 2017 and will continue until 2032.

Real property
projects abroad

300 projects

$25M total

Real property projects abroad completed globally in fiscal year 2021-22

Real property projects abroad

In Canada (as PSPC tenant)

19 buildings

12 National Capital Region

7 regional offices

Abroad (as property custodian)

110 countries

178 missions

2,249 properties

2,249 properties abroad =

144 chanceries and offices +

122 official residences +

1,939 staff quarters +

44 other residences

Business Environment

• The overseas network faces new financial pressures that strain affordability and require tradeoffs. Treasury Board Special Purpose Allotments tightly control the allocation of property funds and restrict flexibility.
• The overseas physical network exists to support departmental and client programs. Program demand drives footprint growth or shrinkage.
• Federal Government requirements for the management of real property, including the greening government strategy and policy renewal, are making real property management abroad more complex.
• The Greening Government Strategy sets the targets and requirements for all federal Real Property.

Departmental Capacities

• Real property authorities for project approval, transactions, and construction contracts, delegated from Treasury Board to the Department, allow for the delivery of a majority of investments.
• Modernized and robust Investment and Project Management Framework for real property supports planning and delivery of projects and ongoing delegations of authority.
• The Department benefits from professional real property human resources capacity across strategic planning, operations, and service delivery functions.
• Emergent improvements to strategic planning informs investment decision-making.

Re-investment

$36.9M major/minor

$27.2M repair and maintenance

$2.6B replacement cost (est.)

Amount of investment in real property assets in fiscal year 2020-21

Drivers: Directory of Federal Real Property

2.0% target, 2.47% results

Real property assets re-investment rate in fiscal year 2020-21

Drivers: Directory of Federal Real Property, Management Accountability Framework, and, Departmental Results Framework

Challenges

• The complexity of managing real property assets in 178 missions located in 110 countries presents challenges (e.g. shifting local security concerns, currency fluctuation, different standards, capricious real estate construction markets) to planning and implementation.
• Real property investments over long-term horizons for programs that adjust their needs on a shorter timeframe may result in a misalignment of real property investments to support priority departmental programs and outcomes.
• GAC must make up lost time resulting from deferred capital spending.
• Global supply chain and inflation are driving substantial cost increases to real property projects.
• Plans have been adapted to create opportunities, including leveraging virtual tools and innovative tech, and engaging with local consultants, staff and external stakeholders.
• The alignment of Greening Government Strategy commitments with the existing GAC portfolio strategy, in order to ensure integration, must be maintained.
• Space reduction is required to support the overall GoC footprint reduction in Canada.

Key departmental authorities

Treasury Board OPMCA* Level-2 enables internal departmental approval of the majority of real property projects

*Organizational Project Management Capacity Assessment

Real Property Transactions Authorities enable real property acquisitions and Special Contracting Authorities enable construction of real property abroad

Opportunities

• Making adjustments to existing facilities to enable the implementation of a hybrid model workplace under post-pandemic environment while respecting the requirement to reduce the overall Real Property footprint as mandated by central agencies.
• Supporting TB submissions on advancing priority projects.
• Advancing major real property projects.
• Responding to Treasury Board policy changes, the results of the Treasury Board Fixed Asset Review, and the Department’s internal audit.
• Modernizing the foundational elements of the Department’s portfolio planning, policy and performance management to better inform decision-making.
• Developing strategies for Greening Government Strategy targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Overview of Corporate Services: Global Presence (Mission Network Management)

Key Priorities

• Ensure optimal functioning of Common Service Delivery Points (CSDP), which are fundamental to ensuring business continuity at missions, especially during the pandemic, mission closures, evacuations and repatriations.
• Optimize international supply chain operations and reorganize resources to enhance client service.
• Improve communication, understanding and management of the Costing Methodology to ensure Common Services provided abroad are financially sustainable for the Department and external partners.
• Continue partnership with the Canadian Foreign Service Institute, other relevant divisions at GAC and Other Governmental Departments to provide ongoing training of Management Consular Officers (MCOs) assigned abroad.
• Address MCO shortages through temporary duty assignments.
• Strengthen relationships and increase communications with stakeholders, partners, and clients.

The International Platform Branch is the whole-of-government resource for centrally managing a network of people, infrastructure, assets and services that enables the Government of Canada to deliver its international programs and priorities at 178 missions in 110 countries.

Entities hosted and managed

25 other government departments and GAC

6 Canadian co-locators

5 foreign co-locators

Partners managed in Canada’s network abroad by coordinating position changes and effecting cost recovery (Canadian co-locators include crown corporations and provincial governments)

7, Common Service Delivery Points managed to enhance stewardship through standardized and streamlined business process, and to mitigate risks through increased internal controls, compliance and enhanced accountability at all levels

Business Environment

• Service delivery in an international context requires a nuanced policy lens and adjustments to processes and activities to take into account local standards, laws and cultures.  
• A shortage of shipping containers, skyrocketing shipping rates for certain routes, and congestion at international ports are having an impact on the relocation of personnel abroad and the delivery of projects at missions.
• Application of Duty of Care responsibilities across our mission network in a changing international environment.

Departmental Capacities

• Over $550M is allocated annually to missions for property and common services.
• Seven Common Service Delivery Points abroad provide missions with support services for local employee staffing, contracting, procurement, and financial transactions.
• GAC distribution, warehousing and logistic operations have been significantly impacted over the course of the pandemic and important operational changes were made to ensure diplomatic mail services
  could be maintained in a safe and secure environment for our employees.
• The Mission Operations division is the Centre of Expertise for providing functional guidance, policies and procedures supporting MCOs to deliver on seven main business lines.
• Senior level interdepartmental committees provide strategic direction and oversight on international operations.

Challenges

• Requiring a more agile evidence-based system and process to enable global footprint reallocation based on departmental priorities
• Whole of government coordination with varying client requirements adds to the complexity of managing the network.
• Chronic Shortage of MCOs increases risk exposure at missions and pressure to deliver GoC mandates abroad. Ongoing significant increase of temporary duty assignments.
• Difficulty recruiting qualified procurement and logistics specialists due to high demand across Government of Canada for experienced resources.
• Dependency on others for goods procurement due to the GAC goods procurement authority. This can result in lengthier processing time.

Procurement and Logistics abroad

>3100 contracts put in place

# of contracts awarded in 2022-23 in support of missions (e.g. goods, real property and servcies)

450.3K kg of diplomatic mail sent abroad

An increase of 96.1K kg over 2022-23

Asset management

736. number of soft-skinned and up-armoured vehicles managed at missions

6,500 & $55M, number and estimated value of works of art managed

Opportunities

• Continue development of data and key performance indicators to support management decisions on the footprint, strengthening centre of expertise, expanding finance, local staff, HR, contracting and procurement, and considering others (e.g. IM/IT, property, material management, Foreign Service Directives).
• Work towards resolving MCO staffing, training by implementing the revised workforce strategy.
• Identify and pilot increased delegation of authorities to missions.
• Continue supporting the GoC priority of reducing GAC’s carbon footprints via the procurement and deployment of low-emissions vehicles at both HQ and abroad.
• Complete large scale vaccine distribution and transportation of COVID-19 vaccines, boosters and pediatrics to missions abroad.

Summary of Senate Committee Sessions

Background and Timelines

• In late February 2022, the Chair of Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA), Senator Boehm, put forward a motion authorizing the committee to examine and report on the “Canadian foreign service and elements of the foreign policy machinery within ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ”, and on other related matters.
• Since its first meeting on the study on April 7, the Senate Committee has heard from over 50 witnesses during 15 sessions – including MINT, MINE and the four Deputy Ministers from ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ. MINA is expected to appear in June.
• Witnesses discussed several themes, including :
  • the interdepartmental leadership and coordinating role played by GAC in advancing Canada's interests abroad;
  • management of human resources, including recruitment, rotation and retention of foreign service officers;
  • treatment of locally engaged staff;
  • training, including language skills, and geographic and thematic expertise;
  • diversity of Canada’s foreign service;
  • management and organizational culture;
  • impacts of the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT; and
  • coherence of Canada’s foreign policy.
• The Committee visited Washington and plans to undertake visits to Canadian missions in London, Oslo and Berlin
• The committee plans to submit its final report by December 2023.

Highlights of April 7th session:

• Need to build and value diplomatic and issue-specific expertisethrough ongoing professional development, sustained recruitment of talent with core skill sets reflective of the current global context and complex issues.
• Must adopt regular systemic hiring mechanisms to address severe understaffing situation and lack of surge capacity.
• Need for increased investment and sustained commitment to trainingthrough the employees' full career cycle, including official and foreign language training. 
• HoM Appointments from outside the public service should be strategic and an exception. 
• Need to examine the roles of non-FS staff as well, including LES to attract high caliber officers in competitive markets.  
• High level of risk aversion in decision making –  recommend flattening of accountabilities and devolution of greater decision-making authority to lower and field levels.
• Need to review “Duty of Care”doctrine and achieve appropriate balance between safety and security of staff with presence and visibility required to remain relevant and engaged in volatile contexts.
• GAC must regain its central agency status – bring the global story to the centre as global and domestic issues are intrinsically linked.
• Need to develop a robust policy planning function to identify key long term strategic priorities, anticipate emerging issues and challenges, introduce new ideas and solutions, bring coherence to responses. 
• Need increased coherence especially between trade and development 
• Must further engage with Canadians through public affairs programs and events -  domestic outreach to better support with international engagement.

Witnesses

• Pamela Isfeld, PAFSO President  
• Michael Small, President Canadian Ambassadors Alumni Association  
• Daniel Livermore, Honorary Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa-
• Margaret Biggs, Matthews Fellow in Global Public Policy, Queen’s University  
• Pierre Guimond, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of International Studies, Laval University  
• Ben Rowswell, CIC President 

Highlights of April 28th session:

• Current Foreign Service (FS) is “fit-for-purpose” for now, but Canada’s Foreign Service capacity has decreased over the past 15 years and there is space for improvement.
• Need to maintain the Foreign Service (FS) as a dedicated and specific profession; the skill of diplomacy is highly specific and developed over time, involving network and relationship building and intercultural competencies.
• Need for a GAC Deputy Minister to be appointed Head of the Foreign Service reporting to the Clerk of the Privy Council. 
• Need for FS to be more exposed to the work of domestic ministries, especially at the EX levels. 
• Need to appoint more Francophones in senior management positions so that the department can resume engaging meaningfully with global francophone diplomatic networks.
• Need a straightforward recruitment process and plans for retention for FS positions to attract the very best and brightest. 
• Impacts of amalgamation and ongoing challenges, particularly on the Development stream where there has been a loss of development experts and capacity.
• LES are the backbone of our operations abroad and priority should be given for them to be recruited, retained and appropriately compensated and appreciated
• Need for better and more robust integration of digital and security concerns into policy.
• Importance of formal and informal mentorship
• Questions around proportion of staff who should be stationed at HQ versus at missions abroad for maximum efficiency.
• Hierarchy as being necessary for maintaining chain of command, but need for more space for creativity, innovation and the capacity to absorb risk.

Witnesses

• Abbie Dann, Former Ambassador to Ukraine and Consul General to Brazil, Member of the Board of Directors, Canadian Executive Service Organization (CESO)  
• Gilles Rivard, Former Ambassador to the United Nations and Haiti; Fellow, Montreal Institute of International Studies  
• Len Edwards, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2007-2010) and International Trade (2001-2004) 

Questions from Senators in the June 9th Session: 

• How does GAC collaborate with IRCC and other departments to deliver services to Canadians abroad and support emerging democracies?
• What are you doing to measure progress towards diversity and inclusion?
• Will the findings of this study be made public? Is the March deadline enough time for this review?
• Development is sometimes viewed as a secondary vocation – what are the attrition rates for former CIDA staff? Does the department feel it has the tools and resources it needs for the development stream?
• What are the geopolitical areas of focus right now and some emerging areas of importance? What are the long-term strategies and timelines?
• What digital technology will help revitalize our Foreign Service?
• What are some of the challenges related to our response in Afghanistan?
• How are LES vetted?
• What is the state of the current pipeline of recruits? What is the number of current vacancies and how are these distributed?
• Are there processes in place for more senior and mid-career professionals to enter the Foreign Service?
• How is GAC doing deeper thinking around the future of the world order post-invasion of Ukraine ?
• What is the impact of having non-career diplomats in HOM positions?
• Will this review have the flexibility to take into account current complexities in the short and long term given the timelines for the project?
• Is Canada’s presence in Africa sufficient? How do we enhance our trade relationships on the African continent?
• What is the procedure and length of time for Foreign Service recruitment?
• How are staff members compensated for hardship posts?
• How does the Foreign Service adapt to changes in political leadership?
• How do we provide consular services to Canadians in risky areas?
• Do we have any diplomatic communication with Russia?
• Why is morale so low in the Foreign Service? What are some of the main challenges?
• Is GAC establishing processes and standard operating procedures for future crises (including having surge capacity)?

Witnesses

• Marta Morgan, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Ret.)
• David Morrison, Deputy Minister of International Trade
• Christopher MacLennan, Deputy Minister of International Development
• Cindy Termorshuizen, Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Highlights of the June 16th Session: 

• Need to increase coordination with other governmental organizations who have interests abroad, particularly those with expertise in areas of emerging importance (i.e. climate, health and cyber);
• Witnesses briefly discussed what PCO’s role is in interdepartmental coordination for Canada’s Foreign Service and foreign affairs.
• Need to liaise and build closer partnerships with the provinces who have interests and presence abroad (especially Quebec who is very active in diplomacy).
• Re-iterating the need to grow and maintain a surge capacity, as well as the importance of re-evaluating and re-invigorating the level of the foreign service presence abroad (noted several times that only 18% of FS are posted abroad).
  • Need for more ‘Foreign’ and more ‘Service’: i.e. more people and more presence abroad; importance of maintaining annual recruitment cycles.
• Pressed on whether it is necessary to maintain a career foreign service, witnesses maintained that is it but highlighted that the field should be permeable to mid-career entry and facilitate and incentivize exchange with OGDs and other sectors.
  • Diplomacy is a language that needs to be learned, practiced, developed, maintained, and cultivated but benefits from diversity of experience.
  • There is no formula for balancing non-career diplomatic appointments.
• Balancing risk, trust and judgement in uncertain times and complex crises is important but even when public servants are encouraged to speak truth to power, mistakes are still possible.
• On risk aversion and oversight in decision making it was noted that every level has the potential to add value and many oversight mechanisms are required by Parliament.
• Importance of investing public and cultural diplomacy.
• Noted that Canada is increasingly becoming a country of immigrants, in which diaspora politics has diplomatic impacts. 
• Need to leverage new technology to update consular processes; need for a separate review of technological infrastructure in government.
• Emergency management and consular capacity is essential; standard operating procedures with flexible responses and rapid deployment is needed.
• Witnesses encouraged the committee to speak to senior locally engaged staff members to better understand their experiences.
• Senators also remarked the attendance of a GAC official at a Russian Embassy event and asked witnesses to speak to the culture and the systemic issues that allowed this attendance to occur.

Witnesses

• Morris Rosenberg, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Ian Shugart, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Clerk of the Privy Council
• Patricia Fortier, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of International Affairs, University of Ottawa
• Colin Robertson, Vice-President and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute
• Randolph Mank, President, MankGlobal Inc. and former ambassador to Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia

Highlights of the September 28th Session:

• Noting the entrenched and systemic nature of challenges that seem to remain unchanged throughout multiple generations, young employees encourage taking bold transformative action.
• Note frustrations with human resources and see solving HR-related challenges as a pre-requisite to being ‘fit-for purpose’.
• Need to reform the FS recruitment process to be more regular, transparent and efficient, relying less on standardized tests which do not assess the competences needed of officers.
• Linguistic, thematic, geographic expertise should be better prioritized in recruitment.
• More targeted recruitment of visible minorities and outreach to universities outside of Ontario and Quebec is needed to improve the diversity of representation within GAC and the Foreign Service.
• Need to expand onboarding, mentorship and professional development opportunities for young employees including opportunities to attend senior-level meetings and be posted abroad.
• Emerging risks related to mental health and employee wellbeing have been exacerbated by the pandemic combined with ever-increasing priorities and chronic understaffing.
• Need to reform hierarchical corporate culture as slow bureaucratic processes can take up valuable time instead of being used for high-level strategic thinking and experimentation.
• Risk aversion is a real impediment to innovation, need to place more trust in employees, increase horizontal decision making and encourage a less rigid corporate culture.
• Need to create a more permeable organization and increase communication and exchange with
• YPN vision for ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ is a diverse, inclusive and people-centered department that prioritizes its employees, works efficiently and demonstrates its values through action.

Witnesses from GAC’s Young Professionals Network (YPN):

• Marissa Fortune, Project Lead YPN Vision 2030, Analyst, Future of Diplomacy Project
• Julien Labrosse, YPN Member, Visits Officer, Office of Protocol
• Sejal Tiwari, YPN Co-Representative, Development Officer

Highlights of the October 6^th and 19^th Sessions: OGD Witnesses

October 6^th Highlights:

• All noted the importance of having a whole-of-government approach to international issues and ensuring close collaboration, communication and coherence between government departments;
• CSIS emphasized the important role of information and intelligence sharing amongst domestic partners and foreign agencies (ex. Five Eyes).
• Gill noted importance of digital transformation, specifically for IRCC’s service delivery but also for CSIS and RCMP in ensuring safety from cyber threats and online misinformation.
• Movement between GAC and OGDs is an added benefit and deepens inter-departmental linkages (witnesses did not cite specific barriers to movement).
• Witnesses from CSIS and RCMP expressed satisfaction with the MOUs governing their relationships with GAC.
• Duty of Care is top of mind and an ever-present concern; there is close collaboration but ultimately it is the responsibility of GAC and the heads of mission.
• On duty of care and compensation/benefits for LES, IRCC noted this is also the responsibility of GAC.
• Regarding recruitment witnesses noted they consider multiple factors including experience, expertise, foreign languages, and diversity. RCMP and CSIS do not recruit specifically for international opportunities while IRCC recruits FS officers via post secondary recruitment and other intakes.
• Witnesses also responded to questions around events in Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iran.

October 19^th Highlights:

• CBSA staff posted abroad are recruited through regular channels then invited to apply to postings abroad once they have gained experience; ECCC and AAFC noted similar processes.
• For ECCC and CBSA specific skills looked for in selecting staff for postings include international interest, interpersonal and intercultural skills, foreign languages, diplomatic sensibility, diversity.
• OGDs rely on GAC and CFSI for some training but also do in-house training prior to posting staff abroad.
• OGDs rely on GAC for international platform and services abroad, HOM responsible for duty of care for employees.
• There is staff mobility between OGDs and GAC (specifically ECCC, limited for CFIA)
• LES are essential to OGD function abroad as they assist with cultural and linguistic knowledge and continuity.
• AAFC noted the importance of integrating LES into the broader portfolio team including by bringing them to Ottawa once a year for in-person meetings
  • AAFC noted the importance of integrating LES into the broader portfolio team including by bringing them to Ottawa once a year for in-person meetings

October 6^th Witnesses:

• Newton Shortliffe, Acting Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
• Liam Price, Director General, International Special Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
• Pemi Gill, Director General, International Network, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
• Karim Virani, Director General, Integrated Planning and Coordination, IRCC

October 19^th Witnesses:

• Stephen de Boer, Assistant Deputy Minister, International Affairs Branch, ECCC (former Ambassador to the WTO and Poland)
• Jean-Marie Huddleston, Director General, Bilateral Affairs and Trade, ECCC
• Catherine Stewart, Ambassador for Climate Change
• Natasha Manji, Director General, International Policy and Partnerships Directorate, CBSA
• Kathleen Donohue, Assistant Deputy Minister and Vice-President, International Affairs Branch, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency
• Marie-Noëlle Desrochers, Acting Chief Agriculture Negotiator and Director General, Trade Agreements and Negotiations, AAFC
• Nathalie Durand, Executive Director, Horizontal and Strategic Initiatives, Canadian Food Inspection Agency

Highlights of the October 20th Session:

• Professor Paris has initiated a taskforce (co-chaired by Meredith Lilly) made up of key experts and senior officials to look into pressing policy issues and will seek to have a report by the spring.
• Need for surge capacity to be able to respond to consecutive crises that have become the norm without interrupting core business.
• Need to strengthen strategic planning capacity and equip GAC to fill a think-tank-like role within Canada to augment analysis and foresight.
  • On the other hand, there is no problem with being reactive as long as GAC is intentional, nimble and effective about it.
• Need a more permeable HR model that allows for mid-career entry of non-government professionals and for FS officers to gain experience in other sectors.
• Need to increase strategic expertise in key areas (critical technology, Asian languages, climate).
• Importance of maintaining political leadership for longer periods of time and avoiding high-ministerial turnover. There have been 15 Foreign Ministers in 22 years and this limits the scope of strategic objectives that can be achieved.
• Less ministerial turnover may also assist with risk-averse culture as it takes time to build up trust, relationships and confidence to take chances on creative solutions.
• Deputy Ministers should have foreign service experience and partisan political appointments should be limited.
• Need to articulate a unified vision of the role and value of Canadian diplomacy.
• For trade policy, our value is in negotiating and establishing rules that are in our interests, and Canadian trade negotiators are internationally renown.
• The international domain is directly connected to daily realities of Canadians (pandemic, security, economy, climate etc.) this can be a wake up call to take foreign policy seriously.

Witnesses:

• Roland Paris, Full Professor and Director, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa
• Adam Chapnick, Professor of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College

Issues Raised by Senators at the November 3^rd Session:

• International crises which used to be rare are becoming increasingly frequent and the department needs to be agile in its responses.
• We have shown we have the capacity to adjust our presence quickly and adapt to changing realities on the ground (ex. Ukraine) but we will need to continue to be flexible.
• Highlighting the importance of Defence and Development working in collaboration in situations of humanitarian crisis (ex. Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan etc.)
• Importance of providing ongoing support to Afghanistan and addressing immigration concerns.
• Need to improve the accessibility of the foreign service to improve geographic representation for provinces such as BC where young professionals are less likely to be
• Need to better leverage Canada’s diversity.
• Since amalgamation there are vacancies in the FSIA stream but what is important is to have enough staff abroad to implement programs and have the right level of delegated authority.
• Amalgamation has been an advantage that allows for greater integration, but it has not always been smooth and there is room for improvement in having more synergy between the streams.
• Having mechanisms facilitating greater dialogue and exchange with ministerial counterparts in other countries would be beneficial.
• Importance of monitoring, evaluating and tracking the results of our local investments.
• Importance of having a whole of government approach in addressing global issues such as food security.
• PCO plays an important role in coordinating policy across the government of Canada and there is an appropriate balance of policy-making authority.
• Areas of expertise that will be needed in the future include expertise around the intersections of climate, agriculture, health and innovative finance.
• Need avenues for mid-career entry of specialists into the department.

Witness:

• The Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan, C., M.P., Minister of International Development and Minister responsible for the Pacific Economic Development Agency of Canada

Highlights of the November 30^th Session: Panel 1

Panel 1: Focus on DND/CAF-GAC Coordination:

• The Canadian Defence Attaché office is part of Canada’s permanent global military presence and is critical to the success of Canada’s global engagement.
• At any time, there are 100+ defence attachés operating out of our missions abroad (currently around 110 [21 are women] in 45 countries covering a total of 145 countries).
• GAC and DND/CAF coordinate very closely on issues of mutual interest including international security, Women Peace and Security, Indo-Pacific, Arctic, Afghanistan etc. and enjoy a close formal an informal institutional relationship.
• Cross-fertilization between DND/CAF and the rest of the public service, including GAC, is highly beneficial.
• Currently undergoing a reconstitution program to reinvigorate, modernize and humanize recruitment and retention within the organization to fill vacancies and create a workforce that looks like Canada.
• Recruitment and attrition issues in CAF/DND partially due to COVID, partially due to the need for culture change, and partially from increased competition over staff.
• DND/CAF are currently in the midst of a study of their global footprint to assess their presence and capabilities and ensure they have the right number of staff abroad, results of this study should be available by February or March 2023.

Witnesses:

• Major-General Blaise Frawley, Deputy Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
• Major-General Greg Smith, Director General International Security Policy, Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces

Highlights of the November 30^th Session: Panel 2

Panel 2: Focus on Special Agency Status Considerations

• Arguments for Special Agency Status: (Doreen Steidle)
  • Lingering and recurring challenges in the department (GAC) that resurface across multiple decades and reviews highlight the need for meaningful structural transformation.
  • Need for creative solutions and new structures that will position GAC for success in the 21st century global environment.
  • Separate agencies are given the flexibility and obligations to manage their own internal rules and regulations – flexibility that is necessary when managing the complexity of staff rotationality.
  • Opportunity to staff independently based on needs and specific operational requirements, opportunity to improve recruitment, retention and create a department with less layers, less hierarchy, less categories.

• Arguments against Special Agency Status: (TBS and PCO)
  • High risk involved - process is highly disruptive with huge transaction costs, time and resource intensive, and may not fix the issues that it intends to.
  • Decreased opportunities for beneficial interchange between GAC and other government departments.
  • Scope of undertaking would need to be defined: potential to radically impact legislation, policies and programs, collective bargaining and unions, staffing categories, salary, pensions, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment.
  • There is currently a lot of flexibility within the rules that exist – with creative leadership and dynamic interpretation there are options to move forward without creating new structures.
  • FSDs can be simplified through the cyclical negotiation process.

Witnesses:

• Doreen Steidle, Former Ambassador (Singapore, Hong Kong and Macau, China)
• Marie-Chantal Girard, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Employee Relations and Total Compensation, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
• Aline Taillefer-McLaren, Senior Director of the Union Engagement and the National Joint Council Support, Employee Relations and Total Compensation Sector, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
• Allen Sutherland, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions, Privy Council Office

Highlights of the December 15^th Session:

• Canada’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy:
  • Dilemma of balancing human rights and rules based international order with trade considerations is built into how Canada negotiates agreements.
  • The IPS is an example of the importance of the nexus between trade, development and diplomacy and of fostering innovation in the context of bureaucracy.
  • IPS is also a good example of working across portfolios and having a robust whole-of-government approach;
  • Stress the importance of having the right people and resources in place for implementation.
• Importance of working horizontally across portfolios, departments, sectors and systems
  • Core expertise that will be needed for the future is this aptitude for horizontality.
• The African continent is an important trading partner with whom we aspire to deepen our trade relationship through business to business connections, capacity building and joint work on combatting climate change.
  • The Future of Diplomacy Initiative is considering our global footprint and its work will be important to deciding whether to expand our presence abroad, including in Africa.
• Amalgamation has created advantages for the department; trade, international assistance and foreign policy benefit from one another and work better when they are together.
• People are our greatest asset; need to better leverage Canadian expats abroad, Canadian chambers of congress, and the Canadian business community.
• Canadian diversity is a strength and asset we should be leveraging through a workforce that is representative of Canada.
  • Need to support younger generation with training to help them become bilingual and maintain this throughout a career.
• Welcome recommendations on how to find synergies and opportunities for meaningful exchanges/mobility that benefit career paths between the public and private sectors.

Witness:

• The Honourable Mary Ng, C., M.P., Minister of International Trade, Export Promotion, Small Business and Economic Development

Highlights of the March 9^th Session:

• The fundamental role of the department is to promote Canadian values and interests.
• Amalgamation has not lived up to its potential. There is a need to further streamline trade, development and foreign policy across the department, and for a new integrated vision.
• There is a need to focus on specific foreign policy priorities. We cannot play on every field, and we are currently trying to spread ourselves too thin. If everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority.
• The department needs to develop practices to allow it to be agile and able to confront new challenges. The department should be able to re-prioritize quickly and deploy resources where needed.
• There is a need for diversity in views in the department in order to achieve better results. There needs to be an environment created where people are free to speak up, and where people are comfortable sharing a different perspective.
• Social media and technological advances are changing diplomacy in fundamental ways, and should be better leveraged. More expertise on cybersecurity is needed in the department.
• Young employees today are more mobile and ambitious than ever before, and retention of some of the best and brightest might be an issue if we do not focus more on career development.
• The department does not make it easy on partners/families of foreign service officers on posting, and there need to be more solutions for that.
• The position of Minister of Foreign Affairs should be “longer term”, and its incumbent should not be changed too frequently (as has been the case over the past two decades). A longer term provides a greater ability to establish and build trust and relationships, which are crucial for a successful Minister of Foreign Affairs.
• Ambassadors also should be appointed for longer-terms and chosen based on their expertise in particular regions.
• Canadians abroad are an untapped resource that should be explored and leveraged.

Witness:

• The Honourable John Baird, C., Former Minister of Foreign Affairs

Highlights of the March 22^th Session:

• Previously, the department of External Affairs was regarded as ‘elite’ in the government of Canada and Ministerial staff came in with deep respect for the quality of the foreign service and its advice. There is an impression that the mutual respect and partnership between the political level and the public service has decreased over the decades.
• Emphasized the importance of experience abroad for officers being appointed to senior roles in the department as this enriches their understanding and advice. Experiences abroad should start early in a career and the more time spent on the ground the better.
• Canada’s historical identity as a colony has been important to it’s evolution on the world stage, as have been the changing types of immigration over the years which have impacted Canadian culture, perspectives and attitudes and will continue to do so.
• Noted the advantages of Canada’s membership in forums such as la Francophonie and the Commonwealth, and the advantages Canada has earned through its positive international reputation.
• Canada used to have a disproportionate impact and presence in Africa (for example through CIDA, la Francophonie and anti-apartheid efforts) and this has decreased over the years but should be given greater attention.
• The loss of the 2020 UN Security Council campaign can be traced back to the fact that Canada entered late but also no longer enjoys the status it once did in the global system and nothing has been done since the election to improve this.
• Canada should seek to learn from countries such as Norway who “punch above their weight” internationally.
• Highlighted the importance of the “off-stage” work of diplomacy and how this has suffered in the age of new media. Privacy was often an important tool of diplomacy which exists in smaller quantities today.
• Informal conversations and relationship-building are essential to the craft of diplomacy.
• When asked about the culture of risk aversion and hesitancy to speak in dissent, he remarked that frankness and honestly was not an issue during his time in the department as they had cultivated an environment of mutual respect and also made use of privacy for crucial conversations.
• There is an advantage to longer tenure for Foreign Ministers as it takes time to build knowledge, trust and relationships.
• Noted that Canada doesn’t necessarily need greater focus to its foreign policy because the problem is not where we operate but how we operate; there is a need to move away from a foreign policy focused on statements and declarations and toward one of change.

Witness:

• The Right Honourable Joe Clark, C., Former Minister of Foreign Affairs

Witness:

• The Right Honourable Joe Clark, C., Former Minister of Foreign Affairs

Highlights of the April 19th Session:

• When employees join the department they do receive robust training from CFSI both to build expertise and to educate them on equity, diversity and inclusion in the workplace.
• While there has been progress in recent years, ADM McCardell and Ambassador Rekhi acknowledged the biggest gaps in representation in the department’s workforce continue to be Black employees, Indigenous peoples, and persons with disabilities.
• Witnesses highlighted how increasing diversity and representation improves policy advice and implementation. Diversity among recruitment team members was identified as another successful model to ensure diversity.
• Witnesses acknowledged the need to improve outreach to a broader range of universities around the country to improve GAC’s geographic diversity and representativeness of all of Canada’s provinces and territories.
• ADM McCardell confirmed that ab initio official language training was reinstated in the last FS recruitment intake after having been halted for several years due to resource constraints.
• All witnesses agreed there are areas of the FSDs that may require modernization and agreed to provide feedback in writing, examples of some areas that may need to be considered included:
• considering models for spousal employment support.
  • Supporting ageing parents who may wish to accompany their child on a diplomatic posting.
  • Supporting employees or dependents with disabilities and creating a system that allows for dignity and privacy.
  • Better support for 2SLGBTQI+ spouses and families posted abroad.
• The progress being made around representation has the possibility to improve retention and motivate diverse employees to envision themselves in senior positions.
• With regard to same-sex couples and 2SLGBTQI+ families, DG Wheeler noted the immense progress that has been made over the past 30 years around the recognition of same-sex partners and the support available for families, but there are still barriers and concerns which can impact 2SLGBTQI+ choices of where they are posted abroad.
• Executive Director Sharma noted that employees with disabilities may choose not to self-identify due to persistent fears that this will limit their career opportunities because of negative stigmas around disabilities. In addition, the complex system of FSDs and navigating postings as a person with a disability or a disabled dependent is a strong disincentive to going abroad.

Witnesses:

• Sandra McCardell, EGM and Champion of the Women Network
• Ayesha Rekhi, Ambassador to the Czech Republic and Champion for the Visible Minorities Network
• Vikas Sharma, Executive Director, Andean Region Division and Champion for the Persons with Disabilities Network
• Stewart Wheeler, Chief of Protocol of Canada and Champion of the 2SLGBTQI+ Network

Highlights of the April 20^th Session:

• One of the greatest assets of the department is its highly trained staff and networks of communication which offer unparalleled intelligence and advice.
• Emphasized the importance of having strong two-way communications channels between HQ and missions and believes that GAC has not devoted enough attention to being a repository for information, especially with regard to intelligence, interference and new technologies.
• With today’s technology, communication should be a stronger preoccupation.
• Similarly to in the 90s, GAC has been suffering with decreased budgets, but there is a need to recast and redesign how decisions are made and have the department take a more central role in the international presence and direction of Canada.
• There is open space now to innovate and convene allies on a host of issues that others are not paying attention to including migration, the nuclear threat and democratic reform. Canada is not contributing enough to these conversations and should take a more active leadership role.
• Expressed that we have worn away the knowledge and experience of the foreign service by not investing in it appropriately. The department must correct the mistake of cutting off access to Canadians, think tanks and academics and should regain the role of convener and mobilizer.
• Indicated that the recruitment of FS officers should cast a wider net to take advantage of Canadian diversity. We should re-evaluate entry criteria and look for other kinds of emerging expertise (ex. Climate, technology) and that the department should create an internship program at missions and HQ.
• Expressed that building friendships and influencing states on the African continent has become more challenging now with Russia and China moving in.
• Noted that both defence and foreign affairs have been underfinanced and need increased investment to respond to modern challenges like arctic security and climate change. Argued there should be reinvestment but it should be accompanied by rethinking how money is used.
• Countries that are “punching above their weight” could include Norway, Costa Rica and countries in eastern Europe like Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Witness:

• The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, C., Former Foreign Affairs Minister
• The department should set up a center for better outreach and consultation and innovation must be supported at the ministerial level to be successful.

Cultural Diplomacy

• ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ and our network of missions abroad engage in cultural diplomacy to build bridges and strengthen people-to-people ties. Cultural diplomacy has been used for decades, and will remain an important tool in promoting Canada’s foreign policy objectives.
• The dedicated funding for ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s Cultural Diplomacy Program ended on March 31, 2023. 
• Our missions abroad will continue to lead and advance cultural diplomacy to meet departmental priorities by using mission budgets to support priority initiatives. Missions will also have the option to use other funds to advance cultural diplomacy, building on existing partnerships with Canadian cultural stakeholders.

Supplementary Messages

• We welcomed the 2019 Senate Report on cultural diplomacy, for its extensive analysis, and recommendations. It informed the department’s cultural diplomacy activities such as officer training and outreach to provinces.
• I expect that missions will continue to leverage other internal funds to advance cultural diplomacy, and Canada’s arts and culture sectors will continue to be supported by GAC’s Trade Commissioner Service, notably through its Creative Industries Trade Program Fund as part of the Creative Export Strategy (CES).
• If asked about cultural diplomacy strategy mandate
  • We continue to actively consider the development of a Cultural Diplomacy Strategy, working with PCH. We have notably engaged cultural stakeholders to see how to collaboratively seize opportunities abroad and help shape a future approach, including developing performance indicators for cultural diplomacy.
• If asked about CES cultural diplomacy positions
  • A number of positions funded as part of Creative Industries trade promotion program will be maintained. We expect, however, that cultural diplomacy positions in our missions abroad and at Headquarters will be affected though funding remains in place for now.

Supporting Facts and Figures

• The CES previously funded 5 cultural diplomacy positions (ABDBI, CNGNY, BRLIN, LDN, PARIS), 4 creative industries trade positions (LNGLS, CNGNY, LDN, PARIS), and 4.5 hybrid positions (MXICO, SHNGI, TOKYO, MMBAI, SYDNY(.5)).
  • Trade obtained funding under Budget 2023 to maintain the majority of the hybrid positions as full trade positions (MXICO, SHNGI, MMBAI).
• To date, 2,536 MCF initiatives have been reported (avg. 362 per year).
• The MCF was accessible by all missions (175). 127 missions accessed the Fund in all regions since its inception.
• Missions have spent $15M over the past 7 years in cultural diplomacy initiatives.
• 75% of MCF initiatives have been reported to have met intended targets.
• The average cost of an MCF initiative is around $6,000.
• Film screenings have the lowest average cost per initiative at just over $3,000.
• Top 5 themes for all MCF initiatives:
  • Canada’s Global Image: 1,576 initiatives / 62%
  • Market Access and Trade Facilitation: 261 initiatives / 10%
  • Individual rights, Freedom of expression: 205 initiatives / 8%
  • Gender Equality, LGBTI, Women: 172 initiatives / 7%
  • Indigenous issues: 116 initiatives / 5%
• Canada’s Global Image is the leading category for MCF, leveraged to advance Canada’s image, reputation, and influence through culture.

AEFA 02 Aug. letter to MINA and its response with annexes

Via email

The Honourable Melanie Joly, P.C., M.P. Minister of Foreign Affairs

Dear Minister Joly,

On February 24, 2022, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (the committee) was authorized by the Senate to study the Canadian foreign service and other elements of the foreign policy machinery at ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ. As a study such as this has not been done since the Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service in 1981, the committee was quite encouraged by your announcement, on May 30, of a comparable internal study currently underway at ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ.

Since its first meeting on the Senate study on April 7, the committee has heard from 18 invited witnesses - including the four deputy ministers of ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ on June 9 - over nearly seven hours of testimony. The committee looks forward to welcoming you, Minister, as well as the Minister of International Trade and the Minister of International Development, to appear on this study in the coming months.

During the committee's initial meetings, witnesses discussed several themes, including the interdepartmental leadership and coordinating role played by ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ in advancing Canada's foreign policy; management of human resources; recruitment, rotation, and retention of foreign service officers; and treatment of locally-engaged staff. Another theme has

been training, including the resources required to develop the language skills and geographic and topical expertise of foreign service officers. The diversity of Canada's foreign service, as well as the management and organizational culture of ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ, have also been discussed.

The committee intends to continue its examination of these themes. It also intends to examine other relevant topics, including the mandate of the foreign service; conditions of foreign service; and the impact of the 2013 amalgamation of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International Development Agency on the foreign service and the coherence of Canada's foreign policy.

To facilitate its work, the committee requests answers from ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ, in English and French, to the questions contained in the annex. The committee looks forward to your input, Minister, and that of ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ, in its consideration of these important matters and would appreciate receiving the requested information by September 19, 2022.

Given that the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ are undertaking similar studies simultaneously and that both have the same goal of ensuring Canada's foreign service is in the best possible position to serve Canada, and Canadians, it is the hope of the committee that these exercises will be mutually beneficial.

Thank you, Minister. Yours sincerely,

The Honourable Peter M. Boehm, Chair

cc:     The Honourable V. Peter Harder, P.C., Deputy Chair

The Honourable Stephen Greene, Steering Committee Member

The Honourable Michael L. MacDonald , Steering Committee Member

Annex

1. Personnel
   • Broken down by year and by stream, how many foreign service officers have been employed by GAC over the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year and by stream, how many foreign service officer positions at GAC were vacant over the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year, how many non-rotational employees have worked for GAC over the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year, how many non-rotational positions at GAC were vacant over the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year, what percentage of GAC's Canada-based workforce has comprised foreign service officers over the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year, what percentage of GAC's Canada-based workforce has comprised non-rotational employees over the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year, how many locally-engaged staff were employed by GAC worldwide over the past 20 years?
   • Broken own by year, what percentage of positions at Canadian missions and offices abroad has been occupied by LES over the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year, how many individuals, including non-rotational staff, occupied positions in each of the different thematic streams within the Canadian foreign service over the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year, hat percentage of GAC's workforce has comprised determinate employees, including short-term contractors and students, over the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year, what percentage of positions designated as part of the career foreign service has been filled by non-rotational employees over the past 20 years?
   • What percentage of positions at GAC are currently filled by term employees and students? Broken down by year, how many positions at GAC have been filled by term employees and students over the past 20 years?

2. Recruitment and Training
   • Apart from the nationwide entry-level foreign service recruitment processes that took place in 2019 and 2021, what other recruitment processes, competitions, or campaigns have been launched since 2010 to hire foreign service officers at all levels?
   • Broken down by year and by stream, how many new foreign service officers have been recruited into the department over the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year and by stream, what percentage of new foreign service officers occupied positions at GAC prior to joining the foreign service?
   • How does GAC determine the number of foreign service officers to recruit as part of each nationwide entry-level recruitment campaign?
   • What has GAC done specifically over the past 20 years, and what is it doing on an ongoing basis, to ensure that the Canadian foreign service is representative of Canada's cultural, linguistic, and geographic diversity as well as traditionally underrepresented groups, including women, Indigenous peoples, and visible minorities?
   • What specific onboarding training do new foreign service officers receive?
   • What are the average and median ages of serving foreign service officers?

3. Diplomatic Postings
   • Broken down by year and by stream, over the past 20 years, what percentage of foreign service officers were posted at a mission abroad and what percentage were based in Canada?
   • What percentage of Canadian heads of mission posts - and which ones specifically - are currently held by individuals that are not career foreign service officers?
   • What percentage of Canadian heads of mission posts - and which ones specifically - are currently held by women?
   • Broken down by year and by stream, what percentage of diplomatic postings abroad were occupied by non-career foreign service officers over the past 20 years? Which posts specifically were occupied by such individuals?
   • On average, how many years after joining the foreign service is a new foreign officer posted abroad for the first time?
   • Is there a probationary period for newly hired foreign service officers? Ifso, how long?

4. Retention and Attrition
   • Over the past 20 years, what percentage of Canadian foreign service officers have left the department after less than five years of service, after less than 10 years, and after a first posting abroad?
   • What percentage of foreign service officers have resigned following extended foreign language training? What percentage has resigned following training in a language considered difficult to learn? Which languages? '
   • What percentage of foreign service officers must complete foreign language training before a posting? In which languages? What percentage has successfully completed foreign language training? What percentage has not?
   • Does GAC conduct exit interviews with foreign service officers resigning from GAC? If so, what are the main reasons cited as contributing to their departures?
   • Broken down by year and by stream, how many foreign service officers have resigned or retired from GAC in the past 20 years?
   • Broken down by year, what has been the attrition rate in the foreign service over the past 20 years?

5. Conditions of Foreign Service
   • Annually, on average over the past 20 years, apart from repatriation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, what percentage of foreign service officers has ended a posting abroad prematurely? What are the main reasons cited for ending a posting prematurely?
   • How often are the Foreign Service Directives reviewed? What role is played by each stakeholder? Are foreign service officers consulted during the review? If so, how?
   • The 1981 McDougall report on the conditions of foreign service listed several issues regarding spouses of foreign service officers. For example, the report recognized that spouses carry a large "burden of adjustment on every move;" that the rotational system demanded that accompanying spouses give up their careers; and that the rotational system prevented accompanying spouses from accessing unemployment insurance and government pension plans. What percentage of accompanying spouses are currently employed in the country where they are posted? In which countries has this been possible and in which has it not been possible? How many reciprocal spousal employment agreements are in place with other countries and international organizations? What services and benefits are offered to accompanying spouses to support them in their own careers?
   • The 1981 McDougall report identified that spouses of heads of missions were "unpaid employee[s] of the Canadian government." Currently, what role are accompanying spouses, particularly spouses of heads of missions, expected to play while posted abroad?

• On average over the past 20 years, what percentage of foreign service officers posted abroad were posted with a non-foreign service officer spouse? Which countries? What percentage of foreign services officers were posted alongside a spouse who was also a foreign service officer? What percentage of foreign service officers posted abroad were single? What percentage of foreign service officers posted abroad were single parents? Please provide gender disaggregated data where possible.
• Has the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in new standard operating procedures regarding duty of care and practical application of the Foreign Service Directives?
• Have any duty of care adjustments been made because of "Havana Syndrome"?

6. Mission Network
   • Please provide a detailed list, organized by regions of the world, regarding each mission and office that Canada currently operates globally. This should include the number of employees at each mission and office along with the titles of their positions.
   • How many co-location agreements does Canada have with other countries as part of its diplomatic network? In which countries does Canada co-locate its diplomatic offices with those of other countries?
   • In which countries does Canada operationalize consular sharing agreements or memoranda of understanding with other countries?
   • During her appearance before the committee on June 9, 2022, Marta Morgan, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that Canada's network of missions abroad supports the international work of 21 other federal departments, three Crown corporations, six provincial governments, six foreign governments, and some international organizations. Please provide a detailed list of the federal, provincial, and international partners using Canada's network of missions abroad.

7. Amalgamation of DFAIT and CIDA
   • How has GAC's organizational structure and governance framework changed since the 2013 amalgamation?
   • How is the department evaluating the degree to which policy coherence has improved or not, since the amalgamation?

8. Diplomacy that is Fit-for-Purpose
   • The Minister of Foreign Affairs Briefing Book from October 2021 notes that GAC intends to "move away from the traditional bricks and mortar and embrace more modem engagement methods to drive diplomacy, trade and international development." What are some of these "modem engagement methods"?
   • How has the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the way GAC engages internationally?
   • Is the department considering modifying the current allocation of resources at missions abroad considering how diplomacy was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic? Are there potential savings involved (e.g. virtual consultations in lieu of travel)?
   • What specific tools, in particular virtual platforms, has GAC developed or relied upon since the COVID-19 pandemic began to support Canada's diplomatic, trade, and development objectives internationally?

9. Interdepartmental Coordination
   • How does GAC coordinate with other federal departments that have international divisions, responsibilities, or mandates? With which departments does GAC coordinate?
   • How many GAC employees, specifically foreign service officers, and at what level, are currently seconded to or are under interchange agreements with other departments and agencies? How many employees from other departments and agencies are currently seconded to or are under interchange agreements with GAC?
   • Over the past 20 years, broken down by year, how many GAC employees, specifically foreign service officers, and at what level, have been seconded to or have been under interchange agreements with other departments and agencies? Over the past 20 years, broken down by year, how many employees from other departments and agencies have been seconded to or have been under interchange agreements with GAC?

STANDING COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Study on the Canadian foreign service and elements of the foreign policy machinery within ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ

Cover Note

The purpose of this cover note is to provide some explanation to the data.

Note 1: It is understood that all questions related to “Foreign Service” refers to the subset component of our workforce having rotationality as part of their conditions of employment. 

Note 2:  Due to the amalgamation with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 2013 and the fact that both original departments were using different IT system to track employment, we are only able to report back on data to 2014. This falls short of the original request of going back 20 years on many questions.

Note 3: In 2018, and as a result of the Amalgamation with CIDA, the Department created another rotational stream to fully recognize the Foreign Service International Assistance (FSIA) officers as an integral part of the departmental rotational system. To do so, the department has reclassified all International Assistance positions abroad and several positions at headquarters to officially integrate them into the rotational pool as a condition of employment.  The appointment of FSIA people was done through a selection process that started in 2018, making the final data only available when that process was complete in 2020.

Note 4: In the Q2 table, the number showing the FSIA stream vacancies is not representative of the real number.  It shows that on March 31, 2020, when the data was generated, the system was in transition as the Department was creating the new FSIA positions (please refer to Note 2 and 3)

Note 5: Questions number 14, 15 and 26 would require a large amount of manual manipulation of the data, which proves impossible to do within the current timelines, and we have, therefore, been unable to provide an answer to it at this stage. For Q36, this personal information is not tracked in our database. The resources required to collect such information would be very significant, and this could not be done in time to meet the Senate's deadline.

Note 6: Responses to questions 17 and 47 will follow as soon as possible.

Personnel

1. Broken down by year and by stream, how many foreign service officers have been employed by GAC over the past 20 years?

Data source: Human Resources Management system (HRMS) as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note: Foreign service officers are defined as Canada Based Staff (CBS) rotational employees.

Produced by HSF in August 2022.

2. Broken down by year and by stream, how many foreign service officer positions at GAC were vacant over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note: Foreign service officers are defined as CBS rotational employees.

Produced by HSF in August 2022.

3. Broken down by year, how many non-rotational employees have worked for GAC over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022 / Source des données: SGRH au 30 juin 2014 et 31 mars 2015 à 2022.

Note: Non-rotational employees are CBS only (excluding Locally Eengaged Staff (LES)).

Produced by HSF in August 2022.

4. Broken down by year, how many non-rotational positions at GAC were vacant over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note: Non-rotational positions for CBS only.

Produced by HSF in August 2022.

5. Broken down by year, what percentage of GAC’s Canada-based workforce has comprised foreign service officers over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note: Foreign service officers are defined as CBS rotational employees.

Produced by HSF in August 2022.

6. Broken down by year, what percentage of GAC’s Canada-based workforce has comprised non-rotational employees over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note: Non-rotational employees are CBS only (excluding LES).

Produced by HSF in August 2022.

7. Broken down by year, how many locally-engaged staff were employed by GAC worldwide over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note: LES employees (excluding CBS).

Produced by HSF in August 2022.

8. Broken down by year, what percentage of positions at Canadian missions and offices abroad has been occupied by LES over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Produced by HSF in August 2022.

9. Broken down by year, how many individuals, including non-rotational staff, occupied positions in each of the different thematic streams within the Canadian foreign service over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note: Occupied positions in each of the streams are considered rotational positions.

Produced by HSF in August 2022.

10. Broken down by year, what percentage of GAC’s workforce has comprised determinate employees, including short-term contractors and students, over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note: For the purpose of this question, determinate employees include all CBS and LES who are not indeterminate; these could be either term, casual, student or emergency.

Produced by HSF in August 2022

11. Broken down by year, what percentage of positions designated as part of the career foreign service has been filled by non-rotational employees over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Produced by HSF in August 2022.

12. What percentage of positions at GAC are currently filled by term employees and students? Broken down by year, how many positions at GAC have been filled by term employees and students over the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note 1: Answer includes all CBS and LES who are either term or student.

Note 2: Percentages cannot be calculated in function of number of position but in relation of number of employees, because all students and some of the terms are not assigned to a position in HRMS.

Produced by HSF in August 2022

Recruitment and Training

13. Apart from the nationwide entry-level foreign service recruitment processes that took place in 2019 and 2021, what other recruitment processes, competitions, or campaigns have been launched since 2010 to hire foreign service officers at all levels?

14. Broken down by year and by stream, how many new foreign service officers have been recruited into the department over the past 20 years?

See note 5

15. Broken down by year and by stream, what percentage of new foreign service officers occupied positions at GAC prior to joining the foreign service?

See note 5

16. How does GAC determine the number of foreign service officers to recruit as part of each nationwide entry-level recruitment campaign?

GAC determines the number of foreign service officers to recruit based on analysis of data such as the number of funded positions and the number of rotational employees, in all rotational pools and all streams, including taking into account projected promotions, attrition and historical trends of Leave without pay (LWOP) as a non-discretionary measure offered to employees through their condition of employment and part of their collective agreement.

17. What has GAC done specifically over the past 20 years, and what is it doing on an ongoing basis, to ensure that the Canadian foreign service is representative of Canada’s cultural, linguistic, and geographic diversity as well as traditionally underrepresented groups, including women, Indigenous peoples, and visible minorities?

We are committed to an inclusive workplace where all employees feel welcome and comfortable. We have Action Plans to reach compliance with the Employment Equity legislation as well as a larger strategy that focuses on Diversity & Inclusion, Anti-Racism, and Reconciliation. We have also developed the relevant governance structure to support these initiatives namely the Anti-Racism Advisory Committee and a Diversity & Inclusion Council which are part of the larger GAC corporate governance. The Gender Based Analysis+ (GBA+) Guide ensures all key HR practices maintain a GBA+ lens. Every aspect of the staffing process including composition of the Selection boards for recruitment and promotion applies an Employment Equity lens to mitigate biasis. In other cases where significant gap exists, we proceed with specific and targeted hiring and promotion processes to certain groups. There is a sponsorship programme that provides opportunity for racialized groups and Persons with Disabilities to be sponsored by senior management in their career development. So far we have had positive results: increased rates of hiring and promotion for employment Equity groups are now allowing us to reduce gaps in representation (except for Persons with Disabilities). E.g.: Black Canadians represent 4.8% of GAC workforce, and 1.1% of Executives, but 7.6% of new hires in 2021-22, over twice their labour market availability (LMA).  

Francophones are well represented at GAC, with about 40% of employees who have French as their first Official Language. Representation in the EX cadre stands at about 20%. We have a number of initiatives to increase the use of both Official Languages in the workplace, from regular OL maintenance available to all employees to ensuring that appointments are made only for those with valid Second Language Evaluation results. Additionally, successful candidates in the Post Secondary Recruitment into the Foreign Service selected from across Canada are provided with training in their second Official Language to ensure that they are bilingual before they are offered a permanent position in ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ. 

These are important strides and over time, we are closing these gaps. However, we know we have to do more. How we increase equity groups’ representation in the Foreign Service is part of the department’s ongoing review exercise, The Future of Diplomacy, announced by Minister Joly and former Deputy Minister Morgan in May of this year.

1. The objective of this effort is to modernize and strengthen Canada’s capacity to engage globally so that the department remains well equipped to fulfill its mandates in the long term in a rapidly changing world.
2. One of the four pillars of the Future of Diplomacy review is “Our people” and focuses on ensuring we are able to recruit, retain and develop a diverse workforce with the qualities and skill sets required to meet the global challenges of today and tomorrow.

18. What specific onboarding training do new foreign service officers receive?

The Foreign Service Onboarding Program (FSOP) is a 2-year integration program designed to equip new Foreign Service Officers (FS-01) with an understanding of how the Canadian Foreign Service, and the unique streams within, contribute to Canada’s place on the global stage.  It is a comprehensive program that includes formal training, on-the-job learning, mentoring and practical exercises aimed at fostering a sense of community among the new recruits and at developing their international competencies:  Intercultural Proficiency, Resilience and Adaptability, Judgement in a Global Context, Influence and Alliance Building.  Before starting in the program, aspiring FS-01s who do not meet the official language requirements are offered full-time official language training on an Ab Initio basis. Once they achieve the required proficiency, they receive a letter of offer as an FS-01.

New FS-01s are assigned to an HQ division at the working level based on their stream: foreign policy and diplomacy, international trade, international assistance, or management, consular affairs, mission operations and emergency management.  They then begin their core program consisting of 150 hours of training on GAC’s policy and departmental priorities such as key bilateral relationships, multilateral diplomacy, indigenous issues, as well as training on foundational skills and knowledge including writing, digital engagement, economics, data analysis, GBA+, intercultural effectiveness, etc.  Participants are matched with a seasoned GAC mentor and invited to participate in quarterly topical discussions and networking events. Upon completion of the core training, new recruits are assigned to a multidisciplinary peer team to undertake a cross-Canada engagement project aimed at deepening their understanding of Canada and of issues of importance to Canadians. The next level of training occurs in smaller groups of various durations (from two to eight weeks) specific to their assigned stream.  Participants are tested for foreign language aptitude and encouraged to consider early career posting assignments that require a foreign language. Upon completion of the 2-year onboarding program, most FSOP participants will seek an overseas posting or a foreign language training assignment.

19. What are the average and median ages of serving foreign service officers?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note: Foreign service officers are defined as CBS rotational employees.

Produced by HSF in August 2022

Diplomatic Postings

20. Broken down by year and by stream, over the past 20 years, what percentage of foreign service officers were posted at a mission abroad and what percentage were based in Canada?

Data source: HRMS as of June 30, 2014 and March 31 of 2015 to 2022.

Note: Foreign service officers are defined as CBS rotational employees.

Produced by HSF in August 2022

21. What percentage of Canadian heads of mission posts — and which ones specifically — are currently held by individuals that are not career foreign service officers?

July 31, 2022

Percentage of HOM who are not Rotational employees: 10%

Data source: HRMS as of July 31, 2022 / Source des données: SGRH au 31 juillet 2022.

Note: Foreign service officers are defined as CBS rotational employees.

Produced by HSF in August 2022

22. What percentage of Canadian heads of mission (HOM) posts — and which ones specifically — are currently held by women?

Percentage of HOM who are Women: 47%

Data source: Posting records as of August 16, 2022

Note: foreign service officers are defined as CBS rotational employees.

Produced by HSF in August 2022

Head of Mission Posts Held by Women
As of August 16, 2022 

23. Broken down by year and by stream, what percentage of diplomatic postings abroad were occupied by non-career foreign service officers over the past 20 years? Which posts specifically were occupied by such individuals?

Please refer to Annex A.

24. On average, how many years after joining the foreign service is a new foreign officer posted abroad for the first time?

Newly recruited personnel are required to complete their training and gain experience at headquarters before being posted abroad.  The number of years at HQ prior to a first posting can vary depending on numerous factors, from operational needs to employee interests.

25. Is there a probationary period for newly hired foreign service officers? If so, how long?

Newly hired foreign service officers external to the public administration are on probation for one year.

Retention and Attrition

26. Over the past 20 years, what percentage of Canadian foreign service officers have left the department after less than five years of service, after less than 10 years, and after a first posting abroad?

See note 5

27. What percentage of foreign service officers have resigned following extended foreign language training? What percentage has resigned following training in a language considered difficult to learn? Which languages?

Since 2014, 72 foreign service officers have resigned.  Of those, 1 foreign service officer had a foreign language training assignment during the four years preceding resignation. The language learned was Spanish.

28. What percentage of foreign service officers must complete foreign language training before a posting? In which languages? What percentage has successfully completed foreign language training? What percentage has not?

In the last 5 years, 341 employees - representing 16% of all assignees to all positions abroad -  were assigned to intensive foreign language training ahead of a posting in a designated position.  Note that a third of all GAC positions abroad (433 of 1297) are designated as requiring foreign language proficiency.

In the last 5 years, 70% of employees who received foreign language training ahead of a posting reached the target level within the established training duration.

Training per Language Delivered in the last 5 years

29. Does GAC conduct exit interviews with foreign service officers resigning from GAC? If so, what are the main reasons cited as contributing to their departures?

Managers are strongly encouraged to conduct exit interviews and GAC provides them with tools and resources to support such discussions.  On average between 70% to 75% of departures are employees who leave for retirement and 20% to 25% for career development.

30. Broken down by year and by stream, how many foreign service officers have resigned or retired from GAC in the past 20 years?

Data source: HRMS by Fiscal Year

Note: Foreign service officers are defined as CBS rotational employees.

Produced by HSF in August 2022

31. Broken down by year, what has been the attrition rate in the foreign service over the past 20 years?

Data Source: HRMS extracted on July 31, 2022

Note: Foreign service officers are defined as CBS rotational employees.

Produced by HSF in August 2022

Conditions of Foreign Service 

32. Over the past 20 years, apart from repatriation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, what percentage of foreign service officers has ended a posting abroad prematurely? What are the main reasons cited for ending a posting prematurely?

Premature departures vary greatly each year.  On average, between 20 to 30 employees annually end their posting abroad prematurely.  However, this number can grow in situations of staff evacuations.  The main reasons for the premature departure from mission are personal (family or medical reasons) or because of a significant change in local context.

33. How often are the Foreign Service Directives reviewed? What role is played by each stakeholder? Are foreign service officers consulted during the review? If so, how?

The Foreign Service Directives (FSD) are co-developed by participating bargaining agents and public service employers, lead by Treasury Board Secretariat, at the National Joint Council (NJC) of the Public Service of Canada.

Like other Directives, the FSDs are deemed to be part of collective agreements between the parties to the NJC, and as such, undergo regular review.  In the last twenty years, the FSDs were reviewed five times, with negotiated updates in effect in 1993, 2002, 2009, 2013 and 2019.  The next cyclical review is being planned for 2022.

FSD Cyclical Review Process:

All employees who serve abroad, including foreign service officers, have an opportunity to voice their opinions in advance of the cyclical review.  Bargaining agents solicit the views of their members as the unions determine their negotiation position.  Departments, including ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ, also seek out employee and hiring managers’ views in barriers to recruitment, retention and posting of qualified people abroad.   This informs the proposals GAC champions as the employer side establishes their negotiating position.

34. The 1981 McDougall report on the conditions of foreign service listed several issues regarding spouses of foreign service officers. For example, the report recognized that spouses carry a large “burden of adjustment on every move;” that the rotational system demanded that accompanying spouses give up their careers; and that the rotational system prevented accompanying spouses from accessing unemployment insurance and government pension plans. What percentage of accompanying spouses are currently employed in the country where they are posted? In which countries has this been possible and in which has it not been possible? How many reciprocal spousal employment agreements are in place with other countries and international organizations? What services and benefits are offered to accompanying spouses to support them in their own careers?

Opportunities that are available for accompanying spouses vary significantly depending on numerous factors including their own work experiences. Spouses who are public servant employees are considered as entitled to appointment in priority to all persons when they leave their position to accompany their spouse.  These spouses can apply to positions within the public service, including at GAC, and/or be employed on a telework agreement.  If both are rotational employees, effort is made to post them to the same mission abroad.  To enable spouses to seek work in local economies, GAC has negotiated reciprocal employment arrangements for 90 countries. Spouses could also seek contract employment directly with the mission when opportunities are available, and based on merit and non partisanship.  The Department does not track data on spousal employment.

Under the FSDs, accompanying spouses can receive some financial assistance under FSD 17 – Assistance for Spouses or Common-Law Partners. The employer provides specific financial assistance to spouses or common-law partners to assist them in securing employment at post, or upon return to Canada to facilitate re-entry into the Canadian workforce. Expenses covered include membership dues in professional associations, employment counselling, professional CV development, and, in limited instances, professional retraining up to $1,000. 

35. The 1981 McDougall report identified that spouses of heads of missions were “unpaid employee[s] of the Canadian government.” Currently, what role are accompanying spouses, particularly spouses of heads of missions, expected to play while posted abroad? / En 1981, le rapport McDougall a souligné que les conjoints des chefs de mission étaient des « employés non rémunérés du gouvernement canadien ». À l’heure actuelle, quel rôle les conjoints accompagnateurs, notamment les conjoints des chefs de mission, doivent-ils jouer lorsqu’ils sont affectés à l’étranger ?

Spouses, including spouses of Heads of mission are not required to play an official role.

36. On average over the past 20 years, what percentage of foreign service officers posted abroad were posted with a non-foreign service officer spouse? Which countries? What percentage of foreign services officers were posted alongside a spouse who was also a foreign service officer? What percentage of foreign service officers posted abroad were single? What percentage of foreign service officers posted abroad were single parents? Please provide gender disaggregated data where possible.

See note 5

37. Has the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in new standard operating procedures regarding duty of care and practical application of the Foreign Service Directives?

Global Affairs continually strives to administer the FSDs in a manner that is employee-focussed, consistent with the intent of the negotiated provisions, all while maintaining the appropriate financial controls expected of a $170-million-dollar program. In the few instances that there is deputy head or managerial discretion identified within the directives, these are applied in a fair, impartial manner to assist both employees and the department.

The challenges brought on by the global impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic affected all aspects of our employees’ lives abroad.  Local pandemic conditions, including health care, differed widely from those in Canada, air routes from postings were severely disrupted, and the global shipping industry delayed delivery of the household effects of employees.   Where the negotiated Directives could alleviate the challenges employees faced during the pandemic, the provisions were applied, and any departmental discretion was utilized to appropriately minimize impact. 

For example, when relocating employees to/from/between posts, authorities were invoked to ensure employees were provided with as much flexibility required at the time as possible. Examples of COVID-related adjustments are:

• Coverage of quarantine expenses, not anticipated within the FSDs;
• Modified shipping methods to provide employees with options that take into consideration the impact the pandemic on the shipping industry;
• Increased allowance for extra baggage for employees going to/from/between posts;
• Increased the number of employees who would qualify for air shipment of household effects due to shipping delays;
• Employees were provided assistance to purchase essential items when their shipments of household effects were significantly delayed;
• Official routings were established to eliminate stop-overs where possible to ensure more direct travel to post;
• Official routings were updated regularly to include alternate options due to the impact COVID 19 has had on the airline industry;
• Costs covered to ensure employees could travel to get the COVID 19 vaccine, if required;
• Reimbursed costs of mandatory COVID 19 testing for relocation travel;
• Reimbursed costs of mandatory COVID 19 testing in schools;
• Amended internal policy to allow more flexibility on the cost of airfare tickets for family reunification travel.

38. Have any duty of care adjustments been made because of “Havana Syndrome”?

The safety and security of Government of Canada staff and dependents is ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s top priority.

Following reports of unexplained health symptoms in the spring of 2017 by Canadian diplomats and families posted to Havana, Cuba, a number of adjustments have been made to GAC policies and protocols to respond to the unexplained health incidents (UHI).

In April 2018, the Embassy of Canada to Cuba was designated as a ‘non-accompanied’ post and all dependent family members were removed from Cuba.

Though the causes of UHI remain unknown, a series of mitigation measures have been put in place at the Embassy of Canada to Cuba in line with the potential causes being investigated.

All GAC staff completing official visits, temporary duty assignments or postings to Cuba require baseline medical assessments targeted to the duration of their stay, and participate in a mandatory health and security briefing prior to departure.

Following reports of unexplained health incidents by American diplomats in multiple locations around the world, on October 7^th 2021, a broadcast message to all staff was issued which outlined the symptoms of UHI and how to report. In addition, briefing sessions on UHI were delivered to all Assistant Deputy Ministers, Heads of Mission, and interdepartmental partners and co-locators within GAC’s mission network abroad. Training modules are being delivered on a regular basis to program managers and others departing on posting.

¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ maintain security and health protocols to respond immediately to any unusual events or health symptoms affecting Canadian diplomats and their families around the world.

GAC, the RCMP and other agencies are cooperating with the U.S. government to exchange information on medical collaboration, our respective investigations, and on detection and mitigation measures.

Mission Network

39. Please provide a detailed list, organized by regions of the world, regarding each mission and office that Canada currently operates globally. This should include the number of employees at each mission and office along with the titles of their positions.

Please refer to Annex B.

40. How many co-location agreements does Canada have with other countries as part of its diplomatic network? In which countries does Canada co-locate its diplomatic offices with Athose of other countries?

Please refer to Annex C.

41. In which countries does Canada operationalize consular sharing agreements or memoranda of understanding with other countries?

Please refer to Annex C.

42. During her appearance before the committee on June 9, 2022, Marta Morgan, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that Canada’s network of missions abroad supports the international work of 21 other federal departments, three Crown corporations, six provincial governments, six foreign governments, and some international organizations. Please provide a detailed list of the federal, provincial, and international partners using Canada’s network of missions abroad.

Please refer to Annex C.

Amalgamation of DFAIT and CIDA

43. How has GAC’s organizational structure and governance framework changed since the 2013 amalgamation?

Following the decision to amalgamate the Department of Foreign Affairs and the International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 2013, the two departments were integrated into a single organizational structure. In support of this integration, the new department’s corporate governance model was also merged into a single corporate governance structure, comprised of three level 1 committees (led by deputy ministers) and four level 2 committees (led by assistant deputy ministers). All committees brought together expertise and perspectives of senior managers from across the three business lines, and included representatives from headquarters and the mission network, with the goal of ensuring internal coherence.

In 2019, GAC undertook a review of the corporate governance committee structure to confirm its effectiveness, efficiency and strength as a mechanism for informed decision-making and accountability.

The new structure, which remains in place today, includes two deputy minister-chaired committees (Executive Committee and Performance Measurement Evaluation Committee), as well an external Departmental Audit Committee.  Five ADM-chaired committees report to Executive Committee (Security Committee, Financial & Operations Management Committee, Corporate Management Committee, Policy & Programs Committee, and the Diversity and Inclusion Council). This governance structure is designed to provide strategic direction and advice on all areas of policy, programming, planning, and the management of resources of the department.

44. How is the department evaluating the degree to which policy coherence has improved, or not, since the amalgamation?

¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ is conducting a series of four geographical coherence evaluations in order to provide an assessment of the extent to which each geographical branch operates in a coherent manner and to examine the factors that either foster or hinder the ability of streams to collaborate when mandates and outcomes are shared. The department has completed the evaluations of the Africa (WGM), Americas (NGM), and Asia Pacific (OGM) branches, and has recently begun the evaluation of the Europe, Arctic, Middle East & Maghreb (EGM) branch. These evaluations will be followed by a meta-analysis of coherence across the entire department in 2024. Five key factors have been identified as enabling or impeding coherence; these include: Policy and Priority Alignment; Organizational Structure; Branch Leadership; Corporate Systems; and Capacity & Expertise. Of these, Branch Leadership and Capacity & Expertise have been found to have the greatest impact on coherence.

Specific to policy coherence, alignment across international policies and priorities set by the Department were found to be promoting a coherent approach to programming. This was particularly true of the Feminist Foreign Policy and the Feminist International Assistance Policy that linked several priority areas, including gender equality. These policies were found to be supported by a cross-cutting GBA+ approach. It was also found that common priorities articulated across international policies presented opportunities for cross-stream collaboration.

Diplomacy that is Fit-for-Purpose

45. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Briefing Book from October 2021 notes that GAC intends to “move away from the traditional bricks and mortar and embrace more modem engagement methods to drive diplomacy, trade and international development.” What are some of these “modern engagement methods”?

• ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ has an initiative underway called The Future of Diplomacy: Transforming ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ. This includes targeting aspects of our organizational capacity and policy framework with the aim to modernize and strengthen GAC’s capacity to engage globally so that the department remains well equipped to fulfill its mandates in the long term, in a rapidly changing world.
• GAC is not moving away from bricks and mortar, but rather adjusting towards a hybrid model that provides our users the flexibility they need to optimize service delivery on an international scale. The post-pandemic environment is increasingly complex, volatile and challenging: there are new actors and technologies, a rules-based international system at an inflection point, and global issues intrinsically linked to domestic issues. We are increasingly being asked to respond to situations and events that are without precedent using tools, structures and processes designed for a different time.
• GAC’s vision is to position Canada as a global leader through digital enablement and service optimization. Focusing on digital innovation and the sorts of operational optimizations that this innovation enables, GAC has developed a Departmental Plan on Service and Digital (DPSD) as a blueprint to strengthen GAC from the ground up to meet this challenge. The Plan aims to improve how we deliver our services, empower our workforce, and secure our foundation to set a new standard in digitally enabled foreign services, including diplomacy, trade, international development and consular services.
• The digital age has significantly changed the way diplomats interact with one another. Information spreads quickly through social media, which has created unique competition on the international stage. Today’s foreign services are vying for virtual influence, which is part of the reason why GAC is making targeted investments in digital.
• The introduction of digital technologies into the field of international relations has changed the way Canada’s diplomats work. Instead of spending hours in airplanes and hotels, they are now able to communicate with their counterparts by leveraging the internet. The availability of mobile, digital collaboration, and communication tools allows for greater productivity and work flexibility. This shift has prompted a near revolution in scheduling habits and work behaviour, expanding what is possible in terms of diplomatic engagement.

46. How has the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the way GAC engages internationally?

Adjustment to Local conditions and Management efforts

Given ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ (GAC)’s international portfolio, the department was required to react to COVID-19 before it even began to cross Canadian borders. Starting in January 2020, an overarching governance was established to support the business continuity plan and subsequent phased process for the easing of restrictions and workplace reintegration while ensuring adjustment to local conditions in Canada and abroad.

A COVID-19 Task Force composed of assistant deputy ministers and other senior officials was established to lead coordination efforts and provide oversight for GAC’s recovery operations related to the COVID-19 crisis, including decision-making on a broad range of human resources management issues impacting the department’s workforce. Its work focused on the stabilization of GAC’s network, in Canada and abroad, including physical return to workplaces and support for employees working remotely. It integrated relevant policy, employee engagement as well as health, safety and well-being considerations. Matters that were referred to the COVID-19 Task Force for decision included, but were not limited to: the lifting of Foreign Service Directive (FSD) 64 (emergency evacuation) with respect to certain missions and the return of employees in accordance with FSD15; the reintegration of employees to the chancery; approval of decision processes related to assignments in the COVID context; approval of a decision process for vulnerable employees and dependants either evacuated under FSD64 or at mission.

The work of the COVID-19 Task Force also informed additional sub-committees.

• Ad hoc: COVID-19 ADM Committee, Mission Posture Review Committee
• Operational: Occupational Health and Safety Policy Committee (OHSPC); All-hazard Response and Recovery Committee (ARRC)
• Corporate Governance: Corporate Management Committee (CMC); Security Committee (SecCom)

With respect to repatriation efforts for Canada-based staff (CBS) and their dependants at the onset of the pandemic, GAC facilitated access to Health Canada's information on vulnerability criteria for the local mission posture, including criteria for individuals at risk of sever consequences due to COVID, to enable individuals to make informed decisions based on perceived risks to their health. COVID-19 scenarios and medical emergency procedures were also established to ensure the safety of CBS and locally engaged staff (LES).

To support missions, GAC also created the Human Resources Emergency Response Team that was responsible for providing managers and employees with guidance and information on matters related to human resources and COVID-19. GAC also developed guides and tools to support missions abroad which were based on TBS guidelines and the Public Service Occupational Health Program’s General Occupational Health Advisory (COVID-19).

Duty of Care for CBS and LES

As prescribed in the Canada Labour Code, GAC was required to ensure the safety of its CBS and LES employees. Established governance structures, such as those described above, exist to address health and safety matters.

GAC developed a protocol in conjunction with the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) in order to ensure that it was able to evacuate CBS abroad with severe COVID-19 illness. 24/7 case management support was offered to CBS abroad and their families for all critical health incidents and medical events.

In the spring 2021, a Vaccination Team was established at GAC. The team’s mandate was to coordinate a large-scale COVID vaccination campaign for CBS posted abroad, their dependants and LES. This included facilitating access to vaccines for CBS and dependants when in Canada, in collaboration with the Department of National Defence, as well as coordinating the distribution of vaccines where Health Canada-approved vaccines were not available locally (for CBS and LES). The first distribution was completed by June 2021 and subsequent phases happened in the fall of 2021 (including primary series, boosters and pediatrics vaccines). GAC also coordinated PCR testing at missions abroad as part of requirements set by local authorities in some countries. A Voluntary COVID-19 Rapid Antigen Testing Program was also introduced at missions to help stop the spread of COVID-19 at missions abroad, including CBS and LES.

The Foreign Directives

The Foreign Service Directives are co-developed by participating bargaining agents and public service employers, led by TBS, at the National Joint Council of the Public Service of Canada.  The provisions are designed to provide a system of allowances, benefits and conditions of employment that, in combination with salary, will enable departments and agencies to recruit, retain and deploy qualified employees in support of government programs outside Canada.

¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ administers the negotiated benefits to its employees posted abroad, along with those of 23 Partner Departments.  Most provisions, like other elements of collective agreements, do not provide an option for discretion, alternative interpretations, or an augmentation of the benefits provided.  However, some of the provisions do allow a narrow amount of Managerial Discretion, or provide the Deputy head of Foreign Affairs some authorities, typically subject to the concurrence of an interdepartmental committee.  Additionally, there is a Special Authority ($10k) delegated to the Deputy head, that can be used to cover some costs to employees resulting from Foreign Service that are not contemplated or prohibited in the text of the Directives.

GAC was as flexible as it could be in administering the FSDs to its employees during COVID, noting the above constraints in authorities.

Evacuation: Almost 500 employees and dependents were evacuated under emergency provisions of the Directives.  Typically, the financial support is provided for up to one month; two months exceptionally.  Given the uncertainty of the progression of the pandemic, the support was provided for up to 6 months to provide employees with peace of mind as the situation evolved.

Relocation: When relocating employees to/from/between posts during the pandemic many internal procedures were adapted to ensure employees were provided with the flexibly required at the time.  

• GAC made use of the Special Authority provided to the Deputy Head that allowed them to cover additional necessary costs such as hotel quarantine and testing during relocation.
• Managerial discretion was applied to provide more employees with air shipments, with funding for additional baggage, as well as with an additional allowance for essential items when the global shipping industry shortages resulted in significant delays of household effects.
• Given the impact on air travel, GAC used its authority to apply flexibility to facilitate employee’s travel, including eliminating previously required stopovers, to minimize COVID exposure and risk to employees.
• Shipping methods were modified to provide employees with options that take into consideration the impact the pandemic had on the shipping industry.
• Additional flexibilities were given to support employees in temporary accommodations upon relocation to the NCR, in light of the difficulty in viewing properties, in finding accommodations, and in removing tenants from their principal residences.
• Applied additional flexibility for employees departing for post from the NCR, given the delays in obtaining passports, and visas as the impact of the pandemic affected these service standards.

Support to COVID19 Vaccine Administration: Supported the Departmental effort by using authorities to financially support vaccine clinics, and travel to neighboring posts to receive COVID 19 vaccine.

Quarantine requirements: GAC continues to provide support for employees who are subject to quarantine restrictions related to COVID 19. By making use of the Special Authority provided to the Deputy Head, the FSDs cover approved quarantine costs for mandatory quarantine following FSD-related travel. 

FSD-related travel

GAC sought and received approval to provide flexibly to employees who were posted in countries with travel restrictions allowing us to administer funds for post travel assistance in unusual circumstances.

All this while remaining within the Code of Value and Ethics for the Public Service and within departmental authorities.

The virtual/hybrid model

On March 13, 2020, in response to the pandemic, TBS guided federal employees to work remotely as long as their position/responsibilities allowed it. With a departmental telework policy already in place prior to the pandemic, various tools and resources were already made available to employees as part of the hazard prevention program to mitigate potential health and safety risk associated with telework. While some employees already had the necessary tools to perform their work from a distance, others required basic office equipment to work remotely on a longer-term basis. Virtual technology was prioritized instead of in-person attendance/travel in order to mitigate any risk of possible exposure to COVID-19. 

With respect to remote work equipment at missions abroad, GAC implemented risk mitigation measures for the provision of equipment designated by their program managers to work from home. For LES, the provision of equipment for use at home was supported when the HOM has deemed it essential for the continued operations of critical services. With respect to critical services remaining on site and the return to work plan, GAC has implemented a number of preventive measures and safe work practices in alignment with its obligations under Part II of the Canada Labour Code and based on the hierarchy of hazard controls.

Over the course of the pandemic, GAC also purchased infection prevention supplies (i.e. hand sanitizer, gloves, non-medical masks, etc.) for employees.

New training and awareness materials were developed and communicated to all employees to promote safe work practices related to working in the office and remote work during the pandemic. All of these measures have significantly limited the impact on our operational services and business lines abroad, while ensuring the health, safety and wellbeing of our workforce.

47. Is the department considering modifying the current allocation of resources at missions abroad considering how diplomacy was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic? Are there potential savings involved (e.g. virtual consultations in lieu of travel)?

• With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada’s missions abroad and regional offices acted swiftly to adapt their activities in a way that prioritized the health, safety and well-being of our workforce while ensuring excellence in delivering services to Canadians.
• A number of good practices were put in place during the pandemic when in-person engagement was not possible, such as virtual ministerial visits and virtual capital-to-capital engagement or bilateral consultations.
• Virtual meetings have also allowed GAC to expand engagement with officials and stakeholders in places that are remote, costly, or dangerous to visit in person.
• Many of Canada’s diplomatic missions abroad resumed in-person operations in 2021 with the realization that although the virtual world can offer opportunities and benefits for modern diplomatic practice, it is unable to fully replace in-person interactions. And this is furthermore true in regions where remote work and virtual options are not an option for local stakeholders.
• Although the pandemic made some aspects of diplomacy more accessible, it also highlighted gaps in digital access, technology and systems as not all stakeholders are equally equipped to participate in virtual settings.
• Furthermore, diplomats have emphasized the importance of face-to-face interactions for consensus building, cultivating innovation and creativity, fostering trust and networks, finding pathways for informal knowledge sharing, specifically around sensitive topics, for monitoring projects and providing services to Canadians abroad.
• Moving forward, the department is working to strike the right balance between maintaining the benefits of virtual engagement while acknowledging the continued critical importance of physical proximity for the conduct of diplomacy. This includes working on the implementation of a hybrid model for positions in Canada, while maintaining a primarily in person-based approach in Canada’s missions abroad.

48. What specific tools, in particular virtual platforms, has GAC developed or relied upon since the COVID-19 pandemic began to support Canada’s diplomatic, trade, and development objectives internationally?

• The main virtual platform GAC implemented during the pandemic to enable international communications, collaboration and productivity is Microsoft 365. This digital platform includes key applications, such as MS Teams, SharePoint and OneDrive, that permit our users to securely conduct video and voice meetings, share and collaborate on documents from anywhere at any time. It continues to be used by up to 15,500 users (including GAC and partner departments), globally, and has been deemed a ‘mission critical’ system for the department in supporting diplomatic, trade and development objectives internationally. While M365 is the primary platform, there are additional products in the collaboration space which include Webex, and standards-based video conferencing.
• Another important virtual platform rolled out during the pandemic includes Microsoft Dynamics. This platform hosts some key applications such as ORBIS, which is GAC’s new consular and emergency case management system. ORBIS is now the core system that will help our network of officers at missions and Headquarters respond to consular and emergency management situations around the globe. Another MS Dynamics application that has been launched and is currently under broader roll-out includes ECHO, which is a client relationship management system for heads of mission (HOMs) and Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Service (FPDS) teams. Work is also underway to replace the department’s aging Grants and Contributions management system, using M365 and Dynamics, to implement more collaborative and transparent tools in support of program delivery and leverage GAC’s data and analytics platform to enable results-based decision-making. These tools will also help reduce administrative burden and ensure financial stewardship.
• GAC’s Data & Analytics Platform has also been partially rolled out with the deployment of Power BI, which is collection of software services, apps and connectors that work together to turn unrelated sources of data into coherent, visually immersive and interactive insights. These insights directly support Canada’s diplomatic, trade and development objectives internationally when it comes to improving data driven decision making.
• GAC modernized the mission critical New Export Import Control System (NEICS) and New Export Controls On-line (NEXCOL) applications that support the implementation and management of the Minister’s responsibilities under the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA). The EIPA covers military, dual-use and strategic goods and technology, as well as trade-managed commodities such as agriculture products, softwood lumber/logs, clothing and textile products and steel. These upgraded client-facing trade controls IT systems provide increased business agility, increased service resilience and reliability as well as modern online services for Canadians.
• GAC has also invested in a project called the Virtual Mission Model in order to modernize the international data network and build a secure, cloud-capable, and collaboration-friendly architecture, while enabling digital culture across the Government of Canada internationally. Feedback from international missions is positive. The solution is deployed to 21 international missions to date, and there are plans to continue that momentum over the coming months.
• GAC’s Digital Strategy was developed with the core purpose of modernizing ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ’s operations to ensure that Canada maintains pace with global leaders who have been increasingly investing heavily in digital innovation, and GAC has plans to continue to transform the way Canada delivers these key services internationally. GAC understands that this is more than a technology implementation, but is also a transformative undertaking, which will modernize how it works.

Interdepartmental Coordination

49. How does GAC coordinate with other federal departments that have international divisions, responsibilities, or mandates? With which departments does GAC coordinate?

Most of the policy issues facing the Government of Canada feature an international dimension. As a result, interdepartmental coordination on international issues, within government, takes place on an ongoing basis, at multiple levels, and through a variety of both dedicated and ad hoc mechanisms. Most departments and agencies, and certainly all major ones, have various connection points with ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ in this context.

• At a framework level and in pursuit of its mandate, ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ prepares analysis and advice to contribute to the advancement of multilateral, international, regional and bilateral foreign affairs, trade and international development priorities. It regularly disseminates and consults on these analyses with other departments, with a view to fostering awareness, seeking inputs, and ensuring policy coherence.
• In certain cases, high-profile or deeply cross-cutting international issues (e.g., engaging with the United States, responding to the war in Ukraine, advancing the Sustainable Development Goals, etc.) benefit from dedicated senior-officials coordination tables, chaired or co-chaired by ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ and other departments/agencies (e.g., Privy Council Office). In other cases, ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ may convene departments in pursuit of key foreign policy priorities (e.g., feminist foreign policy).
• Coordination efforts can also heighten in the lead up to major international engagements or milestones (e.g., G7, G20, United Nations General Assembly, World Trade Organization ministerial meetings, free-trade agreement negotiations, etc.), with dedicated coordination tables at times established to cover the life-time of an initiative.
• There is also a long-standing practice of structured interdepartmental engagement, which ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ can either convene or participate in, as departments prepare proposals for Cabinet consideration.
• Finally, on a day-to-day basis, more ad hoc coordination happens at various levels, from desk officer upwards, directly between departments and ¶¶ÒùÊÓƵ staff who have responsibility for a particular geographic area, functional/thematic sector of activity (e.g., migration, human rights, health, environment, etc.), or organization.

The following are the Interdepartmental committees in which the International Platform Branch manages. Other Branches within GAC may have their own interdepartmental committees.

Interdepartmental Working Group on Common Services Abroad

The Interdepartmental Working Group on Common Services Abroad (IWGCSA) is the first-level common services abroad governance structure that reports and is accountable to the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) Council on Representation Abroad.  Committee membership is at the Director-level and representatives from other government departments, co-locators (provinces, crown corporations) and GAC participate as members. 

Objectives

• To undertake initiatives identified by the ADM Council on Representation Abroad
• To manage the administrative mechanisms that guide the delivery of common services abroad—for example, the Interdepartmental Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Operations and Support at Mission, the Service Delivery Standards and the Cost Recovery Framework
• To provide advice and recommendations to the ADM Council on Representation Abroad
• To serve as the formal dispute resolution body for disputes related to the MO
• To serve as an interdepartmental forum for exchanging information relevant to its membership

The International Platform Branch coordinates with other federal departments that leverage GACs platform abroad through informal meetings as well as more formal governance meetings such as the Interdepartmental Working Group on Common Services Abroad, Missions Committee and The Interdepartmental ADM Council on Representation Abroad who’s mandates are included below. The following federal departments, provinces and Crown Corporations are members of the Platform’s governance bodies:

Clients External to GAC

Missions committee

Mandate

The Missions Committee (MC) is a senior operational committee, the mandate at which is to provide strategic direction & oversight for broad resources & policy issues concerning the mission Network.

It deals with Network policy questions at a strategic level, enhances coherence, provides alignment with Government of Canada priorities and deals with issues affecting missions and the Network as a whole. MC may recommend bringing issues to corporate governance committees such as the Corporate Management Committee (CMC).

Key Responsibilities

• Ensures that resource management & initiatives affecting the Network support Government of Canada goals & objectives.
• Ensures resource management processes for the mission Network are transparent.
• Provides analysis, advice and recommendations to senior management regarding planning & managing change to the Network.
• Provides initial vetting of initiatives related to the resourcing and management of the mission Network before presentation to the corporate governance committees CMC.

The Interdepartmental ADM Council on Representation Abroad

Mandate

• The ADM Council is a senior inter-departmental committee with the mandate of providing strategic direction and oversight for broad resources and policy issues concerning the mission Network and is essential for good governance between Network Partners.
• Dealing with Network policy questions at a strategic level, enhancing coherence, providing alignment with Government of Canada plans and priorities, and dealing with issues affecting missions and the Network as a whole.
• Exchanging information, seeking consensus, advising on the effective and coordinated delivery of common services, including the nature of services, related programs and policies, review of the Interdepartmental MOU, and service standards designed to enable Canada’s representation abroad.
• Support endorsement of new cost recovery rates associated with the provision of common services in the Network, to ensure a sustainable, well-maintained collective International Platform. This includes changes resulting in mass deletions, major downsizing, and financial decisions that could affect the delivery of common services abroad.

Membership

Permanent Members

1. ADM, International Platform Branch (ACM - GAC) – Chair
2. ADM, Operations, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) – Deputy Chair
3. Chief Financial Officer and Comptroller (IRCC)
4. ADM, Sub-Saharan Africa Branch (WGM)
5. ADM, Europe, Artic, Middle East and Maghreb Branch (EGM)
6. ADM, Americas Branch (NGM)
7. ADM, Asia Pacific Branch (OGM)
8. ADM, Consular, Security and Legal Adviser (JFM - GAC)
9. ADM, Chief Trade Commissioner (BFM-GAC)
10. ADM, Human Resources Branch (HCM)
11. ADM, Corporate Planning, Finance & IT Branch (SCM)
12. ADM, Consular, Security & EM Branch (CFM)
13. ADM, Global Issues & Development Branch (MFM)
14. Deputy Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
15. Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence (DND)
16. Assistant Secretary, International Affairs, Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS)
17. ADM, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and Canadian Food Inspection Agency (AAFC/CFIA)
18. Vice-President, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
19. Vice President International Business Development, Export Development Canada (EDC)
20. Deputy Chief, Corporate Services, Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
21. ADM, Strategy, Shared Services Canada (SSC)
22. ADM, Public Safety Canada (SOLGEN)
23. Canadian Provinces
24. ADM, Government of Alberta (AB)
25. ADM, Government of Ontario (ON)
26. ADM, Government of Quebec (QC)
27. ADM, Government of British Columbia (BC)
28. ADM, Government of Saskatchewan (SK)

GAC Experts

• Director General, Client Relations and Missions Operations (AFD)
• Director, Client Relations Division (AFR)
• Director General, Chief Information Officer (SID)
• Director General and Deputy Chief Financial Officer (SWD)
• Director General, Physical Resources Bureau (ARD)
• Special Advisor (ACM)
• Director General, Locally Engaged Staff (HLD)
• Director General, FSD Administration Bureau (HED)

50. How many GAC employees, specifically foreign service officers, and at what level, are currently seconded to or are under interchange agreements with other departments and agencies? How many employees from other departments and agencies are currently seconded to or are under interchange agreements with GAC?

Data source: HRMS as of July 31, 2022

Note: Foreign service officers are defined as CBS rotational employees.

Produced by HSF in August 2022

51. Over the past 20 years, broken down by year, how many GAC employees, specifically foreign service officers, and at what level, have been seconded to or have been under interchange agreements with other departments and agencies?

Please refer to Annex D.

52. Over the past 20 years, broken down by year, how many employees from other departments and agencies have been seconded to or have been under interchange agreements with GAC?

Please refer to Annex D.